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Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity: Japanese Education in Manchukuo, 
1931-1945 
 
Andrew Reed Hall, Ph.D. 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
This study investigates the creation and implementation of elementary and 
secondary education policy for Chinese-language schools by Japanese officials in the 
puppet state of Manchukuo.  Using Manchukuo textbooks, education journals, and 
post-war memoirs, it examines the background of the policy-makers, the nature of the 
ideology they constructed, and the role language played in dissemination of the 
ideology.   
 The study traces the efforts by the Japanese officials to create a new 
“Manchurian” national consciousness which they hoped would replace Chinese 
nationalistic identity among the majority Han Chinese.  Originally they tried to shape 
this identity by employing familiar Chinese models which they expected would mask 
Japanese control.  They used Confucian terminology and appeals to historical 
precedents to try to legitimize the creation of an independent northeastern state.  In 
time, however, the weight of Japanese demands for empire-wide ideological orthodoxy 
  viii 
led the Manchukuo leaders to abandon the Chinese models, and instead portray the 
state as client, dependent on the Japanese Emperor and in need of an injection of 
Japan’s superior culture.  Leading Japanese officials began to support forcing the 
Chinese to follow Japanese linguistic and ceremonial forms in hopes that it would cause 
them to appreciate and even willingly support the Japanese effort towards creating a 
unified Greater East Asia.  In other words, their goals changed from securing an 
acquiescent population to creating willing allies, an effort in which they were ultimately 
unsuccessful. 
While the Manchukuo education bureaucracy supported the shift towards an 
emphasis on the Japanese language, as late as 1943 they resisted attempts at filling the 
curriculum with Japanese militaristic and imperial material, defying the current trend in 
Japan and Korea.  This resistance was lead by a group of Japanese educators 
who were participants in the liberal “New Education movement” of the 1920s, who 
found in Manchukuo an opportunity to implement school reforms which had become 
impossible in the increasingly conservative atmosphere in Japan.  Their success at 
keeping militaristic elements at bay demonstrates the Japanese empire was less 
monolithic than usually thought.   
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Chapter 1 
Setting the stage 
 
The creation of Manchukuo and the role of education 
On the evening of September 18, 1931, elements of the Japanese Kwantung 
(Guandong) Army stationed in Fengtian Province manufactured a clash with Chinese 
troops which led to their occupation of the entire Northeast China region.  The coup 
leaders acted in order to create a military base of operations and buffer zone against the 
Soviet Union, to protect existing Japanese economic interests from Chinese competition, 
and to secure the region as a source of future raw materials and industrial development.  
They then fabricated an indigenous autonomy movement as a pretext for the creation of 
a nominally independent state.  The new state of Manchukuo (in Chinese Manzhouguo, 
in Japanese Manshūkoku) was established on March 1, 1932, with the former Qing 
emperor Pu Yi as Head of State.  The Japanese government allowed the Kwantung 
Army to control Manchukuo as a virtual colony until the war’s end in 1945. 
 By creating a puppet state, the Kwantung Army opened a new chapter in 
Japan’s colonial experience.  In Japan’s formal colonies of Taiwan and Korea the 
populations were considered subjects of the Japanese Empire, and therefore all attempts 
at creating a national or cultural identity separate from Japan were automatically 
suspect (Ching 2001).  In Manchukuo, however, nominal independence created 
ideological breathing room, a freedom which some Japanese saw as an opportunity to 
create a new kind of culture and national identity.   
The largest-scale institution for disseminating the Japanese leadership’s vision 
for Manchukuo to the people was public education.  The region’s education system 
had been ravaged by the fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops from 1931 to 
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1934, and the Japanese put considerable effort into reopening the schools, reorganizing 
and expanding the system, and creating new curriculum content.  They hoped that by 
investing in the education system they could communicate a new state ideology, train a 
compliant class of collaborators, and gain public legitimacy. 
Some might ask why the Japanese bothered to create a state ideology and make 
an effort to reorganize and expand the school system when they had occupied the 
region primarily for strategic reasons.  While Japan’s initial military operations in East 
Asia were often marked by brutality, and open resistance was met with immediate and 
disproportionate suppression, indefinite large-scale military occupation was an 
expensive and unattractive option for Tokyo.  As in nearly all colonial regimes from 
ancient times, the Japanese relied on local leaders to act as their agents in the business 
of local administration.   
In the 20th century, however, the size of governments world-wide rose 
dramatically in colonial as well as independent regimes, which in turn created a 
demand for a larger number of educated workers to staff official posts.  Governments 
came to rely on public education to meet their increased staffing needs.  Benedict 
Anderson found a key aim of French educational policy in late -19th and early-20th 
century Indochina to be the production of “a carefully-calibrated quantum of 
French-speaking and French-writing Indochinese to serve as a politically reliable, 
grateful, and acculturated indigenous elite, filling the subordinate echelons of the 
colony’s bureaucracy and larger commercial enterprises” (Anderson 1991, 126).  This 
assessment closely matched the goals of the Japanese in Manchukuo.   
Naturally the public also recognized the new job opportunities, and also 
demanded improved public education to prepare their children.  If Manchukuo could 
  3 
not supply modern education on a scale as large as or larger than the previous regime, it 
would lose any chance it had for public legitimacy.   
 
Objectives of the study 
 This study has two major objectives: 1) to analyze the new “Manchurian” 
ideology that the Japanese officials hoped would replace Chinese nationalism among 
the majority Han Chinese, and to examine the implementation of the ideology in the 
country’s elementary and middle schools, and 2) to explore the range of opinions 
among Japanese in Manchukuo concerning this ideology, focusing on the resistance 
among a group of liberal educators toward the more assimilative and ultra-nationalistic 
policies of the Manchukuo government.   
Originally the Manchukuo leadership tried to shape a new Manchurian identity 
by employing familiar Chinese models which they expected would mask Japanese 
control.  They used Confucian terminology and appeals to historical precedents to try 
to legitimize the creation of an independent northeastern state.  In time, however, the 
weight of Japanese demands for empire-wide ideological orthodoxy led the Manchukuo 
leaders to abandon the Chinese models, and instead began emphasizing the state’s 
subservient relationship to Japan and need to adopt Japan’s culture.  The state’s 
leading Japanese officials began programs which tried to force the Chinese to follow 
Japanese linguistic and ceremonial forms, in hopes that these forms would cause the 
Chinese to appreciate and even willingly support the Japanese effort toward creating a 
unified Greater East Asia.  In other words, their goals changed from securing an 
acquiescent population to creating willing allies, an effort in which they were ultimately 
unsuccessful.   
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While the Manchukuo education bureaucracy supported the shift toward an 
emphasis on the Japanese language, they resisted attempts at filling the curriculum with 
Japanese militaristic and imperial material, a stand which went against the trend 
developing elsewhere in the empire.  This resistance was led by a group of Japanese 
educators who had long experience in the region, and who were participants in the 
liberal “New Education movement”.  The ideas of the movement had gained currency 
in Japan in the 1920s, but fell out of favor as the state and society moved to the right 
during the 1930s.  Among the items on their agenda were student-centered and 
hands-on teaching methods, an emphasis on practical and vocational learning over 
academicism, internationalism over nationalism, and the encouragement of individual 
talents over group conformity.  They saw in Manchukuo an opportunity to implement 
school reforms which had become impossible in the increasingly conservative 
atmosphere in Japan.  They spoke openly against the education and cultural trends 
occurring in Japan, such as the retreat from language reforms and the frequent use of 
ultra-nationalistic messages.  Although they were beaten back by 1945, in part 
because of their efforts Manchukuo never became the site the kind of extreme 
assimilative campaigns as occurred in wartime Korea and Taiwan.  The effort of these 
educators to create a unique and relatively liberal school system and their success at 
keeping militaristic elements at bay even after the Pacific War began demonstrates the 
Japanese empire was less monolithic than usually thought.   
Besides the two major aims of charting Manchukuo state ideology and 
exploring the diverse nature of opinion among Japanese colonial officials, this paper 
has two secondary aims: 1) examining the degree to which the Manchukuo leaders 
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achieved their goals, and 2) analyzing Japanese attitudes toward the role of language in 
colonial education.   
Just as the leadership engaged in an evolving dance between the goals of 
teaching a pro-Japanese message and of keeping the schools attractive to students, 
likewise Chinese students and their families faced the question of whether to attend 
schools sponsored by what many saw as an illegitimate government, or risk going 
without an education.  In the end the desire of the students and families for modern 
education took precedence, and the numbers attending the elementary and middle 
schools swelled.  Japan also apparently succeeded in convincing the population that 
outright rebellion was unwise, as after 1933 there were few major attacks on Japanese 
interests in Manchuria, and Guomindang and Communist organizers had little success 
organizing a resistance movement in the region after the Sino-Japanese War began in 
1938.  A preliminary survey of Manchukuo-era and post-war interviews of Chinese 
suggests, however, the Japanese failed to create a generation who were friendly to 
Japan, much less supportive of Japan’s imperial rule.   
Manchukuo provides a useful stage for examining Japanese attitudes toward 
language and its role in empire during the period.  After a preliminary period in which 
the Japanese language was not stressed in Manchukuo, the government joined an 
empire-wide shift to what might be called an “optimistic” view of the power of the 
Japanese language to instill loyalty in the hearts of non-Japanese Asians.  Despite 
generally approving of the shift, leading Manchukuo educators opposed the use of 
excessively chauvinistic and Japan-centered classroom materials, and supported 
Japanese language orthographic reform proposals which were becoming taboo subjects 
in Japanese society.  Their approach, which I call “reform optimism,” differed 
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significantly from education in colonial Taiwan and Korea, where by the 1930s the 
colonial governments disparaged nearly all aspects of the traditional local cultures and 
expected the people to see themselves as Japanese.  
   
Until recently, only the birth, death, and planned economy of Manchukuo have 
been subjects of historical study among Chinese, Japanese, and Western historians.  
Only in the last ten years have scholars begun to more deeply explore Manchukuo 
government and society during the years of relative calm.1  These new fields of study 
are important for two reasons.  First, Manchukuo was a watershed in Japan’s colonial 
experience.  It has often been noted that Japanese experimented with new economic 
models, architectural styles, railway engineering, and even legal forms, in Manchukuo, 
in the hopes of exporting the results to Japan and the rest of the empire.2  They also 
                                                          
1 Besides frequent studies of the Manchurian Incident and its diplomatic wake, there have also been 
numerous studies of the Kwantung Army’s attempts at creating a planned economy in the region, 
beginning with Joseph Schumpeter, and going up to recent studies by Ramon H. Myers and Takafusa 
Nakamura.  Among the recent major studies of Manchukuo’s government, ideology, and society in 
English are Y. Tak Matsusaka, “Managing Occupied Manchuria, 1931-1934,” in The Japanese Wartime 
Empire, 1931-1945, eds. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton University Press, 
1996); Lincoln Li, The China Factor in Modern Japanese Thought: The Case of Tachibana Shiraki, 
1881-1945 (State University of New York Press, 1996); Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: 
Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (University of California Press, 1998); Rana Mitter, 
The Manchurian Myth (University of California Press, 2000); Mariko Asano Tamanoi, “Knowledge, 
Power, and Racial Classifications: The ‘Japanese’ in ‘Manchuria,’” The Journal of Asian Studies, 59, no. 
2 (May 2000). 
 
2 For example attempts by Japanese to institute a colloquial legal code in Manchukuo, which they hoped 
would inspire imitation by lawmakers in Japan, is examined in Yasuda Toshiaki, “Nihongo hōritsu 
buntaigoka to ‘Manshūkoku’” Hitsotsubashi Ronshū, 128, no. 3 (Sept. 2002).  
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experimented with new colonial political forms, including increased local participation 
and limited acceptance of ethnic plurality, and applied the lessons learned in the regions 
it conquered after 1937.  To appreciate the Japanese imperial imagination after 1931, 
one must understand what happened in Manchukuo.  Second, in Manchukuo one can 
explore the development of government ideology and policy in a multi-ethnic society in 
which a minority group controls the levers of power.  This includes how the dominant 
group works to form a national identity which meets the demands of the hegemonic 
metropole ideology while still appealing to local interests, as well as a consideration of 
the place of language and historical memory as signifiers of identity.  The Manchukuo 
case provides a contrast to similar situations in apartheid-era South Africa and the 
non-Russian Soviet Republics. 
Chapter 1 provides a brief background of the region’s history, including the 
pre-1931 education policies of the Chinese provincial governments and local 
Japanese-run school systems.  In Chapter 2 the makeup of the Manchukuo education 
bureaucracy is outlined.  Changes in the bureaucracy’s leadership are traced using 
contemporary documents and post-war memoirs, and the question of how these changes 
impacted the direction of the country’s education is discussed.  Special attention is 
paid to the place of New Education movement thinkers in the education bureaucracy, 
and how they used Manchukuo as a laboratory for their ideas.  Chapter 3 includes a 
discussion of the creation and development of Manchukuo’s state ideology, using 
propaganda authored by the Manchukuo state and its supporters.  These documents 
demonstrate a change from an initially familiar Chinese model which emphasized good 
government based the Confucian concept of wangdao, or the “kingly way”, as well as 
ethnic equality, to one centered on loyalty to the Japanese Emperor and recognition of 
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Japanese superiority.  Chapter 4 aims to scrutinize Manchukuo’s Japanese language 
program, comparing it to language programs in other contemporary empires, and 
analyzes the competing positions among Japanese educators about the role language 
education should play in creating a supportive, even assimilated, population.  I am 
interested in the way faith in what some Japanese saw as the sacred nature of their 
language blinded them to the alienation their efforts caused among Chinese students.  
Finally, Chapter 5 features an analysis of elementary and middle school textbooks, 
which demonstrate the nature and changes in ideological messages in terms of teaching 
the students consciousness of Chinese, ‘Manchurian’, and Japanese history, culture, and 
language.  Along with the textbooks, the messages sent by rituals and other 
extra-classroom activities the schools required of their students are examined.  In both 
chapters 4 and 5 the reaction of Chinese students to their Manchukuo school 
experiences is briefly introduced, as ascertained by post-war interviews. 
Before beginning the examination of Manchukuo education, a review of the 
region’s history is in order.  Of particular interest for this study are 1) the long-term 
historical question of the region’s Chinese or non-Chinese identification, and 2) the 
more recent history of region’s modern schools and the Japanese presence.   
 
Manchuria and China 
 The territory originally occupied the by Kwantung Army in 1931 was a region 
known in the West and in Japan as “Manchuria”, and is usually called the “northeast” 
(Dongbei) by Chinese.  It is made up of the present-day provinces of Liaoning (also 
known as Fengtian or Liaodong), Jilin, and Heilongjiang.  A large central plain covers 
one third of the region, ringed by three mountain ranges.  To the east and north of the 
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plain are deeply forested areas, while high dry plateaus lie to the south and west.  The 
dominant central plain is well suited for agriculture, especially the area from 
Changchun down to the end of the Liaodong peninsula.  The vast majority of the 
population lived in rural villages on this central plain.  By 1934 the Kwantung Army 
also occupied Rehe province to the south-west and the eastern section of Inner 
Mongolia to the west, and integrated them into the newly created Manchukuo state, so 
that it covered over 380,000 square miles of territory.  
The region was controlled by a variety of peoples in the centuries before the 
Qing.  In ancient times Tungusic peoples created a series of small kingdoms which 
battled for control of the region with Chinese and Korean kingdoms, as well as northern 
Xiangnu, Kitan, and Mongol peoples.  In 1582 a Jurchen Tungusic chieftain named 
Nurgaci began a series of campaigns that by 1616 succeeded in gaining for his clan 
supremacy over the region later known as Manchuria.  In 1635 and 1636 his son Hung 
Taiji publicly transformed the khanate into an empire.  He invented the name Manchu, 
or Manzhou, as a new name for the Jurchen bannerman clans, and renamed his empire 
Qing.  In 1644 the Qing occupied Beijing, and after a period of consolidation 
conquered all of the former Ming Empire (Crossley 1997, 47-80).   
The term “Manchuria” is controversial, because some feel it implies a natural 
division from the rest of China.  The first known use of the word to refer to a 
geographical area, as opposed to an ethnicity, was by a Japanese mapmaker in the late 
1700s.  The use of the term as a toponym then spread to the West, and was even used 
by some Chinese in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Elliott 2000, 626-635).  
Whatever its name, Qing emperors from the time of Kangxi in the late 17th century 
encouraged a sense of separate space for the region.  For example the Kangxi emperor 
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sent an expedition to explore the region and establish the sites of historical and 
mythical events from the royal Aisin Gioro family’s past, and asked his Jesuit advisors 
to help complete a detailed map of the region.  The Qianlong emperor commissioned a 
history of the Manchu people, which emphasized differences between them and the 
Han, and later led the composition of the epic poem Ode to Mukden, which praised both 
the people and land of his ancestors. Apparently a major reason for these efforts was to 
facilitate a sense of ethnic identity among Manchu bannermen, who were by then 
scattered in garrison towns throughout the empire (Crossley 1997, 122-125, Elliot 2000, 
607-617).   
Another aspect of the Qing emperors’ efforts to cultivate Manchu ethnic identity 
was their efforts to keep Han Chinese from dominating the area.  As the Qing 
dispatched Manchu bannermen throughout their newly acquired territories, significant 
numbers of Han farmers from nearby Northern provinces began to immigrate to the 
region to take advantage of economic opportunities.  In 1669 the Qianlong emperor 
tried to limit the number of Han who could settle in the central plain of Manchuria by 
creating a marked boundary, the “Willow Palisades”.  Despite these and similar 
measures taken over the next two hundred years, thousands of farmers moved into the 
region illegally in search of fertile land (Elliot 2000, 617-619, Lee 1971, 183). 
  During the 18th and 19th centuries the Russian empire began making territorial 
claims to the Amur River region in northern Manchuria, and in 1860 the Qing ceded to 
Russia all lands north of the Amur.  Japan also made its first major inroad into the area 
during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, when for a time it occupied part of the 
Liaodong peninsula.  These developments convinced leaders in the Qing government 
that their efforts to keep Han Chinese out of the region had the unintended result of 
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making it easier for foreign powers to move in.  Choosing territorial integrity over 
their efforts of ethnic-preservation, the Qing in 1860 began to open large sections of the 
region to Han immigrants.  In 1905 the Qing lifted all bans on Han land ownership, 
and in 1907 they revised the administration of the northeast provinces, replacing the 
previous military districts with three new provincial governments, and creating 
administrative structures which mirrored those found in the provinces south of the 
Great Wall.  These actions appear to have brought Manchuria into the Chinese 
consciousness as an indivisible part of the realm.  Mark Elliot, however, has pointed 
out that the Qing’s two centuries of treating the region separately from the rest of the 
empire had fostered among the Chinese “a separate sense of place” for the northeastern 
provinces (Elliot 2000, 617-619). 
With the development of the railroads and steamship lines in the early 20th 
century, Manchuria became more closely connected with the rest of China and the 
world, and the production of soybeans for the world market became the staple industry 
of the region. The resulting demand for agricultural laborers in the sparsely populated 
region, together with the improved transportation and overpopulated conditions in 
North China, resulted in a new and greater flood of Han immigration into Manchuria.  
Most were single male migrant laborers from Shandong and Hebei Provinces, but a 
substantial number brought their families to settle in the region (Gottschang and Lary 
2000).  Although population estimates are sketchy, it appears that the total population 
of the region rose from around 5 million in 1898 to 20 million in 1915, and 30 million 
in 1930.  In 1932 Han Chinese made up almost 95% of the population of the region.  
Around 630,000 Koreans lived in the region in 1932, making up 2% of the population, 
although their numbers doubled to 1,200,000 by 1945. Approximately 800,000 
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Mongols, 230,000 Japanese, and 200,000 Manchus also resided in Manchuria in 1932 
(Hirano 1982, 125). 
Since the 1880s voices from within the Japanese army had called for the 
creation a strategic foothold in Manchuria.  Just as Korea was seen as critical to the 
defense of the home islands, the Liaodong peninsula was seen as essential for the 
defense of Korea.  Japan’s 1905 victory over Russia gave it the opportunity to declare 
Korea a protectorate and appropriate Russian interests in southern Manchuria.  These 
included the Liaodong leasehold, which Japan renamed the Kwantung (Guandong) 
Leased Territory.  Japan also won control of the Russian-built railway line from 
Dalian to Changchun, along with special economic and administrative rights in towns 
situated along that railway.  To manage the railway and the other assets that came with 
it, the Japanese government in 1906 authorized the creation of the South Manchurian 
Railway Company (SMR).  The railroad company served as the spearhead of Japanese 
economic and cultural activities in Northeast China, and accumulated substantial profits 
for much of its history.  The Japanese army stationed troops, named the Kwantung 
Army, in the leased territory and along the SMR rail line.   
China dissolved into civil war in the years after the 1911 Chinese revolution, 
and by 1920 the warlord and former bandit Zhang Zuolin and his Fengxi (or Fengtian) 
military clique gained control over most of Northeast China.  Zhang walked a difficult 
course between the demands of the local Japanese military and commercial leadership 
and Chinese nationalists. In the 1920s the Chinese nationalist movement spread from 
Shanghai and Beiping north to the educated segments of northeastern society.  In the 
northeast, Chinese nationalism naturally took Japan, the locally dominant imperial 
power, as the touchstone against which it defined itself.  Popular anger against the 
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Japanese presence was expressed through the Recovery of Rights Movement, which in 
the northeast centered on a demand that Japan return the Kwantung territory.  
Nationalists, many who came from the developing Chinese bourgeois class, led rallies 
and drew up petitions calling for the return of rights.  Zhang distrusted the nationalists 
and did little to respond to their demands.  He also had a complex relationship with the 
Japanese, who provided him with money and advisors, but eventually became frustrated 
with his unpredictability.   
 On June 4th, 1928, Zhang was killed in a plot engineered by maverick 
Kwantung Army officers.  Apparently they hoped that Zhang’s death would lead to 
instability in the northeast, giving the Kwantung Army an opportunity to intervene and 
take over the region.  The incident did not lead to wider hostilities, however, and 
Zhang Zuolin’s son, Zhang Xueliang, was eventually able to take his father’s place as 
the region’s ruling warlord. 
 Zhang Xueliang, unlike his father, supported many of the goals of the Chinese 
nationalists, and therefore had an even more difficult relationship with the Japanese 
than did his father.  The younger Zhang tried to consolidate his rule by harnessing and 
directing the power of nationalist sentiment.  He allied himself with a group of local 
young activists, and together they planned the region’s transformation.  He declared 
an alliance with the Chiang Kaishek’s Guomindang government in December 1928, 
although his relationship with Chiang never moved beyond mutual mistrust.  As will 
be discussed below, the new ties with Nanjing led to the adoption of the Guomindang 
education system, including the use of textbooks which contained anti-Japanese 
materials.   
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Zhang tried to reduce the region’s dependency on Japanese institutions by 
creating a new railway line and a port at Huludao which would compete with the SMR 
and the Japanese-run port of Dalian (Dairen) in the Kwantung Leased Territory.  
Japanese commercial and military leaders alike were disturbed by the regime’s actions 
(Mitter 2003, 150-154).  This fear and mistrust, together with Japanese military 
ambitions for control of the region, led directly to the Kwantung Army’s occupation of 
the region beginning in September 1931.   
 
Education in pre-1932 Manchuria and the Japanese presence 
Neither modern education nor Japanese-run schools were new phenomena in 
Manchuria in 1932.  Unlike Europe’s colonies in Africa and Asia, Manchukuo in 1932 
had a short but significant history of an indigenous modern school system.   
In 1932 only twenty five years had past since the abolition of the Qing 
examination system.  Chinese dynastic governments for centuries had sponsored the 
examinations, which tested the students’ ability to memorize classical texts and master 
the forms of stylized essays, as a way of recruiting government officials.  During the 
Qing period the court oversaw the administration of the exams, but it did not involve 
itself in the education process other than banning certain books and giving occasional 
grants to favored schools.  Education occurred in private, family, and clan schools.  
Because of the emphasis on the exams, the schools tended to avoid teaching any kind of 
“practical learning,” such as math or science.  Despite the lack of government support, 
there was a remarkable growth in literacy and school attendance during the Qing period 
(Rawski 1979).  Under pressure from reformists and after decades of military and 
  15 
social disaster, the court abolished the exam system in 1905 and called for the creation 
of new schools based on Western models.   
Change on this scale, of course, took considerable time.  Modern education in 
Northern China, which was considered a cultural backwater in the late Qing, was 
further handicapped by the relatively low percentage of people who had attended any 
school under the old system.  Once source states that in 1908 in Shenyang, the largest 
city in the region, 27% of the men and 0.5% of the women were literate, lower than 
Rawski’s estimate of literacy for China as a whole at the time, which was 30-45% of 
men and 2-10% of women (Hirano 1982, 386, Tsukinoki 1989, 2-5).  Zhao Erxun, the 
powerful military governor of Fengtian in the last years of Qing rule, made the 
investment of provincial funds into the creation of schools a priority, and invited 
Japanese and Western educators to the region to help set up colleges and medical 
schools.  Throughout the 1910s, however, most elementary and middle schools were 
little more than reorganized academies, which continued to use traditional methods 
such as the memorization of Confucian classics.      
After the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japanese institutions stepped 
into this educational lacuna with their own modern schools.  The two main agents of 
Japanese interests in the region, the Kwantung territorial government and the South 
Manchurian Railway, founded a number of schools for local Chinese and Korean 
students, as well as for Japanese.  Just as Japan’s political status in Manchuria was 
volatile and disputed throughout the 1905-1931 period, the schools sent their local 
students a series of contradictory and changing messages about their nationality and 
their connection with Japan.   
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Without going into too great of detail about the nature of Japanese-run 
education in Manchuria from 1905 to 1931, one should note the significant divergence 
in content between the SMR and Kwantung Territory schools, which was caused by 
their differing locations.  The Kwantung government held complete control over its 
territory, and carefully observed and regulated private Chinese and missionary-run 
schools in its domain.  In the railway zone, however, the Japanese had less political 
power and had to compete for students.  While both systems required students to study 
the Japanese language beginning in the first grade, the Kwantung schools took extra 
steps to create an atmosphere as closely resembling a school in Taiwan or Korea as 
possible, requiring the students to sing the Japanese national anthem and training them 
in Japanese-style military drill.  The SMR, on the other hand, closely followed the 
contemporary Chinese government’s system for its elementary school practices and 
curriculum.  The SMR schools used textbooks published in China more often than did 
the Kwantung schools, and the company required its teachers to have a greater 
understanding of Chinese culture, exemplified by its practice of sending teachers to 
Beiping for a period of study before they took their posts (Isoda 1998, 55, Kumano 
1934, Takenaka 2000, 2:122).   
In March 1914 the SMR began editing its own Japanese language textbooks.  
SMR Japanese language textbooks were modified versions of those published by 
Japan’s colonial government in Korea, with some key omissions.  While the SMR 
retained chapters on the Japanese flag and Japanese customs found in the Korean 
textbooks, it removed all references to the Japanese Emperor.  Apparently the SMR 
intended for its schools to familiarize the Chinese students with things Japanese, they 
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did not try to turn the students into imperial subjects, which was a key goal in Korean 
colonial education (Isoda 1998).   
The May 4th movement changed the cultural landscape of China beginning in 
1919, and the reform of education was at the center of contemporary debate.  Those 
influenced by John Dewey and other progressive Western educators criticized the 
continued emphasis on the memorization of classical texts in schools, and called on 
teachers to facilitate individual thought, personal freedom, and the study science in the 
classroom.  The reformers supported more access to education for women, increased 
use of the written vernacular, administrative decentralization, and the creation of 
kindergartens and coeducational schools.  Many of their goals were codified by the 
Chinese central government in the National Education Plan of 1922, which ordered a 
redesign of school structure and curriculum based on American models.   
 The progressive education movement in China faltered in the mid-1920s as 
intellectuals began to doubt the applicability of American-style education.  In 1928 the 
increasingly conservative Guomindang party took control of the government and 
gradually discarded the 1922 regulations.  They replaced them with a centralized 
education system modeled on those of France and Germany, including military training 
and ideological instruction intended to promote a cohesive national identity (Pepper 
1996).   
In the northeast, although Zhang Zuolin used the lion's share of his revenues to 
finance his military expeditions, the region’s relatively strong economic position 
allowed for higher funding for education than in most other regions of the country.  
The challenge and example provided by the Japanese SMR and Kwantung schools also 
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may have served to goad the northeastern Chinese into building a respectable system.3  
Zhang Xueliang promised to increase support for education after his father’s death in 
1928, and his nationalist allies saw the growth of schools as a key to the dissemination 
of their nationalist ideology.  By 1930 there were over 15,000 schools in the three 
northeastern provinces, including 300 middle schools.  The younger Zhang also gave 
substantial personal donations to Northeastern University, the pinnacle of the region’s 
education pyramid.  The ratio of enrollment in Fengtian schools was high compared to 
the rest of China: 30% of the elementary school-age population in Fengtian were 
enrolled in 1929, compared to 28% in the Japanese-run schools in Kwantung and a 17% 
overall percentage for China.  The more rural and politically weaker provinces of Jilin 
and Heilongjiang had 21% and 11% enrollment rates (Hobo 1932, 35-37, Shimada 
1935, 736). 
Throughout the period from 1922 to 1931 Chinese educators and students in 
Manchuria were among the leaders in demonstrations against special rights for 
Japanese interests.  In February 1929 the Fengtian Provincial Education Department 
announced it would implement the Guomindang’s recommended school curriculum and 
textbooks.  This curriculum included a “political studies” course for elementary and 
middle schools, which included lessons criticizing foreign countries, particularly Japan, 
                                                          
3 Northeastern Chinese officials often toured the Japanese-run schools and wrote reports detailing aspects 
which could serve as models for Chinese-run schools.  For example, a 1918 delegation of Fengtian 
Provincial education officials reported in an education journal on a visit to an exhibit of work by Chinese 
students in Ryojun and Dairen.  They remarked positively on the vernacular essays, the art based on real 
life, rather than copies of old paintings, and the utilitarian handicrafts, and while they were critical of the 
Japanese-run schools, they focused more on encouraging Chinese teachers to use the Japanese teaching 
methods as models (Tsukinoki 1989, 26-27). 
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for their occupation of China.  A contemporary Japanese report labeled the 
Guomindang-approved textbooks as “anti-Japanese,” and concluded that “children who 
are educated today with these textbooks will become ardently anti-Japanese in ten 
years” (Tachibana 1931a, 135).  
When the Kwantung Army created Manchukuo in 1932 a small but significant 
number of young people had received a modern education, which included nationalist 
and anti-Japanese ideological training.  To dismantle the school system or allow it to 
disintegrate might rid the Japanese of this annoyance, but it would also devastate any 
Japanese effort to claim legitimacy for the new state.  A major challenge facing the 
Manchukuo leaders, therefore, was to remove the anti-Japanese aspects of education, 
while preventing a decline in the number of schools or students.   
 In 1931 competing forces of Chinese nationalism and Japanese imperialism 
clashed in Manchuria, each with their own armies, ideologies, and schools.  By the 
spring of 1932 the Japanese controlled the body of Manchuria, as only a few 
anti-Japanese militias remained in the field along the northern and western boarders.  
The struggle for the minds of the Manchurians, however, had only just begun.   
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Chapter 2 
New Education reformers in the Manchukuo government: A clash of ideologies 
Colonial rule in Manchukuo was a chaotic mix of interests and ideologies.  
Kwantung Army officers, the local Japanese settler community, experienced 
bureaucrats recently arrived from Japan, and leading Chinese all took part in the 
administration of the state.  Although for many years scholars have appreciated the 
generative role military leaders in the field played in Japanese foreign policy in the 
1920s and 1930s, it is only recently that they have come to appreciate that the 
administration of the empire was also disjointed and ad-hoc, rather than centralized and 
monolithic.4  The Governors-General of both Taiwan and Korea were both appointed 
directly by the emperor, and thus enjoyed considerable authority to plan and carry out 
policies without approval from the Japanese cabinet.  Although the Army leadership in 
Tokyo regained control over the Kwantung Army and won oversight over the puppet 
state by 1934, day-to-day administration of Manchukuo remained in the hands of the 
Kwantung Army and its hand-chosen civilian officials.  As long as the military 
retained firm control of the colonies, the Japanese Army allowed the colonial authorities 
to govern as they saw fit, and even helped to minimize pressures from the civilian 
segments of the Tokyo government.  
While independent from Tokyo, conflicts over ideology and bureaucratic 
privilege within Manchukuo’s ruling institutions were fairly frequent.  A well-known 
rivalry developed within the Kwantung Army between officers Ishiwara Kanji and Tōjō 
                                                          
4 The contradictory nature of Japanese imperialism is a conclusion drawn by a majority of authors in the 
recent anthology Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, editors, Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 
1895-1945, 2003. 
 
  21 
Hideki, for example.  Among civilians there was tension between long-time Japanese 
civilian residents who had participated in the formation of the new government and 
Japanese officials the Kwantung Army later recruited from Japan, most of whom had no 
previous experience on the continent.  This certainly occurred within in the education 
bureaucracy as well. 
The differences between local Japanese and new arrivals was partly a 
bureaucratic power struggle, but a difference in viewpoints was also involved.  Local 
Japanese educators, particularly those connected with the SMR, tended to be 
participants in what is usually called the New Education movement, a campaign which 
called for reforms based on Western liberal education theories.  In Japan the movement 
peaked in the 1920s, but then lost momentum in the early 1930s.  In Manchuria, 
however, the local Japanese educators continued to experiment with many of the ideas, 
in hopes that they could inspire change back home in Japan.  The recent arrivals from 
Japan tended to try to replicate Japanese education in Manchuria.  After an initial 
period of conflict the two sides came to an understanding, and from 1937 to 1943 they 
worked together to create a unique education system, which combined some of the more 
conservative, statist principles of 1930s Japanese society with the liberal ideas of the 
New Education movement. 
This chapter introduces the nature of the Manchukuo government, and 
summarizes the history of the state’s education bureaucracy and school structure.  This 
framework which will help the reader put the developments in education content 
presented in later chapters into context. 
Although this chapter focuses on the Japanese policy makers who created the 
Manchukuo education system, there were also many non-Japanese, particularly Chinese, 
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officials within the education bureaucracy.  Unlike in Korea and Taiwan, Manchukuo 
was established on the premise that the local non-Japanese population created the state 
and were at the center of its rule.  In reality, of course, the Japanese held all the reigns 
of power.  I will begin with a short section on the role of non-Japanese in the creation 
of Manchukuo and in the education world.   
 
The creation of the Manchukuo government: Co-opting local elites 
Rana Mitter recently has pointed out that while most Chinese accounts of war 
years imply there was a high degree of active resistance to the Japanese, these accounts 
are greatly exaggerated.  In reality the Kwantung Army was successful in inducing a 
significant number of Chinese leaders to acquiesce in the creation of Manchukuo by 
March 1932.  A few paramilitary units put up sporadic resistance in the field, and a 
number of civilians with direct ties to Zhang Xueliang fled to the south where they 
unsuccessfully lobbied the Nanjing government to actively support these units (Mitter 
2000, 130-132).  For the most part, however, local elites decided against active 
opposition to the Japanese, and some even supported the creation of the new state.   
Mitter states that the collaboration which occurred in Manchuria was for the 
most part a passive, rather than active one:   
To take a well-known European example, the Nazis in the Sudetenland acted 
as a fifth column in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s, actively agitating for the 
assimilation of the region into the German Reich . . . In contrast, there seems 
to have been no such activity in France before 1940, even on the part of 
French fascist organizations such as the Croix de Feu; however, once the 
German occupation was a fait accompli, there was an enthusiastic clique of 
French politicians who sought active collaboration with the Germans for their 
so-called National Revolution.  Despite decades of local Chinese 
collaboration with Japanese dominance in the Northeast before 1931, the 
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Manchurian case seems to belong to the French rather than the Czech type . . . 
(O)nce the coup had happened, the dynamics of domestic Manchurian politics 
meant that the Japanese were able to find collaborators for their new “state” in 
the Northeast (Mitter 2000, 18).  
 
This lack of resistance can be attributed to a Confucian worldview which gave 
high priority to achieving a stable social order, frustration with the Zhang regime, and a 
history of ties between Japanese and the region’s elites.     
 The Kwantung Army worked quickly to assure the elites that it would establish 
a responsible government.  The Shenyang Shibao, a Japanese-owned Chinese language 
newspaper which was the largest circulation periodical in the region, published daily 
articles and editorials aimed at winning the people’s support for the creation of the state.  
For example Xi Xia, a military leader who was named governor of Jilin Province as a 
reward for his cooperation, sat for an interview with the newspaper on Oct. 14, 1931.  
Xi assured the paper’s educated Chinese readers that government structures would 
remain largely unchanged under the new regime, and that therefore officials and soldiers 
did not need to fear for their jobs.  He also promised financial reforms, including the 
reduction of taxation and government expenditures (Mitter 2000, 84-85). 
 Elite frustration with the Zhang Xueliang regime was also a major factor in 
cooperation with the Japanese.  Support for Zhang was especially weak among the 
more rural and conservative elites in Northeast society.  Many were disillusioned 
because of the tax burden he imposed, his continued high military expenditures, 
involvement in wars outside the region, and his refusal to grant power to the provincial 
assemblies.   
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 Finally, many members of the region’s elite had established close contacts with 
Japanese since the Sino-Japanese War.  Yu Chonghan, for example, was a leading 
Fengtian politician and an early supporter the concept of an independent state.  He had 
served as Zhang Zuolin’s foreign minister until 1927, and opposed the younger Zhang 
because of his recalcitrance against shifting political power to provincial assemblies.  
He had studied at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies as a young man and worked 
for the Japanese Army as a translator and spy during the Russo-Japanese War.  
Prominent figures like Yu who were familiar with the Japanese apparently saw the 
Kwantung Army’s coup as an opportunity to return to power (Mitter 2000, 34-37, 
Komagome 1996, 251-253). 
 If these Chinese collaborators had any illusions about their own place in the 
new government, these were soon shattered.  The Manchukuo government, on paper, 
was based on the Chinese Republican model, including a powerful Prime Minister and a 
number of ministries.  As Y. Tak Matsusaka has noted, however,   “Behind this 
grand façade . . . stood a nearly vacant lot” (Matsusaka 1996, 106).  The ministries 
were mostly symbolic, intended to impress observers and co-opt local power holders to 
whom posts were given.  Few were intended to do actual governing work. The 
Kwantung Army chose Japanese officials to hold all of the real policy-making posts in 
the government, and reserved the right to make final judgments in all major decisions. 
 The main organ through which the Kwantung Army controlled Manchukuo 
was the General Affairs Board of the Council of State (Kokumu-in Sōmu-cho), which 
was nominally part of the Manchukuo Prime Minister’s office.  Through this office the 
Kwantung Army directed the government, an arrangement they referred to as “internal 
guidance.”  The board was always headed by a Japanese who acted under the direction 
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of the Kwantung Army chief-of-staff (Matsusaka 1996, 107, Yamamoto 1993, 92).  An 
example of the board’s centrality to Manchukuo economic plans can be seen in the job 
placement of Furuumi Tadayoshi, a bureaucrat from Japan’s Ministry of Finance, who 
was sent to Manchukuo in July 1932 to create the country’s budgets.  Initially he was 
attached to the weak Finance Ministry, but almost immediately he was transferred from 
the ministry to the Finance Department of the General Affairs Board, where the real 
financial decisions were made (Tsukase 1998, 29). 
 A sense of the subservient role of the Chinese ministers can be gleaned from 
the record of a March 1932 conference of the Council of State.  At one point Komai 
Tokuzō, the first director of the General Affairs Board, proposed that Japanese officials 
hold twenty percent of the positions in the central government.  Xi Xia, the Jilin 
Governor and Minister of Finance, objected to the proposal, and asked that Pu Yi’s 
opinion be solicited.  Komai angrily dismissed Xi’s comments and scolded him, saying, 
“Japan sacrificed more than any other in the Manchurian Incident.   If you think you 
can build Manchukuo on your own, go ahead and try” (Tsukase 1998, 42).  The actual 
ratio of Japanese officials in the government turned out to be much higher.  In 
December 1934 Japanese held 53% of the top positions in the central government (835 
out of 1587 total positions). In 1940 Japanese held 69% of the posts.  More 
importantly, Japanese vice-ministers and bureau chiefs, rather than the non-Japanese 
ministers, were the real power holders in each government organ (Tsukase 1998, 43). 
Just as the identity of the real policy-makers within the Manchukuo government 
is murky, so too is the inner workings of the state’s education bureaucracy.  Presently 
only a few post-war accounts of the bureaucracy’s inner workings by are known to exist, 
all written by Japanese.  This is not surprising, since Chinese who served in high 
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positions in the puppet state were often discriminated against or even branded as traitors 
in post-war Chinese society.   The Japanese who wrote about their experiences make 
few references to their Chinese colleagues except in social terms.  Since all of these 
authors were writing for a Japanese audience, it may have been that they simply 
disregarded the role of the Chinese.  A more plausible explanation, on the other hand, 
was that most of the Chinese officials were not dedicated to the Manchukuo experiment 
enough to take vigorous steps to strengthen the state.  It appears that most did their 
jobs, furthering the work of training teachers, writing textbooks, and opening new 
schools, but they were not greatly involved in the creation of a wider vision for 
Manchukuo, especially after 1935, when the state ideology began to turn from 
Confucianism to a focus on the Japanese Emperor. 
 
Manchukuo’s Japanese leadership 
The management of Manchukuo’s state affairs can be divided into three areas, 
according to the Kwantung Army’s ability and interest: 1) those controlled directly and 
openly by the Kwantung Army; 2) those controlled covertly by the Kwantung Army 
with the assistance of civilian Japanese; 3) those left to the management of Japanese 
bureaucrats under light Kwantung Army supervision.  The Kwantung Army openly 
controlled national defense, the area in which it was most interested and able, under the 
terms of an agreement signed with the Manchukuo government on March 10, 1932.  
The state budget, monetary policy, and economic development, areas in which the 
Kwantung Army was greatly interested, but had no practical experience, were directed 
by the General Affairs Board of the Council of State, under the Kwantung Army’s close 
supervision.  The third level of government was those areas which the Kwantung 
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Army recognized as important, but had no immediate interest or expertise, and therefore 
turned over to Japanese bureaucrats in the ministries.  These included education and 
health.  The Kwantung Army still ultimately controlled these areas by picking the 
leading officials and reserving the right to veto policies.  Beyond the basic expectation 
of training a compliant and productive population, however, the army appears to have 
allowed Japanese officials considerable leeway in the formation of education policy.  
The background of the civilian Japanese working in the Manchukuo government 
changed over time.  In November 1931 the Kwantung Army began setting up 
Self-Rule Guidance Committees (jidō jichi iinkai) in the region’s provinces and 
prefectures to assist local governments in the transition toward the new system of rule.  
The committees were staffed by both local Chinese leaders and members of the 
Japanese settler community.  Most of the local Japanese were SMR employees, and 
many participated in one of two political groups, the Manchurian Youth League and the 
Daiyūhōkai.  Most of the committee members became officials in Manchukuo’s state 
or local governments after March 1932.  By the end of the year, however, Japanese 
army authorities deemed many of the local Japanese untrustworthy or ill-trained for 
their missions, and removed them from office.   In the place of these Japanese, the 
Kwantung Army recruited bureaucrats from Japan’s central government, particularly the 
Finance and Home Ministries (Mitter 2000, 105-106).  
Louise Young has noted how the creation of Manchukuo created job 
opportunities for a large number of ambitious Japanese officials and intellectuals.  Not 
only did the state bureaucracy need to be filled, but so did the SMR’s newly created 
Economic Research Association, which was entrusted with the job of planning the 
state’s economic direction.  This demand coincided with a generally difficult job 
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environment in Japan due to the Great Depression, and more specifically with the job 
difficulties of leftist academics because of ideological repression in Japanese 
universities.  Many leftist Japanese intellectuals went to work in Manchukuo, despite 
their ideological differences with the Kwantung Army leaders.  Young found the leftist 
intellectuals justified the contradiction between their principles and their employment 
with the hope that they could help bring about progressive change in the new, unsettled 
environment of a new state.  Manchukuo seemed to offer them the first chance to put 
their ideas into practice.  Also, their employment gave them an opportunity to continue 
their own research, while earning a much larger paycheck than what they could expect 
in Japan (Young 1998).   
Clearly many of these intellectuals were frustrated with the pace of change in 
Japan, and hoped that the fruits of their efforts in Manchukuo would inspire change 
back home in Japan.  In 1941, however, the Kwantung Army began to crack down on 
the leftist intellectuals working for the SMR and in the Manchukuo government.  The 
first wave of arrests occurred in November of that year, and continued until the end of 
the war.  Many of the leftists’ utopian projects were also abandoned at this time, 
sacrificed to the more immediate needs of the war.  
An example of such a person was Chikusa Tatsuo, a Tokyo judge who joined the 
Manchukuo Justice Ministry in 1938.  Chikusa for years had written in support of a 
large-scale reform the Japanese legal code.  He was particularly interested in rewriting 
the laws in colloquial Japanese so they could be understood by the common people, and 
liberalizing inheritance laws.  In Manchukuo he began writing a new legal code, and 
spoke openly about his dream that it could serve as a model for Japan.  He completed 
his plan in 1943, but the government failed to institute most of it, largely because of a 
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rising political tide against reforming the Japanese language.  After the war he returned 
to the Tokyo Regional Court, and also served for 27 years on the government’s 
Language Research Committee, where he was a key figure in the linguistic reform of 
Japan’s legal code (Yasuda 2002, 64-79).  
Manchukuo’s education bureaucracy also had many who hoped their reforms 
would inspire change in their homeland.  The education bureaucracy was unique, 
however, in that the majority of these reformers were men with long-standing 
experience in Manchuria, rather than recent arrivals.  
 
The New Education movement and Manchuria 
Since at least the mid 1920s many Japanese educators in Manchuria subscribed 
to the ideas of the New Education movement.  The term New Education movement 
refers to the agenda of a loosely connected group of Japanese educators who were 
influenced by Western theorists like Dewey, Pestazolli, and Montessori.  From around 
the time of World War I the movement gained great support among Japanese educators, 
but in the 1930s the movement lost ground and leading activists began to abandon the 
movement’s more liberal elements.    
Among the items on the agenda of New Education activists were increased use 
of student-centered and hands-on learning, an emphasis on practical learning over rote 
memorization, the use of physical objects, maps, and charts in teaching, internationalism 
over nationalism, decentralization over central control, an emphasis on instruction about 
local conditions, and the encouragement of individual talents over group conformity 
(Linicome 1999, 339).  The central figure of the movement was Sawayanagi Masatarō, 
a former vice-minister of education and founder of Seijō Academy (Seijō Gakuen). 
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The editors of textbooks in the Japanese Ministry of Education in the 1918-1932 
period were obviously influenced by the New Education movement. Compared to 
textbooks from the earlier periods, as well as those that followed, the 1918-1932 
textbooks contained many more detailed descriptions of foreign countries, more stories 
set in modern times, and contained many positive references to Western-style 
democracy and civics.  The editors also provided two different sets of Japanese 
language readers, so local teachers could choose the materials most appropriate for their 
children.  Sawayanagi and other movement educators did not think the reforms went 
nearly far enough, however.  They criticized the textbooks for remaining too 
state-centered, and advised teachers to create their own classroom materials, rather than 
relying too heavily on the textbooks (Karasawa 1955). 
 The center of New Education movement activity in Manchuria was the SMR’s 
Manshū Kyōiku Senmon Gakkō (Manchuria Education Training School), which is 
usually referred to by its abbreviation Kyōsen.  Kyōsen was founded in 1925 by Hobo 
Takashi, then the SMR’s director of education.  At the time Japan was suffering from a 
teacher shortage caused by the strong economy, which made it difficult for the SMR to 
find enough qualified teachers to staff its elementary schools.  Hobo convinced the 
company to let him build a teacher training school that would supply teachers for the 
company schools.  The SMR sent him to Europe and the United States for nearly two 
years to study their school systems.  He returned as a strong critic of contemporary 
Japanese education, particularly normal education, which he felt provided teachers with 
inadequate training and promoted conformity.  At the time Japanese normal schools 
stood at the same educational level as middle schools, accepting elementary school 
graduates and training them to teach at elementary schools.  Hobo thought that 
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elementary school teachers should graduate from college, or at least senmon gakkō level 
schools.5  He also wanted the schools to train students to think for themselves, rather 
than conform to norms presented by the teachers.  In a 1927 school address, Hobo said, 
“[In Japanese normal schools] the youths’ natural feelings are suppressed and their 
humanity is corrected . . . National Morals curriculum is over-emphasized, causing the 
students to lose their intellectual critical powers . . . [The schools] create blindness and 
obedience.”  He demanded that Kyōsen, on the other hand, produce “bright students 
who can read original texts . . . [and] who are not conservative” (Ryōnankai, 1972, 37, 
Suzuki 1989, 555-556). 
 Hobo hand-picked a staff of like minded New Education movement instructors.  
Prominent among them was Fujimoto Fusajirō, a former director of Sawayanagi’s Seijō 
Academy, a hotbed of New Education thought, and Terada Kijirō, who would later go 
on to head the Manchukuo textbook editing department.  In 1933, because of economic 
reasons, the SMR closed Kyōsen.  The school produced around 140 graduates during 
the eight years of its existence, most of whom went on to teach in SMR schools.  A 
large number of them also went to work for the Manchukuo education bureaucracy, 
especially during the 1932-1934 and 1938-1945 periods, as I will discuss below.  They 
brought to the Manchukuo government a spirit of reform and experimentation and an 
desire to emphasize local educational needs.   
Other leading New Education movement participants had ties to Manchuria.  
Uchihori Korefumi, an associate of education reformer Sawayanagi, from 1917 to 1923 
was the principal of the SMR’s only secondary school for Chinese students, Nanman 
                                                          
5 Senmon gakkō refers to a level of education between secondary schools and colleges, for which there is 
no accepted translation in English. 
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Middle School, and may have been the original conduit to Hobo of New Education 
ideas.  Sawayanagi himself visited Northeast China for six weeks starting in October 
1925 at the invitation of the South Manchuria Education Association, an organization of 
SMR and Kwantung Territory teachers.  In his speech to the association he spoke of 
the need to develop Japan’s cultural level rather than its military power and the 
importance of promoting a spirit of internationalism rather than nationalism (Nomura 
1995, 124).   
The SMR textbook editing department appears to have been strongly influenced 
by the movement.  Unlike the textbook department in Japan’s Ministry of Education, it 
was staffed by active teachers, not education officials, and from 1924 until 1945 it 
published textbooks designed to fit local conditions.  The texts encouraged hands-on, 
physical-participation education of a kind that would not appear in textbooks in Japan 
until the early 1940s (Isoda 1989, 16-19).  In 1927 Hobo Takashi was promoted to the 
position of SMR Regional Affairs Director, which strengthened his power to shape the 
region’s education.  By the time Manchukuo was established, the spirit of the New 
Education movement had permeated the entire Japanese education world in Manchuria.     
 
The Manchukuo Education Bureaucracy 
The Manchukuo division of government responsible for education fluctuated 
between the ministerial and sub-ministerial levels.  When the state was created in 
March 1932 the new Education Bureau was part of the Civil Affairs Ministry 
(Minsheng-bu).  Kamimura Tetsuya, the first director of the Education Bureau, 
together with Prime Minister Zheng Xiaoxu convinced General Affairs Board director 
Komai to create an independent education ministry.  As a result the Education Ministry 
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(Wenjiao-bu) was created on July 24, 1932.  In July 1937 the Education Ministry was 
dissolved and education affairs were reabsorbed into the Civil Affairs Ministry.  In 
March 1943 the Education Ministry was recreated, and remained in place until the state 
ceased to exist at the end of the war.  The bureaucracy was given authority over 
education for primary and secondary education for all non-Japanese in the country.  
The Japanese ambassador to Manchukuo was responsible for education for Japanese 
children in Manchukuo, an area not examined in this paper.   
Prime Minister Zheng served as the first Education Minister in 1932-1935, and 
afterward the post continued to be held by high-ranking Chinese officials.  Real 
decision making-power, however, was held by the ministry’s department chiefs, 
primarily the General Affairs Department Director and secondly the School Affairs 
Department Director, offices always held by Japanese.  Many of the middle and lower 
level bureaucrats were Japanese as well.  The Kwantung Army established a ratio of 3 
Japanese officials to every 7 non-Japanese as the model make-up of the ministry.  The 
actual percentage of Japanese officials in the ministry fluctuated throughout the 1930s 
from 36% to 47%, and the leading officials were always Japanese (Tsukase 1998, 43, 
Yamashiro 1993, 170). 
After the Education Ministry was created in July, Kamimura held both the 
General Affairs and School Affairs Division Director posts for a time.  He was an 
experienced Manchuria hand, having worked for the SMR as a civil affairs official since 
1919.  Both his choice of friends and his writings clearly mark Kamimura as a 
supporter of the New Education movement.  He enjoyed very close ties with three of 
the most prominent Japanese liberal educators in Manchuria, Hobo Takashi, Terada 
Kijirō, and Maenami Nakao (the second principal of Kyōsen).  He was also a lifelong 
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friend with fellow Kagoshima native Owara Kunio, the president of Tamagawa 
Academy and a leading figure in progressive education efforts in Japan (Ryōnankai 
1972, 196-197, Tsukinoki 1993, 170-171, 175). 
 One of the few documents written by Kamimura known to exist confirms his 
New Education orientation.  It is a transcript of a speech to the Manchukuo National 
Teacher Training seminar in June 1932, which was published as a pamphlet by the 
ministry and distributed to Chinese teachers throughout the state.  In the speech 
Kamimura spoke against forcing opinions on students rather than teaching them to think 
for themselves. “We can describe a pen, tell about its shape, and observe that despite a 
shortcoming at the top, the ink still comes out well.  We give this information to the 
student, and the student can make a judgment based upon that information.  This is 
education, letting the student make his own choice rather than giving our own 
predetermined judgment.  Propaganda is the opposite, telling them that there is only 
one pen, and that they don’t have a choice.  It tells them that there is only one pen that 
they need, with no other information about other options.  This kind of education is 
truly an evil thing, but tragically it is the norm today, not just in the Chinese Republic, 
but also in Japan . . . My hope is that education can be separated from propaganda, and 
become true education.” (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 238).  Likewise, he criticized Japan for 
its “narrow nationalism” which he claimed it shared with China and Western countries, 
and called for increased international understanding as a cure (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 240).  
These opinions show Kamimura placed himself squarely in the New Education camp. 
Kamimura immediately began staffing his bureaucracy with former SMR and 
Kwantung Territory teachers and education officials, including many from Kyōsen, the 
center of the New Education movement in the region.  This was a natural move, since 
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he had personal connections with these men, and they had experience teaching in the 
region.  However, officials with significantly different backgrounds were also 
appointed to the ministry around the time.  On September 30, 1932, as part of the 
general trend of bringing Japanese bureaucrats into the Manchukuo government, 
Nishiyama Masai was named the Education Ministry General Affairs Director, with 
Kamimura staying on as School Affairs Director, a position with slightly less authority.  
Nishiyama was a Monbushō (Japanese Ministry of Education) veteran who had 
experience directing the Japanese ministry’s Senmon Gakkō and Religion departments.  
He brought with him a number of Japanese education officials with no previous 
experience in Manchuria.  By mid-1933 a struggle between Nishiyama’s “Monbushō 
faction”, and Kamimura’s “local faction” became quite heated.  Although several 
sources mention the conflict, there is no clear indication whether it was caused by a 
substantial ideological difference between the two groups or simply was a turf war 
between officials from different backgrounds.  By late 1934 and early 1935 many 
members of the local faction had left the ministry, some accepting transfers to 
provincial governments and some leaving the Manchukuo government entirely 
(Ryōnankai 1972, 209-210, Tsukinoki 1993, 171-175). 
The first years of the ministry’s existence was marked by confusion and 
inter-ministry conflict.6  Previously there was no unified education bureaucracy for the 
                                                          
 
6Besides the battle between the local and Monbushō factions, there was a heated battle between Iwama 
Tokuya and Nagamine Yoshitsuna, the leaders of the textbook editing department and the ministerial 
inspectorate, over the nature of the new curriculum and textbooks.  Both were presumably allied with 
the local faction.  Iwama, who first came to teach in Jinzhou in the Kwantung Territory in 1904, was the 
most senior member of the Japanese education community in Manchuria, while Nagamine, from 
Kagoshima, was an associate of Kamimura’s.  One former official claims that the disagreements 
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region, so the infrastructure of the ministry, including personnel, communication with 
regional education officials, and the process of collecting information, had to be created 
from scratch.   More importantly, armed conflict continued in many parts of the 
country, forcing most schools to close and scattering teachers and students alike.  The 
most immediate job was to locate teachers and get the schools reopened.  If ministry 
statistics are to be believed, the number of enrolled elementary school students 
recovered to pre-incident levels relatively quickly, by 1934.   The middle school 
student population, on the other hand, remained below pre-incident levels until 1938 
(see Table 4.7).  The ministry appears to have left the particulars of reopening schools 
to the local provincial and prefectural governments, and focused its energy on training 
teachers and creating content for the newly opened schools.   
 The structure and content of Manchukuo education will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  Briefly, however, the ministry in the 1932-1937 period did 
not initiate any major changes in the existing Republican education system.  The 
general curriculum, number of years of schooling, and normal education system 
remained unchanged.  There were some significant changes in content, however.  The 
ministry moved swiftly to eradicate pro-Republican and anti-Japanese messages in the 
schools by finding and banning textbooks which contained offending passages, or at 
least ordering those passages inked out (Manshūkoku Shikai 1970, 1104).  The 
ministry encouraged schools to teach from the Chinese classics until its textbook 
department could edit and publish replacements.  Also, it established summer 
retraining courses for Chinese teachers from the Republican era who remained at their 
                                                                                                                                                                          
between the two delayed any serious progress on the establishment of a nation-wide curriculum for 
almost a year (Tsukinoki 1993, 174-176). 
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jobs.  The new textbooks and teacher retraining emphasized Confucianism, particularly 
the idea of wangdao, or the kingly way, as well as ethnic harmony, international 
cooperation, and a positive picture of Japan.  Compared to education content in the 
colonies of Korea and Taiwan, however, Manchukuo’s 1932-1937 education could not 
be described as assimilationist.  Japanese language education, for example, was quite 
minimal compared to that found in the two formal colonies at the same time.  The 
ministry first directed elementary schools to begin teaching Japanese language in 1934, 
but only for two hours a week, beginning in the third grade.  In Korea, by comparison, 
elementary school students from the first grade spent ten hours a week on Japanese 
language study in the early 1930s.    
 
New Education in Fengtian  
As mentioned, the particulars of reopening and staffing the schools was left to 
the provincial and prefectural governments.  The Education Department in Fengtian 
Province, by far the largest and most powerful economically of the northeastern 
provinces, was the most well organized and functioning education organ during the 
early years of the state’s existence, and was the sight of considerable New Education 
experimentation.  The department’s success probably was linked to its inheritance of 
the structure, documents, and personnel of the Republican-era provincial education 
department, and because it was led by Tsubokawa Yokichi, a Japanese educator who 
was able to blend the previous Chinese education bureaucracy with his own set of 
hand-picked, loyal Japanese subordinates.  Tsubokawa was among the most 
experienced Japanese in the Manchuria education world, working as a teacher in SMR 
schools for Chinese since 1910 and as principal of the SMR Fengtian City school since 
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1922.  The Fengtian school was the SMR’s “model” or experimental school for 
Chinese, and thus presumably was a site of much New Education movement activity 
(Ōmori 1994).  Tsubokawa became the Fengtian Provincial Education Department 
General Affairs Director in January 1932.   Many of the Republican-era Chinese in the 
department remained at their posts, perhaps because Tsubokawa was well acquainted 
with them from his years of experience in the area.  Tsubokawa brought with him 
several Japanese educators with local experience; most had taught in SMR schools 
under Tsubokawa.   
The department quickly demonstrated its ability by publishing a detailed plan for 
a new provincial education system on March 1st, 1932, the very day of the Manchukuo 
declaration of establishment (Fengtian-sheng Jiaoyu 1932).  Also, in September 1932, 
it published a series of elementary school textbooks to be used in place of those 
Republican textbooks banned for containing anti-Japanese material (Wenjiao-bu 1932a, 
21-22).  These textbooks were approved by the central Education Ministry for use 
throughout the country until it was able to begin publishing its own textbooks in 1934.  
The Fengtian Education Department also began publishing its own Chinese language 
education journal, Fengtian Jiaoyu (Fengtian Education) in January 1933.  The journal 
continued to be published monthly until at least 1940. 
While none of the Japanese officials in Tsubokawa’s department had direct 
contact with Kyōsen, almost all were former SMR educators, and they appear to have 
been strongly influenced by the New Education movement.  This is born out in the 
pages of Fengtian Jiaoyu, which published numerous articles about the benefits of 
physical participation education.  Physical participation education (rōsaku kyōiku) was 
based on the ideas of the Swiss education philosopher Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, and 
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popularized in Japan after the First World War by Kitazawa Shūichi, the principal of the 
Tokyo Girls’ Higher Normal School.  Kitazawa emphasized the importance of student 
initiative and creativity, and encouraged teachers to invent activities which would 
prepare students for their likely future occupations.  He encouraged the creation of 
school gardens, aquariums, and aviaries where students could learn both responsibility 
and actively gain an appreciation of nature (Isoda 1999).  The journal frequently 
referred to the innovations of Kitazawa and his fellow reformers. 
A 1933 issue of Fengtian Jiaoyu, for example, records in Chinese speeches 
given at a January 1933 training conference on elementary school physical participation 
education.  Seven Japanese teachers from Kyōsen and the Kyōsen-attached elementary 
school taught the workshops, which presumably targeted Chinese teachers.  In his 
welcoming address Fengtian Provincial Education Inspector Morita Ryōichi, a 
Tsubokawa subordinate, declared, “We must implement physical participation 
education in Fengtian, as it is the pinnacle of education theory and action.”  He praised 
the Kyōsen-attached elementary school as “[t]he ideal elementary school in Manchuria, 
where profound research into both the theory and practice of physical participation 
education is taking place.”  The lectures featured suggestions such as that of Kuwara 
Shiji, a Kyōsen-attached elementary school teacher, who spoke in detail about the need 
to synergistically teach history and geography, using objects the students could 
physically manipulate; such as maps, lineage charts, and newspaper articles (Fengtian 
Jiaoyu 2-1, May 1933, 17, 63-68).  All of the lecturers were clearly influenced by the 
New Education movement. 
In December 1934 Manchukuo reorganized the state’s provincial system, 
breaking up the large provinces of Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang into ten smaller 
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provinces, in part to strengthen the central government by dismantling the traditionally 
strong provincial governments.  The move probably weakened the Fengtian Education 
Department’s previously central role in Manchukuo education.  Still, Tsubokawa 
remained the central figure in Fengtian provincial education until at least 1940, and 
many of his staff members were sent to the new provinces in the mid 1930s, presumably 
to set up departments based on the Fengtian model. 
 
Enforced orthodoxy in Japan 
 Although Japanese educators were putting some of the progressive ideas of the 
New Education movement into practice in Manchuria in the 1930s, the movement was 
facing serious setbacks in Japan.  While the Manchurian Incident provided some 
Japanese leftist intellectuals with opportunities in Northeast China, in Japan it gave the 
political right the political capital it needed in its campaign to eradicate ideologies that 
threatened to undermine national unity.  Censorship laws already in place were 
strengthened, and popular rightist figures pressured the government to purge 
free-thinking professors such as Takigawa Yukitori (fired from Kyoto University, 1932), 
Minobe Tatsukichi (forced to resign from the House of Lords, 1935), and Yanaihara 
Tadao (forced to resign from Tokyo University in 1937).  Although the number of 
purges were limited, they had a chilling effect on academic freedom.  The message 
was clear: anyone who taught a world view which was centered on something other than 
the Emperor and the kokutai, such as the needs of the individual or class, was a potential 
target.   The spirit of this turn to enforced orthodoxy is summarized in the following 
1940 policy statement from the Konoe cabinet. “[Our goal is the] thorough renovation 
of education in harmony with the fundamental principles of the national polity, and also 
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the establishment of ethical principles of the nation stressing, above all, service to the 
state and eradicating all selfish and materialistic thoughts” (Marshall 1994, 120). 
In the early 1930s the education establishment embraced a reemphasis on 
inculcating student loyalty toward a model of a hierarchical state family, or kokutai.  
The Japanese Education Ministry’s 1933 textbook revision placed a much stronger 
emphasis on the concept of kokutai and emperor-centered myths in elementary and 
secondary school textbooks.  The texts emphasized racial consciousness in its stories 
of founding gods and ancient warriors.  Chapters about ancient Japan largely replaced 
those about foreign cultures and individuals from the previous period.  They also 
described the Japanese language as the repository of the Japanese people’s spirit.   
 Faced with this changing climate, New Education movement activists 
jettisoned the more liberal and individualistic aspects of their proposed reforms, while 
continuing to push ones which did not pose a threat to the emphasis on kokutai.  These 
developments can be followed in the public positions of Noguchi Entarō, a close 
associate of Sawayanagi and president of the New Education Association, the 
movement’s main umbrella organization in the 1930s.  Noguchi and the association 
bowed to the trends of the time by abandoning their previous internationalist ideology 
and emphasis on the development of the individual spirit.  They continued to support 
making education as practical as possible by linking taught information to physical 
representations which could be manipulated by the students, and by merging curriculum 
subjects as much as possible, in the manner of Montessori schools in the West.  
History and geography were singled out as subjects which could be merged into a new
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curriculum called social studies, as was happening in parts of the United States (Isoda 
1991, 36-39, Lincicome 1999, 357, Nomura 1995, 124).7   
 The trend toward enforced theological orthodoxy gained strength under the 
pressure of war in the 1940s.  The Ministry of Education began another major textbook 
revision in 1941, resulting in a set of texts in which nationalistic and jingoistic rhetoric 
spilled beyond morals and history into even the geography and science textbooks.  
Karasawa Tomitaro, in his extensive study of elementary school textbooks, estimates 
that over 76% of the Japanese Language curriculum chapters contained 
ultranationalistic messages, while almost no positive portrayals of Westerners remained.  
Nearly every instruction or suggestion in the textbooks were tied to appeals to the 
students’ loyalty to the state and the Emperor (Karasawa 1956).  Elementary and 
middle school students spent increasingly less time in the classroom, and more in trips 
to Shinto shrines, in military drill, and, after 1942, in labor projects.    
 
The education bureaucracy and the Shingakusei, 1935-1939 
 In 1935 the decision makers in the Manchukuo General Affairs Board made a 
series of personnel changes which ended the turf war between the local and Monbushō 
factions in the Education Ministry.   They handed the top positions in the ministry to 
Japanese bureaucrats who were aligned with neither group—officials originally from 
the Japanese Home and Finance Ministries closely connected with the General Affairs 
                                                          
 
7 New education reformers had recommended the creation of a social studies curriculum since the late 
1920s.  An example of this position can be found in an article by Tokyo Higher Normal School teachers 
Kobayashi  Sumiami and Sasaki Yūichi in a volume published by the New Education Association, 
Kyōiku Kakushin, Nihon Kyōiku no Kaizō, 1937, p. 70 (Isoda 1991, 50). 
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Board.  These kind of officials, few of whom had any previous experience in education, 
continued to lead Manchukuo education until the state’s destruction in 1945.  Besides 
having no personal interest in the fray between former officials of the Monbushō and 
the SMR, their connections with the Board probably reassured the central government 
that the education bureaucracy would remain firmly under their control.    
The first such official was Kume Nario, who replaced Nishiyama Masai, the 
leader of the Monbushō faction, as Education Ministry General Affairs Director in early 
1935.  Kume had worked his way up the ranks in the Japanese Home Ministry, 
eventually serving in the appointed position of prefectural governor in Oita, Ehime, and 
Nara Prefectures.  In 1933 he came to Manchukuo to be the Fengtian Provincial 
General Affairs Director, the most powerful civilian position in the country’s largest 
province.  The transfer of this leading Japanese official to the Education Ministry 
seems to indicate the concern Manchukuo leaders had for the state of affairs in the 
ministry. 
The arrival of Kume brought about the end of the inter-ministry battle between 
the local and Monbushō factions.  Kume was critical of local faction leader Kamimura 
because of his participation in the tensions, and arranged for him to be demoted to the 
position of a higher normal school principal.8  Kamio Kazuharu was named as the new 
School Affairs Director in March 1935.  Like Kume, Kamio had worked in Japanese 
local governments, but had also served in several positions in the Korean colonial 
government in the late 1920s, including a stint as Education Department Director.  In 
                                                          
 
8 Kamimura was said to have been insulted by the transfer, and soon afterward suffered a stroke.  He 
later returned home to Japan to teach at the reformist Tamagawa Academy (Kamio 1983, 42, Tsukinoki 
1993, 175).  
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1933 he came to Manchukuo to work at the General Affairs Board.  The new 
administration of Kume and Kamio fired or transferred away a large number of 
Kamimura’s underlings, particularly those connected to Kyōsen.  Some former SMR 
educators and former Monbushō officials continued to work at the ministry, but now 
both sides were firmly under the control of the General Affairs Board (Kamio 1983, 42, 
Tsukinoki 1993, 175).  
 Little is known about the inner workings of the ministry in the 1935-1937 
period, largely because there were few Kyōsen-connected educators in the ministry at 
the time, and most of the post-war testimonies about the ministry were written by these 
men.  Kamio’s own memoir quickly passes over his time in the Education Ministry, 
merely noting that his attempts at reform were foiled by Kwantung Army interference.  
He blamed Kume, who was the liaison with the Kwantung Army, for failing to defend 
the reforms.  Kamio left the ministry in February 1936, and Kume held both General 
Affairs and School Affairs Director positions until August 1936 (Kamio 1983, 41-43).  
The Ministry appears not to have sponsored any New Education reforms during this 
period, although Kyōsen graduates, then exiled from the government, continued to teach 
and conduct education experiments in SMR-run schools in the railway zone. 
By 1936 the state’s domestic situation had stabilized, and the Education Ministry 
met its immediate goals of reopening schools and revising the curriculum.  The 
number of functioning schools and attendance rates rebounded to the level found before 
the Manchurian Incident in 1931 (Kurokawa 1997, 183-189).  Anti-Japanese 
textbooks were removed from the schools, and the ministry’s textbook editing 
committee published sets of state-approved textbooks for elementary and middle 
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schools in 1934 and 1935.  Also, summer re-training courses for Chinese teachers were 
held throughout the country (Wenjiao-bu 1935). 
With the situation stabilized, ministry officials turned to the creation of a new 
education system to replace the still-in-use 1922 Chinese Republican system.  The 
ministry circulated a plan in July 1936, and invited comments from officials in the 
Fengtian Provincial Education Department and the SMR (Maeda 1998).9  In August, 
very soon after the process began, Kume resigned from the ministry and was replaced 
by a pair of lawyers, Minagawa Toyoji as General Affairs Director and Tsutomi 
Tsukuda as School Affairs Director.  Minagawa, who had worked as prosecutor and 
regional official in Japan, had served since 1932 as the third highest-ranking official in 
the Manchukuo General Affairs Board.  He was known for his geniality, political skills 
and ability to negotiate effectively with the Kwantung Army and other government 
organs (Gotō 1976, 119).  Tsutomi was a constitutional scholar who had worked in the 
state’s Legal Affairs Department since 1933.  The new team led the ministry in the 
completion of the Shingakusei (new education system).  The ministry presented the 
final plan at a national education conference in April 1937, Pu Yi promulgated it in May, 
and it went into effect on January 1, 1938 (Minsheng-bu 1939). 
The implementation of the Shingakusei in 1938 brought about major changes in 
both the content and structure of Manchukuo education.  These changes were 
influenced by shifts in both the Manchukuo ideology and the New Education movement 
during the 1935-1940 period. 
                                                          
 
9 The Education Ministry may have solicited replies from all of the provincial education departments, but 
the Fengtian reply is the only one known to exist (Maeda 1998).  
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 The various shifts in Manchukuo ideology will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3.  Suffice it to say that just as Japanese society and government swung to the 
right in the 1930s, from 1935 to 1940 Manchukuo’s public ideology moved from an 
image of an independent wangdao Confucianist state working together with its friendly 
neighbor Japan, to that of a client state whose legitimacy rested on the Manchukuo 
Emperor’s connection to the Emperor of Japan.  This shift was manifested in the 
primary and middle school curriculums by an increased emphasis on the individual’s 
duty to the state and the Manchukuo Emperor, and an increase in the hours of Japanese 
language instruction and other Japan-related material.  Japanese was for the first time 
declared one of the national languages, and Japanese language class time for the first 
time equaled or surpassed that of Chinese language instruction in both primary and 
secondary schools.   
While the philosophical background of the Manchukuo education leaders in the 
mid-1930s is unclear, the plan they created appears to have been influenced by the 
increasingly conservative trends within the New Education movement in Japan at the 
time—a retreat back to a state-centered curriculum and away from internationalism and 
individualism, but also a renewed emphasis on practicality and curriculum synergy.  
Manchukuo schools became a kind of testing ground for the ideas of this more 
conservative form of the movement.   
In terms of structure, the plan was intended to unify and broaden elementary 
school education, while reducing the number of secondary school years and making the 
schools more practical.  Minagawa defended the reduction in school years by asserting 
that the country’s large unschooled population and underdeveloped economy required 
an emphasis on building more elementary schools rather than wasting resources on 
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building an unnecessarily large secondary education system.  Minagawa and others 
claimed the state of the country’s economy required few skilled laborers, and therefore 
too many secondary schools would create a class of “educated idlers” (Minagawa 1939, 
20-21, Minsheng-bu 1939, 21, Tamura 1941, 37, 46-49).  Minagawa appears to have 
feared educated, underemployed people could become leaders in anti-Japanese 
activities.   
To address these concerns the previously two-level middle school system was 
changed to a single-level system, with the total length of middle school education 
reduced from six years to four, and general studies (humanities and science), the favored 
middle school major in early 20th century Chinese schools, was eliminated in favor of 
vocational courses (agriculture, commerce, industry, and marine industry).  This 
change coincided with the government’s adoption of a Soviet-style five-year economic 
plan in 1937.  They tried to create a system in which the number of trained graduates 
in each field matched perfectly with the needs of each economic sector as outlined by 
the five-year plan.  The elimination of the humanities and science major in middle 
schools was bitterly resented by many in the non-Japanese population (Isoda 1994).     
The1938 plan directed schools to teach synergistically, emphasizing the 
connected nature of subjects within the curriculum, which was a favorite reformist goal 
of the New Education movement.  In elementary schools the curriculum subjects 
national language (Japanese and Chinese or Mongolian), morals, civics, history, and 
geography were merged into a single subject named national people’s studies (C. 
guomin-ke), with two textbooks a semester, one in Japanese, and one in Chinese or 
Mongolian.    
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Finally, the system was adjusted to give the central education bureaucracy 
greater control over education.  It transferred all normal schools to state control, 
prepared the way for all teachers to become state-appointed employees by 1939, and 
increased pressure on private schools to join the state-run system.   
 In July 1937, as the finishing touches were being applied to the Shingakusei, a 
state-wide reorganization of ministries resulted in the demotion of the Education 
Ministry back to the status of a department in the Civil Affairs Ministry.  The 
Mongolian Affairs Ministry’s education department was also transferred to the Civil 
Affairs Ministry.  Except for the additional responsibility of administering education in 
the Mongolian regions, the mission and personnel of the education bureaucracy 
remained largely unchanged by these moves, and it appears to have had no real impact 
on the bureaucracy’s function.  Minagawa remained on to oversee the implementation 
of the Shingakusei as the Education Bureau Director until August 1938, when he 
resigned to take a leading position in the Concordia Association (Kyōwakai), the 
Manchukuo government-sponsored mass organization, as well as serve as a director of 
the Manchukuo Education Society, a state-run association of educators.   
 
Striving for uniqueness, 1938-1942 
 Manchukuo’s leaders chose Tamura Toshio, a Japanese Finance Ministry 
official who came to Manchukuo in 1932 to work as the National Taxation Agency 
Director, to replace Minagawa as Education Bureau Director.  Tamura changed the 
nature of the department by hiring a large number of former SMR employees.  SMR 
educators, particularly Kyōsen-related educators, were largely barred from the ministry 
during Kume’s tenure because of their participation in ministry infighting during the 
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Kamimura/Nishiyama years.  During Minagawa’s period of leadership 
SMR-connected educators began trickling back into the education bureaucracy, and 
their numbers rose dramatically under Tamura.   
A major reason for this shift in personnel was the Japanese government’s 
decision to renounce its rights of extraterritoriality in Manchukuo, which occurred in 
stages over 1937 and 1938.  Because of this, the SMR ended its direct participation in 
education in Manchuria in December 1937.  It transferred authority over its schools for 
Chinese students to the Manchukuo government, and its schools for Japanese students 
to the Japanese embassy in Manchukuo, which essentially placed them under the control 
of the Japanese Education Ministry.  Many of the independent-minded SMR educators, 
who had over thirty years created their own unique education culture, bristled at their 
new subservient relationship to Japanese bureaucrats and left the former SMR-schools.  
Some of these men were welcomed into the Manchukuo education bureaucracy.   
The key individual in recruiting SMR-experienced educators was Terada Kijirō, 
whom Tamura hired to be Textbook Editing Department Director in the fall of 1938.  
Terada held the position of Head Teacher at Kyōsen from its founding in 1924 until 
1930, and then moved on to be a principal at SMR-run middle schools for Japanese.  
Terada wrote prodigiously about progressive education issues throughout the 1930s, and 
commanded a strong degree of loyalty from his former Kyōsen students.  Because of 
his influence scores of Kyōsen alumni and other former SMR educators entered the 
Manchukuo education bureaucracy (Terada 1975, 82-86, 168, 231, Ryōnankai 1972, 
239-247). 
According to Terada, he and Tamura shared a common vision for the 
implementation and further development of the Shingakusei.  Their partnership 
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represented an alliance between the conservative statist ideology then prevalent in both 
the Japan and Manchukuo governments at the time (represented by Tamura) and the 
moderately conservative wing of the 1930s New Education movement (represented by 
Terada).  The partnership resulted in the continuing centralization of education 
administration and the strengthening of “statist” aspects of education.  They further 
developed Manchukuo’s unique curriculum, sketched out by Minagawa and Tsutomi in 
1937, using some New Education movement principles like physical participation 
education and social studies.  The pair (as well as Tamura’s successor, Kita Kiyoshi) 
appear to have dragged their heels, however, in implementing changes in the education 
curriculum reflecting the establishment of Shintō as the state ideology in 1940.  They 
also resisted attempts by the Japanese Ministry of Education to assimilate Manchukuo 
education into the Japanese central system (Terada 1975, 80-83). 
 
Statism and Shintōism 
Both Tamura and Terada wrote prolifically during the 1938-1942 period about 
their vision for Manchukuo education.  Both supported the current government line 
that Manchukuo should have a strong central government with the power to direct the 
economy.  Their statist ideology can also be seen in their interest in linking state 
planning initiatives to higher education.  Tamura called for state plans like the 1937 
Five Year Industrial Plan to include detailed estimates of the number of new employees 
needed in each sector, so that higher education institutions could train exactly that 
number.  He also opposed choosing higher education students through open testing, 
and instead supported a system by which recommendations by middle school principals 
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about the students’ abilities and “appropriateness” determined entry into the higher 
schools (Tamura 1941, 37, 46-49, Terada 1941, 213).   
In 1940-1942, changes in Manchukuo’s public ideology and the beginning of 
Japan’s war with the Atlantic powers had an impact on Manchukuo education.  After 
Pu Yi’s second state visit to Japan in May 1940 the Manchukuo government declared 
the country’s official ideology to be State Shintō.  This included the recognition of 
Amaterasu, the mythical ancestor of the Japanese emperor, as the country’s “foremost 
god,” the establishment of a Shintō State Founding Shrine in the capital, and the 
construction of branch shrines near every public school (Nomura 1995, 76).  In 
September the Japanese celebratory days commemorating Japan’s mythical foundation 
(Kigensetsu) and the Japanese Emperor’s birthday were added to the Manchukuo school 
calendar.  
In March 1941 Kita Kiyoshi, an official at the General Affairs Board since 1932, 
replaced Tamura as the Education Bureau Director.  Kita, a former normal school 
teacher in Japan, was the first former educator to lead the education bureaucracy since 
Nishiyama and Kamimura were removed in 1935.  In December of that year Japan 
went to war with the United States and Great Britain, and in March 1942 a Manchukuo 
Imperial Rescript declared that the country would put all of its energy into cooperation 
with Japan in the war effort. 
While Tamura, Terada, and Kita supported a statist emphasis in the curriculum, 
they were less interested in including material celebrating State Shintō.  Although 
Tamura publicly stated that he thought the Manchukuo kokutai was an extension of the 
Japanese kokutai, the introduction of State Shintō, with its mythical elements so foreign 
to the country’s non-Japanese, appears to have gone too far for him.  After the war an 
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education official reported that around February 1941 Tamura privately expressed his 
unhappiness with the State Shintō policy (Tamura 1941, 36-37, Komagome 1996, 439).  
While laudatory comments about State Shintō policies became de rigueur among 
Manchukuo officials in the 1940s, Tamura, Terada, and Kita almost completely ignored 
the subject in their significant corpus of writings during their time as education officials.  
Terada, who had long supported the idea of Manchuria as an unique entity independent 
of Japan, appears to have been particularly disturbed by the new ideology.  In a 1940 
article, listing the challenges faced by Manchukuo education, he hints at his 
dissatisfaction by saying, “[The state ideology of] State Founding Spirit is not yet 
completed.  [I always] try to avoid these kind of abstract, ideological theories, but I 
think I should comment in this case.  . . . Frankly, it still has many dogmatic aspects, 
and I do not think it is at a point where the people of the world can accept it” (Terada 
1941, 223).   
As a result of the education leadership’s disinterest, textbooks and education 
journals published in 1940-1943 mention Shintō symbols in only the most perfunctory 
ways.  This is not to say that the textbooks and journals of that period were free of 
militarism—they did discuss in great detail the importance of uniting with Japan, 
sacrificing to win the war, and the heroic role of the military.  Also, although the 
curriculum touched only lightly on Shintōism during this period, school ceremonies 
containing Shintō elements, including the worship of the Japanese emperor, were taking 
place throughout the country by the end of 1941.   
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Terada and education content 
After the war Terada rationalized his participation in the Manchukuo 
government by claiming that he and his associates largely ignored the ideological 
aspects of the state, instead focusing on implementing reformist education, with the 
ultimate goal of inspiring change within Japan. “Secretly in my heart I wanted to blow a 
new wind into the elementary and middle school textbooks in Japan itself.  I tried to 
reform Japanese education from Manchuria” (Ryōnankai 1972, 240).  Among the 
reforms Terada tried to implement were a greater emphasis on in-class science 
experiments, the use of pronunciation-based kana and accent marks in teaching 
Japanese language, the creation of a Chinese syllabary based on the Japanese kana 
system, and the creation of a social studies curriculum unifying history and geography, 
which he hoped would replace the more traditional morals curriculum as a central tool 
in the building nationalist spirit.  In 1940 Terada asked the renowned philosopher Miki 
Kiyoshi, a former student, to assist him in inviting leading Japanese scholars to advise 
his textbook editors.  As a result Miki and the physicist Ishiwara Jun spent two months 
in Manchukuo in 1940 advising the textbook editors, and the literary scholar Yamamoto 
Yūzō, the mathematician Ogura Kinnosuke, and the legal expert and economist Tsunetō 
Kyō agreed to act as consultants from Japan.  All of these scholars were noted for their 
liberal or even radical views, and it is said that Tamura had to exert great force to gain 
approval from Kwantung Army officials for the scholars’ participation (Ryōnankai 1972, 
240, Terada 1932, 116).10   
                                                          
 
10Although all five of these men were leading scholars at the time, Miki probably remains the most 
well-known figure of the group for his work on the philosophy of history, his attempts to merge Marxism 
and fascism in the early 1940s as a member of Prime Minister Konoe’s Shōwa Kenkyūkai, and his death 
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Although Terada was clearly a participant in the New Education movement, he 
supported Tamura in his efforts to centralize education authority, such as limiting the 
number of students accepted into middle schools based on the state’s annual needs, an 
idea abhorrent to more liberal members of the movement (Terada 1975, 83).  Terada 
carried this centralization effort into his textbook editing department.  Previously the 
education bureaucracy farmed out the job of writing many of the textbooks to the 
provincial education bureaucracies and individual educators.  Terada was determined 
to make his department the sole source of textbooks for all the country’s schools, and he 
greatly increased the size of the department to sixty editors to accomplish this task 
(Manshūkoku Shikai 1970, 1106).  
While Terada worked to centralize Manchukuo education, he resisted pressure to 
go the next step and allow Manchukuo education to fall under the control of Japan’s 
Monbushō.  At a time when there was increased pressure to “Japanize” Manchukuo 
society, Terada’s organization produced textbooks which were consistently unique, 
bearing little resemblance to the textbooks used in Japan.11  While they did contain 
                                                                                                                                                                          
in prison in 1945.  Ishiwara and Ogura were close friends and well known for their criticism of 
militarism.  Tsunetō and Yamamoto were leading members of the pre-war literary world.  Yamamoto 
received warnings from the police in 1933 for his donation of profits from a play to a Communist group, 
and Tsunetō resigned from Kyōto University that same year in protest over the firing of Takigawa 
Yukitoki and the limitations placed on academic freedom.  Yamamoto was also a key figure in the 
National Language Alliance (Kokumin no Kokugo Renmei), a post-war group which initiated a successful 
1946 grass-roots campaign for converting all laws and official documents, including the new constitution, 
from the archaic bungotai form into colloquial Japanese (kōgotai) (Dower 1999, 392-393, 616). 
 
11 Although Terada did not oppose the 1938 education system’s strong emphasis on Japanese language 
education for non-Japanese, he insisted that it be paired together with equally intensive Chinese language 
instruction for Japanese living in Manchukuo (Manshū Kokugo 1940, 55). 
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material laudatory toward the Japanese imperial system and society, they also continued 
to emphasize the region’s traditional culture and traditions, based on the idea that such 
material would more naturally pique the students’ interest.  The struggle with the 
Monbushō can be seen in the records of education conferences held in 1939 and 1942, 
which brought together education officials from the naichi (Japan) and gaichi (colonies, 
puppet states, and other occupied areas).  Both conferences featured lively debate over 
the appropriateness of using Japanese language textbooks produced in Tokyo in the 
gaichi.  At the 1939 Monbushō-sponsored Conference on National Language Policy, 
held in Tokyo, Japanese education officials introduced a new series of standardized 
Japanese language texts designed for use in the gaichi.  Unlike the representatives 
from Taiwan and Korea, the Manchukuo education officials present were clearly 
dubious about the texts.  Ichitani Kiyoaki, one of Terada’s assistants, said “I am afraid 
that the materials will contain foolish things about ethnic groups in the gaichi which 
will offend them.  That is why you should entrust these things to the people who live in 
the gaichi.”  Ōide Masayoshi, an SMR education veteran and prolific author of 
Japanese language textbooks in Manchukuo and occupied China, stated in an opinion 
paper submitted to the conference that the Japanese Education Ministry’s efforts were 
“going too far with an ideal, so that it is not appropriate to the situation.”  In the end 
the Manchukuo officials agreed to accept the texts as a reference, but made no promise 
to use them in their classes (Monbushō Toshokyoku 1939, 188, Ōide 1939a, 19).  
The friction over the use of material from Japan continued at the 1942 East 
Asian Education Conference, sponsored by the Manchukuo Civil Affairs Ministry and 
held in the Manchukuo capital Xinjing [Changchun].  At the Japanese language 
committee session a Japanese principal from Taiwan suddenly stood up and presented a 
  56 
motion, asking that “excellent experienced people from the gaichi” participate in the 
editing of future Japanese language texts intended for that region, because “the 
textbooks they [the Monbushō] have published are full of information about Japan, 
which are inescapably dull [for gaichi students].  We would like textbooks which are 
simple and clear, linguistic, and useful in daily life.”  Immediately Terada stood up to 
second the motion, and “everyone applauded” in support.  It seems probable that 
Terada arranged for the proposal to be made, and that it represented the will of the 
Manchukuo education leadership.  The Monbushō official present opposed the 
reduction of Japan-related material in the texts, but did admit that Manchukuo officials 
had the authority to decide whether to use the texts or not (Minsheng-bu 1942, 116-118, 
Komagome 1996, 325-326).   
 
War and the descent into orthodoxy, 1943-1945 
 The nature of Manchukuo education changed again as the war conditions 
became more severe after 1942.  Planned reforms ground to a halt as Japanese teachers, 
expected to be the leaders of reform, were drafted into the army, and a paper shortage 
made publishing new textbooks difficult.  From 1943 a new emphasis on Shintō 
principles in the curriculum and increasing amount of time spent in “public labor 
service” and military drills resulted in a steep decline in the amount of academic study 
occurring in schools. 
 In April 1943 the Manchukuo education bureaucracy was raised from the level 
of a department in the Civil Affairs Ministry to that of an independent ministry for the 
second time.  As before, a Chinese official was named Education Minister, but real 
power was held by the Japanese directly below him, led this time by Vice-Minister 
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Tanaka Yoshio.  Tanaka brought in a new team of Japanese officials who previously 
had no connection with Manchukuo education.  This may have been in response to the 
education bureaucracy’s previous reluctance to emphasize State Shintō in the 
curriculum.  The last member of the previous administration leadership was leave was 
Terada, who remained as head of textbook editing until he retired in April 1944.  His 
replacement, Katō Masayuki, was a former textbook official from the Monbushō with 
no previous experience in Manchukuo (Manshūkoku Shikai 1970, 1097).   
Around this time the ministry leaders began filling the curriculum with State 
Shintō ideology that the 1938-1942 leaders had avoided.  In October 1943 a 
deliberative council chaired by the Prime Minister and including members from 
throughout the Manchukuo education world was formed.  In October 1944 the council 
presented a report detailing the state’s education principles, with State Shintō as the 
cornerstone, and laying out a plan for teaching those principles during wartime (Bunkyō 
Shingi Kai 1944).  At the same time ministry officials prepared a new outline for the 
morals curriculum, including instructions for teachers on how to teach State Shintō 
principles, which was completed in June 1944.  Katō’s textbook editors were assigned 
the job of creating new morals textbooks to go along with the new emphasis, but few if 
any were completed by the end of the war.  
 As war conditions worsened, labor service and drill began to dominate school 
time, particularly in the middle schools and colleges.  In June 1939 the Manchukuo 
government first began requiring students to give free labor service to projects selected 
by the provincial governors.  The guideline was strengthened in December 1942 by the 
Student Labor Public Service Law, which required college students to work 30-45 days 
per year on national construction projects or agricultural production as part of student 
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labor teams.  In 1944 the Education Ministry began requiring middle school students to 
join the teams as well.  Middle school fourth year students were expected to work up 
to 125 days a year, third year students 75 days a year, and first and second year students 
up to 50 days a year.  Students in elementary schools also appear to have participated 
in labor service to some degree.  The ministry hailed this decision as a successful 
unification of practical education and labor service, but naturally the students viewed it 
as slave labor (Manshūkoku Shikai 1970, 1099).   
Although military drills were first instituted in Manchukuo middle schools in 
1940, in 1943 they became part of the standard curriculum.  Many Chinese testimonies 
about this period claim that in the last years the amount of time spent on academic 
subjects in the middle schools and colleges was drastically reduced.  One witness 
claims that during the last years the curriculum at his agricultural middle school became 
insubstantial and disorganized, and the students spent only two months a year in the 
classroom (Isoda 1991, 47, Manshūkoku Shikai 1970, 1099-1110).  The situation for 
Japanese students in Japan was fundamentally similar, but it seems clear from the 
testimonies available that conditions for students were worse in Manchukuo than they 
were in Japan. 
 
Conclusion 
 Although Manchukuo was a puppet state, the power holders did not always 
agree on the details of its manipulation.  In many areas government idealists who really 
believed in the independent and unique nature of the state quickly realized the true 
nature of the situation, and either acquiesced or left the government.  Education, more 
than any other sector, however, continued to attract idealists, and for a time the ministry 
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actively welcomed their participation.  Terada Kijirō was representative of this class of 
reformist educators who used Manchukuo as an opportunity to create a new kind of 
education outside the calcified institutions of Japan.  They worked within a system, 
however, that ultimately ran at cross-purposes with many of their ideals, and in an 
empire in which ideological conservatives were moving society into a lock-stepped 
march.    For a time they created a space free of some of the ideas they abhorred, but 
eventually they could not stop the trend of the times from overwhelming them.    
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Chapter 3 
Independence or Dependence: The development of a puppet ideology 
 A major goal in the creation of the puppet-state of Manchukuo in 1932 was the 
neutralization of anti-Japanese attitudes among the population so they would not 
interfere in the establishment of a military occupation dedicated to strengthening 
Japan’s strategic position.  The occupiers feared anti-Japanese sentiment spurred by 
Chinese nationalism as a potential obstacle to their goals, and immediately worked to 
remove the nationalist ideology taught in the region’s schools since 1929.  They aimed 
not only at eradicating all signs of that nationalism, but also at creating a new national 
ideology which could take its place as a unifying social force.   
Japanese began creating a rationalization for the occupation and the creation of 
the state of Manchukuo immediately after the commencement of hostilities in 
September 1931, citing Chinese misrule, historical precedent, and Japan’s special rights 
in the region.  As the Kwantung Army moved to create a puppet state, its supporters 
created a state ideology under the twin rubrics of “ethnic harmony” and the “kingly 
way” to mask the country’s true nature.  Through these mottos they hoped to dampen 
ethnic consciousness and play up their role in the strengthening of traditional values and 
the establishment of a fair government.  They presented the new ideology as unique, 
wholly unlike those in place in Nanjing and Tokyo.  The Japanese leadership changed 
key aspects of the ideology several times over the thirteen years of Manchukuo’s 
existence, reflecting changes in the leadership personnel, in the international situation, 
and in Japan’s domestic society.  By the 1940s the ideology’s mask of uniqueness was 
judged to be dangerous and unnecessary, and it was stripped away, to be replaced by a 
blatant ideology of Japanese ethnic superiority and the Japanese emperor system.   
  61 
The origins, development, and ultimate collapse of Manchukuo state ideology 
will be examined in this chapter, including the causes of its frequent changes of 
direction.  The reason given for the creation of the new state will be discussed first, 
followed by an examination of the concepts of “ethnic harmony” and the “kingly way”.  
Key documents examined include the transcripts of the League of Nations debate on the 
Manchurian Incident, texts of key Manchukuo government proclamations, the writings 
of three key creators of the state ideology—Kyoto University professor Yano Jin’ichi, 
Prime Minister Zheng, and journalist Tachibana Shiraki, and a 1934 Manchukuo higher 
elementary textbook.  Through a variety of sources, I intend to examine the way the 
state ideology was presented to different audiences, including to the international public, 
Japanese and Chinese intellectuals, and Chinese schoolchildren.  
 
Justifications of Manchukuo independence 
Before the Manchurian Incident the Kwantung Army plot leaders had envisioned 
a simple military occupation of the region, not the creation of a nominally independent 
state.  By September 22, however, pressure from Army leaders in Tokyo made it clear 
to them that a puppet state would give them a better chance of keeping control over the 
region (Yamashiro 1993, 63-64).  Therefore the Kwantung Army leaders engineered 
the formation of a committee of provincial leaders who in February 1932 declared the 
region’s independence from the Nanjing government, and on March 3, 1932 declared 
the formation of the state of Manchukuo, which they claimed was a sovereign and 
independent state.     
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The Kwantung Army originally defended its actions as simple self-defense.12  
As the plans for the creation of a puppet state matured, however, the plotters, together 
with civilian allies and eventually Japanese Foreign Ministry officials, developed a 
three-fold set of public justifications for the removal of the region from Chinese 
sovereignty, the creation of the state of Manchukuo, and Japan’s participation in the 
process.  They were: (1) China (both the Nanjing and Zhang Xueliang governments) 
had lost any mandate to govern the area because of its misrule and corruption, and the 
independence movement reflected the will of the people in rejecting those governments;  
(2) the Manchurian region historically had been independent of China; and (3) Japan 
had a special right to intervene and assist in the removal of the previous government 
because of a long-standing special relationship with the region and a superior ability to 
bring about good government and economic development.  
The Japanese claimed China as a whole suffered from decades of disorder, 
mismanagement, and economic extortion by warlord armies, and that nowhere was this 
truer than in Manchuria under Zhang Xueliang, who they claimed had driven the local 
population into poverty and desperation.  The following passage by the 
                                                          
12 The immediate justifications for the Kwantung Army’s military actions in September 1931 and the 
resulting occupation of the entire region was the purported attack by Chinese troops from Zhang 
Xueliang’s army on a section of the South Manchurian Railway’s line near Mukden and an attack on 
Japanese troops sent to investigate the explosion.  Japanese Army propaganda pamphlets from the period 
insisted the Kwantung Army acted in self-defense in all its actions, even those far from the railway lines.  
Once all credible military opposition melted away, however, the Japanese Army needed to construct a 
new justification for the Kwantung Army’s expanding activities.  This they did by asserting that 
Japanese nationals and property were threatened by widespread outlaw activity orchestrated by Zhang 
Xueliang, although it would be more accurate to say the Kwantung Army itself that had thrown the region 
into disorder.  (Young 1998: 140-145). 
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pro-Manchukuo Japanese writer Yano Jin’ichi is a standard presentation of this 
position:  
When the Qing was overthrown, wangdao (kingly way) rule immediately 
disappeared in China.  Bandits of all kinds ran rampant, squeezing the 
good people.  Warlords and bureaucrats, not to be outdone, selfishly 
robbed the people through extortionate taxes, monopoly rights, and 
deliberately depressing agricultural prices.   The 30 million people of 
Manchuria . . . at last could not stand it. They broke away, declared 
independence from China, and built a new state (Yano 1933, 301-302). 
An official version of Yano’s claims appeared in a 1934 Chinese language 
Manchukuo Higher Elementary School history textbook, which stated: 
Warlord dictatorial rule worsened after Zhang Xueliang took power . . . 
The Manchurian government became weary and weak.  The warlords 
imposed unbearable taxes to pay for ballooning military expenditures.  
They issued an excessive amount of currency, which caused the economy 
to collapse, and they encouraged the people to participate in anti-foreign 
movements.  Just as the Manchurian people were falling into destitution 
and peril, the situation was resolved by the great events of September 18 
(Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 62-63). 
As for the Chinese state as a whole, on February 19, 1932, Japanese diplomats at 
the League of Nations began to claim that China could not be regarded as an “organized 
country” with the ability to protect the “rights and interests of foreigners” (Willoughby 
1935, 245). On February 23 the Japanese government in a written statement to the 
League Council stated it “does not and can not consider that China is an ‘organized 
people’ within the meaning of the Covenant of the League of Nations . . . Its population 
is not organized except in patches.”  It continued: “There is no unified control in China 
and no authority which is entitled to claim such control” (Willoughby 1935, 268-271).  
It was no accident that this claim was first made the day after the Chinese collaborators 
in Manchuria declared independence from the Nanjing regime. 
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Japanese propagandists also claimed that the Chinese government had violated 
treaties between the two countries by directly supporting anti-Japanese activities in 
Manchuria.   Japanese diplomat Yoshizawa Kenkichi first raised these allegations in a 
cable to the Chinese Government at Nanjing on October 8, 1931.  He wrote: 
It is to be noted that [the] anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted 
as [an] instrument of national policy under the direction of [the] 
Nationalist Party . . . That movement must therefore be clearly 
distinguished from one which originates spontaneously amongst people.  
It is therefore evident that [the] present anti-Japanese movement in China 
is not only in contravention of [the] letter and spirit of treaties existing 
between [the] two countries, but constitutes [a] form of hostile act 
(Willoughby 1935, 77).   
At League of Nations sessions on October 13, October 23, and October 26, Yoshizawa 
continued to claim that Japanese nationals had been repeatedly harassed and threatened 
by Chinese agitated by the government’s anti-Japanese propaganda.  Official Chinese 
support for anti-Japanese activities, he held, represented an abrogation of treaties 
between the two countries, and justified the continued presence of Japanese troops 
throughout the region.     
 Buttressing these claims against the Chinese government were pledges of 
support given to the Japanese occupation by local Chinese leaders, which the Japanese 
portrayed as representing the overall “will of the people”.  The Japanese, through a 
mixture of open threats and promises of power-sharing, convinced many prominent 
Chinese to join local governing bodies and eventually declare independence from 
Nanjing.  Most of the declarations of independence contained references to the 
people’s will.  For example, an October 1, 1931 declaration by the “Northeastern 
Gentry and People’s Committee” announced that groups “all over the Northeast” had 
resolved on a policy of independent self-government.  “We now have an 
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unprecedented opportunity, having suffered under violent warlord rule, to set up a new 
independent government. . . .  This is a genuine resolution of the popular will.” The 
cooperation of these bodies with the independence movement formed the basis of the 
commonly repeated Japanese claim that the creation of Manchukuo represented “the 
united will of the 30 million people of Manchuria” (Mitter 2000, 83). 
The 1934 Manchukuo Higher Elementary history textbook portrayed these 
events as spontaneous actions by local Chinese leaders. It read: 
After Zhang Xueliang’s military clique and officials fled, the region fell 
into a state of anarchy, and security and financial conditions became very 
unstable.  In Fengtian Province the Regional Support of Peace and Order 
Committee was formed, with Yuan Jinkai as chairman.  In Jilin Xi Xia 
declared independence.  In Heilongjiang a Civilian Rule Leadership 
Committee was established . . . The committees wanted to find an 
agreement with their Friend State [Japan] and separate politically from 
China . . . In every province and region the people resented the cruel and 
heartless nature of the old political regime and desired to organize an 
independent state.  They presented petitions of request one after 
another . . . Representatives from all areas of Manchuria assembled in 
Fengtian and held the All-Manchurian Promotion of State Foundation 
Conference.  They released a declaration calling for the swift 
establishment of a new state, and quickly cabled the announcement to each 
region.  The Administrative Committee represented the people’s 
will--they could not go against it, nor could they let national affairs go 
long in suspension (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 66-69). 
 
 The second major part of the new ideological framework was that historically, 
geographically, and culturally the region was fundamentally separate from the rest of 
China.  Before discussing the specific claims of Manchurian independence, one should 
note that a common theme in Japanese studies of China since 1991 was the idea that the 
struggling Republican state would never achieve complete unification, because China 
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lacked a true unified ethnicity.  This line of thought grew out of the studies of Japanese 
scholars, particularly Nakamura Kyūshirō, who were influenced by contemporary 
German theories of ethnic nationalism.  They interpreted these theories as predicting 
Japan’s rise, because of its relative ethnic homogeneity, and the disintegration of China, 
because of its ethnic heterogeneity (Doak 2001).  Many Japanese scholars and activists, 
using these ideas as a basis, advocated Japanese involvement in China in order to 
cushion the shock of the state’s inevitable disintegration into a number of smaller, 
viable states. 
On the same day the Japanese at the League of Nations claimed China was not 
an organized country, they also began criticizing China’s claims of sovereignty over 
Manchuria by claiming that Manchuria was not an area historically populated by Han 
peoples.  He described it as the land of the Manchus, and referred to the Chinese 
population there as “Chinese immigrants”, placing them on par with other foreign 
immigrants.  He also pointed out that the Russian government had played a role in the 
separation of Outer Mongolia from China to form an independent country without an 
outcry from the world community (Willoughby 1935).13  
While there was significant support in Republican China for a reorganization of 
the state into a loosely unified federation of provinces14, at least an equally significant 
                                                          
13 The representative, named Satō, did not go so far as to claim positively that Manchuria was not under 
Chinese sovereignty, as Japan’s Foreign Ministry under Shidehara Kijūrō was not yet ready to take that 
stand.   The Chinese representative replied that Manchuria was politically, historically, and culturally 
Chinese, that the majority of the population was Han Chinese, and the presence of a non-Han minority 
was irrelevant, since China was a multi-racial state.   He added that Japanese claims of having no 
interest in infringing on China’s sovereignty resembled broken promises given to Korea in 1905. 
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number of leading Chinese, including the leadership of the Guomindang Party, strongly 
opposed any attempt at dividing the state or weakening central control.  The Chinese 
government’s claims of sovereignty over Manchuria were eventually accepted by the 
Lytton Commission, the body sent by the League of Nations’ to investigate the 
Manchurian Incident in 1932-33.15 
Pro-Manchukuo activists rallied to attack the narrative presented by the Chinese 
government.  A leading figure among them was Yano, who since the 1920s had written 
extensively on the historical independence of Manchuria.16  Almost immediately after 
the coup he traveled to Manchuria to assist the Kwantung Army in developing an 
ideological framework for the new state.  His writings emphasized the legacy of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
14See Prasenjit Duara, “Provincial Narratives of the Nation; Centralism and Federalism in Republican 
China.”  In Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity, ed. Harumi Befu.  
Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1993. 
 
15 Briefly stated, the Chinese government/Lytton Report position held that Han Chinese had dominated 
and controlled the region for centuries, especially since the Ming dynasty conquered the region in the 
Fifteenth Century.  Although the following Qing dynasty’s emperors were Manchu, not Han, they 
eventually absorbed Chinese culture and upheld many of the conventions of the previous dynasty.   
During the early Qing period, because so many Manchus left Manchuria to occupy China south of the 
Great Wall, many Chinese immigrated into the southern part of the region, and eventually they became 
the dominant population there.  For most of the Qing period Manchuria was ruled separately from the 
rest of China by military governors, but in 1907 its government was reorganized on the same provincial 
lines as the rest of the realm, which marked the end of its unique status.  After 1912 it became part of the 
Chinese Republic, along with the rest of the country.  They also point out that although the warlord 
Zhang Zuolin declared the region independent at one point, this did not mean he wanted to separate from 
China, rather he continued to maneuver for the unification of the country under his rule. 
 
16 Yano Jin’ichi (1872-1970) studied and taught in Beijing before becoming a professor of Chinese 
studies at Kyoto University in 1911.  In 1932 he began working as an advisor and propagandist for the 
Kwantung Army and the Manchukuo Foreign Office (Fogel 1984).  
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non-Han kingdoms which existed in the region from ancient times, independent from 
the ethnic Han dynasties which were based in the Yellow and Yangtze River valleys to 
the south.  At times the Han dynasties were able to conquer and occupy portions of 
Manchuria, but likewise the Manchurian kingdoms were sometimes able to do the same 
to territory in the south.  Some, like the Bohai (or Parhae, which existed roughly 
698-926), enjoyed diplomatic equality and a lively trading relationship with the 
contemporary southern dynasties.  The Liao (907-1113) and Jin (1115-1234) managed 
to conquer much of present-day North China at their height.  Finally the Qing dynasty 
built an empire in the 17th century which covered almost all the territory ever controlled 
by any previous Chinese entity.  Therefore, Yano held, China had no more right to 
claim historical dominance over Manchuria than Manchuria did to claim sovereignty 
over the rest of China. 
The official acceptance of this ideology in Manchukuo can be seen in the 
introduction of the 1934 Manchukuo Higher Elementary School history textbook.  It 
began: 
On the Relationship between China and Manchuria:  Historically, many 
states have been established in Manchuria, like the Bohai, Liao, Jin, and 
Qing.  These were all independent states, and contended with China 
proper (zhongguo benbu) as equals.  These strong ethnic groups were 
able to ward off the Chinese ethnicity (zhongguo minzu).  Because of 
their cultural strength they could participate in equal trade with those from 
the Chinese culture.  Therefore, our Manchuria is a full-fledged state, 
with traditional ethnic groups and a firm culture (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 1-2). 
Three long-term bases of Manchurian independence were listed in another 
chapter of the same textbook.  They were Manchuria’s history of cultural and ethnic 
difference from China, its geography, and the precedent of a succession of independent 
states.  It stated: 
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The first point is our ethnic history.  Manchuria, from the time of the 
Shushen [an ancient kingdom] to the Qing, has had its own special 
customs and ceremonies, different from the customs of China 
(Zhongguo) . . . The second point is our geographic relationship.  
Manchuria has always been independent, not subordinate to China.  It 
was occupied for a short time during the height of the Han and Tang, but 
the occupations could not be sustained.  It was natural for those northeast 
of the Great Wall to establish their own state.  That is why the Chinese 
call it ‘outside the wall.’   The third point is the established precedent of 
state building.  In the past the Fuyu, Bohai, Jurchen, and Manchu have 
established kingdoms in this land.  The lesser kingdoms have protected 
the region, while the greater ones have expanded over China’s central 
plain.  They achieved greatness by establishing independent kingdoms 
(Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 63-64). 
 Chinese intellectuals argued that Manchuria had become a fundamental part of 
China during the years both were ruled by the Qing from the 17th to the early 20th 
centuries.  Prime Minister Zheng Xiaoxu and Yano Jin’ichi, in separate documents, 
addressed this claim by arguing that the Qing should not be considered a “Chinese” 
empire, but rather a “Great East Asian Empire.”  Manchuria and China proper were 
ruled by the same dynasty, but until its final decades they were administered as separate 
entities.  Also, since the Qing rulers themselves were Manchu, those employing the 
Qing precedent to prove Chinese-Manchurian unity could just as well argue that China 
south of the Great Wall was under Manchurian sovereignty as the other way around 
(Wenjiao-bu 1932, 64-66, Yano 1933, 46). 
Furthermore, Yano argued, Sun Yatsen used the motto of ethnic 
self-determination to rally support for his Republican revolution against the Qing.  
When his “racial revolution” succeeded, the connection between Manchuria and the rest 
of China was dissolved.  The successor state, the Chinese Republic, was based on Han 
ethnic identity.  That is why Mongolia immediately declared its independence, as 
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Manchuria did a few years later in 1932.  While Manchuria was nominally considered 
under Chinese sovereignty in the 1912-1931 period, actually the central Chinese 
government exerted little control over the region.  Instead, it was controlled by 
warlords, most notably the Zhang family.  Since their rule was illegitimate and 
rapacious, it should not be considered evidence of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria 
(Yano 1933, 292-293). 
 Chinese critics of Manchukuo also held that the overwhelming numerical 
predominance of the Han in Manchuria, 96% of the population in 1931 by one estimate, 
bolstered Chinese claims of sovereignty.  This was a much harder argument for the 
Manchukuo advocates to counter.  Yano attempted to rebut the position by claiming, 
rather weakly, that the Han population had only arrived very recently, a continuation of 
an ancient pattern of immigrants temporarily fleeing to the region to escape civil war in 
the south (Yano 1933, 286-287).   For the most part, however, Manchukuo advocates 
avoided using ethnicity as a justification for independence.  Instead, they used the 
concept of “ethnic harmony,” declaring that each ethnic group living in the region 
would be treated as equals under the new government.  I will discuss ethnic harmony 
in a following section.  
 
The third leg of the Manchukuo independence-legitimizing narrative claimed 
Japan had special rights to act in the region, even the right to remove the “illegitimate” 
Zhang Xueliang government and replace it with a new independent entity.  Japan had 
earned this right, they claimed, because of its ties with the region going back to ancient 
times, because of the debt the region owed to Japan for saving it from Russian 
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deprivations in 1904-1905, and because of Japan’s sizable economic and cultural 
investments in the region. 
 Although Japanese propagandists often spoke of the “long standing ties” 
between Manchuria and Japan, in fact there were very few ancient ties to which they 
could point.  The most significant were those between the Yamato court at Nara and 
the Bohai state in the years 727-900.  A teacher’s manual to the 1934 Manchukuo 
history textbook gave the following instructions to teachers:  
1. Have the students clearly understand that today’s spirit of friendly 
collaboration between the Japan and Manchuria has developed because the 
two countries have been in close contact since ancient times.  2.  Have 
them understand that because there were opportunities for political 
communications and commercial and cultural exchanges between Japan 
and Manchuria in ancient times, today both countries again need to press 
forward toward being of one mind (Wenjiao-bu 1935c, 28).   
The non-Han dynasties centered in Manchuria after the Bohai (the Liao, Jin, and Qing), 
however, had little to no contact with Japan which could be used by supporters of 
Manchurian independence. 
 While the propagandists made use of what ancient contacts between Japan and 
Manchuria they could find, their attention was more strongly directed toward Japan’s 
interaction with Manchuria in the more recent past.  The major locus of Japan’s 
perceived special position in Manchuria were the sacrifices made by Japanese troops in 
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which they described as an effort to keep 
Russian imperialists out of Manchuria and Korea. 
 For example, the chapter on the Russo-Japanese War in the higher elementary 
Manchukuo history textbook reads as follows:  
Russia, after the Sino-Japanese War . . . seized special rights in Manchuria, 
and began expanding its power into Korea.  This deeply troubled the 
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Japanese.  During the Boxer Rebellion many Russian troops entered 
Manchuria, acted as if it were their own territory, and threatened the peace 
of the Orient.  The Qing was weak and could not resist them, so Japan, 
acting to defend the country and to assure East Asian peace, courageously 
intervened. 
The text then goes on to list post-war Japanese economic and cultural contributions to 
the region: 
[The Japanese] saved Manchuria from losing its independence.  The 
danger abated, and the Japanese began to develop the country.  The use 
of the word ‘paradise’ [to describe the region] first appeared during this 
period.  First [the Japanese] built up the industrial sector, using buried 
and neglected resources.  This development benefited the whole world.  
Next they worked to raise the region’s cultural level, establish schools 
and newspapers, write books, and urge students to study abroad.  They 
increased the number of train lines, improving transportation. Altogether 
they blessed our people.  The Japanese never failed to do their utmost 
to provide assistance and support (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 48-51). 
Besides past Japan-Manchuria connections, Manchukuo advocates also argued 
that because the Japanese had created a strong centralized government and a vibrant 
economy in their own country, while China had failed to do either well, that Japan was 
the appropriate country to guide Manchuria into the modern world.  Tachibana Shiraki, 
a Japanese scholar of Chinese society and advisor to the SMR, became the Kwantung 
Army plotters’ chief advisor on matters of Chinese society in 1931.  Previously, in 
1927, he wrote that Chinese had seldom related their own individual interests to 
patriotism, their ties were to their village and region, not the Chinese state.  Tachibana 
and his contemporaries commonly claimed that “the Chinese do not have the least 
interest in the state.”  Tachibana and Colonel Ishihara Kanji, a leading actor in the plot 
to occupy the region, held a lengthy discussion about Chinese society in March 1931, 
and on that day Ishihara echoed Tachibana’s positions in his diary (Hirano 1982, 
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400-401).  In a May 1931 document Ishihara wrote, “It is highly doubtful the Chinese 
could create a truly modern state, but I am certain that through our protection the Han 
people could become happy, because they could take charge of their own development” 
(Ishihara 1931, Yamashiro 1993, 54).  Other Japanese scholars whose opinions on the 
weak state consciousness in China who also may have influenced the Kwantung Army 
officers include Yano , Wada Kiyoshi, and Inaba Iwakichi, an instructor at Japan’s War 
College.  Yano, for example, wrote:  
[Although] the Chinese Republic was created 20 years ago, they have yet 
to build a true country because of their lack of state values.  To build 
state values, you have to actively help the citizens feel a reason to live and 
die.  They are foolishly trying to remove the rights and privileges of 
foreign countries to make up for the lack of these values and build the 
state . . . but they will never succeed.  The new state of Manchukuo must 
promote these state values, helping the citizens feel honor, joy, and pride 
in being citizens (Yano 1933, 296-297). 
 Other reasons given for the legitimacy of the new state include saving the 
region from Communism (Wenjiao-bu 1932, 210), and the proprietary rights of Pu Yi’s 
Aisin Gioro family over the region (Wenjiao-bu 1932, 267-269, Yano 1933, 15), but 
neither were emphasized nearly as much as those mentioned above. 
 Manchurian independence, therefore, was rationalized by Manchukuo 
advocates by claiming Chinese misrule, the historical autonomy of the region, and 
Japan’s special right to intervene.  These, however, were not the kind of ideals that 
would stir the people’s souls and inspire them to live and die for their country.  With 
this in mind, the founders of the state created a vision of the nature of the new state 
using more idealistic principles, which they hoped would inspire the non-Japanese into 
becoming patriotic Manchukuo citizens, and draw Japanese into helping participate in 
the Manchukuo project. 
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The Nature of the New State  
Although the Japanese military could forcibly remove the Zhang Xueliang 
regime and its Guomindang allies from Manchuria, the Chinese nationalist ideals that 
they propagated and represented were not so easily removed from the society.  Along 
with their military efforts against nationalists, therefore, the Japanese occupiers also 
attempted to root out Chinese nationalist consciousness, and replace it with a newly 
pieced-together ideology. 
The creators of Manchukuo promised the residents of the new state that they 
were creating new kind of independent state, combining aspects of traditional Chinese 
culture with new social ideas and technology imported from Japan, led by local elites 
with Japanese assistance.  The idealistic principles of the state can be summarized by 
two phrases, “ethnic harmony” and the “kingly way”.  “Ethnic harmony” (C. minzu 
xiehe, J. minzoku kyōwa) referred to the end of racial inequality, the creation of a society 
in which the various ethnic groups cooperated in a common goal of creating a great 
nation.  The “kingly way” (C. wangdao, J. ōdō) referred to a form of government 
extolled in the Chinese classics which acted in the best interests of the people.    
The official interpretation of both of these concepts changed considerably over 
the period of Manchukuo’s existence.  These changes occurred as the importance of 
emphasizing Manchukuo’s independence faded after Japan drove the Guomindang 
government out of Nanjing in 1937, and as Japanese tolerance of alternate social and 
political structures within the empire lessened.  “Ethnic harmony” became more 
Japan-centered and assimilationist, and the “kingly way” changed from an emphasis on 
traditional Chinese governing principles to one which modeled itself on the emperor 
system in Japan.   
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One should keep in mind that the Manchukuo consciousness that the Japanese 
leadership tried to create was, as Rana Mitter has pointed out, always a “negative” 
consciousness, much more focused in describing what it was not (Chinese nationalist 
and communist) then what it was.  Also, it defined the state as fundamentally allied to 
another state, Japan.  Thus from the start this was the ideology of a puppet state, not an 
indigenous nationalism (Mitter 2000, 97-98).  As such, while many Japanese may have 
been sincerely inspired by it, there is little evidence that a significant number of 
non-Japanese were similarly moved.  Many may have accepted it as part of the status 
quo, but it never appears to stirred any passion or acted as a motivating force among the 
population.  
 
Ethnic Harmony 
 “Ethnic harmony” referred to the idea that Manchukuo national identification 
should be based on shared geography and interests rather than ethnic ties.  Within 
Manchukuo, ethnic groups would be treated equally, and this equal treatment would 
help inspire the people to cooperate in the establishment of the state.  Internationally, 
Manchukuo would become a model of cooperation, especially with Japan, its “close 
friend”.  The ideology was designed in opposition to Chinese nationalism and 
communism, portrayed as a unifying, rather than a dividing force.  Proponents of the 
ideology hoped that by defeating nationalism and communism, which they saw as 
dividing society ethnically and socially, people should be encouraged to find 
contentment in the promotion of domestic and international peace and the economic 
success of the allied countries of East Asia.   The discourse was first developed by 
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Japanese settler groups in Manchuria before 1932, and used some concepts already 
accepted by many in the Chinese public. 
 There is little indication that these concepts were ever able to hide the reality of 
Japanese domination from the general public.  In time the contradictions between the 
dominant Japanese ideology of ethnic singularity and superiority and the pressures 
exerted by the demands of local Japanese for special services changed the discourse.  It 
became focused on the need for non-Japanese to place themselves in harmony with 
Japan, rather than find an equal middle ground.  The lack of real equality hollowed the 
ideology of much the persuasive power it might have held with the non-Japanese public.  
This section will discuss the creation of these principles, their changes over time, and 
the real position of the different ethnic groups within Manchukuo society.   
 In 1929 the Manchurian Youth League (Manshū Seinen Renmei), an 
organization of civilian Japanese living in Manchuria, first began to use the term “ethnic 
harmony” in its official literature, and on June 13, 1931 it declared that it would make 
“harmony among the races residing in Manchuria and Mongolia its main objective” 
(Hirano 1982, 412-414).  Since 1905 the Japanese living in Manchuria had carved out 
a comfortable world for themselves, which began to be threatened in 1928 by Zhang 
Xueliang’s alliance with the Guomindang and the coincident attempt to restrict 
exclusive Japanese privileges.  These Japanese settlers developed a vision of a 
Manchurian society which would feature inter-ethnic cooperation, but which would 
continue to protect the role of the Japanese as the region’s economic leaders (Egler 1977, 
90-108).  Briefly stated, their ideology held that: (1) all residents in the state, 
regardless of their ethnicity, are equal; (2) each ethnicity should be valued for its unique 
  77 
culture and strengths; (3) the spirit of cooperation is necessary for the success of a 
multi-ethnic state.   
  The chief reason ethnic harmony appealed to Japanese settlers was it offered 
them the promise of acting in the region on an equal legal basis as native-born 
inhabitants.  This is made clear in the state’s founding declaration, the Proclamation of 
the Establishment of Manchukuo, which stated: 
There shall be no discrimination with respect to either race or caste among 
those people who now reside within the territory of the new State, 
including the races of the Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Japanese and 
Koreans; nationals of other countries as well, may upon application 
acquire as permanent residents, equal treatment with others and their rights 
shall be guaranteed thereby (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 1).   
 The proclamation held out the promise to Japanese (and other non-natives) of 
unfettered access to Manchuria and its resources, while before the Japanese were limited 
to the strip of land running along the SMR railway line.   
 Rather than dwell on increased Japanese economic opportunities, however, 
most discussion of ethnic harmony focused on its moral necessity.  Pu Yi’s March 9th, 
1932 Presidential Declaration (Zhizheng Xuanyuan) stated:  
Humanity must cherish morality.  But some feel that their race is superior 
to others, showing their lack of morality . . . The purpose of international 
competition is the infringement of other’s rights and the gaining of 
personal advantage . . . Through morality and charity we will rid ourselves 
of ethnic views and international fights (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 2). 
In a pamphlet distributed to teachers, Prime Minister Zheng wrote: 
Everyone who presently lives in Manchuria will be called 
‘Manchukuoans’—the Han, Manchus, Mongols, and all others.  All are 
equal; there is no difference between them.  All are needed in the 
construction of the new state.  We will cooperate in unison, acting as 
different bodies with one mind.  Through coexistence and cooperation a 
healthy new state will develop.  These ideas are based on the philosopher 
  78 
Zhangzi’s ‘Heaven and Earth,’ in which he wrote, ‘differences make us 
great’ (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 70).   
 The editors of the first Manchukuo elementary school textbooks in 1934-35 
took up this ideal by emphasizing and celebrating the unique cultural aspects of the Han, 
Korean, Japanese, and Mongol peoples in the texts.  For example, the 3rd grade 
Chinese language readers included a chapter on a traditional Chinese 
mountain-climbing festival, a chapter poetically describing Mt. Fuji, and a chapter 
celebrating traditional Mongolian customs. 
 Besides the opportunities it offered the Japanese, and the moral authority it 
seemed to offer, promoters of the ideology of ethnic harmony hoped it would help to 
keep out the ideologies of Chinese nationalism and communism, which threatened the 
existence of the Manchukuo state.  A middle school morals textbook published in 1934 
stated the following on the dangers of nationalism: 
Modern ethnicities are narrowly nationalistic, which makes the people 
selfish, suspicious, and jealous.  Nationalists do not emphasize ethnic 
harmony or the morality of neighborly friendship.  They use nationalism 
as an excuse to resort to arms and try to win wars.  This happened in 
Europe in 1914, where suspicion and jealousy caused an international 
conflict, resulting in countless deaths.  Guns bristled like forests, bullets 
fell like rain, and blood was everywhere.  It produced orphans, widows, 
and childless parents, spreading horror and grief.  We reject ethnic 
nationalism and advocate ethnic harmony; otherwise the result will be 
many times worse than the European war (Wenjiao-bu 1934c, 106). 
 On communism, Zheng wrote, “Communist policy is a plan to destroy the 
world, and is the great enemy to our theory, so we can not coexist with it” (Wenjiao-bu 
1932, 70).  This position was included in the above-mentioned middle school morals 
textbook. “Some countries promote nationalism, and some countries promote 
communism, which calls the workers to class conflict.  These evil ideas are sources of 
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chaos.  The only way to solve this confusion is to promote ethnic harmony” 
(Wenjiao-bu 1934c, 121). 
 Only a “moral” (non-Communist) international cooperation promised 
prosperity for all.  Zheng, looking back to the past, said: 
[W]e model our state after the ancient state of Bohai which existed here.  
It was an independent country which carried out peaceful and culturally 
advanced policies.  To the west it was friendly with the Tang, and to the 
East it exchanged envoys and fostered good relations with Japan.  For 
over 210 years it built a flourishing culture (Wenjiao-bu 1932, 70). 
 
Selective use and rejection of Chinese concepts of ethnicity and the state 
 Although the Manchukuo ideologues proclaimed their intention to discard 
ethnic nationalism as unifying principle, they still desired to form a new kind of 
“national identity” based on non-ethnic principles.  They included a shared geography 
and culture, and pan-Asian solidarity, which they presented as more constructive bases 
for a people.  . 
 Some Manchukuo ideologues, Tachibana in particular, sited Sun Yatsen as a 
source of their ideas.  Sun’s ideas on ethnicity and nationalism evolved over his 
lifetime.  At one point he turned away from the influential ideas of the anti-Manchu 
nationalists like Zhang Binglin, who framed their calls for revolution against the Qing in 
ethnic terms--the Han majority overthrowing the usurping Manchus (Chow 1997).  He 
said the term “Chinese national” (guomin) should apply to any Asian born in the state’s 
territory.  The state would act in the interests of what he called the “five nations” of 
China (the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Uighur, and Tibetan peoples) and grant ethnic 
minorities a reasonable degree of political autonomy.  Also, in a 1924 speech given in 
the Japanese port city of Kobe, Sun called for increased “pan-Asian” cooperation and 
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urged Japan to take the lead by abandoning what he called its Western militarism and 
return to its pacific Eastern heritage.17  
 The Manchukuo ideologues borrowed both the ideas of “five nation’s 
harmony” and “Pan-Asian cooperation” from Sun.  They originally defined the five 
nations of Manchukuo as the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Korean, and Japanese peoples.  
In other words, geography and a broadly shared “Eastern” tradition were emphasized 
over ethnic differences.  The 1934 middle school morals textbook stated that there 
were three ways for a minzu (ethnos/nation) to form, shared lineage, shared geography, 
and shared culture (including language). While identity based solely on shared lineage 
is defined as “narrow” and destructive, the second and third routes are portrayed in a 
more positive light (Wenjiao-bu 1934c, 103-104). 
 At the same time as they borrowed Sun’s idea of “five nations harmony”, 
Manchukuo ideologues claimed moral superiority over the Chinese Republic by 
asserting that its founding state ideology was inherently discriminatory against non-Han 
peoples, both foreign and domestic.  Tachibana and editors at the Japanese-run 
Manshū Nippō claimed in 1931 and 1932 that the discriminatory ideas of Zhang Binglin 
were held by the current leader of the Guomindang, Chiang Kaishek.  They said 
Chiang had turned away from Sun’s promises of autonomy to ethnic minorities because 
he feared local autonomy could harm state unity.  Symbolic of this choice was his 
decision in June 1928 to replace the Chinese Republican flag, which had five colors 
                                                          
 
17 Sun’s pan-Asian ideals, although rejected by Chiang Kaishek, continued to find some support after his 
death.  In 1930 a new journal Xinyaxiya (New Asia) was founded by GMD party member Dai Jitao, 
which listed the promotion of Sun’s pan-Asianism as among its chief goals (Duara 1997).  
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representing five races, with a white sun flag.  The pro-Manchukuo writers described 
Chiang’s actions as a betrayal of Sun’s ideals, and claimed that Manchukuo represented 
a return to the values of ethnic autonomy, international cooperation, and Eastern 
morality (Komagome 1996, 240-245).   
 Pro-Manchukuo writers also did not feel any compunction about 
simultaneously borrowing ideological capital from Sun’s enemy, the defunct Qing 
Empire.  The establishment of the Aisin Gioro family, the former Qing ruling house, as 
titular rulers of Manchukuo was represented by some as a rejection of the Chinese 
Revolution and a return to what they described as the Qing ideal of cooperation among 
peoples.  Yano wrote, “Manchukuo is a refutation of the racialist nature of the 1911 
revolution.  The people of Manchukuo, by turning to Pu Yi, have rejected racialism 
and affirm the greatness of the Qing, which was the greatest of the Chinese dynasties” 
(Yano 1933, 293). 
 As these early attempts to link Manchukuo to China’s past suggest, Manchukuo 
ideologues publicized their ideology as the natural development of the most 
forward-looking people from throughout East Asia, rather then presenting it as a new 
idea imported from Japan.  There was a vibrant stratum of Pan-Asian thought found in 
1931 Chinese society that the Manchukuo creators were able to mine, including the 
literature produced by popular Chinese “enlightenment societies” like the International 
Morality Society and the Red Swastika Society. 
 The International Morality Society and the Red Swastika Society were both 
formed in Shandong in the early Republican period.   Leaders of these organizations 
tried to instigate a return to what they called traditional Eastern values such as 
international cooperation, stable families, and charitable works, as a way to bring order 
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back a society that they saw as rocked by the rapid influx of Western ideas and 
technologies.  The International Morality Society in particular sought to bring about 
ethnic harmony within China by de-emphasizing ethnic differences and emphasizing a 
shared cultural heritage of Confucian order and Buddhist charity.  In this it was 
influenced by the former Qing reformer Kang Youwei, who served as the society’s 
president from its foundation in 1918 until his death in 1927.  At the end of the Qing 
dynasty he had opposed Zhang Binglin’s ideas of racial warfare and insisted on the 
fundamental similarities between the Manchus and the Han.  During the Republican 
period the organization attempted to transcend national and religious boundaries by 
incorporating the best aspects of all the major world religions and encouraging members 
to, in today’s parlance, “think globally”.  In the 1920s they organized drives to raise 
money for victims of natural disasters in Japan and the Soviet Union as well as at home.  
Prasenjit Duara has stated that the Chiang-led Guomindang, after establishing 
themselves in Nanjing, “regarded all the redemptive societies, as it did the Morality 
Society, with extreme hostility and banned them” because they represented an 
alternative, internationalist model which threatened the orthodox nationalist ideology 
being produced by the state (Duara 1997, 1035). 
 The Manchukuo government embraced these societies and may have used their 
ideologies as models in the creation of their own concepts of “ethnic harmony” and “the 
kingly way”.  In 1933 the Xinjing (Changchun) chapter of the Morality Society 
declared independence from the central organization, and in 1936 the Manchukuo 
Morality Society was created, with Manchukuo government leaders in many of the 
leading positions.  The society opened hundreds of lecture halls, clinics, and schools, 
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and appears to have developed a large active membership under the Manchukuo regime 
(Duara 1997, 1550-1551, Komagome 1996, 265-268).   
 Although Manchukuo government declarations promised ethnic equality and 
harmony, in reality the Japanese took control of all government functions they deemed 
important from the very beginning.  There was some attempt to hide the true racial 
inequality of the society in early Manchukuo propaganda, but by 1935 the Japanese 
began to be singled out as the state’s “leading race”.  Over time even the token 
attempts at recognizing the worth of non-Japanese cultures withered away, and cultural 
policy moved toward instilling Japanese traditions, language, and religion into the 
culture of the region’s population.  In the next section the image pro-Manchukuo 
writers tried to present of the different ethnic groups’ place in Manchukuo society will 
be discussed. 
 
Ethnicity and ethnoyms in Manchukuo 
 The creators of the Manchukuo ideology had to define the state’s legitimacy on 
something besides ethnic self-determination, because the overwhelming majority of the 
population was Han Chinese.  When discussing ethnicity, therefore, pro-Manchukuo 
writers were forced into one of two rhetorical maneuvers, either emphasizing Manchu 
and Han ethnic difference, or eliding them.  The first rhetorical approach, favored 
during the years preceding and immediately following the Manchurian Incident, 
required the writer to emphasize the region’s past ethnic makeup over the current 
situation. Yano took this approach, as did Ishihara, as seen in this 1928 statement: 
Manchuria does not belong to Han people; it is the Japanese who have a 
deep relationship with the region.  Those who speak of racial 
self-determination must understand that Manchuria belongs to the Manchu 
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and Mongol peoples, who are racially closer to the Japanese than to the 
Chinese.  Even though most living here now are Han, economically they 
are closer to our country than to China proper (Yamashiro 1993, 58).   
 
Ishihara first asserts the region’s independence on ethnic terms, but then in mid-thought 
he recognizes the reality of a Han majority, and switches to a claim that economic ties 
override the population’s ethnic makeup.   Ignoring the contemporary ethnic reality, 
however, was not a promising approach in a period which valued ethnic 
self-determination. 
 To avoid this difficulties, most post-1932 Manchukuo propaganda and official 
documents avoided discussing the question of multiple ethnicities altogether, referring 
simply to “the people of Manchukuo”.  When they recognized the existence of 
ethnicity, they utilized a creative (but inconsistent) set of ethnonyms.  They almost 
never used labels which could link the Manchukuo population with the Chinese 
Republic, such as Zhongguoren (Chinese) or “Han”.  Instead they usually referred to 
the Han population in new terms which obfuscated ethnic divisions, most commonly 
manren (-Man person), but also manzhouren (-Manchuria person) and 
manxi (-Man descent).   The meaning of these terms was unfixed, and could vary 
widely with each author.  They did not refer directly to the Manchu ethnic group, who 
for years had been called manzu ().  For the most part the terms referred to both 
Han and Manchus, lumping together the two peoples that Ishihara and Yano had tried so 
hard to separate rhetorically.  For example, in the March 1932 State Founding 
Declaration, the “five races” of Manchukuo were listed as the “Han, Manchu, Mongols, 
Japanese, and Koreans”.  In 1936, however, a similar list by the Concordia Association 
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(Kyōwakai) merged the Manchu and Han into one category, and filled the open space by 
including the small Russian minority (Manren, Mongols, Japanese, Koreans, and 
Russians).  Sometimes Manren referred to all non-Japanese East Asians who lived in 
Manchukuo, and on rare occasions it even included the Japanese as well (Tamanoi 2000, 
255-257).   
 In any case, by labeling as “Manchurian” those people conventionally known 
as Han Chinese, the Manchukuo government was asking millions to deny a part of their 
cultural and family heritage.  Remember that the majority of Han living in Manchuria 
had come from Shandong and Henan provinces in the previous century, and many 
doubtless retained contact with family members still living in their home villages.  As 
will be discussed in Ch. 5, the Manchukuo government does not appear to have ever 
demanded the Han population completely give up its cultural heritage.  Textbooks in 
the 1934-1937 period, and to a lesser extent after 1937 as well, included a significant 
amount of material on traditional Chinese history and culture, affirming the historical 
ties of the majority to what they considered their heritage.   By changing the name of 
their ethnicity, however, the government apparently did intend for the majority to think 
of themselves as something “more” than just Han Chinese. 
 Mariko Asano Tamanoi has pointed out that when pro-Manchukuo authors 
wrote about a Han in Manchukuo involved in criminal or anti-state activities they often 
called the perpetrator zhina-ren () a common Japanese language term for 
“Chinese”, but when lauding a Han for a positive act, they always referred to them as 
manren (Tamanoi 2000, 257).   I believe the unspoken thrust of the pro-Manchukuo 
rhetoric was that manren are Han (or other East Asians) who had been changed by their 
connection with the geography of Manchuria and by their close association with 
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Japanese.  The government affirmed much of the positive heritage and attributes of 
Han culture, but also implied that the Manchurian Han had taken a forward step beyond 
their fellows in the south.  Criminals and others deserving of censure, however, had 
somehow failed to allow themselves to be changed, and therefore were fit only to be 
called zhina-ren.   
 
Ideological contradictions and the rhetorical construction of Japanese leadership  
 While Pro-Manchukuo writers portrayed Han Chinese as a people who required 
the metamorphosis that Manchukuo could provide, there was little such expectation that 
Japanese were in need of as significant a transformation.  The Japanese in Manchukuo 
presented themselves as society’s natural leaders, advanced to such a degree that they 
had no need of fundamental change.   
 The Manchukuo ideology of ethnic harmony directly contradicted with the 
widespread Japanese ideas of racial superiority and uniqueness, which by the 1920s had 
become the hegemonic discourse in Japan and which was fundamental to justifying its 
imperial efforts.  Early on, most pro-Manchukuo writers remained silent about this 
contradiction.  One exception, an apparent true believer in the new Manchukuo 
ideology, was Kamimura Tetsuya, who as the first Manchukuo Education Ministry 
General Affairs Chief was mentioned earlier.  In a 1932 handbook distributed to 
Chinese-speaking teachers, Kamimura hints that he thought the Manchukuo ideology 
superior to the ideology of Japanese racial uniqueness and superiority. “All of the 
leading countries”, he wrote, “have mistaken ideas of selfish nationalism.  Even 
present-day Japan is influenced by this narrow nationalism” (Wenjiao-bu 1932, 240). 
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 Clearly most Japanese in Manchukuo, however, felt they held a special 
leadership role which placed them above the other ethnicities.  Local Japanese avoided 
speaking openly about Japanese control in 1932-1933, while the Lytton Commission 
was still preparing its report, but their reticence disappeared soon thereafter.  For 
example in 1933 Tachibana, who was among the most committed of the Japanese to a 
real “ethnic harmony”, affirmed that Japanese held special “leadership qualities,” and 
stated “as long as the leading race is not arbitrary and selfish it has the right to lead” 
(Tachibana 1933).   
 Tachibana, a founding editor of the independent Japanese-language journal 
Manshū Hyōron (Manchuria Review), actually presented one of the most liberal 
Japanese plans for multiethnic and democratic participation in the government.18  
Tachibana’s plan, however, was rejected by the Kwantung Army, who never allowed 
the creation of a representative Manchukuo assembly.19 
                                                          
18 Tachibana presented his plan in a January 1932 Manshū Hyōron article “My plan for establishing a 
new Manchurian State”.  He hoped it would serve as an alternative to a recently completed Kwantung 
Army sponsored plan by Matsuki Satoru.  Although many writers professed a desire for ethnic harmony 
in Manchukuo, Tachibana backed up his words by proposing the creation of a National Assembly with an 
ethnic ratio of representation set at: Han:7, Japanese:7, Manchus:3, Koreans:2, Muslims:2, Mongols:2, 
and Russians:1.  He also recommended the creation of provincial assemblies with representation ratios 
established based on the ethnic makeup of the local population.  Since the population of Manchukuo was 
overwhelmingly Han at this point, the 7:7 ratio of Han to Japanese in the proposed legislature was far 
from fair.  Still, it was an attempt to create a system of shared power between the ethnicities, and was 
thus much different from anything found in the colonies of Korea and Taiwan (Tachibana 1932a). 
 
19 Some Japanese leaders apparently defined “cooperation” as meaning an ethnic division of labor, or 
even enforced ethnic separation, not an integrated society with free competition between the different 
peoples.  In an April 1931 internal Kwantung Army document, Ishihara Kanji described the division, 
designating commerce, agriculture, and manual labor to the Han Chinese, pasture ranching to the 
Mongols, rice farming to the Koreans, and industrialization and military affairs to the Japanese (Ishihara 
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By 1934 Chinese language school textbooks and government propaganda began 
to openly proclaim the leading role of the Japanese in Manchukuo.   For example a 
chapter of the 1934 Manchukuo History textbook, after a section lauding Japan for its 
history as the region’s benefactor, described in paternalistic tones how Japanese 
officials assisted the Manchukuo government: 
Japan sent advisors to help guide the central administration immediately 
after the establishment of the state.  Legions of Japanese officials have 
come to help with the sundry affairs of state in every segment of 
government (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 74-75). 
Although the government urged the Han Chinese to adjust their ethnic identity 
and refer to themselves only as “Manchurians”, they never asked Japanese in 
Manchukuo to undergo a change to that degree.  In 1933 Yano wrote: 
When Manchuria becomes such a great country that the Chinese 
(zhinaren) people living there will not see themselves as Chinese, but as 
happy Manchurians (manzhouren), it will have a great influence on China.  
When Manchuria becomes such a great country that the Japanese living 
there see themselves as happy Manchurians, it will have a great stimulus 
on Japan  (Yano 1933, 306-307).    
 
While it is true that Yano does point to some degree of adjustment in the Manchurian 
Japanese sense of ethnic identity, it is important to notice he did not say that he did not 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1932a, Hirano 1982, 410).  He wrote that peaceful cooperation could be achieved by encouraging the 
ethnic groups to stick to the jobs which suited them the best, applying the Confucian ethic of “Know 
one’s place and be content with one’s lot”.  Keeping each in its own element would disengage the ethnic 
groups, lessening racial contacts and conflicts, and allowing peaceful coexistence to develop.  I have not 
yet been able to find any indications of this idea in the Manchukuo Chinese-language propaganda or 
textbooks, so if the idea of ethnic separation was prevalent among the state leaders after Ishihara, they 
did not introduce it into the public ideology. 
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say he expected them to abandon their identity as Japanese, as he did for the Chinese.  
There was a vision of Japanese coming to Manchuria to stay for many generations, 
willing to “bleach their bones in the Manchurian sun”, as many Japanese authors put it 
(Ichijō 1932, 59).   Authors who used these terms usually expected Manchurian 
Japanese to take on the more rugged, action-oriented characteristics that the colonial 
Japanese imagined separated themselves from their compatriots (Tamanoi 2000, 
268-269).  None of these authors ever suggested that a Japanese would loose his basic 
Japanese identity by becoming Manchurian as well.   
The Japanese constructed a vision of themselves as heroes in a struggle to build 
a state out of scratch both for the glory of Japan and the benefit of the world.  Hoshino 
Naoki’s statements serve as an example.  Hoshino was a Ministry of Finance official 
sent to help with Manchukuo’s finances, and he eventually became the General Affairs 
Board chief, the most powerful civilian position in the Manchukuo state government.  
At a 1939 lecture he said: 
The most important thing for Japanese in Manchuria is the necessity of 
having pride in yourself as a Japanese wherever you go.  Always 
remember you bear the responsibility of building Manchukuo, and 
therefore you should remain here to the end, putting your whole heart and 
soul into creation and progress” (Hoshino 1939, 718).   
Hoshino apparently saw no contradiction in the need to have pride as a Japanese while 
at the same time being a Manchukuo citizen.20   
                                                          
20 In a post-war memoir Hoshino stated, “Throughout Manchukuo’s short life we tried to bring happiness 
to all the people of Manchukuo and create a new paradise, but we had never-ending trials.  It ended as a 
dream that we still cling to.  During that time young Japanese showed a determination to work hard, and 
I am confident that it is something of which the Japanese can be eternally proud.  I certainly do not think 
that I am the only one who is proud of my efforts in establishing Manchukuo” (Tsukase 1998, 116-117). 
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 No matter what the rhetoric, the Japanese were at firmly ensconced at the apex 
of power, and therefore received a lion’s share of services and privileges from the 
government.  Schools for Japanese children were given greater funding, Japanese 
employees received better wages and higher quality food, even special passenger cars 
were set aside exclusively for the Japanese (Yoshino 1942).  Few Japanese thought of 
themselves as “Manchukuo citizens”, and few had any contact with Chinese outside of 
the servants in their household.  An examination of post-war reminiscences written by 
Japanese who worked in the Manchukuo government shows that they kept together as a 
insular group in the capital, planning “progressive” policy experiments, but rarely 
including non-Japanese in their deliberations (Tsukase 1998, 39, 119-120). Tachibana 
openly criticized other Japanese officials whom he felt had a “dekasegi [migrant 
worker] spirit.”  “Instead of a consciousness of being loyal servants to Manchukuo, the 
Japanese officials see themselves as spokesmen for Great Capitalist Japan . . . and plan 
to return home” (Tachibana 1934c).   
 While some, like Kamimura and eventually Ishihara, became enamored with 
the vision of a new kind of moral, pan-Asian modernism, most of the Japanese were 
fully aware that they were simply colonial masters.  Tōjō Hideki, a Kwantung Army 
leader in the mid-1930s, was one such realist.  In a postwar memoir Kwantung Army 
economics advisor (and later Kenkoku University professor) Okuno Kiraki recalls Tōjō 
laughing at him during one meeting, saying, “You mean you take this business about 
Manchukuo independence and ethnic harmony seriously?” (Okuno 1977, 114).  
Whether they took the vision seriously or not, the position of the Japanese as the rulers 
of the country was never in doubt to anyone on the scene.  The willingness of the 
Japanese to openly display their political position, however, changed over time. 
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The retreat from “ethnic harmony” 
The decisions in 1931-1932 to create an ideology of ethnic “harmony” or 
“equality” were made in the context of trying to win support (or at least deflect 
criticism) for the Manchukuo project domestically and internationally, and were a 
reflection of popular pan-Asian and democratic ideals of the times.  As the 1930s wore 
on, however, these ideals were emphasized less as Manchukuo’s existence became more 
secure, Japan became increasingly estranged from the West, and the trend toward 
greater cultural assimilation in the colonies became stronger.   Accordingly, there was 
increased emphasis in the Manchukuo propaganda toward patterning the state after 
Japan, looking to the Japanese emperor as a source of legitimacy and an example of 
morality, and encouraging the population to copy Japanese customs.  The celebration 
of all things Japanese could not help but make the position of Japanese in Manchukuo 
even stronger.  
A major shift toward modeling the state on Japan occurred with the 
promulgation of the 1935 Huiluan Imperial rescript.  As I will discuss in greater detail 
below, Pu Yi made his first state visit to Japan in 1935, including an audience with the 
Japanese emperor.  The rescript promulgated in his name upon his return lauded the 
moral nature of the Japanese state, and declared Pu Yi’s loyalty to the Japanese emperor.  
It stated: 
I am unified in spirit with the Japanese emperor . . . [W]e must be at one 
heart and morality with our friend, creating a base for our two countries’ 
eternal relationship, and bringing forth true Oriental morality (Nomura 
1995, 97).   
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The document played a role in Manchukuo schools similar to that of the Rescript on 
Education in Japan, recited at school assemblies and studied in the Morals curriculum. 
Louise Young has pointed out that in Japan the image of Manchukuo as a 
“branch family” of the Japanese state began to be used at this time, although it does not 
appear to have been used in Chinese language materials until 1940 at the earliest.  
Japanese-language materials designed to attract rural Japanese to Manchukuo asserted 
the “superiority of the Japanese race” among the “five races”.  They were to act as the 
“nucleus,” “pivot,” and “axis,” of society, holding “positions of leadership and 
guidance” and playing a  “driving force.”  The racial differences between Japanese 
and non-Japanese in Manchukuo were asserted by pointing to Japanese superiority in 
technology and hygiene.  Young demonstrated, however, that this technological gap 
was more fantasy than reality, as Japanese settlers, portrayed as teachers of superior 
Japanese farming methods, actually desperately tried to learn local cultivation practices 
from Chinese and Korean farmers once they arrived in the foreign climate (Young 
1997). 
Before 1935 only Chinese and Mongolian were recognized as Manchukuo’s 
“national languages”, while Japanese was taught in the elementary schools as a “foreign 
language”.  In 1937 the government designated Japanese as one of the official national 
languages, and in 1938 it decreed that Japanese be the only language taught in all public 
schools, thus imbuing it with the highest status of the three national languages.  That 
same year the government increased the hours of Japanese language instruction in 
elementary schools from 0-2 hours a week to 6-8 hours a week, with similar increases in 
middle schools.  A handbook of regulations for the 1938 new education system stated,  
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“Japanese language is to be emphasized as one of the national languages, upon which 
the spirit of Japanese-Manchurian unity is based” (Minsheng-bu 1937, 4).   
Besides the changes in language and legal policy, the textbooks published in 
1938 presented a new vision of “ethnic harmony” emphasizing assimilation rather than 
cooperation.  The following remarks by the Japanese educator Yamamoto Haruo are 
typical of the period, “Ethnic groups usually dislike each other and are estranged, . . .  
[but] the mission of the people of Manchukuo is to follow the ideal of the Japanese 
people”  (Yamamoto 1940, 14).21  The Manchukuo people were now explicitly 
encouraged to model themselves on the Japanese.  There was debate within the 
                                                          
 
21 Yamamoto, who was invited by the Manchukuo government in 1939 to write a report on the state of 
education in the country, predicted a future in which the Japanese and non-Japanese would intermarry to 
such a degree that they would form a group united by blood and culture.  He wrote “The Japanese and 
Manchurians (including the Han, Mongols, and Koreans) come from the same culture and race, and 
inter-ethnic marriage will open more paths toward union of the ethnicities.  As long as there are ethnic 
conflicts and barriers domestically, the formation of a truly unified state can not be achieved.  This has 
been proved in the British-Irish conflict, the black conflict in America, the British in India, French in 
Indochina, and Italians in Ethiopia.  People’s sense of superiority, based on “East is East,  and West is 
West”-ism, firmly makes it illegal for a white person to marry a yellow or black person.  So states based 
on true ethnic harmony will never be formed in these lands.  But between the Manchurians and Japanese 
this barrier does not exist.  For example the Emperor’s brother married a Japanese woman.  Japan has 
melded with other people before, for example in the distant past when the Yamato people, the nucleus of 
the Japanese ethnicity, merged with the Izumi people, forming the Great Japanese People.  So it is not 
strange to imagine this happening in Manchukuo” (Yamamoto 1940: 28-29).   Others, however, 
strongly opposed the idea of mixing the races.  Eto Toshio, an SMR librarian and long-time Japanese 
resident of Manchuria, wrote in 1942, “By mixing five sho [9 liters] of beer and five sho of urine, you can 
make one to [18 liters] of beer-colored liquid. But this [mixture] is after all urine, and can be used only as 
a fertilizer. If [the Japanese race] becomes one with vice of the Han race, and becomes one [with the Han 
race] in the flesh, strong as it is, the Yamato [Japanese] race would have to perish. If one is to call that 
concordia, nothing more is insulting for the Japanese” (Eto 1942, 74). 
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Manchukuo education community on the question of how far they should go in 
encouraging assimilation, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Also, by 1937 the legal system, which in 1932 retained most of the laws 
inherited from the Chinese republic, was reorganized based on Japanese models. 
Manchukuo courts began treating the Japanese language texts of laws (which were 
written in both Japanese and Chinese) as the official version, and a bureaucratic 
promotion system based on the results of Japanese language tests was set up (Yasuda 
1997, 35-37).  Japan’s extraterritoriality rights in Manchukuo were abrogated, but this 
action actually gave Japanese citizens a greater opportunity to exploit business 
opportunities outside of the former SMR railway zone.  The Imperial succession law of 
1937 left the door open for a child of Pu Yi’s brother and his Japanese wife (from the 
Japanese imperial family) to become the next emperor.  In a variety of ways the legal 
system was manipulated to give Japanese interests the greatest leverage and Japanese 
symbols the greatest prestige (Tsukase 1998, 34-35).   In 1940 Shintoism and the 
Japanese emperor system replaced the Confucian “kingly way” ideology as the other 
main principle in the Manchukuo ideology, as will be discussed below.  This removal 
of the last vestiges of traditional Chinese philosophy in the ideology probably further 
strengthened the pressure on non-Japanese in Manchukuo to assimilate themselves to 
Japanese ways if they wanted to rise in Manchukuo society. 
The trend in the Taiwan and Korea colonial governments toward the cultural 
assimilation of the colonial populations in the late 1930s and early 1940sdoubtless had 
an effect on the Manchukuo ideology.  A 1936 pamphlet by a Japanese colonial 
official in Taiwan criticized the Manchukuo ideology and called for a closer official 
connection between Manchukuo and Japan.  The author apparently feared Taiwanese 
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reformists saw the potential for popular participation latent in the early Manchukuo 
ideology as an opening to call for political reform in the colonies, and therefore 
represented a threat to the colonial governments. An internal Korean colonial 
government document created around 1940 criticized Manchukuo’s “ethnic harmony” 
ideal, stating: 
Even though Manchukuo was founded on the principle of ethnic harmony, 
at this time when the Koreans are preceding on a route toward unification 
with Japan . . . it should be discarded.  There is significant concern that 
this inconsistency will create ethnic dissonance (Komagome 1996, 
279-281).  
The document went on to insist on the necessity of having “an empire with fixed 
guiding goals throughout Japan, Manchuria, and China.”  The colonial Korean 
government had by 1940 embarked on a campaign to wipe out Korean national identity, 
even banning the use of the common term Chōsenjin to refer to the Koreans, instead 
calling them “peninsular people”, so it is not surprising that even empty promises of 
ethnic equality troubled them.  Although it may have served a purpose in helping to 
deflect criticism immediately after the coup, the ideology of ethnic harmony clashed 
with the mainstream of Japanese ideology in the rest of the empire, and as a result was 
de-emphasized in stages from 1933 until the end of the war (Komagome 1996, 
279-281).  
Still, efforts toward the cultural assimilation of the non-Japanese people of 
Manchukuo never occurred to the degree that they did in Korea and Taiwan in the 
1938-1945 period.  Japanese language instruction never reached the levels found in 
those colonies, and the principle of ethnic equality was never formally abandoned.  I 
believe there are two reasons for this.  First, the energy required in creating a state 
ideology fundamentally different from Japan’s made it difficult to abandon.  Although 
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its main purpose was to hide Japanese control, the ideology gained enough discursive 
inertia that even by 1945 it was not possible to completely abandon it.  A second 
reason is that there were not enough Japanese colonial agents available to act as models 
and enforce policies of assimilation.  Most elementary schools did not have Japanese 
teachers, and many did not even have any Chinese teachers with significant Japanese 
language training.  Facing the massive bulk of the Manchurian population and 
dwindling resources, the Japanese struggled simply to keep the people acquiescent.  
Training a significant amount of the population in the Japanese language and customs 
was beyond their abilities.   
  
The status of minority groups in Manchukuo 
Pro-Manchukuo propaganda made little mention of the other minorities living in 
Manchukuo beyond listing them as members of the “five races of Manchukuo.”  The 
three largest minorities were the Koreans, Manchus, and Mongols.  A sizable Korean 
population had lived in Manchuria since ancient times, and the flow of immigrants shot 
up in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  Most lived in the Jiandao region, just across 
the Yalu River from Korea, where they pioneered the use of wet rice agriculture in 
Manchuria.  Their numbers more than doubled from around 630,000 in 1932 to 
1,200,000 in 1940.  They are an enigmatic group, who deserve more attention among 
historians of East Asia.  East Asian historians Barbara Brooks and Carter J. Eckert 
have done some preliminary work, and have found that they fell into a shifting set of 
identities, manipulated by all the parties based on their needs.  Contributing to the 
impermanent nature of the Koreans’ position was their lack of a well defined legal 
status, their economic rivalry with Han farmers, and the ability of many to pass as 
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Japanese.  Japanese officials often set the Korean population against neighboring Han 
Chinese as a way of keeping both groups weak and under control. 
An example of Japanese manipulation includes the Japanese reaction to elements 
of Zhang Xueliang’s retreating army, which killed thousands of Korean residents in 
Manchuria immediately after the start of the Manchurian Incident.  The Japanese, 
claiming these Koreans were Japanese subjects, played up the incidents as examples of 
Chinese crimes against Japan.  Japanese officials also encouraged Korean farmers to 
immigrate to Manchukuo because of their success in wet rice farming, and helped them 
displace Han Chinese, sometimes immediately after the Japanese had displaced those 
same Koreans on the peninsula.  These immigration policies fueled distrust between 
the Koreans and Han (Kin 1992).   
 There was a great deal of uncertainty about the Koreans’ legal status in 
Manchukuo. In 1932 and again in July 1938 the Kwantung Army claimed that the 
resident Koreans were “Manchukuo nationals” (kokumin)  (Gendai Shi Shiryo #11 
1965, 956).  But in May 1939 the Korean Government General announced that those 
Koreans were, like the Japanese, part of the “population” (jinmin) of Manchukuo, but 
not “subjects” (shinmin) of Manchukuo.  Instead they were subjects of the Japanese 
Empire.  Although the implications of these differences for resident Koreans are not 
yet clear, in at least one case their position as subjects of the Japanese empire seems to 
have taken precedence over their position as Manchukuo nationals.  Conscription of 
Koreans into the Japanese Imperial Army was implemented in August 1943, and the 
first draft inspection was held in 1944.  The Manchukuo government decided on a plan 
which conscripted the Koreans in Manchukuo into the Japanese army the same way as if 
  98 
they lived in Korea (Tsukase 1998, 102-106).  So for the draft, resident Koreans were 
treated as if they were subjects of formal Japanese empire, not Manchukuo. 
 Just as the Japanese used the Koreans to further their colonial ends, educated 
Koreans also used Manchukuo as a way to get ahead in the extended Japanese empire.  
At a time when Japanese rule in Korea was becoming increasingly harsh, many Koreans 
found new opportunities in the empire as comparative “insiders”.  Because Japanese 
language education had a longer history in Korea, the relatively large numbers of 
Koreans fluent in Japanese were in demand in Manchuria, where the small number of 
Japanese migrants made the need for Japanese-speaking officials, policemen, and 
educators a priority.  Also, a considerable number of Koreans attended the Manchukuo 
military academy, probably in hopes of using it as a stepping stone to the Japanese 
military (Brooks 1998, Eckhart 1996).  As an example of this migration of educated 
Koreans, Eckhart points out the striking number of Koreans who appear in a November 
1938 list of newly registered medical doctors in Manchukuo.  Koreans from Korea 
made up about 48% of the 323 new doctors in the listing, compared to about 37% 
Japanese and 15% Chinese (Eckert 1996, 35).  The Koreans in Manchukuo, therefore, 
had an ambivalent status as both colonizers and colonized. 
 
 Although the Manchukuo imperial family members were ethnic Manchus, 
pro-Manchukuo propaganda said little about their place in Manchukuo society, usually 
lumping them together with the Han as manren.  The Manchu population has been 
estimated at between two and four hundred thousand, only around 1% of the total 
Manchukuo population.   There were few attempts to use the Manchus as symbols of 
the state.  The Manchukuo textbooks included a few chapters about past Qing rulers, 
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especially in the 1934-1937 period, but to a much smaller degree than the attention paid 
to Japanese and Chinese history and culture.  Although Japanese groups sponsored a 
considerable amount of study of ancient Manchu texts and archeological sites, there was 
no effort made at reviving the Manchu language and culture.  As for Manchu support, 
a Japanese Foreign Ministry official in Jilin wrote to his superiors in March 1932:  
Of course the Manchus are happy about the new state, but the degree of 
excitement is greater among the Manchus from south of the wall.  The 
ones from Manchuria tend to be indifferent.  Those in China have long 
stood apart from Han society and have been unsympathetic toward it.  
They have not forgotten that during the Republican revolution they were 
greatly persecuted . . . So it means a lot to them that a new country with 
the head of their house as leader has been created.  On the other hand, the 
Manchus that live in Manchuria . . . are more conciliatory toward the Han 
and their customs . . . and so they are not greatly excited about the new 
state (Tsukase 1998, 106-107).   
I have not seen any other information about the Manchus to confirm or deny this 
statement.  More work in this area remains to be done.22 
 
There were between 800,000 and one million Mongols in Manchukuo, only 2 or 
3 percent of the population, but they occupied almost one third of the state’s total area.  
Among the upper classes of Inner Mongolian society there appears to have been 
substantial initial support for the creation of Manchukuo.  Mongol princes had 
cooperated with Japanese agents in a number of earlier attempts at creating an 
independent Manchurian-Mongolian state, largely because they hoped that such state 
could help stem the influx of Han settlers on Mongol pasture land.  Support from the 
                                                          
22 A recent dissertation by Dan Shao, “Ethnicity in Empire and Nation: Manchus, Manzhouguo, and 
Manchuria (1911-1952)” (University of California, Santa Barbara, 2002) addresses these issues. 
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Mongols provided needed ideological cover for the Kwantung Army, as it strengthened 
their claim that the region was multi-cultural, and not therefore inherently part of China.  
When Manchukuo was created in 1932, it included the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, 
which they organized into the semi-autonomous Xingan Province.  The province acted 
as a base for the organization of the western part of Inner Mongolia into pro-Japanese 
governments beginning in 1936, and was also an important military site, as it shared a 
border with the Soviet-dominated Mongolian People’s Republic.  
The Japanese made good on their promise to prohibit excessive Han 
immigration.  They also worked to diffuse primary education in the region, and opened 
the way for Mongol students to enter colleges in Manchukuo and Japan (Nakami 2003, 
101).  A 1936 Manchukuo government edict instructed officials to encourage Mongols 
to build the state by maintaining their traditional culture and working together with 
Japan.   From the little material I have seen, education in the Mongol regions was less 
Japan-centric than in the Han regions.  In the 1932-1937 years they were encouraged 
to keep and value most aspects of their traditional culture, while also learning to value 
Japan and its culture, just as in the Han areas.  But while positive messages about 
Chinese culture decreased precipitously after 1938 and especially 1942 in Han area 
education, positive messages about Mongolian culture appear to have continued in their 
schools during the later period.  For example in 1942 the government built a shrine to 
Genghis Khan in Wang-yin-sume, at a time when the government was working to move 
attention within the Han community from the cult of Confucius to worship at shrines to 
the Shinto goddess Amaterasu.23 
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 The creators of the ideology of ethnic harmony and pan-Asian cooperation 
promoted it as a force which could unite the different peoples of Manchuria rather than 
divide and weaken them, as ethnic nationalism and communism would do.  They 
claimed that the West desired to control all of East Asia, and in the face of this threat 
Asians were obligated to choose this road of strength.  Pu Yi’s acceptance of the 
position of Manchukuo head of state symbolized the region’s return to the pan-Asian 
cooperation they claimed was a mark of the Qing dynasty.  While the ideology may 
have given the Han Chinese population a greater degree of freedom of expression and 
access to social advancement than was afforded the colonial populations of Korea and 
Taiwan, in all it offered little comfort in the face of military occupation.  Within a few 
years the few benefits offered by the ideology disappeared, and the dream essentially 
died, harmony turned out to mean little more than a multi-ethnic forced march.   
 
The Kingly Way 
 The second major principle of the state presented in pro-Manchukuo 
propaganda was that its government would be based on a traditional Confucian 
philosophy of “the kingly way” (C. wangdao, J. ōdō). Over time, however, wangdao 
and other traditional Chinese concepts disappeared from the Manchukuo writings, and 
by 1940 the Japanese emperor and Shintoism became center of the state ideology.  
This section will cover the original use of the principle of wangdao, its change over 
time, and its eventual abandonment.   
                                                                                                                                                                          
23 Li Narangoa has recently pioneered the study of Mongols in Manchukuo.  See her article, “Educating 
Mongols and Making ‘Citizens’ of Manchukuo.” Inner Asia, 3, 2001, for specifics. 
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The Manchukuo advocates’ basic definition of wangdao rule was encapsulated 
in the phrase shuntian anmin (	
), which can be translated as “follow the 
mandate of heaven and bring peace to the people”.  This meant that the head of state 
held his position by the intervention of heaven, and that the state should provide not 
only peace but competent and impartial government.24  The Manchukuo advocates 
presented the ideology as a positive alternative to both liberal democratic and 
communist forms of government.  They traced the origin of wangdao to the ancient 
philosopher Mencius, who said that the ruler must be virtuous, reflect the will of the 
people, and act in behalf of the total population, not a small group.  The ancient 
philosophers considered wangdao to be the opposite of the more common badao, or 
hegemonic rule, based on raw power.    
Beyond these basic principles, however, the definition of wangdao was both 
unstable and vague throughout Manchukuo’s history, as the Manchukuo ideologues 
disagreed on whether rural autonomy, capitalism, the emperor system, nationalism, and 
anti-militarism fit in the framework of wangdao.   The one aspect of wangdao which 
was particularly troubling to some Japanese was the ruler’s position being dependent on 
the “mandate of Heaven” declared through the people’s will.  This left open the 
possibility of a legitimate transfer of power through a popular revolution.  This was 
disturbing in both practical and ideological terms to the Japanese officials.  In practical 
terms, it left open an avenue for popular protest.  Ideologically, it went against modern 
                                                          
 
24 This phrase was used in the State Establishment declaration of March 1932, which read, “The polity is 
based on the Way, and the Way is based on heaven.  The purpose of establishing a new state is chiefly to 
achieve shuntian anmin.” 
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Japanese Emperor system dogma which denied the legitimacy of mandate revolution.  
In 1935, when Japanese officials moved to make the Manchukuo ideology more closely 
resemble Japan’s, the idea of the mandate of heaven disappeared from pro-Manchukuo 
discussions of wangdao.   
Throughout the 1930s the meaning of wangdao remained vague.  This lack of 
clarity probably was useful in that it made the concept flexible and easy to manipulate, 
but it also meant that it had little power to inspire.  Still, there was enough inherent 
danger to Japan in the idea of wangdao that in the 1940s the concept disappeared 
entirely from pro-Manchukuo writings.  
 
Wangdao and the formation of Manchukuo 
 Japanese in Manchukuo first started using the word wangdao in conjunction 
with a new state system in late September 1931, soon after it had become clear to the 
Kwantung Army coup leaders that they had to create a puppet state rather than simply 
occupying the region.  They turned to three Japanese China experts—Tachibana, Noda 
Ranzō, and Koyama Sadatomo—to help them create their governing principles.  All 
three were paid advisors to the SMR and frequent contributors to the journal Manshū 
Hyōron.  By October the three began meeting with the Kwantung Army plotters and 
became part of their brain trust.25  Tachibana later claimed that soon after the 
Manchurian Incident he discussed using the concept as a way to win support from the 
Chinese population with Ishihara.  He wrote: 
                                                          
25 Katakura Tadashi, in his daily record of the Kwantung Army’s actions after the Manchurian Incident, 
recorded a meeting on Oct. 9th between the Kwantung Army leadership and “Noda Ranzō, a SMR advisor, 
and the taciturn Tachibana Shiraki, experts on Chinese society.” (Gendai Shi Shiryō #7 1964: 206-207). 
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Colonel Ishihara, as plainspoken as ever, said, “What exactly is wangdao?  
It must not be some kind of deception or empty words.”  But it was not a 
deception.  I explained how it would work and that the Chinese would 
immediately accept it.  It would be very convenient, but not just that, it 
would be a suitable theoretical base.  So we used it (Zadankai 1941). 
  
 The Manshū Hyōron group’s definition of the term wangdao, however, appears 
to have gone beyond the expectations of the Kwantung Army leaders, to include 
democratic and socialist ideals.  Noda was the first of the group to publicly use the 
term, in the October 31 issue of the journal.26  He championed the Manchurian Incident 
as “a wangdao mandate change,” with the purpose of overthrowing warlord violence 
and capitalistic exploitation, and restoring the “autonomous rule of rural society” to the 
region.  The Japanese military, in response to the desires of the average farmers, was 
administering “divine revolutionary punishment” against a rotten system.  Signs of the 
popular discontent could be found in the “increasing activities of lower class rural 
religious organizations and bandit organizations” (Noda 1931).  Like the rest of the 
Manshū Hyōron group, he defined wangdao rule as a decentralized, rural, 
anti-capitalistic, and democratic phenomenon, based on the people’s will.  
 The leftist and pro-rural viewpoint of the Manshū Hyōron group was shared by 
many members of the SMR’s Economic Research Group, another part of the Kwantung 
Army’s brain trust, who were influenced by Japanese communist Kōza-ha doctrines on 
                                                          
 
26 The first known published use of the word wangdao in Manchuria after the coup was  in a September 
29 editorial in the Japanese language newspaper Manshū Nippō, which opined that the 1911 Revolution 
was a true mandate change, but that the Zhang warlord clique and the nationalists under Chiang Kaishek 
had perverted the principles of wangdao, and thus had lost the mandate in the Northeast (Komagome 
1996, 241).   
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economic development.  The Manshū Hyōron and Economic Research Group had their 
greatest influence on the creation of the Manchukuo ideology and policy in 1932, before 
the arrival of most of the Japanese officials from the Tokyo bureaucracy at the end of 
that year (Li 1996).  Both of the local groups appear to have been at least as interested 
in creating a new anti-capitalistic, anti-party model for Japanese domestic reform as 
they were in creating a working state for the people of Manchuria.  Apparently this 
opportunity convinced Tachibana and the others to work with the Kwantung Army in 
the creation of Manchukuo. 
 Tachibana and his allies tried to win Chinese support for their ideas by using  
ideological terms employed by Sun Yatsen and by having leading Chinese collaborators 
echo their support.  Sun impressed many Japanese with his 1924 Kobe speech in which 
he called on Japan to help lead a struggle against Western militaristic badao culture 
using Eastern wangdao culture.  Tachibana, who had written several pieces about Sun 
before the Manchurian Incident, also admired his ideas on organizing a state based on 
local autonomous villages.  Tachibana’s group often used the authority of Sun’s name 
in explaining their hopes for the development of Manchukuo.  
 In the last months of 1931 Yu Chonghan and Yuan Jinkai, leading landowners 
and former Fengtian provincial officials, came out in support of the creation of a state in 
Manchuria based on wangdao principles, and became key members of the autonomous 
councils which eventually declared the region’s independence.  The Kwantung Army 
placed these men in key positions because of their history of cooperation with Japan, 
and because as landowners they could be expected to oppose Zhang Xueliang and his 
military and industrial policies.  Both Yuan and Yu publicly voiced their support for a 
wangdao-based government that would end the heavy taxes placed on them in support 
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of warlord armies, and provide the peace needed for the development of a prosperous 
economy (Yamashiro 1993, 76-78, 82-87, Komagome 1996, 250-252). 
 After 1932 civilian bureaucrats seconded from the Japanese bureaucracy 
replaced Tachibana and his allies as the Kwantung Army’s principle advisors.  The 
Japanese bureaucrats’ plans for stabilizing the Manchurian economy and building up a 
centralized, industrial economy appealed to the Kwantung Army leaders, whose desire 
to use the mining and industrial potential of the region for military purposes apparently 
overrode their interest in seeing the region become a model of rural reform for Japan.  
The SMR Economic Research Group was disbanded in 1935, and although Tachibana 
continued writing articles and editorials for the Manshū Hyōron throughout the 
Manchukuo period, his voice was sidelined in the creation of Manchukuo ideology and 
policy (Li 1996). 
 Two thinkers whose writings appear to form the basis of the Manchukuo 
ideology of the 1932-1935 period were Zheng Xiaoxu and Yano Jin’ichi.  Zheng was a 
Confucian scholar and Qing loyalist who joined Pu Yi’s retinue in Tianjin in 1923, and 
acted as a liaison between the deposed emperor and the Japanese in the negotiations 
leading to Pu Yi’s acceptance of the title of Head of State in 1932.  Zheng had written 
about wangdao as early as 1882, and used the term frequently to describe the ideal 
Manchukuo government.  His understanding of the term was informed by the orthodox 
Zhu Xi school of Confucianism, which emphasized the role of the emperor and the 
importance of a strong centralized state, as opposed to Tachibana’s Daoist and 
Mohist-based ideas, which called for rural village autonomy and a state-based welfare 
system.27    
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 Yano held a similar ideological position as Zheng, and he penned numerous 
books in Japanese justifying the Manchurian Incident and explaining wangdao and the 
history of Manchuria.  In 1932 he began working as an advisor and propagandist for 
the Kwantung Army and the Manchukuo Foreign Office (Fogel 1984).  Both Zheng 
and Yano emphasized the importance of modeling state and society on the moral codes 
found in ancient Confucian texts.   
 Next to be examined are five aspects of wangdao government as the 
Manchukuo advocates defined them, fair government, local autonomy and state welfare, 
anti-modernism, the head of state, and the role of the people’s will.   
 
Fair Government 
 One aspect of wangdao rule that all the commentators agreed upon was the 
promise that it would bring fair, impartial, and able government to all of society.  This 
promise was usually signified by the four character slogan anmin leye (), 
which can be defined as “live in peace and work in contentment.”  Naturally this was 
the aspect of the Manchukuo project that was most attractive to the residents of 
Manchuria.  The Fengtian notable Yu Chonghang specifically mentioned the need for 
fair government when announced his support of an independent state in November 1931.  
He complained that for twenty years the residents of Manchuria had suffered “for the 
sake of one man and his family,” meaning the Zhang regime.  In particular he blamed 
                                                                                                                                                                          
27 Key elucidations of Zheng’s ideas are found in Materials on Spreading the Spirit of the State’s 
Founding, a two-volume Chinese-language set intended for distribution to Manchukuo teachers, 
published in October 1932 and May 1933 (Wenjiao-bu 1932).    
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the warlords for creating an unfair taxation system and wasting most of the revenue on 
military spending.  He asked that relations with Zhang Xueliang and the Nanjing 
government be cut, the tax burden be lightened, the quality of officials improved by 
raising their pay and establishing government inspectorate divisions, the police system 
be reformed, industry and transportation be developed, and local rule respected.  
Although it was their very military actions which destroyed the functions of government 
and placed the region in turmoil in the first place, the Japanese in Manchuria were 
happy to promise a government which would address all of Yu’s requests (Yamashiro 
1993, 82-87).   
 The Manchukuo government, in a 1934 elementary school history textbook, 
claimed that it was instituting the kind of reforms that Yu desired.  It stated: 
Our country was founded on the great principle of wangdao . . . Because 
morality and benevolence are the foundations of wangdao, the ability to 
live in peace and work in contentment is the result.  Therefore our 
country truly seeks to lighten punishments, relieve the tax burden, 
encourage agriculture and sericulture, promote business, philanthropy, and 
benevolence, and cooperate with all nations (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 79).   
Over the next two chapters the textbook gave detailed claims of the state’s success in 
accomplishing reforms in education, civil administration, rural medical services, the 
judicial system, the tax code, the monetary system, the management of natural resources, 
the transportation system, and international relations (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 79-85).  
 
Local autonomy and state welfare 
 More controversial than the general concepts of honest and responsive 
government, however, were the specific interpretations of wangdao as a decentralized, 
rural-based system with an active social welfare network, made by Tachibana and his 
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allies.  Tachibana, unlike Zheng and Yano, did not define wangdao in Confucian terms, 
but rather in utopian Daoist and Mohist terms, tinged with modern socialism.  
Although his interpretation was ultimately rejected by the Kwantung Army, 
Tachibana’s voice retained some degree of influence in Manchuria throughout the 
1930s, and several Japanese officials continued to try to carry out his ideas. 
 Lincoln Li has pointed out that Tachibana’s vision of Chinese society was one 
in which datong (, great commonwealth) could only be achieved through the 
realization of xiaokang (, small prosperity) (Li 1996).  Tachibana’s “datong” 
referred to the kind of socialist utopian society in which poverty would be eliminated, 
education stressed, and the weak protected.  In December 1931 Tachibana quoted the 
Book of Rites, one of the Chinese classics, to explain the nature of a great 
commonwealth society:  
The great way is observed, and heaven rules.  Wisdom is chosen, ability 
developed, belief is taught, and harmony practiced.  A man treats not 
only his own parents as parents, nor only his own child as his child.  
There are places for the old to end their lives, the strong to be of use, and 
the young to grow up.  There are places to help the sick and destitute . . . 
There is no robbery, so no one locks their doors.  This is datong 
(Komagome 1996, 260, Tachibana 1931).   
He went on to quote Mencius’ on the well-field system to elucidate the communal 
nature of this society: “Each household on 100 se of land will gather together for 
education, preparation of the fields, and savings, protecting by two- and three-fold the 
livelihood of the populace.”  Tachibana intended Manchurian society to reach a 
communal ideal which had never actually been realized in China. 
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 The socialist nature of Tachibana’s ideas were confirmed in February 1932 
when the Manshū Hyōron published the founding declaration of the study group the 
Kenkoku-sha, written by Tachibana’s ally Noda Ranzō, which asserted:  
Wangdao is the realization of Confucian datong society thought, making 
ethical the political way, and protecting the people’s livelihood by 
socializing wealth.  It is the great way of government (Nōda 1932).28   
  
 Komagome Takeshi has pointed out that the vision of a great commonwealth 
society quoted by Tachibana in the Book of Rites was influenced by Daoist and Mohist 
ideas, and had been lightly regarded by Confucianists since ancient times.  In 
particular the concepts of treating all old people as one’s parents and paying as much 
attention to the support of the young as the old went against the grain of Confucian 
thought.   These ideas did have mainstream popularity in Chinese society, however.  
For example, Kang Youwei, one of the men behind the 100 Days reforms and president 
of the International Morality Society, used the ideas from the Book of Rites in his 
attempt to create a national religion based on classical Chinese thought.  Sun Yatsen 
(who probably was Tachibana’s source for the idea) and Mao Zedong have also said 
that a datong society was their end objective (Komagome 1996, 260-261).  
 In order to achieve a datong society, Tachibana held, “small prosperity” needed 
to be the immediate goal of the state.  By “small prosperity” Tachibana meant rural 
prosperity and autonomy.  This would be achieved through creating a decentralized 
government, with autonomous regional governments responding to the needs of small 
                                                          
28 In March 1932, when Manchukuo was formally created, the year 1932 was declared “Datong Year 1”, 
and the word remained the state’s era name until a new one was chosen at the time of Pu Yi’s ascension 
to the imperial throne in 1934.   
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landholding farmers through programs like rural credit cooperatives, which would free 
farmers from their dependence on large landholders.  The state would prioritize 
agricultural development over large industrial projects, in part because the capital for 
industrial development would have to come from untrustworthy elements in Japan and 
in the West.   
 Cooperation from rural elements could be obtained, Tachibana reasoned, by 
winning over the leaders of popular societies like the Red Swastika Society and the 
International Morality Society.  Cooperation with these groups was appealing not only 
because, as mentioned above, they tended to support pan-Asian efforts, but also because 
they took the achievement of a datong society as one of their goals.  As mentioned 
above, Kang Youwei was both a proponent of datong society and a past leader of the 
International Morality Society.  The society appears to have been a key organ of 
Chinese collaboration in Manchukuo.  The Xinjing chapter of the Morality Society 
declared its independence from the main body in 1933, and included key Chinese 
collaborators among its leaders.  In 1936 it was reorganized into the Manchukuo 
Morality Society.  Kobayashi Ichiro, a bureaucrat in the Manchukuo government 
Religion Agency, said the Society: 
conformed to national policy and showed strenuous efforts at enlightening 
the population.  The national policy of building a wangdao polity and 
moral state coincided with the Society’s aims (Komagome 1996, 
264-268).  
 The cooperation of the Morality Society, however, was almost the only area 
where Tachibana’s plans were realized.  There was opposition to his ideas both from 
former Japanese Finance Ministry bureaucrats, who favored a centralized government 
and industrialization over rural reform, and from Prime Minister Zheng, whose 
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orthodox Confucian views clashed with Tachibana’s ideas about a datong society.  
While the Kwantung Army leaders may have been sympathetic to Tachibana’s 
rural-centered, utopian ideas, doubtless few of them actually cared enough about the 
lives of the common Chinese peasants to invest effort in such a major undertaking 
which promised little in return for them.29  While they, like Tachibana, feared the 
power of untrustworthy capitalists, they apparently felt that by controlling the economy 
at the center they could keep the upper hand over outside investors.  In 1935 the 
economic bureaucrats took the country off of the silver standard and pegged the 
currency to the Japanese yen, which made investment from Japan easier.  In 1937 they 
moved closer to instituting a centralized economy by creating the country’s first five 
year plan (Mitter 2000, 120-121, Li 1996). 
 Prime Minister Zheng also favored a strong central state, not because of the 
ability of such a state to control the economy, but because as a Qing loyalist he wished 
to return power to the imperial family, and as an orthodox Confucianist he thought that 
a strong central government was the best way to ensure good government.  For 
                                                          
 
29 From the beginning of the Manchukuo project the mainstream position amongst the Kwantung Army 
leadership was that the new entity be a centralized state able to direct the extraction of resources and 
development of industries needed by the military.  On November 7, 1931, Matsuki Satoru, a civilian 
Kwantung Army advisor, presented the first detailed plan for the state to the Kwantung Army.  It went 
against many of Tachibana’s ideals, calling, for example, not only for strong centralized state, but also the 
extermination of popular Chinese societies, which he saw as a danger to the state (Gendai Shi Shiryō #7 
1964: 247-253).  Also, in January 1932, Royama Masamichi, a political scientist, advised the Kwantung 
Army that because there was no real indigenous support for the state, it should be treated just like Japan’s 
other colonies (Li 1996).  Tachibana publicly criticized both Matsuki’s and Royama’s advice, but their 
views ultimately were more influential than his. 
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example, during the discussion over the nature of the newly created Kyōwakai, a state 
sponsored organization, Zheng rejected a July 1932 plan by Tachibana to make the 
fundamental mission of the society the encouragement of local autonomy, according to 
Tachibana (Tachibana 1934b).  Despite the defeat of Tachibana’s large-scale plans, 
some individual Japanese from the SMR Economic Research Group (and its successor, 
the Manchukuo Interim Economic Research Unit), pursued large-scale rural research 
projects in hopes of bring about rural reform.   For example two socialist disciples of 
Tachibana, Ōgami Suehiro and Satō Daishirō, tried to build agricultural cooperatives 
within the Manchukuo state structure in the mid-1930s.  They promised the 
cooperatives would both link the peasants more closely to the state and improve 
productivity by providing a structure that would free them from their dependence on 
rich landlords and their general stores for loans and goods.  By November 1941, 
however, the Kwantung Army grew distrustful of the leftist researchers and began 
arresting many of them, ending the rural reform efforts.  Both Ōgami and Satō died in 
prison before the war ended (Young 2000, 298-301, Tsukase 1998, 123-125). 
 
Anti-modernism 
 With the victory of Zheng’s vision of the state ideology over Tachibana’s, 
several government decrees were issued in an apparent effort to reintroduce Confucian 
values into the official realm. As an orthodox Zhu-xi school Confucian, Zheng found 
nationalist and patriotic rhetoric distasteful and disturbing to the peace, and therefore 
spoke out against the trend in Republican China of teaching military education in the 
schools.  He was also distrustful of the pursuit of overseas education and the success of 
the baihua (colloquial Chinese) movement, which he claimed had sullied Chinese 
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culture in the years since the fall of the Qing.  Zheng’s comments on these subjects to 
educators were published by the Manchukuo Ministry of Education in two 1932 
documents.  Two examples of his ideas put into policy include the March 25, 1932 
directive ordering elementary schools to replace nationalist textbooks with the 
Confucian classics as the main study material, and the July 23, 1932 government edict 
reinstating the Festival of Confucius.30   
 Like Tachibana’s plans for regional autonomy and social state dreams, however, 
most of the anti-modern aspects of Zheng’s wangdao Confucianism appear to have 
gained little traction with the Japanese military leaders.  Middle school morals 
textbooks published in 1934 show signs of Zheng’s influence.  They included chapters 
which warned of the dangers of unfettered nationalism and capitalism, and said little 
about the modern military or technologies.   The textbooks published from 1935 
onwards, however, promoted pride in one’s Manchukuo nationality, respect for the 
military, and praise for modern technological achievements.  I will discuss the contents 
of these textbooks in greater detail in Chapter 5.31   
                                                          
30 Found in the Seifu Kōhō, the Manchukuo government’s daily record of government edicts and 
announcements.  The edict on textbooks is in Vol. 1, #2.  The edict on the Festival of Confucius 
is in Vol. 39, Education Ministry Directive #9. 
 
31 Zheng’s comments are found Manchukuo Education Ministry documents, republished in MKSS 2-1 
(Wenjiao-bu 1932a) and MKSS 2-2 (Wenjiao-bu 1932b). 
“China has the oldest culture and greatest learning in the world.  But in the last twenty years others have 
trampled upon and weakened the culture.   Although there are various causes, students who have gone 
to other countries to study bear a heavy responsibility for the situation.  They come to overly revere and 
gullibly accept what is taught in the foreign schools.  Then they loose the ability to see the good in their 
own country’s traditions.  They come home and sneer at their country’s education.  Taking their 
foreign education as a model, they work to destroy China’s ancient morality and culture.  This pains me 
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The Head of State 
 Another area in which Manchukuo advocates disagreed was the nature of the 
head-of-state.  The journalist Tachibana, who felt that the state was a restoration of the 
revolutionary ideals of Sun Yatsen, argued that sovereignty rested with the multiracial 
citizenry.  Although he did not publicly object to the instillation of Pu Yi as President 
in 1932, he never showed any interest in using Pu Yi as a propaganda tool.  In January 
                                                                                                                                                                          
greatly.  For example, they try to replace the ancient beautiful morality with the Three People’s 
Principles, and try to replace our deep culture with light baihua texts” (Wenjiao-bu 1932a). 
 
“Today the countries of the world base their education on patriotism and militarism.  But that is 
unknowingly taking them down the terrible road to war.  Of course no one wants war, but patriotism 
must lead to anti-foreignism, and militarism toward a passion for war.  We are in increasingly great 
danger of experiencing another major war in the near future.  If our new country follows the example of 
schools in of the world’s leading countries, which emphasize patriotism and strong troops, we too will 
become a war-loving country, and our state’s founding will lose all of its meaning.  Therefore 
Manchukuo should replace patriotism and militarism with wangdao, thereby avoiding meaningless wars.  
It must dispense with patriotism and xenophobia, and replace them with charity.  Replace militarism 
with the Eastern morality of Confucian worship and benevolence.  If we base ourselves on correct ideas 
like these, develop men of high character, and build customs of peace and happiness, we will avoid the 
great tragedies of war and destruction” (Wenjiao-bu 1932a). 
 
“Today all countries train their citizens become thinkers, patriots, and able people.  This is education for 
a military populace.  The reason that countries train their citizens is because they are afraid of falling 
behind other countries.  But they should know the point of patriotism is to hate others . . . The result is 
the destruction of social stability and human life, and also great improvements in electricity and weaponry.  
Although both the accuracy and price of military weapons are thousands of times greater than before, 
warfare has not ceased.  Clearly the people don’t stop dying, and the treasury gets used up.  So 
wangdao is the cure to save the world.  It can rid of world of the catastrophe of war, create social 
stability, and provide happy lives and business.  If we want to carry out wangdao, we must clean out old 
patriotism thought.  The main idea is to build universal love.  We must get rid of military education, 
and instead teach propriety and justice.” 
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1934 the government announced that Pu Yi would become emperor, and that the official 
name of the state would be changed to Manzhou Diguo (Manchurian Empire).  
Tachibana was unhappy with this decision, and wrote an editorial in the Manshū 
Hyōron that month stating that royalty was not a necessary part of a wangdao 
government (Tachibana 1934b).  Zheng and Yano, however, valued the legacy of the 
Qing empire more than that of Sun Yatsen, and thus held Pu Yi’s participation as the 
head of state and then emperor as a source of the state’s legitimacy.  This was not only 
a reflection of Zheng’s Zhu Xi-based philosophy, which centered on the role of the 
emperor, but also was due to his position as a Qing loyalist and long-time supporter of 
Pu Yi.  Also, as an outsider in the Northeast he lacked any local power base, so his 
position depended on the Manchu emperor.   
 Both Zheng and Yano emphasized the Confucian idea of the ruler’s role as a 
sage, ruling by example and standing as an intermediary between heaven and his people.  
In one piece Yano defines the wangdao state by invoking Mencius, saying: 
It is a polity where if even one person has not gained his proper place, the 
ruler must feel the responsibility to personally lend a hand, as if it were he 
himself who had been pushed into a ditch.  When rich men living a 
luxurious lifestyle exist simultaneously with poor people struggling for 
their daily lives, the King will feel great responsibility . . . In modern terms, 
a wangdao polity is one in which there is absolutely no exploitation . . . 
[and] the morality of the ruler forms the basis of the polity (Yano 1933, 
297-299).   
 If a ruler is necessary for a wangdao government, why was the former Qing 
Emperor Pu Yi chosen as that ruler?  Yano and Zheng explain the choice as being 
based on the imperial family’s long personal connection with the Manchurian region, 
and what they described as the Qing house’s record of high moral rule and the morality 
of Pu Yi himself.  In 1933 Yano wrote of the Qing house’s morality:  
  117 
In all of Chinese history there has never been a ruling house of more 
benevolent and wise rulers . . . Sun Yatsen made various critical remarks 
about the Qing polity, but all of his claims were nonsense . . . Emperor Pu 
Yi, who abdicated as a result of a racial revolution has been appointed 
Head of State of this new country.   Manchuria is the homeland of the 
Manchu dynasty, the origin of the Manchu people, and the site of their 
hard experiences.  The majority of the people are Chinese (J. shina-jin), 
also known as Han, but they have rejected the racist ideas found among 
their fellow Han, and installed Pu Yi.  In doing so, they have regained the 
blessings of benevolent rule by the Qing dynasty (Yano 1933, 292-294). 
 In their claims of Pu Yi’s own high personal morality, Chinese-language writings 
often featured a story in which Pu Yi’s purported actions mirrored a well-known tale from the 
14th century collection of stories of pre-Imperial China, Romance of the Three Kingdoms.  In 
the original story a group of nobles visit a hero in his mountain retreat in a time of crisis and 
ask him to be their leader.  He initially refuses, but eventually gives in to their supplications, 
agreeing to “leave the mountains” and take on the burdens of rule.  Both Zheng’s 1932 
handbook for educators and the 1934 Manchukuo history textbook mention the Aisin Gioro 
family’s heritage in Manchuria, and refer to the “leave the mountains” story.  The textbook 
stated:  
Manchuria was the homeland of the Qing house, of which His Majesty 
was the last lord.  Added to this, he is a man of the highest morality and 
extraordinary character, who has the respect of our 30 million people.  So 
for reasons of history and personal character they [the provincial leaders in 
Manchuria] all urged that he, as the most appropriate person, become 
Head of State.  So the Administrative Committee . . . sent representatives 
to go to him in Pt. Arthur.  They had to plead with him several times 
before His Majesty agreed to leave his retirement and take the position.  
Finally, because of the representatives’ sincerity and the aspirations of the 
30 million people, he finally accepted (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 70-73, 
Wenjiao-bu 1932). 
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The Mandate of Heaven 
 In the decision to reinstate the forms of the Qing empire, however, the creators 
of Manchukuo ran into the problem of what to do with a central aspect of Chinese 
political philosophy that was not in tune with the contemporary political tide in Japan, 
the idea that the mandate of heaven is declared through the people’s will.  Early 
writings on Manchukuo claimed the people’s will was the source of legitimacy of the 
state’s creation and the ascension of Pu Yi.  In time, however, this position was 
de-emphasized, and eventually the publicly asserted source of legitimacy was 
transferred to the will of the Japanese emperor. 
 When Manchukuo was created, Sun Yatsen’s vision of a Republic based on the 
people’s will was still the most widely accepted form of government among Chinese 
intellectuals.  The state’s supporters tried to co-opt the concept by claiming they 
enjoyed popular support (Ogata 1964).  In the October 1, 1931 declaration of 
independence, for example, the Chinese signatories claimed that their actions were 
based on “the people’s will.”  Kwantung Army advisor Matsuki Satoru’s November 
1931 confidential outline of the new state stressed the importance of choosing a state 
structure which appears to be based on the people’s will: 
The independent Manchurian state should be a people’s rule government 
(minshu seitai).  We do not need to strictly adhere to the formalities of 
people’s rule, but it does need to be some kind of system based on 
people’s will.  Therefore the head of state (it does not matter whether he 
is a prince, president, or chairman) must represent the people’s will.  This 
follows the last 5000 years of Chinese popular traditional thought (Gendai 
Shi Shiryō #7 1964, 252-253).   
In the same document, however, Matsuki writes that a parliamentary system should be 
avoided because “the masses’ political consciousness is not yet developed in the area,” 
  119 
and that a “advisory body of imperial retainers” should have the power of “direction and 
guidance” over important laws.  The government Matsuki recommended resembled the 
Japanese-run system in Korea in 1905-1910, while it was occupied but not yet a formal 
colony.  Yamashiro Shin’ichi has noted the Matsuki’s plan took into consideration the 
section of Sun’s influential political manifesto Three People’s Principles on democracy, 
and detects: 
an ambivalent situation where although they [the coup supporters] 
opposed the Three People’s Principles, they realized that unless they 
brought in some kind of democratic causal agent, they could not present 
Manchukuo as an entity that could stand next to the Chinese Republic 
(Komagome 1996, 257-258, Yamashiro 1993b, 92).   
  
 In 1932 the Manchukuo government announced the creation of the Concordia 
Association (C. Xiehehui, J. Kyōwakai), a state controlled party or “mass organization,” 
which the government heralded as the organ through which the people’s will could be 
legitimately expressed.  In reality, of course, it did nothing to connect the voice of the 
people to government decisions.  The preamble of the organization denied any role as a 
political organization, stating “This society will not engage in political movements”.  
Although one of its roles was to solicit the views of the people on government policies, 
it had no official connection with or input into Manchukuo government organs.  Its 
main functions were to publicize and win support for the government’s policies and root 
out anti-Manchukuo activities.  Louise Young notes that the organization appealed to 
Japanese because it seemed to overcome the problem of bourgeois democracy that many 
saw as disruptive to Oriental societies, and allowed them to believe that the new state 
represented the local population and provided them with services.  One Japanese 
publicist claimed that under the system “representatives . . . truly express the opinions 
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of the multitude,” that “people say frankly what they think to officials . . . Officials get 
people to understand what they intend to do,” and “both the people and the officials 
cooperate.”  Although the system was clearly not democratic, the Concordia 
Association rhetoric gave it “a populist gloss” (Young 1998, 288-289).  
The United Council of the Concordia Association, in a state without a legislature, 
provided the only forum for non-Japanese to express their opinions and criticize the 
government in a public debate.  The council was created in 1934 and existed on the 
state, regional, and country levels. Okamura Hiroshi’s study of the Seventh State 
Council of September 1940 has shown that the participants did not simply support the 
government policies, but instead offered their own critical opinions (Okamura 1993).  
Still, there was no system by which the council’s decisions could be turned into policy, 
so the debates ultimately meant little more than talk.  
 
Komagome Takeshi has pointed out that during the 1933-35 period Japanese 
officials in Manchukuo began to have doubts about the usefulness of the wangdao 
philosophy as interpreted by Confucianists like Prime Minister Zheng.  Probably 
changes in the international situation contributed to this feeling.  In 1933 Japan 
withdrew from the League of Nations, and therefore the need to camouflage the state’s 
puppet nature became less important.  Also, in 1934 the Nanjing government began the 
New Life movement, which reemphasized Confucian concepts like propriety, 
righteousness, incorruption, and shame, and revived the Festival to Confucius.  
Therefore Manchukuo’s use of wangdao lost its effectiveness as a Confucian bulwark 
against the Guomindang government (Komagome 1996, 279).  Also, as mentioned 
above, the Manchukuo leadership appears to have received pressure from the colonial 
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leaders in Korea and Taiwan to remove aspects of the ideology which potentially could 
inspire indigenous movements in the colonies to call for similar forms of autonomy.  
Domestically, Japanese began to face the problem that the Manchukuo ideology, 
based as it was on Confucianist ideas, held within it the concept of a legitimate popular 
revolution if the government is deemed to have lost the mandate of heaven.  In 1933 
the educational theorist Chiba Meikichi published his work, “A Criticism of 
Manchuria’s Wangdao Thought” after a visit to the country.  He wrote: 
Wangdao is closely related to and indivisible from the three ideas of 
Virtuous Rule, Revolution, and People’s Rule . . . It is hard to believe that 
wangdao in today’s Manchuria can spiritually and intellectually pacify the 
two-fold threat of Communist forces working among the Koreans and 
bandits remaining from Zhang’s army.  Spreading education and teaching 
wangdao thought may give malcontents who have lost their positions and 
power the motivation to join revolutionary movements (Chiba 1933, 43, 
107).  
 
In other words, Confucianism is fine when it is taught to the ruling classes, but when it 
is made the educational content for the children of the masses, you teach them that they 
have the right to rise up against a bad government.  The ability of the concept to pacify 
the people, which itself was highly in doubt, was not worth the potential danger it 
posed.32 
                                                          
32 Yano Jinichi avoided defining the mandate of heaven in his writings on wangdao.  In a 1933 work, 
although he clearly states what “people’s will” in a wangdao system is not, a parliamentary system, he is 
vague about what it is.  “Under a constitutional system the will of the people is followed, but this is not 
the same as the people’s will in a wangdao state.  Under a constitutional system the people’s will is the 
economic desires of the people, but under a wangdao system the people’s will is . . . a moral sentiment.  
It is this sentiment itself which is the people’s will and heaven’s will . . . Government must follow the 
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Still, the concept of the “people’s will” continued to be used by Zheng and 
Tachibana in early 1934 in the context of Pu Yi’s forthcoming ascension to the position 
of emperor.  In a January 1934 document, “The Prime Minister’s Proclamation on 
Implementing the Imperial System,” Zheng wrote, “All the people sing odes of praise to 
wangdao, and with all their hearts desire an emperor who will rule according to 
Heaven” (Komagome 1996, 278).  In an article in the Manshū Hyōron the next month, 
Tachibana criticizes Japanese bureaucrats who were uncomfortable with the “mandate 
of heaven” concept, and would have preferred a system closer to Japan’s Tennōsei 
(emperor system).  He quoted one as saying, “I fear that something that can be 
proposed by the people’s will can also be brought down by them,” and claiming that 
“there is a heaven’s will which rejects the people’s will,” that is, the Emperor’s will 
should always be considered sacrosanct.   Tachibana, who hoped to harness the power 
of the political traditions of the Chinese masses, scoffed at those who “see the Chinese 
people’s ideology darkly.”  He stated:  
Because wangdao thought says, ‘The people’s will is heaven’s will,’ then 
it naturally follows that ‘what is supported by the people’s will can also be 
overturned by the people’s will.’  So yes, wangdao thought certainly does 
not guarantee the eternal nature of this new dynasty begun by Mr. Pu Yi.  
The only emperor in the history of historical China to claim an eternal 
blood line was the First Emperor of Qin.  No wonder this political article 
of faith has sunk deeply into the Chinese people’s consciousness” 
(Tachibana 1934a, Komagome 1996, 278). 
In this area, as others, Tachibana’s version of Manchukuo state ideology would soon be 
rejected by those who ran the state. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
true people’s will, not private opinions.  It must not act with prejudice toward the different ethnicities 
living in the territory of the new state, but instead treat all equally”  (Yano 1933: 299). 
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The fall of “the people’s will” 
 1935 was a pivotal year in the development of Manchukuo’s ideology.  In that 
year the Confucianist concepts found in the rubric of wangdao began to be 
de-emphasized, replaced by the Japanese emperor as the source of the state’s legitimacy.  
The first public display of this shift was the Huiluan Xunmin Zhaoshu, or Imperial 
Rescript Admonishing the People Upon the Return of the Imperial Carriage (hereafter 
referred to as the “Huiluan Rescript”) released on May 2, 1935, after Pu Yi returned 
from his first state visit to Japan and audience with the Shōwa emperor.  In the 
Rescript, said to be written by the Japanese classics scholar Satō Tomoyuki, Pu Yi 
expressed devotion and loyalty to the Japanese emperor, climaxing with his statement, 
“I share the same spirit as the Japanese emperor.”  Wangdao terminology, which were 
frequently used in previous rescripts, were not mentioned, and in their place a Japanese 
concept of a son-to-father style of loyalty to the emperor was emphasized.  As 
mentioned above, the document was intended to play the same role in Manchukuo that 
the Rescript on Education played in Japan, recited in schools daily and at other public 
events (Nomura 1995, 77).  Note also the symbolism of Pu Yi’s trip to Japan, 
reminiscent of East Asian envoys to imperial China, petitioning for imperial recognition 
as vassal states.  Not coincidentally, in 1935 Zheng was removed from his position as 
Prime Minister and replaced by Zhang Jinghui, a near-illiterate former warlord, who 
posed little in the way of an ideological challenge to the Japanese.   
On September 18, 1936, for the first time an internal Kwantung Army document 
defined the meaning of “heaven’s will” as the will of the Japanese emperor, not the 
people, as previously stated by Zheng and others.  In doing so, they clearly defined the 
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Manchukuo emperor as subservient to the Japanese emperor.  Apparently written by 
Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirō, it stated: 
The Manchukuo emperor’s position is based on heaven’s will, in other 
words he receives his position by the Imperial will of the Tennō (Japanese 
emperor).  He serves the Tennō, and acts through the Tennō’s will.  
Eternally he stands below the Tennō as the center of the Manchukuo 
people and as the manifestation of the principles of the nation’s 
founding . . . His position is like that of the moon, which reflects the light 
of the sun.  Therefore if by any chance the Manchukuo emperor should 
oppose the ideals of the state’s founding, he would lose the Tennō’s great 
will, and the Tennō would remove him from his position . . . Therefore the 
Tennō has suzerain authority over Manchukuo . . . Wangdao government 
means the manifestation of the Tennō’s will, not a government of 
philosophers, as wangdao thought was in ancient China” (Gendai Shi 
Shiryo #11 1964, 909).   
Pu Yi chaffed at restrictions placed on him by the Kwantung Army, in particular the 
requirement that he act as the ritual inferior to the smaller Shōwa emperor (Crossley 
1997).  The Kwantung Army may therefore have been preparing for the eventuality 
that they would have to discipline Pu Yi for disobedience. 
This same document also hinted at removing the public fiction of Manchukuo’s 
independence.  It stated: “Establishing Manchukuo is the first step in the Yamato 
people’s course of world historical development, with the mission of achieving the ideal 
of ‘Eight corners under one roof,’ . . . Manchukuo is an independent state within the 
Japanese Imperial Alliance, of which the Tennō is the Great Center.” Similarly the 
March 1937 Imperial Succession Law stated “The beauty of the achievement of eternal 
unity between ruler and the people . . . is achieved with the help of the His Majesty the 
Japanese emperor” (Yamamoto 1993, 77). 
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 Soon these principles were finding their way into pro-Manchukuo writings and 
official government documents.  For example, in a November 1936 Manshū Hyōron 
essay, the publisher, Koyama Sadatomo, stated that while Manchukuo had not yet 
attained the level of a kōdō (-Japanese imperial) government, achieving that 
position should be the country’s primary goal.  He defined wangdao government as 
one based on philosophical principles, with the leader subject to mandate change, and 
kōdō government as one based on the eternal reign of a divine family, exempt from 
mandate change. Kōdō government was the greatest and most moral form in the world, 
with wangdao government a lesser form, although itself far greater than “class-based 
governments” like parliamentary democracies, dictatorships, and fascism.   For 
Manchukuo to reach the desired stage, kōdō principles had to replace wangdao 
principles.  For example, the relationship between the emperor and the people needed 
to be expressed in terms of a father and his children, a common rhetorical framework in 
Japan at the time (Miyazawa 1997,14-15).  The need for changes of this kind was often 
discussed in Manchukuo journal articles and government documents in the 1936-1940 
period (Yamamoto 1940, 8-9). 
As will be described in Chapter 5, this change can be traced through the 
different editions of Manchukuo textbooks.  The 1934 morals textbooks centered 
around Confucian principles, rarely mentioning Japan or Japanese things. A morals 
textbook for Higher Elementary Schools, published in December 1935, however, 
included a chapter which replicated in Chinese the text of the Japanese Imperial 
Rescript on Education, which had been taught in both Japan and its colonies for decades 
as a centerpiece of the Japanese imperial ideology (Wenjiao-bu 1937, 76-81).  In April 
1937 the long-awaited Shingakusei (new education system) was announced.  Under the 
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new system, besides greatly increasing the hours of Japanese language education, the 
Education Ministry did away with instruction based on the Confucian classics and 
replaced them with “National Morals” textbooks which emphasized positive aspects of 
Japanese culture and Japan-Manchukuo unity.  An Education Ministry official later 
explained: 
It (wangdao) did not fit with the national policy of Manchukuo, a country 
of Imperial succession, so of course we had to eliminate the ideas of 
abdication and changing the dynasty (Minsheng-bu 1939, 60).   
In 1939 Tamura Toshio, the Manchukuo Education Department Director, went further 
in his criticism of the original ideology, stating: 
The most active agent working to block the achievement of Manchukuo 
educational spirit has been wangdao thought from ancient China, an 
Oriental-style democracy. Not only that, but they have made it hard to 
understand the nobility of kōdō, and hindered Japanese-Manchurian unity” 
(Yamamoto 1940, 9). 
At the same time wangdao ideas began to be rejected by Japanese officials in 
Manchukuo, Japanese running the puppet governments in other parts of China also 
declined to use them.  The first Japanese-run puppet government in Northern China, 
the Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government (1936-1937), in a document on 
school textbook selection, stated that the new texts would include materials on  
“cooperation and great peace between the East Asian peoples” and “Eastern (Tōyō) 
morality” (Tōa Bunka Kyōkai 1937, 35).  The use of the term “Eastern Morality” 
instead of “wangdao”  probably stemmed from an understanding of the problem of the 
revolutionary potential of the latter term in Manchukuo.   Although they built on many 
of the puppet-state forms first developed in Manchukuo, I have not found the concept of 
wangdao in any of the official documents of any of the other puppet-states in China. 
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Pu Yi’s second state visit to Japan in May 1940 heralded changes in the official 
Manchukuo ideology which were much more drastic and abrupt than the changes of the 
1934-1939 period.  Officials tried to accelerate the cultural assimilation of the culture 
through the establishment of Japanese State Shintō as the country’s official ideology, 
including the recognition of Amaterasu, the mythical ancestor of the Japanese emperor 
and premier god of State Shintō, as the country’s “foremost god”.  They also 
established a Shintō State Founding Shrine in the capital, as well as branch shrines at 
every public school.   
During his state visit, Pu Yi declared “We intend to make Japan’s Amaterasu our 
own god.”  To achieve this, he presented a specially made mirror to the Ise Shrine of 
Amaterasu, where it was imbued with the divine presence.  He then returned to 
Manchukuo with the mirror and enshrined it in the newly built State Founding Shrine.  
In the July 1940 Rescript on the Foundation of the National Polity (C. Guoti Dianding 
Zhaoshu, ), Pu Yi announced that he and his subjects were expected to 
worship at the shrine, showing their devotion to Amaterasu and their loyalty to the 
Japanese emperor (Nomura 1995, 76-77).  The worship of Amaterasu replaced the 
Aisin Gioro family’s traditional worship of their Qing ancestors, and marked the final 
removal of all significant ties to their Chinese imperial past. 
The nature of State Shintō, or “The Way of the Gods” (yuishin no michi), as it 
was usually called, was discussed in a 1941 middle school textbook: 
The establishment of our country, and its developments since its founding, 
are all based on the divine virtues of Japan’s Great Ancestor, the god 
Amaterasu Ōkami, and the protection of the (Japanese) Emperor, the 
living god . . . The Way of the gods is the principle ideology of our 
country, and comes from the (Manchukuo) Emperor’s firm conviction and 
understanding (Minsheng-bu 1941, 145-146).  
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The textbook went beyond the Rescript on the Foundation of the National Polity by 
clearly declaring that the Japanese emperor himself was a living god, and that 
Amaterasu was the ultimate source of the creation of Manchukuo.  Sakuta Sōichi, the 
founder and vice-chancellor of the state-run Kenkoku University, wrote in 1942: 
Manchukuo was born and created by the will of god.  This will of god 
was afterwards shown to be “the way of the gods,” or Amaterasu . . . At 
the time of the state’s founding wangdao spirit was elevated, but this was 
not the spirit by which the country was born and created . . . The Japanese 
emperor, who is the direct manifestation of the divine will, protects and 
guides Manchukuo (Nomura 1995, 76). 
The change in national ideology is also reflected in the changes in the national 
anthem.  The words to the first Manchukuo national anthem, written by Prime Minister 
Zheng, praised the moral principles of wangdao, which would eventually bring the 
world together in peace.  A new anthem, announced as part of the state’s tenth year 
celebration in 1942, instead celebrated the morality of the Japanese emperor (Tsukase 
1998). 
 These changes reflect the developments in domestic Japanese society at the 
time.  The establishment of the Educational Reform Council soon after the 1935 
Emperor Organ Theory controversy played a major role in the change of Japanese 
Emperor system ideology in Japan in the mid-1930s.  The Council’s 1936 report 
recommended that the government officially emphasize the position of the emperor as a 
living god and father of the family state.  In response to this recommendation the 
Ministry of Education in May 1937 produced a pamphlet entitled Kokutai no Hongi 
(The Fundamental Principles of the State Polity), which did just that.  Several 
members of the Education Reform Council, including Hiraizumi Kiyoshi and Sakuta 
Sōichi, were subsequently appointed as the founding committee members of 
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Manchukuo’s Kenkoku University in early 1937.  They became very close to the 
Kwantung Army leadership and became their main ideological advisors.  They 
recommended the creation of a central State Founding Shrine in the capital, although 
they disagreed over what divine figure should be the object of worship.  Although their 
plans were delayed by the start of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, they remained leading 
ideological figures in Manchukuo; Hiraizumi as “Lecturer to the Emperor” on 
Manchukuo history, and Sakuta as vice-chancellor of Kenkoku University.   
Presumably they were involved in the decision to introduce State Shintoism in 
Manchukuo in 1940 (Komagome 1996, 283). 
 Naturally the sudden importation of a complex foreign ideology was confusing 
and difficult to justify.  The Japanese textbook editors, for example, were frustrated by 
the constant need to create new textbooks to match the state’s frequent ideological shifts 
(Terada 1975, 84).  Members of the Concordia Association assigned to work with 
collaborating Chinese religious groups like the Red Swastika Society and the Morality 
Society complained that Shintō principles clashed with the organizations’ traditional 
Chinese principles (Komagome 1996, 285).  Another Japanese official, Yamashita 
Nobutsune, wrote in a 1941 book, “If we claim that kōdō is superior, and embellish 
wangdao with ideas from ancient Japan, the Chinese will simply see it as a tool of 
Japanese subjugation.  We say we are following the ‘kingly way’, but are really 
pursuing the ‘hegemonic way’.  This could help the communists win the hearts of the 
Chinese.” (Kōain 1941a). 
The internal contradiction of imposing an ideology based on racial superiority 
and blood lines onto a foreign country also caused difficulties.   For example at a 
Concordia Association round table meeting in 1943 a Japanese official commented that 
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for the sake of unity the remaining differences between Japan’s and Manchukuo’s 
political systems should be removed.  Tazaki Masayoshi, the national Concordia 
Association leader, rejected this proposal, saying if one ignores the distinctions between 
the two countries, the youth would “not recognize the absolute uniqueness of kōdō, 
which would be an unforgivable offence to kōdō.”  Tazaki’s argued that true kōdō 
exists only in people of  “the same blood and same source.”  This demonstrates the 
contradictions found between the imperialist need to use a logic of kōdō universality, 
and the nationalistic need to insist on absolute uniqueness (Komagome 1996, 284-285). 
At the same time that the quasi-religious Shintō ceremonies were being pushed 
on the Manchurian population, attempts to more completely mobilize the population 
into the war effort further alienated the people. At the 10th anniversary of the state’s 
founding, in March 1942, an new imperial rescript declared that the country would 
devote all of its power into the “service” of the war effort.  The rescript made clear 
Manchukuo’s subservient position by elucidating who would do the service (the people 
of Manchukuo), and who would receive the service (Japan).  In December of that year 
the Guominxun (), a pledge of allegiance, was promulgated, with the intention of 
it being recited at schools, places of work, and in prisons.   Besides calling for the 
worship of Amaterasu, it proclaimed the achievement of “Greater East Asian 
Co-Prosperity” as the country’s ultimate goal, rather than earlier goal of attainment of 
world peace based on the wangdao philosophy (Kenkoku Kyōiku 1943.3, 10, Nomura 
1995, 79).  Also, the amount of time spent by students in forced labor in support of the 
war effort ballooned after 1943, and by 1944 students spent very little time in the 
classroom.  
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If for the non-Japanese the wangdao philosophy of the state’s first years was 
vague and lacking motivating energy, the changes introduced in the 1940s emphasizing 
Shintō ideas and pro-Japanese service appear to have caused a great deal of anger and 
frustration. Kimura Haruyoshi, a Japanese official in the Fengtian post office, later 
recalled the Han “had their own firm faith, so of course they could not believe in 
Amaterasu.”  Several of his non-Japanese subordinates refused to worship at the State 
Founding Shrine, and as a result were fired (Tsukase 1998, 72).   
 
Conclusion 
 As soon as the Manchurian Incident occurred on September 18, 1931, the 
Kwantung Army and its allies began creating a vision of the region as an ideal state, 
born out of the pure efforts of heroes, and destined to bring peace and happiness to the 
entire world.  To avoid the problem of explaining the power they wielded as a minority 
ethnic group, the Japanese employed the construct of minzoku kyowa; while to avoid the 
problem of admitting a dictatorial rule, they utilized the ancient concept of wangdao 
rule.  Although it was obvious to most that it was ruse to cover a Japanese coup, some 
Japanese came to accept it and devote their lives to it.  In time even Ishihara appears to 
have come to believe in his own creation and became angry when Japanese officials 
treated the country too much like a puppet.  Japanese educators were among the key 
creators and disseminators of this idealistic vision, and thousands of them made the 
commitment to join the effort, leaving home and family behind.   
 Over time the façade of universalistic principles expressed early in the state’s 
history was removed, because it contradicted Japan’s ideology of Emperor-centered 
uniqueness, and left open the possibility of a legitimate popular revolution.   In the 
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period from 1935 to1940, pro-Manchukuo writers tried to present a vision of a system 
which mixed the best of China and Japan, but by 1941 the true socially unequal and 
politically dependent nature of Manchukuo became an officially recognized part of the 
state ideology.  The sight of Chinese children forced to participate in Shinto rituals, 
rituals which implied the Japanese were immutably set apart as the superior people, 
destroyed any remaining credibility the ideology may have had in the sight of the 
Chinese.  
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Chapter 4 
Language Policy in Manchukuo: Imperial optimism and opportunistic reform 
In 1938 the Manchukuo government raised Japanese to the status of a state 
language and gave it a higher de facto status than Chinese and Mongolian, the other two 
state languages.  This policy shift was part of a series of changes initiated in 1935, 
when the Manchukuo government began abandoning its efforts to win popular support 
by trying to make the state look like a fundamentally Chinese entity.  It significantly 
increased the hours of Japanese language instruction in the elementary and middle 
schools, and used language proficiency exams, language requirements for government 
officials, and a new Chinese language phonetic writing system as tools in asserting the 
dominance of Japanese.  They switched to a system in which students were expected to 
accept aspects of the Japanese imperial ideology and feel a unity with Japan, although 
not necessarily completely abandon their native ethnic heritage.   
The Japanese were engaged in what Robert Phillipson calls “linguistic 
imperialism” or “linguicism”, which he defines as: 
ideologies, structures, and practices which are used to legitimate, 
effectuate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources 
(both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the 
basis of language (Phillipson 1992, 47). 
 
Japanese colonial governments always used education to “legitimate, effectuate, 
and reproduce” their power.   By 1938 the Manchukuo government, however, decided 
that the previous system, which emphasized Chinese culture and friendship with Japan, 
had failed.  An insufficient number of the population viewed the state as a legitimate 
institution, nor were enough people actively cooperating with the Japanese.  The 
government decided the schools should go beyond teaching simple friendship, and 
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instead try to foster a sincere loyalty toward Japan. They considered the Japanese 
language the primary tool in achieving this task.    
The change of direction in Manchukuo ideology was part of an empire-wide 
shift to what might be called an “optimistic” view of the power of the Japanese 
language to instill loyalty in the hearts of non-Japanese Asians.   While by 1938 a 
number of key leaders in the Manchukuo bureaucracy, led by Terada, were Japanese 
language optimists, they were also dedicated reformers.  They opposed the use of 
excessively chauvinistic classroom materials, and supported Japanese language 
orthographic reform proposals.  Their approach differed significantly from education 
in colonial Taiwan and Korea, where by the 1930s the colonial governments disparaged 
nearly all aspects of the traditional local cultures and expected the people to see 
themselves as Japanese.   
This chapter begins by examining the evolving views on the role of language 
education in the Japanese empire, in particular a school of thought I call “reform 
optimist”, which animated the Manchukuo education world.  This is followed by an 
investigation of language policy in Manchukuo, including the number of classroom 
hours, textbook content, debates about the proper teaching style, efforts to foster 
Japanese language use outside the classroom, and finally the degree to which they were 
successful in teaching the language.     
 
Kotodama and the roots of Manchukuo policies on language 
Yamaguchi Kiichirō (1872-1952) could reasonably be called the father of 
Japanese language policy in Manchukuo, although he never held a bureaucratic position 
in the puppet state.  In Taiwan at the turn of the century he created the Direct Method, 
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a teaching system which revolutionized language instruction throughout the empire.  
He felt the Japanese language was infused with a living spirit, which could be 
experienced by anyone who immersed themselves in the language.  He therefore held 
that language instruction was the Japan’s most effective tool for gaining a subjected 
people’s loyalty.  For him it was the language itself, not propaganda messages taught 
in language class, which was effective, and so he opposed efforts to win over students 
with frequent tales of Japanese military might or Japanese divinity.  Although thought 
the spoken language was “sacred”, he did not feel the same way about the orthographic 
forms created to express the language, and supported reforms to simplify the written 
language.  In his career he taught in schools in Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and China, 
and he was able to spread his ideas throughout the empire.  A number of educators 
who were receptive to his ideas, including Fukui Yū and Terada, were appointed to 
leading positions in the Manchukuo education bureaucracy, where they were able to put 
the ideas into practice. 
 Before looking at the debate between the Yamaguchi camp and its rival schools 
of thought, an examination of the intellectual roots of Yamaguchi’s ideas are in order.  
From pre-modern times there existed a belief in Japan that certain words had a mystical 
power when used in rituals and public events, and played a role in the relationship 
between humans and spirits, or kami.  This innate power which existed in language 
was called kotodama, or “the soul of words”.    
 In the Edo period century nativist kokugaku (Japanese studies) scholars such as 
Motoori Norinaga searched for what was fundamentally Japanese about the society.   
One of their main objects of interest was the Japanese language, a system which could 
be traced to ancient times, even to the age of the gods, but remained in use to that day.  
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For them, therefore the “signs”, or Japanese words, were not arbitrary, but rather were 
vessels connecting them to a sacred past.    
The Western-trained linguist Ueda Kazutoshi (1867-1937) did more than any 
other person in his age to systematize kotodama theories of language and nationalism.  
In 1894 Ueda returned from three years of study in Germany sponsored by the Japanese 
Ministry of Education, and took a position at Tokyo Imperial University.  Influenced 
by European nationalist language scholarship, as well as the Edo-period kokugaku 
scholars, he became convinced the Japanese people needed to understand and gain a 
pride in their language, and the Japanese government needed to reform the written 
language.  On the first point he held that the Japanese language was the unifying force 
of the nation, the “spiritual blood of the Japanese people.”  He insisted that the spirit of 
the language was the source of Japanese people’s moral and intellectual strength, and 
therefore was what made them uniquely Japanese.   On the second point, he called for 
the state to abolish the use of kanji (Chinese characters), and institute in their place a 
phonetic Latin or reformed kana system.  Since Japan’s kanji characters came 
originally from China, they did not share in the language’s kotodama, and therefore 
warranted no special consideration (Lee 1996, 96).     
 The idea that a language holds sacred power was not uniquely Japanese.  
Many ancient religious communities believed took great pride in their possession of 
texts written in a sacred language.  Benedict Anderson has pointed out belief in a 
sacred language leads to an idea among ancient peoples that was “largely foreign to the 
contemporary Western mind”: the non-arbitrariness of the sign. 
The ideograms of Chinese, Latin, or Arabic were emanations of reality, 
not randomly fabricated representations of it . . . In the Islamic tradition, 
until quite recently, the Qur’an was literally untranslatable (and therefore 
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unstranslated), because Allah’s truth was accessible only through the 
unsubstitutable true signs of written Arabic.  There is no idea here of a 
world so separated from language that all languages are equidistant (and 
thus interchangeable) signs for it.  In effect, ontological reality is 
apprehensible only through a single, privileged system of re-presentation: 
the truth-language of Church Latin, Qur’anic Arabic, or Examination 
Chinese (Anderson 1991, 14).   
 
The use of these truth-languages across cultures allowed some ancient peoples to 
imagine themselves part of a global community. 
In the West during the Enlightenment, Anderson goes on, age of exploration 
discoveries demonstrated the existence of other great civilizations, and the development 
of print technology helped to spread the use of written vernacular languages.  These 
developments led to the fall of Latin and the rise of vernaculars, which in turn caused 
the idea of the non-arbitrariness of the sign to wane.   
 Although the idea of a Latin being imbued with a sacred power declined in the 
West during the Enlightenment, in the early 19th century ideas of linguistic superiority 
began to come to the fore.  Aided by the energy gained from the Industrial Revolution, 
France, Britain, and other Western European states began to move out of their trading 
enclaves and colonize large swaths of Africa and Asia.  The economic and military 
imbalance between the colonizing and colonized peoples helped convince the 
Westerners that they were superior in all ways, including their language.  The British, 
as Richard Bailey argues, began to see English as: 
the "natural" language of the highest human ideals, and the zeal that 
propelled economic and cultural imperialism was coupled with the use of 
English. The intrinsic qualities of the language were believed to be so 
superior for all manner of intellectual activity that it was easy to confuse 
  138 
altruism with self-interest and generosity with exploitation (Bailey 1991, 
110).  
 
An example of the zeal and assurance of superiority with which some British 
promoted their language was the British philologist Julius Charles Hare (1795-1855), 
who said: 
And as of all the works of man language is the most enduring, and partakes 
the most of eternity, and as our own language, so far as thought can project 
itself into the future, seems likely to be coeval with the world, and to 
spread vastly beyond even its present immeasurable limits, there cannot 
easily be a nobler object of ambition than to purify and better it  (Bailey 
1991, 106). 
  
The self-satisfying pleasure of seeing others work to achieve the language of 
one’s childhood was not the only reason given for language instruction.  Another 
British philologist, William P. Russel, proclaimed in 1801: 
If many schools were established in different parts of Asia and Africa to 
instruct the natives, free of all expense, with various premiums of British 
manufacture to the most meritorious pupils, this would be the best 
preparatory step that Englishmen could adopt for the general admission of 
their commerce, their opinions, their religion. This would tend to conquer 
the heart and its affections; which is a far more effectual conquest than that 
obtained by swords and cannons: and a thousand pounds expended for 
tutors, books, and premiums, would do more to subdue a nation of savages 
than forty thousand expended for artillery-men, bullets, and gunpowder” 
(Bailey 1991, 106-107).33 
                                                          
33 Just as with the Japanese (as shall be discussed in this chapter), there were wide variations within 
Western colonial ideology on the questions of how European the colonized peoples could become, how 
many people should the colonizers try to educate, and how much of the native language and native topic 
be allowed in the schools.  Most everyone involved in colonizing enterprises in the 19th and 20th century, 
however, saw education as a way of co-opting the local population; tying them emotionally to the 
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French colonial policy in late 19th and early 20th centuries was even more 
focused on language instruction as the molder of minds.  While the British tried to 
limit education to an elite few for the most part, the French tended to see themselves on 
a mission to “civilize” the non-Europeans, with the French language as their primary 
instrument.  For example, Georges Hardy, the Inspector General of Education in 
French West Africa in 1912-1919, said of an African child learning French, “He can not 
possibly forget the good ideas that were introduced to him via this language . . . these 
are our ideas, which constitute our moral, social and economic superiority, and little by 
little they will transform the barbarians of yesterday into disciples and assistants.”  
Similarly, in 1930, Governor General Brevie of French West Africa said, “The native’s 
mind can become disciplined by the mastering of spoken French” (White 1996).  
Accordingly, government-run schools in French Sub-Saharan Africa, from the time they 
were first opened in 1857 through to the end of the colonial era, banned the use of all 
languages besides French in the classrooms, similar to the situation in Taiwan and 
Korea after 1937.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
colonizers.  For example Rambaud, the French Minister of Public Education in 1897, wrote about three 
waves of conquest in Algeria.  The first was military, and the second administrative. “The third conquest 
will be by the School: this should ensure the predominance of our language over the various local idioms, 
inculcate in the Muslims our own idea of what France is and of its role in the world, and replace 
ignorance and fanatical prejudices by the simple but precise notions of European science” (Phillipson 
1992, 113-114).   
A French senior inspector in 1910 said colonial education would:  “connect them to the Metropole by a 
very solid psychological bond, against the day when their progressive emancipation ends in a form of 
federation, as is probable . . . that they be, and they remain, French in language, thought, and spirit”  
(Phillipson 1992, 114).   
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 The British and French, based on ideas like those proffered above, created 
education systems in its colonies in which the metropole languages became the gateway 
to success.  The numbers of students the various colonizers tried to teach, and the 
degree to which the tried to teach the language, differed with each colony and under 
each governor.  Built into the structure of each colony, however, was the belief in the 
superiority of the metropole language.  Today the idea that European languages are the 
only means to a wider intellectual life continues to reverberate throughout the Third 
World.  Ali Mazrui has said, “Education to many people came to mean simply the 
ability to speak English” (Mazrui 1975, 150).  Many in sub-Saharan Africa believe that 
secondary schools, in which the medium of instruction is English or French, are the key 
to all social and educational advance, since they are the only channels through which 
the dissemination of European knowledge is possible. The prevalent view is that 
without European languages there can be no history, mathematics or science teaching.  
To this day many educators hold that scientific and technological fields must be taught 
in English because vernaculars can not develop terminologies precise and modern 
enough to convey the particulars of these fields. A corollary to the dissemination of 
English as the language of civilization is that vernaculars, along with vernacular 
knowledge, are denigrated and maintained in isolation from modern discourses (Collins, 
Burns, and Ching 1994, 211).  
There were some significant historical differences between the situation in 
Europe and in Japan.  Although the Japanese language certainly went through great 
transformations over the centuries, there was not as strong a sense of a vernacular 
overthrowing a sacred language.  At the turn of the century, at the same time Ueda and 
others brought the idea of kotodama to the fore, Japan also began to expand overseas, 
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which resulted in a surge in nationalistic pride.  While in Europe modern nationalistic 
pride in the metropole languages was basically a secular phenomenon, in Japan this 
pride also had a religious connotation, which could not help but contribute to the 
virulence of the Japanese colonizers’ sense of superiority over their neighbors.   
 
Colonial language policy schools of thought 
 In the first decades of the 20th century, as Japan embarked on its age of 
colonization, at least four different schools of thought on proper colonial language 
policy began to emerge: gradualists, utilitarians, nativists, and reform optimists.   The 
first two groups tended to be pessimistic about the power of the Japanese language, 
while the last two were optimistic language could play a role in winning the loyalty of 
non-Japanese colonized peoples.  The following section will examine the views of 
these groups on Japanese language education, native language education, and Japanese 
language reform. 
 
Gradualists 
 Gradualists generally were not believers in the power of kotodama.  Trained 
in Western linguistics, they eschewed seemingly irrational concepts of sacral languages.  
While they may have viewed Japan as superior to its neighbors, they saw the difference 
in terms of Japanese technological superiority, not ties to an ancient sacred past.    
 For the most part the leading colonial policy makers in Taiwan and Korea in 
the first two decades of the century were gradualists.  They felt native culture and 
tradition were so deeply engrained that state-sponsored efforts at cultural assimilation, 
including Japanese language education, could not bear much immediate fruit.  The 
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most that could be hoped for was a compliant, overawed population who would cause 
little trouble for the government.  They were influenced by 19th century Western 
concepts of “scientific racism” embodied in the writings of Haeckel, Lamarck and 
Spencer.  The diffusion of social Darwinism, in particular, provided scientific 
legitimacy for the notion that social and political development was a manifestation of 
the interplay of natural forces (Weiner 1997).  They therefore implicitly rejected 
Ueda’s claim that the Japanese language was the “spiritual blood of the Japanese 
people,” because anyone can learn a language, and therefore this “spiritual blood” 
would be theoretically transfusable.  They denied the colonized peoples an equal place 
within the Japanese nation, and gave no hope that their status would change in the 
foreseeable future.   
Gotō Shimpei, Tōgō Minoru, and Kumamoto Shigekichi, Japanese colonial 
officials in Taiwan and Korea in the period from 1900 to 1920, were representative 
examples of the gradualist position.  Gotō, the top civilian administrator in Taiwan 
from 1898 to 1906, supported Japanese-language education, but insisted that the 
numbers be limited to training a small corps of government functionaries.  Gotō often 
spoke of a “hundred year plan” to raise the colony to civilization, and once wrote that 
only after 3000 years of loyalty could the Taiwanese become like the Japanese and 
enjoy the benefits of the Meiji Constitution (Gotō 1921, 10, Komagome 1997, 60).  
Tōgō, a civilian administrator in Taiwan insisted that colonized peoples would never 
give up their ethnic identity and desire for self-rule, which would doom any attempt at 
assimilation to failure and disorder.  He recommended a system in which indigenous 
languages and customs be allowed to continue unmolested in return for local 
cooperation with the colonial power’s economic and political control (Peattie 1984,102, 
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110-112).  Kumamoto, a leading education official in Korea at the time of the 
annexation, wrote in a 1910 interagency memo that because of the huge cultural gap 
between Koreans and Japanese, Koreans could never achieve the sense of unity with the 
Japanese ruling house that he claimed Japanese enjoyed.  Any effort at assimilating the 
Koreans and making them loyal subjects to the Japanese throne was hopeless and in 
vain.  Rather than loyalty, colonial schools should teach students to be obedient (Lee 
1996, 255-157). 
 Gradualists, for the most part, called for a long-term approach in education, 
starting with a few schools for gentry class children.  Schools should focus on 
Japanese language education, but also allow some continued native language study, and 
teach traditional subjects like the Confucian classics to gain the trust of the gentry 
families  
Under their direction Japanese was declared the “official language” off the 
colonies immediately after annexation, and was taught from the first grade of public 
elementary schools.  Japanese language was taught ten to twelve hours a week in 
Korean elementary schools in 1911-1937, which made up about a third of the total class 
time.  In those same years Korean language classes were taught for three to six hours a 
week.  Other courses were taught in a mixture of Japanese and Korean, depending on 
the abilities of the teachers and students (Oguma 1998, 74).  The system was 
essentially the same in Taiwan.  
 
Utilitarians 
 A second group, the utilitarians, agreed with the gradualists that the Japanese 
language contained no special power.  They held colonized peoples would only 
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become interested in the Japanese language once they saw economic benefits such study 
could bring.   The utilitarians became increasingly critical of the colonial governments 
empire-wide in the 1930s as the governments came to demand immediate cultural 
assimilation. 
Among the utilitarians was the Kwantung Territory educator Tomiyama 
Tamikura, who in 1932 criticized an article by Tokyo Imperial University language 
professor Hoshina Kōichi supporting compulsory Japanese language education in 
Manchukuo schools.   Tomiyama, who had previously worked as a teacher in Korea 
and Taiwan, wrote of the impossibility of forcing the Japanese language on colonized 
peoples: “Real progress in learning a language comes when a student begins seeking for 
it.  Forcing language study will produce no more than temporary surface progress” 
(Tomiyama 1932).  Similarly in 1940 the language scholar Ogaeri Yoshio said that 
because the Chinese nature was highly practical they would not put any effort into their 
studies until they saw concrete economic benefits to learning the language (Ogaeri 
1940). 
Yanaihara Tadao, a noted liberal critic of Japanese colonial policy, in 1937 
wrote that although the French had found some success in their attempts to assimilate 
Africans by teaching them Enlightenment ideas, and promising social and political 
freedom, Japanese colonial policy makers were following an irrational path of trusting 
the Japanese language to imbue Koreans with the “Japanese spirit”.  He wrote:  
There is nothing to show spreading a language will lead directly to 
harmony between the different peoples.  Language is nothing more than 
the outward form of social life, it can not change people’s hearts 
directly . . . Language is a means of expressing and spreading ideas, it is 
not the birthplace of ideas . . . The policy of using national language 
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education to assimilate the local population is an inversion of the 
relationship between ideas and language (Yanaihara 1937: 304, 326).   
 
Nativists 
 The third group, nativists, were believers in the concept of kotodama.  Like 
the reform optimists, they were language optimists.  That is they held that instruction 
in the Japanese language and culture could change non-Japanese, despite a lack of blood 
ties.  They were convinced that if the colonized peoples could be made to speak 
Japanese and learn Japanese customs, their character would naturally become more 
refined, and they would appreciate and become allies in Japan’s mission to lead a 
unified East Asia. Calls for increased enrollments and eventually even compulsory 
education in the colonies tended to come from members of the optimistic camps. Unlike 
the reform optimists, nativists saw the language as not only bound to the kokutai 
(national polity), but even as its chief protector.  They supported the complete 
reorganization of colonial society based on Japanese models.  They opposed allowing 
any residual native language education, in fear that mixing Japanese and native culture 
in the schools could lead to cultural miscegenation.  The leading voice in this camp 
was the linguist Yamada Takao (1873-1958).   
Nativists were the ideological allies of supporters of Hiraizumi Kiyoshi’s 
conservative “imperial history” (kōkoku shikan), which fervently defended the 
historicity of the divine origins of the Imperial family and the Japanese people.  
Because of this divine connection, they saw Japanese as a unique language, making 
comparisons with other language impossible.  In 1943 Shida Engi, an ally of Yamada’s, 
expressed the group’s position on the unique nature of Japanese: 
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The national language protects the kokutai and trains the people in 
righteousness.  It was called waga kuni no kotoba ‘(our country’s 
language) [in ancient histories], never Nihongo, which one uses when 
speaking of it in an international sense, equating it with other languages . . . 
The word kotoba (language) is not the same thing as the academic 
language thought of by scientific linguists (Lee 1996, 307). 
 
The nativist linguists regarded any attempt at simplifying the language, like kana 
reform, as sacrilege.   In 1940 Yamada wrote the following in rebuke to the reformers: 
 They say the national language is in disorder and uncontrolled, but 
really who is trying to make the language disordered?  Since the Meiji 
restoration it has been the roman letters supporters, kanji abolitionists, 
kana usage-destroyers, and national language reformers—these are the 
ones responsible for confusion . . . They use their ideas to willfully 
disrupt the state’s education, sullying the purity of the national language 
(Lee 1996, 304-305).34   
 
 
 
                                                          
34 Although nativists tended to strong support Japanese language education in the colonies, there is also a 
sense of reservation in some of their writings about trying to transfuse the spiritual blood of the Japanese 
language to the colonies, and feared attempts to teach the language to foreigners would result in a 
disastrous simplification of the language.  In 1940 Yamada Takao criticized efforts to simplify the 
language for foreigners as signs of a “servile vulgar attitude” (Lee 1996).  Frederick Cooper and Ann 
Laura Stoler have commented that colonialism is often a tenuous balance between programs that would 
bind the interests of specific groups to the colonial state and policies that would maintain a range of 
cultural distinctions designed to contain and curtail the aspirations of the colonized (Cooper and Stoler 
1997).  Although nativists strongly supported colonialism, they also desired to maintain a cultural 
distinction with the colonized.  Their fears resembled that of many Britons during the height of their 
Empire, according to Ali Mazrui, saw “the phenomenal spread of the language . . . as at best an amusing 
phenomenon, and at worst as something which is tending to pollute and corrupt their language” (Mazrui 
1975, 75). 
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Yamaguchi and the reform optimists 
 The fourth group, reform optimists, agreed with the nativists that language has 
an indefinable power which changes a person who learns it.  Unlike the nativists, they 
did not see Japanese as unique in that respect—learning any language will naturally 
incline the learner to empathize and even feel allied to the speakers of that language.  
While they frequently expressed their pride in Japanese cultural achievements, they did 
not see the language as singular, and therefore sacred.  They also supported 
orthographic reform as a way to stimulate language reform in the empire, because they 
saw the complicated kana system in use as a barrier to the literacy of Japanese and 
non-Japanese alike. 
 The first reform optimist to lead a colonial education effort was Izawa Shūji, 
the Taiwan Education Department Chief in 1895-1898.  In 1901 he wrote, “Our eternal 
purpose is to spread our national language to the Taiwanese . . . [It] will instill in the 
hearts of the Taiwanese respect and loving loyalty to our Emperor, creating a bond that 
must never be broken.  There is truly no other way to accomplish this except through 
national language education” (Isoda 1998, 56).  Izawa supported the rapid spread of 
public schools in Taiwan, all teaching Japanese, his efforts were halted by budget 
limitations and the ascension of Gotō Shimpei and his pessimistic view of gradual 
education expansion  
 Related to the optimistic view of language education was the “direct” teaching 
method developed by Yamaguchi Kiichirō.  Yamaguchi taught in schools in Japan 
since 1887, and then went to Taiwan in 1896 to teach at a training center for Japanese 
language teachers.  There he discovered a book by French educator Francois Gouin on 
foreign language immersion education.  He led other teachers in in-class experiments 
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with techniques advocated by Gouin, and eventually developed his own set of 
techniques, which he called the “direct method”.   
The central concept of the direct method was that a foreign language must be 
learned the same way the child learns its native language.  Teachers were instructed to 
not use any written characters in the first weeks of instruction, but to instead teach 
listening comprehension and pronunciation using pictures, physical objects and “total 
physical response” activities (physically acting out sentences while speaking them).  
They could introduce Japanese kana and eventually kanji characters only after the 
students mastered basic pronunciation.  Students were banned from using their native 
language at all stages of learning.   Teachers not only forbade students from asking 
questions in their native language, they did not provide them with any written 
translation of the materials for use either in the classroom or at home.   
In 1933 Yamaguchi said his theory was based on the inherent meaning and spirit 
of words (kotodama), which could be understood only in the context of other concepts 
expressed in the same language.  Defining a word out of context destroyed its essence, 
and in fact any attempt at defining a word acted as a barrier to learning.   He saw the 
intellectual process of understanding the meaning of a word (denotation) as 
fundamentally opposite to feeling it emotionally (connotation).  Language could not be 
properly learned intellectually, but rather through complete immersion, he claimed, and 
therefore he urged schools to provide no translations of Japanese materials (Komagome 
1996, 333).  Yamaguchi envisaged his method was the polar opposite of what he called 
the “translation method,” that is, learning a language by comparing a target language 
text with a translation in the learner’s native language.  Educated Japanese were 
familiar with the translation method as it was the primary means of teaching English in 
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Japanese middle and higher schools at the time.  Yamaguchi and his allies often held 
up the study of English in Japan as a negative example which Japanese language 
education in the empire must not follow.    
The Taiwan colonial government actively promoted the direct method, 
publishing two pamphlets on it in 1900 and requiring all language teachers to attend 
training courses run by Yamaguchi, who became a school inspector.  In November 
1911 Yamaguchi transferred to a position at a middle school in Korea, which had 
become an official Japanese colony the year before.  He succeeded in making the 
direct method widely accepted in that colony as well.   
 In 1914 the SMR invited Yamaguchi to come to Liaoyang in the railway zone 
to teach a training course on his method.  The course was attended by language 
teachers from throughout the railway zone and the Kwantung Territory, and resulted in 
the method becoming the standard in Japanese-run schools in Manchuria (Takenaka 
2000, 263-267).35  In 1925 Yamaguchi transferred to a position at the Ryōjun 2nd 
Middle School and Normal School in the Kwantung Territory, where he continued to 
influence SMR and Kwantung language teachers, some of whom went on to become 
leaders in the Manchukuo education establishment.  In 1938 Yamaguchi moved to 
Beijing to lead the teaching staff at a new Japanese-run school named Shinmin Gakuin.  
In each area his methods became accepted as the standard Japanese language teaching 
model among teachers from Japan. 36 
                                                          
 
35 The SMR and Kwantung teachers had already adopted the similar Berlitz system in 1912, so the switch 
to the Yamaguchi direct method was apparently not a difficult one (Takenaka 2000: 260-262). 
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 In 1941 Yamaguchi wrote: 
One learns Japanese (or any foreign language) at school by learning the 
meaning of a thing, imagining it, considering it, feeling it, and willing it, 
all through the Japanese language.  By doing these things students can 
feel the true word-sprit (kotodama) of Japanese, understand Japan’s 
culture, and experience Japanese spirit (Yamaguchi 1941).   
 
Note that he does not say Japanese language teacher must teach specifically about Japan.  
Rather the process of learning the language itself transmits Japanese spirit.  For 
Yamaguchi it was the form of the language, not the content, which played the vital role.  
In fact, Yamaguchi opposed the use of ideological and pro-Japanese propaganda 
material in the elementary school classroom, a position the nativists opposed.   He felt 
that teachers needed to use materials familiar to the students and universal in nature.  
These would pique the students’ interest, while nationalistic Japanese material would 
only serve to drive them away.   
 
The triumph of language optimism 
 Although the ideology of Yamaguchi’s teaching methods was “optimistic”, 
they were at first used by the relatively “pessimistic” colonial governments to teach 
Japanese to a very limited population in the 1910s.   In the 1918-1922 period a major 
shift away from gradualism occurred in the colonial governments, due to the policies the 
Japanese Prime Minister Hara Kei, and in reaction to the 1919 March 1st rebellion in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
36 While most Japanese educators supported Yamaguchi’s method, some commentators critically noted 
many teachers used the techniques only because they gave them excuse to not learn the students’ 
language (Ogeari 1940: 190, Shinohara 1941: 949).   
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Korea.  New colonial governments under Den Kenjirō in Taiwan and Saitō Makoto in 
Korea tried to win popular support in two ways, offering some concessions to popular 
demands, while also ramping up cultural assimilation efforts.  For example they 
responded to demands for more education opportunities by embarking on a massive 
school-building program.  This served to placate to some degree local concerns, while 
also advancing the cause of Japanese language education.  
 Also in the early 1920s the colonial governments published new series of 
elementary school textbooks, which featured less stories with Japanese characters, and 
less emphasis on the Japan state and its divine origins, while there were many more 
stories about Chinese and Koreans (these changes will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 5) (Yi 1985).   In general the changes represented a victory for Yamaguchi 
and the reform optimists, although Yamaguchi complained the government should have 
gone farther in reducing the ideological nature of the textbooks (Komagome 1997, 
335-336). 
 In the 1930s, however, colonial policy in Taiwan and Korea began to move 
away from the positions of the reform optimists and toward those of the nativists.  The 
first sign of the shift was a new set of textbooks published in Korea from 1930 to 1935, 
which included much more on the Japanese state and its divine origins, although it 
continued the trend of the 1920s textbooks of including many references to Korea (Yi 
1985).    In 1937, however, as Japanese society turned away from internationalism to 
a more self-confident ultranationalism, there was a fundamental change in the colonies.  
The Taiwan and Korea colonial governments launched campaigns to wipe signs of 
non-Japanese identity from among the colonial peoples through removing of all 
non-Japanese language education in the public schools, closing non-Japanese language 
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newspapers, enforcing public worship at Shintō shrines, instituting compulsory name 
changes, and military recruitment.  This effort is generally called the kōminka 
campaign, kōminka being a Japanese word for “changing the people into Imperial 
subjects”.  In Taiwan the campaign began in April 1937, when the government 
removed classical Chinese from the elementary and middle school curriculums and 
abolished the use of the Chinese language from all newspapers.  In 1938 the Korean 
colonial government not only removed Korean language class time from most schools, 
it banned students from using Korean at school in any context, and even tried to 
discourage them from speaking the language outside of school.37  All Korean language 
newspapers were forced to close around this same time (Chou 1996, 49).  Both 
colonial governments tried to promote the use of Japanese among general society, 
although the Korean government was particularly forceful in its efforts.38   
 Although Japanese colonial authorities moved toward cultural assimilationist 
optimism in the 1930s, in the social and political spheres the state still barred colonized 
peoples from gaining rights equivalent to Japanese citizenship.  Japanese scholars 
Yamanaka Hayato and Komagome Takeshi have urged scholars to avoid calling 
kōminka policy “assimilation”, but rather “stratification policy” (Komagome 1996, 
17-18).  Rather than promising a future where assimilated colonized peoples could 
                                                          
37 In some areas of the colony Korean language did remain an optional subject until 1941, when it was 
completely removed from the curriculum (Chou 1996: 49).  
 
38 In Taiwan there was no attempt to ban the public use of Chinese or other indigenous languages, except 
for in a few city halls.  Taipei prefecture began a program in 1937 honoring those families who claimed 
to speak only Japanese in the home.  In Korea the colonial government considered the native language a 
greater threat than Taiwanese was considered by the Taiwan colonial government, and worked more 
actively to ban it from public places (Chou 1996: 50-54). 
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gain citizenship rights, stratification policy merely offered them the opportunity to gain 
their natural and proper place in a racially defined hierarchy of dependent peoples 
within the empire.  By subjecting the colonized peoples to increasingly optimistic 
assimilative requirements, while remaining “pessimistic” about embracing them as 
citizens, the colonial governments’ kōminka policies only deepened the contradictions 
of colonialism.  
 After the start of the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 the government began 
supporting an active language dissemination policy for its growing empire, a change 
from the previous practice of leaving colonial cultural policies to the colonial 
governments.  An example of this kind of optimism was found in a June 1939 speech 
by Araki Sadao, a nativist general who was serving at the time as the Minister of 
Education.  The setting was the first Japanese Language Policy Conference, a meeting 
marking the Ministry’s first attempt to unify Japanese language education in the empire.  
Araki, giving the keynote address, invoked Ueda Kazutoshi when he stated: 
Our national language is the spiritual blood flowing through our people 
(kokumin), and this spiritual blood firmly ties the people together.  If we 
can send our language, this spiritual blood, flowing through the peoples of 
East Asia at a time our country embarrasses the great ideal of ‘eight 
corners under one roof’ (hakkō ichiū), they will cooperate with us in 
achieving the great work of establishing a New East Asian Order and 
laying the foundations of world peace.  That is why it is vitally important 
to craft policies that work toward this goal (Monbushō Toshokyoku 1939, 
1).39  
                                                          
 
39 Increased reliance on Japanese as a tool to in winning the hearts of the people can also be seen in a 
June 1939 document by the Cultural Division of the Kōa-in (Asia Development Board), a sub-ministerial 
agency involved in administering occupied China. Titled “An Outline for Japanese Language Diffusion 
Policy,” it stated, “The foundation of Asian development efforts is the kind of education which imbues a 
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In other words, Japan’s “spiritual blood” could be “transfused” throughout East Asia.  
The optimist view of language, in particular the nativist variety, was by 1939 a central 
pillar in the ideology of Japan’s formal colonies. 
 
Reform optimism in Manchukuo 
 Although the governments of Taiwan and Korea became dominated by nativist 
thought by the late 1930s, in Manchukuo the reform optimists controlled education 
policy into the 1940s.   
 In the state’s first years cultural policies reflected the gradualist view.  As 
Manchukuo was a puppet state, and the majority of the population was not considered 
subjects of the Japanese Emperor, the possibility of cultural assimilation must have 
seemed even more remote than in Taiwan and Korea.  Leading Chinese officials like 
Zheng, as well as a few Japanese like Tachibana, argued that Manchukuo government 
and society should pattern itself chiefly on Chinese models.  An attempt at assimilation 
would only prove the state’s dependent status.  Concern for exposing the true nature of 
the puppet state, however, ultimately proved to be a weak barrier to empire-wide 
assimilation optimism.  
From Manchukuo’s earliest days Japanese educators and officials nearly 
unanimously supported teaching the Japanese language in the schools to at least some 
degree.  Some were ultilitarians, who claimed language learning would economically 
                                                                                                                                                                          
soul with imperial way spirit.  Schools must train students to become pure Japanese who can lead the 
people of the continent . . . The weapon is Japanese language” (Komagome 1997: 318). 
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and politically benefit non-Japanese, and that Japanese could act as a lingua franca for 
the region’s various ethnic groups.   By 1937, however, assimilation optimism had 
swept through the ranks of Japanese officials and educators in Manchukuo, becoming 
the mainstream (although not sole) opinion.   
An example of assimilation optimism can be found in the writings of Fukui Yū.  
Fukui had taught Japanese to Chinese students in SMR-run schools in Manchuria since 
1918.  In 1932 he became a Manchukuo Ministry of Education textbook editor, and 
was placed in charge of editing the 1934-35 and 1938-39 series of elementary school 
Japanese language textbooks.  He was one of the few SMR-connected educators to 
survive the ministry’s purge in 1934 and 1935.  In a 1939 article he criticized those 
who defended Japanese language instruction on utilitarian grounds:   
They encourage Japanese language study by claiming it will help students 
advance in the world and find business success.  But this is not true, 
some students, despite years of diligent study, have not succeeded in 
business nor risen in position, and now feel that they should have done 
something more practical in school.  Utilitarian encouragement works 
even less for school students living in distant mountainous regions who 
will never meet a Japanese face to face in their lives. The entire approach 
is wrong.  The purpose of learning Japanese is not to have a good 
command of language, as in a foreign language course.  Japanese 
language training itself brings about complete education.  In other words, 
the students’ feelings and lifestyle themselves will be reconstructed by the 
Japanese language.  This is the real reason.  Even if they never have the 
opportunity in their lives to use their Japanese language skills, it is worth it.  
They will become Manchukuo nationals, without interest in their original 
ethnicity.  It is for this mental training that they must learn Japanese  
(Fukui 1939, 3, italics added). 
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Fukui here abandons all pretence of the usefulness of Japanese in the people’s daily 
lives.  Instead, the language is a tool for “mental training”, intended to reshape the 
population’s minds so they would become amenable to Japanese interests.  His words 
echo those of the French Governor General Brevie, mentioned above, who claimed the 
French language would introduce the African population to mental discipline.  
 While other Japanese educators in Manchukuo were less willing to discount the 
practical uses of Japanese than Fukui, many agreed with him that the Japanese language 
had the ability to “reconstruct” the personalities of the students in positive ways.  
Kazumizu Yoshiyama, a Japanese teacher at Fengtian First Normal School, said in a 
speech to Chinese teachers in 1936:  
All Manchukuoans have the duty to learn Japanese . . . Most people study 
Japanese in order to learn how to express themselves, but this should not 
the main reason.  In Japanese there is the expression kotodama.  It 
means when you study a word, you do not just learn its outside meaning; 
you have to learn its spirit . . . By understanding the Japanese spirit, the 
Manchukuo people can learn their correct role, and carry it out faithfully 
(Kazumizu 1936, 30). 
 
In the same speech, Kazumizu, like Fukui, said that only after the students completed 
the four Japanese language elementary school readers (two years of material) could they 
“for the first time be called Manchukuo nationals (Manzhouguo-ren)”.   To them the 
Japanese language was not just an important tool of communication, it was the essence 
of citizenship in the new state. 
Hori Toshio, a SMR Japanese language teacher and Fengtian provincial 
education inspector, wrote in 1940 that the purpose of Japanese language education was 
to teach the Manchukuo population to “realize the goodness, greatness, and strength of 
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Japan and Japanese people, and use these things to completely reconstruct their 
lifestyles” (Hori 1940a, 24).  Fukui, Kazumizu, and Hori clearly demonstrate the 
almost religious faith held by some educators in the power of the Japanese language.  
Like most optimistic assimilators of the era, they also showed no indication that they 
were bothered by their implicit suggestions of Chinese cultural inferiority to Japanese.   
 
Manchukuo language policy 
 Japanese was not recognized as a Manchukuo state language until 1937.  
Chinese was generally treated as the national language, with Japanese usually 
designated a foreign language.   In pre-1938 textbooks, for example, Chinese language 
and literature were taught as “National Language Studies”, while Japanese language 
courses were placed in the “Foreign Language Studies” category.  In time, however the 
public status of Japanese rose, as the government required an increasing amount of 
Japanese in public spaces.  In 1937 Manchukuo moved to a bi-lingual system similar 
to that used in Taiwan and Korea before 1937, while the governments in Taiwan and 
Korea moved on to monolingual language policies, the likes of which never occurred in 
Manchukuo. 
 Yasuda Toshiaki, in an examination of the languages used in Manchukuo 
government business, found the central government published official documents 
primarily in Chinese in 1932, but by 1936 they had declared the Japanese language 
version of documents to be the authoritative versions (Yasuda 1997, 36).40 Yasuda also 
                                                          
40 Yasuda looked at the central government’s daily digest of official communications and directives, the 
Seifu Kōhō (C. Zhengfu Gongbao), which became increasingly Japanese-centered as time progressed.  
From March 1932 to April 1934 a Chinese language “original” and a “Japanese translation” of the digest 
were published separately.  In April 1934 the digest switched to a single bilingual version, with Chinese 
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examined the authorized language of treaties the Manchukuo government signed with 
foreign governments.  English, German, and Chinese were used as the official 
languages in treaties with non-neighbors.  In a very important agreement on national 
boarders with Mongolia (a puppet of the Soviet Union), however, Japanese and Russian 
were declared the two authorized languages.  So in a case where imperial powers saw a 
treaty as truly important, they bypassed the client states’ languages and relied on their 
own languages (Yasuda 1997, 37).  
 
The Japanese language in Manchukuo schools: 1932-1937 plans and policy 
 In the 1932-1937 period the government did not emphasize Japanese language 
education in elementary and secondary schools, particularly when compared to schools 
in Korea and Taiwan.  The low number of Japanese language hours fit the public 
ideology of the period, which downplayed Japanese domination and emphasized the 
state’s link with Chinese tradition.  As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Manchukuo 
state ideology was taught primarily in the history, morals, and Chinese classes. 
 There were several factors which retarded the spread of Japanese in the region 
besides concessions to the state ideology.  One was the small number of Japanese and 
Japanese-speaking Chinese available to act as language teachers.  There was probably 
never more than 2000 language teachers from Japan in the country at a time, as will be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
on the top and Japanese on the bottom.  On November 11th, 1935 the government announced that the 
Japanese version of official communications and other government documents, previously considered 
simply a translation, would begin to be considered as an equally official version beginning January 1st, 
1936.  Local governments, on the other hand, continued to use only Chinese or Mongolian for their 
official business up to 1936. 
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discussed later in the chapter.  In contrast, the country was huge, both in terms of area 
and population.  By the time the state’s boundaries stabilized in 1934 it covered over 
400,000 square miles and contained 30 to 35 million people.  By contrast, Taiwan is 
only a 13,000 square mile island, and less than three million people lived there when 
Japan took control in 1895.  In 1910 there were between 15 to 20 million people living 
in Korea, a territory covering more than 84,000 square miles.   
 The prior existence of an embryonic modern education system in the region 
also presented a difficulty for the Japanese, completely unlike the situation they faced in 
Taiwan in 1895 and substantially different from Korea in 1910.   A relatively small 
segment of the public in those colonies expected public education at the time the 
Japanese took control, so the colonial governments could begin by teaching a small elite 
population of students and then gradually expand. As they expanded, normal schools 
could train native students as Japanese language teachers to help with the demand for 
teachers.  In Manchuria, on the other hand, there were as many as 13,000 elementary 
schools in existence before the Manchurian Incident.  In the years immediately after 
the coup the government tried to gain the population’s trust by reopening schools closed 
by the disorder and fighting.  By the end of 1934 the number of open schools and 
student enrollment returned to pre-1931 levels—12,896 elementary schools and 346 
middle schools, with over 870,000 total students enrolled (Kurokawa 1997, 190).  In 
comparison, in Taiwan in 1905, ten years after annexation, there were 180 elementary 
schools for Taiwanese with 32,000 students enrolled, and in Korea in 1919, nine years 
after annexation, there were 89,000 students in state-run elementary schools.  Japan did 
not have enough surplus teachers to meet the needs of a major language teaching 
program in a country of this size and with this many schools. 
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 The first body assigned to create a plan for Manchukuo education was the SMR 
Economic Research Group.41  In January 1932, two months before Manchukuo was 
established, Kwantung Army Chief of Staff Miyake Mitsuharu wrote the SMR president 
asking him to establish a board to “act as the military’s advisors, investigate a variety of 
matters in Manchuria, and create plans for developmental policies and programs,” 
including education (Nomura 1995, 96).  The group’s report, completed in August 
1932, recommended that Manchukuo retain the previous Republican elementary and 
secondary education system, with its 4-2-3-3 pattern of elementary and middle schools.  
                                                          
41 The Education Division was led by Tsuji Masao, a SMR employee who became one of the founding 
officials of the Ministry of Education, and included several other past and present SMR and Kwantung 
Territory educators, as well as advisors from the Japanese Ministry of Education. 
Two less detailed plans for Manchukuo education were created in 1931 and 1932.  Both focused on 
long-range goals, presaging the system created in 1937-1938.  The first was Kwantung Army advisor 
Takagi Shōsuke’s “On Establishing an Independent Manmo.” Takagi presented his plan in December 
1931, three months after the Manchurian Incident and before the establishment of the puppet state.  He 
called for strong state control over education and a curriculum which would emphasize the Japanese 
language and Japanese culture, which he claimed would cause the Chinese to come to love Japan.  He 
proposed that elementary schools teach Japanese from the first grade for at least six hours a week, and 
that middle schools teach it for ten or more hours a week (Takagi 1932: 589).  Although not quite to the 
level of Taiwan and Korea, where Japanese was taught for 10-12 hours a week from the first grade, it 
was an ambitious plan.  Similarly, in 1932 Hoshina Kōichi, a leading scholar of Japanese at Tokyo 
Imperial University, wrote supporting a similar level of Japanese language education in Manchuria.  He 
added that Japanese should be made the only language of officialdom, with the other local languages 
reduced to vernacular status, similar to the pre-1937 policy in Taiwan and Korea.  More uniquely, as I 
will discuss later, Hoshina proposed that Chinese language characters be phased out, and Japanese 
phonetic kana be used in all official documents (Hoshina 1932:3).  As it turns out, Manchukuo’s 
post-1937 system followed Takagi and Hoshina’s ideas quite closely.  For 1932, however, the goals 
were out of the government’s reach.   
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They suggested the only changes which should be made in the curriculum were the 
removal of pro-Guomindang textbook materials and the addition of Japanese language 
classes.   Japanese courses she be a required beginning in the first year of higher 
elementary school, or 5th grade, and be taught for 2-3 hours a week.  Depending on the 
local conditions, however, local authorities could exempt higher elementary schools 
from the Japanese language requirement.  Essentially, the group asked elementary 
schools to teach a minimal amount of Japanese wherever possible, while admitting that 
at least for a time there would be areas where it would unfeasible.  Japanese language 
instruction should be adamantly required only in the middle schools, of which there 
were only 144 at the time (Minami Manshū Tetsudō 1935, 31-32, 37).42    
                                                          
42 Lower and higher middle schools under the Republican system, both three year institutions, taught 
English language for six hours a week.  The SMR group recommended that in lower middle schools all 
six hours be switched to Japanese, and in higher middle schools two of the six be switched to Japanese.  
Since there were so few middle schools open at the time, they probably felt confident that language 
teachers could be found to teach these classes (Minami Manshū Tetsudō 1935: 37).   Lower elementary 
schools would have the option of offering Japanese as an elective for students beginning in the 3rd grade.   
 
Parallel to the SMR Economic Research Group’s planning, the provinces, led by Fengtian Province, 
began to set up their own language education plans.  In March 1932 the Fengtian Education Department, 
which had just been reorganized with the assistance of Japanese educators from the SMR, published a 
plan similar to the SMR group’s.  It set the Japanese language curriculum at three hours a week, starting 
in 5th grade.  Middle schools would teach Japanese from 2 to 7 hours a week, depending on the kind of 
school.   Some schools would be allowed to teach English or Russian instead, depending on local 
conditions (Fengtian-xiang Jiaoyu Choubei-chu 1932).  A September 1932 Jilin provincial plan closely 
resembled the Fengtian plan, while a May 1932 Heilongjiang Provincial plan instructed that Japanese be 
taught only in middle schools, not higher elementary schools.  Each province also created Japanese 
language academies, designed to teach the language to elementary school graduates outside of the 
standard middle schools.  For example, a May 15, 1932 order by the Heilongjiang Provincial 
government mandated the creation of a Mass Japanese Language School with three teachers to teach 
80-100 students for two hours a day (ZG #15, 17-18, June 9, 1932).   
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The Manchukuo Ministry of Education accepted almost all of the Economic 
Research Group’s recommendations, perhaps because, as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
ministry was in a state of disarray in its first years, and it was unable to come up with its 
own plan.  It retained the Chinese Republican education system for the time being and 
inserted Japanese language instruction only the few middle schools.  It was probably 
not until 1934 that the government began publishing textbooks and encouraging 
Japanese language study in elementary schools.43   
In that year the Ministry of Education announced its first general curriculum 
guidelines and published its first textbooks, including Japanese language texts for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
43On June 14, 1932 the Education Department of the Civil Affairs Ministry began providing make-shift 
textbooks published by the SMR to the schools, and promised a new set of textbooks compiled by the 
Fengtian Education Department would be available in September of that year.  Among the Fengtian 
textbooks was a Japanese language middle school textbook, edited by Ōide Masayoshi, a former SMR 
educator and textbook editor, but no Japanese language textbooks for elementary schools (ZG, June 18 
1932: 8, Fengtian Jiaoyu, June 1933: 6).  On July 29-30, 1932, the newly created Ministry of Education 
convened the First National Education Administrators Conference, a meeting of ministry and provincial 
education leaders.  There Fengtian Education Department General Affairs Director Tsubokawa Yokichi 
recommended that middle schools throughout the country teach Japanese as part of the already existing 
foreign language curriculum (almost always English), rather than as a new subject.  Concerned with 
student reaction to a sudden switch, he said, “How would the students feel if suddenly we completely 
changed [the foreign language curriculum] to Japanese?  We should take a gradual method.  For 
example, schools which have been teaching English for six hours [a week] should divide that time in half, 
and teach three hours of Japanese [and three of English].  I think this half and half way would be 
appropriate.”  Ministry of Education leader Kamimura applauded the idea, and asked the other provinces 
to follow Fengtian’s example (Wenjiao-bu 1932a: 28).  In fact a gradual shift in middle schools did 
occur.  The 1934 national curriculum split the middle schools’ six hours evenly between Japanese and 
English.  A 1936 revision resulted in four hours of Japanese and two of English.  Finally the 1937-1938 
New Education System completely eliminated English language instruction from middle schools and set 
Japanese language instruction at six hours (Wang 2000: 166). 
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elementary and middle schools.  The number of Japanese language class hours under 
the 1934 system, however, was minimal.  The curriculum guidelines declared that 
Japanese should be taught beginning in the third grade, at least two hours a week for 
third and fourth graders, and three hours a week for fifth and sixth graders.  It could 
also be taught from first grade in areas with “superior educational ability.”44  For 
example, two model “experimental” elementary schools created in 1935 taught Japanese 
from the first grade, for four to five hours a week (Isoda 1998, 67).   These standards 
were met in elite elementary schools, but not in many others.  An informal 1936 
survey of Japanese language education found that Japanese was taught in all provincial 
and city elementary schools and in most county schools, but only about half of village 
schools and private schools (Hori 1940b, 9-10).  In 1936 there were 3,772 provincial, 
city, and county schools in the state, and 9,322 village and private schools.  Slightly 
over half the total enrolled elementary school students attended village or private 
schools (they tended to be smaller than the provincial, city and country schools) 
(Wenjiao-bu 1936, 6).  By 1936, therefore, roughly 2/3 of the country’s elementary 
school students were receiving some kind of Japanese language education.   Only 
around 1/4 of the total elementary school-age population was enrolled in 1936, so only 
around 1/6 of elementary school-age children were being taught Japanese.  Of course 
the amount and quality of the instruction varied greatly.    
                                                          
44The textbooks themselves mention recommended class time hours, and these hours were codified in the 
December 13 1935 Ministry of Education Directive #127, “Regulations on Elementary School 
Curriculum”, and the Dec. 14, 1935 Ministry of Education General Affairs Department’s journal article 
“Some points to be aware of in implementing Elementary School Curriculum” (Fengtian Jiaoyu 4.8, Nov. 
1936). 
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 Although the encouragement of Japanese language education had become 
Manchukuo state policy by 1934, Japanese still was considered a foreign language.  
For example, a January 1937 elementary school regulations revision emphasized the 
place of Chinese as the main language of instruction in the schools.  It said that 
Chinese needed to be studied “so students can clearly write and express their ideas.”  
Japanese instruction, on the other hand, aimed only at teaching “simple words and 
phrases, for practical use” (Shi 1993).  Compared to Korea and Taiwan, where since 
1912 Japanese was taught from 10 to 12 hours a week from the first grade, the amount 
of time spent on Japanese in Manchukuo was quite limited. 
 
Japanese as a national language: The Shingakusei 
 In May 1937 the Manchukuo Ministry of Education promulgated a set of laws 
and regulations, called the Shingakusei (new education system), which greatly changed 
the structure and content of elementary and middle school education throughout the 
state.  The changes went into effect on January 1, 1938.  Under the new system the 
ministry raised Japanese to the level of the pre-eminent national language, although 
Chinese and Mongolian also remained national languages.  They significantly 
increased the number Japanese hours of instruction, while cutting native language 
instruction hours.  They also cut the standard number of school years and merged a 
number of curriculum subjects.   
 Ministry of Education officials began planning the new system by at least 1936, 
a time many Japanese in Manchukuo were clearly impatient with the limited degree of 
Japanese language education in the schools.45  Feeling more secure in their control of 
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the population and less concerned with the opinion of the West, they felt that the new 
state’s “founding spirit” could not be properly communicated through the existing 
system, which was dominated by Chinese language, history, and morals classes.   
 In July 1936 the Ministry of Education created the first known internal draft of 
a new education system.46  On March 10, 1937, while internal debate on the new 
system continued, the ministry first publicly indicated they would strengthen the official 
position of the Japanese language.  They did this through a directive sent to all 
provincial governors ordering them to “thoroughly disseminate the Japanese language in 
all schools . . . in order to help students understand the indivisible nature of the hearts 
and minds of Japan and Manchukuo.” Accompanying the directive was a nine-point 
plan which directed language teachers to help the students “experience Japanese spirit, 
culture, and customs.”  It also called for an increase in casual Japanese use by the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
45 This impatience can be seen in the words of the Japanese teacher Kazumizu Yoshiyama.  In May 
1935, after Pu Yi’s first visit to Japan, the Manchukuo government promulgated the Huiluan Rescript, 
which shifted claims for the state’s legitimacy away from the mandate of heaven toward the will of the 
Japanese Emperor.  In July of that year Kazumizu, in a lecture to a group of Chinese teachers, said, “As 
Japan and Manchukuo are united in all things (politics, industry, transportation, national defense, etc.), 
the Japanese language is vitally important for the Manchukuo peoples’ daily lives, and a necessary 
element in Manchukuo’s development” (Kazumizu 1935: 92-93).  In a talk given to a similar audience 
one year later, he went farther, saying, “Today Japanese is a necessary language in Manchukuo.  It is not 
a foreign language; all Manchukuo citizens have a duty to learn it” (Kazumizu 1936: 92).  
 
46Both the July 1936 plan and comments on the plan by the Fengtian Education Department continued to 
treat Japanese as a foreign language. Neither documents contained details on the number of hours the 
language would be studied, or from what grade (Maeda 1994, Maeda 1998).  A separate January 1937 
plan by the Fengtian Education Department, however, called for Japanese language instruction in the 
provincial middle and normal schools to increase to six to ten hours a week (up from four), and Chinese 
language course to go down to four to five hours a week (down from six) (Fengtian Jiaoyu 5.2, April 
1937: 112-127).  
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teachers and students both at school and at home, encouraged holding speech contests 
and performances, and called for the use of the Japanese syllabary (kana) to accompany 
scientific words written in Chinese characters in Chinese language documents (Fengtian 
Jiaoyu 5.5, July 1937, Takaogi 1940, 47-48).  This final point is reminiscent of the 
Western conception of the inability of non-European languages to express modern 
concepts. 
 In May 1937 the government promulgated the New Education System.  The 
system renamed the four-year lower elementary schools “People’s Schools” (J. Kokumin 
Gakkō, C. Guomin Xuexiao) and two-year higher elementary schools “Advanced 
People’s Schools” (J. Yūkyū Kokumin Gakkō, C. Youji Guomin Xuexiao).  In both 
elementary school levels the language, ethics, science, history, and geography 
curriculum were merged into a single subject called “national people’s studies” (J. 
kokumin-ka, C. guomin-ke), which took half the schools’ classroom hours.   
 The system changed the middle schools even more fundamentally.  Previously 
middle school education was split into lower and higher levels, which lasted three years 
each.  The government merged these two levels into a single four-year middle school, 
called “Higher People’s Schools” (J. Kōtō Kokumin Gakkō, C. Gaodeng Guomin 
Xuexiao) (to avoid confusion, I will continue to call the schools lower elementary, 
higher elementary, and middle).  The government required each middle school to 
declare a vocational specialty—agriculture, commerce, industry, or marine industry.  
Arts and science middle schools, previously the norm, were no longer allowed 
(Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1937a).   
 One of the key features of the new system was the establishment of Japanese 
not only as a national language, along with Chinese and Mongolian, but also the 
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language with the greatest prestige. Under the new laws Japanese became the only 
commonly studied language throughout the system.  Schools in Chinese areas were 
required to teach Japanese and Chinese language classes, while in Mongolian areas they 
were required teach Japanese and Mongolian.47  Japanese instruction now began in the 
first grade, for six to eight hours a week.  The number of Japanese language classroom 
hours remained slightly below Chinese/Mongolian language classroom hours in the 
lower elementary schools, were equal in higher elementary schools, and were greater in 
middle and normal schools.  Recognizing the continuing lack of Japanese language 
teachers in the elementary schools, however, the regulations also allowed local 
governments, with permission from the provincial governor, to exempt some schools 
from the Japanese language requirement.  In any case, the new system brought about a 
sharp rise in the expected amount of Japanese language instruction.  Tables 4.1, 4.2, 
and 4.3 illustrate the rise in Japanese language instruction hours and drop in other 
language instruction in the elementary and middle schools. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
47 Section three of the Education System Outline (Gakusei yōkō) stated, “The Japanese language shall be 
emphasized as one of the national languages, upon which the spirit of Japanese-Manchurian unity is 
based” (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1937b).  The state never promulgated a language law, so the 1937 
education laws were the sole source of the language’s national language status (Maruyama 1942: 
120-121).  Contemporary Japanese commentators were often quick to point out that since Japanese was 
the only language taught throughout the country, the system established it as the primary national 
language, although words such as “primary” or “superior” appeared nowhere in the laws (Ebata 1940: 2-4, 
Maruyama 1942: 127).  Miyai Ichirō, a Japanese resident of Fengtian, commented in 1940 that many 
Japanese mistakenly believed Japanese was the only official national language (Kawamura 1994: 180). 
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Table 4.1: Weekly language curriculum instruction hours in Manchukuo elementary schools 
 
 Lower  
Elementary 
Higher 
Elementary 
Grade   1   2   3   4 5 6 
 1934: Japanese        0 0 2 2 3 3 
 Chinese 6-8 6-8 6-7 6-7 4-7 4-7 
 Total school hours NA NA NA NA NA NA 
       
 1938: Japanese         6 6 7 8 8 8 
 Chinese/Mongolian 7 8 8 9 8 8 
 Total school hours 24 26 28 30 33 33 
       
1943:  Japanese 6 6 6 6 6 6 
      Chinese/Mongolian 6 6 6 6 6 6 
 Total school hours 26 28 32 32 35 35 
(Kazumizu 1935, 93; Kazumizu 1936, 31; Wenjiao-bu 1936b, 12; Minsei-bu 
Kyōiku-shi 1937c, 35-37; Saki 1943, 66, 74; Wang 2000, 156. Hours for the Chinese 
[Guowen] class differ in different sources over the 1934-1937 period.) 
 
 
Table 4.2: Weekly language curriculum instruction hours in Manchukuo middle schools, 1934 (1936 
adjustment shown in parentheses). 
 
 Lower 
Middle 
Higher  
Middle 
Normal 
Grade 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 
Japanese 3 (4) 3 (4) 3 (4) 3 (4) 3 (4) 3 (4) 3 3 3 
Chinese 6 6 6 5 5 2 5 5 4 
English 3 (2) 3 (2) 3 (2) 4 (2) 4 (2) 5 (2) 3 3 3 
Total hours 31 31 31 31 31 31    
(Manshū Teikoku Nenpō 1934; Wang 2000, 166.  Japanese hours increased and 
English hours decreased in 1936.) 
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Table 4.3: Weekly language curriculum instruction hours in Manchukuo middle schools, 1938-1945 
 
          Middle
(1938-1945) 
Normal 
(1938) 
Normal 
(1943) 
Grade 7 8 9 10 1 2 1 
Japanese 6 6 6 6 9 4 6 
Chinese/Mongolian 3 3 3 3 5 2 6 
Total 40 40 40 40 40 40     41 
(Wang 2000, 169; Xu 1996, 155) 
 
 A related question is the degree to which Japanese was used in non-language 
courses, such as in ethics, math, and science.  From 1934 to 1942 all textbooks in 
elementary and middle schools were written in Chinese, except for those used in the 
Japanese language course itself.   This and other anecdotal evidence suggests the 
majority of school instruction during these years took place in Chinese.  One source 
claims that in 1941 middle schools began to require students to use Japanese in a variety 
of school situations, including formal greetings upon entering and leaving the school, 
when addressing teachers, and when entering the teachers’ room (Wang 2000, 180).  In 
1943 the government decided that future textbooks outside the language curriculum 
would be written in both Chinese and Japanese, with the Chinese text appearing on the 
top of the page and Japanese on the bottom (Terada 1943, 70).  In 1943 middle schools 
began shifting the teaching of non-language courses from Chinese to Japanese, just 
before the first generation of students who had studied Japanese since the first grade 
were enter the middle schools.  One former student, for example, claims that in his 
higher elementary school in 1940 and 1941 Chinese was the standard classroom 
language for all classes except for the Japanese language class.  At the normal school 
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(then at the same level as the middle schools) he attended in from 1942 to 1944, 
however, all courses except for math (and presumably Chinese) were taught in Japanese.  
These classes would have included ethics, science, education, and physical education 
(Ōmori and Li 1994, 291). 
 Throughout the existence of the Manchukuo state, therefore, Japanese language 
instruction in elementary schools did not exceed 25% of the total curriculum hours, 
although it may have gone much higher in middle schools by 1943.   For the most part, 
Japanese remained one of the courses of study, not the general language of instruction.  
In this way the structure of the Manchukuo education policy resembled that of the 
non-Russian schools in the Soviet Union from 1938 to 1958.  During that period the 
Soviet government mandated that schools for non-Russians had to begin teaching 
Russian in the third grade, but that it would remain a course of study, not the general 
language of instruction.  The Soviet government resisted requests from a variety of 
quarters to increase Russian language instruction in the non-Russian schools, because 
they were determined to support the continuing existence of minority people’s native 
language and cultures and thus avoid the image of imperialism.  One of the ways the 
Soviets tried to legitimize itself was to define the state as fundamentally different from a 
Western-style empire.  They wanted the state to be seen as a multi-ethnic partnership 
of equals.   In the schools, therefore, the government expected the students to accept 
the Soviet civic ideology while retaining their ethnic identity.  Although the 
government accepted a certain amount of instruction in the lingua franca of Russian was 
needed for national unity, particularly for those eligible to enter the military, for the 
most part the ideology could be taught in the students’ native language (Martin 2001, 
69-70, Blistein 2001, 254). 
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 While the structure of the Manchukuo schools resembled the 1938-1958 
non-Russian Soviet schools, the Shingakusei-period ideology of education more closely 
resembled French colonial policies, as I have described.  Like the Soviets, the Japanese 
expected civic unity, but not complete ethnic assimilation, to prove that they were 
different from Western imperialists.  Unlike the Soviets, and like the French, however, 
the language optimists among the Japanese (like Yamaguchi and Fukui) felt that certain 
principles could only be taught in the metropole language.  A major reason for this 
difference was that in the Soviet case the government-sponsored civic identity taught in 
the schools to teach was largely an intellectual construct, based on Marxism.  Since 
Marxism was presented as a logical construct, it presumably could be expressed equally 
well in any language.  In the Manchukuo case, however, the civic identity was more of 
an emotional construct—they expected the people to believe in the divinity of the 
Japanese Emperor and Japan’s sacred role as protector of East Asia.  As ideas that 
required more faith than logic, they were deemed untranslatable by the language 
optimists, a “non-arbitrary sign”.  To teach these important concepts, therefore, they 
deemed aggressive Japanese language instruction to be necessary. 
 As schools for Chinese are the focus of this study, I will only briefly mention 
the state of language education for the other ethnic groups in the state.  Mongolian was 
recognized as one of the national languages at least by 1937, and education in that 
language was always allowed (Narangoa 2001). Ethnic Koreans living in Manchukuo 
were considered Japanese imperial subjects, and so for the most part their schools, like 
the schools for Japanese children, did not come under Manchukuo government 
jurisdiction.  They were run by a variety of different Japanese colonial instructions 
over the course of the Japanese occupation.  In the first years of the state the schools 
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for Koreans taught in both the Korean and Japanese languages, and used textbooks 
published by the colonial Korean government.  In 1939, following the lead of the 
Korean government, the schools banned all use of the Korean language on school 
grounds for every grade.  Very few schools for Koreans taught any Chinese language 
during the Manchukuo period (Isoda 1994, 105).   At this point I have little 
information on the education system for Russians in Manchukuo.  
 
Divisions among Japanese educators  
While Japanese educators in Manchukuo generally agreed that the local 
population would “benefit” from learning Japanese, they were divided on the questions 
of content and methods of instruction.  I perceive two major divisions, between 
language optimists and utilitarians over the use of the direct method versus the use of 
translations, and within the optimist camp between conservatives (or nativists) and 
reformers over language curriculum context and Japanese written language reform.   
Division #1: Teaching methods 
 The first division, over language teaching methods, was between the language 
optimists, who endorsed Yamaguchi’s “direct method,” and utilitarians who supported 
Ōide Masayoshi’s “accelerated method”, which used translations.   
 The Manchukuo government early on endorsed the direct method in public 
schools. Teachers’ manuals for the 1934 Japanese language elementary school 
textbooks, the first published by the Ministry of Education, instructed teachers to use no 
other methods.  One manual, probably written by Fukui, stated:  
Teach using the direct method, not translations.  Teach the language only 
in Japanese, never use any Manchurian [Chinese].  You will fail unless 
you are firm on this.  Teachers who use Manchurian think it will make it 
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easier on the children and help them understand, but it always results in 
complete failure.  It unconsciously sets an expectation among the 
students that lessons will be explained in Manchurian, and provides a 
barrier to careful listening to the sound of the language as well as 
self-expression.  Students then become dependent on translations and fail 
to learn how to speak, no matter how much they practice (Wenjiao-bu 
1937, 10-11). 
 
 Although the Manchukuo government supported using the direct method, a 
significant number of Japanese language teachers in Manchukuo (and later northern 
China) were followers of Ōide Masayoshi and his accelerated method (Ogaeri 1940, 
189).  
 Ōide Masayoshi (1886-1949) graduated from Tokyo Higher Normal School in 
1886, taught in normal schools in Japan until 1913, and then went to Korea, where he 
taught at several higher education institutions.  In 1919 the SMR hired Ōide as a 
school administrator and member of the company’s education research center.  In 1922 
the Kwantung Territory and SMR formed a joint textbook editing department, the South 
Manchuria Education Society Textbook Department (Nanmanshū Kyōikukai Kyōkasho 
Henshūbu).  Ōide was one of the department’s chief editors, and acted as department 
chair in 1926-1929.  As an editor he oversaw the creation of the standard Japanese 
language elementary and middle school textbooks used in SMR and Kwantung 
Territory schools.  
The textbooks Ōide edited in the 1922-1931 period contained no Chinese 
language translations, basically following Yamaguchi’s direct method.  By 1931, 
however, Ōide began to express doubts about the method’s applicability in Manchuria.  
In a teacher’s manual for a set of 1931 textbooks (published before the Manchurian 
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Incident), he pointed out some limitations in the method.  First, because Japanese 
schools in Manchuria were on “leased territory”, not formal colonies, Japanese had to 
be taught as a foreign language, not a national language.  Because the schools existed 
within an environment of anti-Japanese activities, the schools had to stress the 
usefulness of the language, not the language as “the embodiment of the Japanese spirit,” 
as Yamaguchi held.  Ōide also noted that Yamaguchi’s insistence that all classes 
should be taught in Japanese was impractical in Manchuria.  Since the schools taught 
Japanese for fewer hours than in Taiwan and Korea, the students’ language ability was 
quite low at the early levels.  That made Japanese language instruction in other 
subjects, like science and math, impossible (Takenaka 2000, 276-277).   
As Japan’s empire grew beyond the formal colonies after 1931, Ōide became 
increasingly convinced that the direct method was not appropriate for most schools in 
the extended empire.  Besides his concern over the antagonism an emphasis on 
Japanese spirit would cause among the students, Ōide felt that the nature of language 
education in mainland China was fundamentally different, in that a significant 
percentage the student population was made up of older students.  Schools in occupied 
Manchuria and Northern China in the 1930s enrolled older children and adults to a 
much greater degree than occurred in Taiwan and Korea at the time Yamaguchi first 
developed his methods.  There were also many secondary and higher education 
institutions in existence in Manchuria and Northern China when Japan occupied those 
regions, most of which were allowed to reopen on the condition that they add Japanese 
language courses.   
As Ōide may have deduced, and linguists have now determined, immersion 
methods such as Yamaguchi’s work best with pre-elementary and elementary 
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school-aged children.   Summarizing the present consensus, one linguist has said in 
order to gain native pronunciation in a second language, children must be part of an 
extended immersion program before age six.  To gain native grammar ability children 
must be part of such a program before age twelve.  Also, in order for the programs to 
succeed, the children must have sufficient motivation, such as a strong belief that 
language study will result in significant benefits.  For older learners, a mixture of 
explicit language instruction in the learners’ native language and language practice in 
the target language is considered most effective, rather than relying solely on immersion 
methods.48   
 From 1930 to 1934 Ōide researched these questions while working as 
vice-principal at the SMR-run Nanman Middle School.  He later wrote about these 
experiences:  
An opportunity for a sudden advance in Japanese language study presented 
itself after the Manchurian Incident . . . Those of us with experience 
fanned out all over Manchukuo to study language instruction.  Our 
expectations, however, were crushed, as general Japanese language ability 
[among Chinese students] did not improve.  Japanese was being taught in 
all levels of schools, from elementary to college, and also in many schools 
for adults.  However none of these schools achieved good results . . . The 
“speaking method” [direct method] then in use is a long-term program 
created with young children in mind.  The kind of language instruction 
needed immediately after the establishment of Manchukuo, however, was 
a fast method which would produce quick results, not a slow method 
requiring many years.  I then realized that the previous teaching methods 
would not be effective (Ōide 1940, 410-411). 
 
                                                          
 
48Personal correspondence with Dr. Jenifer Larson-Hall. 
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 To meet the needs of the situation Ōide created an “accelerated” teaching 
method.  The fundamental principle of the method was to split up the students’ 
learning into two steps, learning the meaning of the material, and then learning how to 
express the material in Japanese.  Students were expected to do the first step as 
homework, using a version of the Japanese text which included a translation into 
Chinese, explanatory notes, and pronunciation guides.  In class the teacher would lead 
oral exercises, using only Japanese.  In 1934 Ōide left his position at Nanman Middle 
School and founded his own private publishing company, Manshūkoku Shobungu.  In 
1935 he began publishing new versions of Japanese language texts he had previously 
edited for the South Manchuria Education Society Textbook Department and the 
Manchukuo government, adding Chinese language translations and footnotes.   Also, 
from 1937 he began publishing his own series of textbooks designed to be used with his 
accelerated method.49  These original textbooks were designed to prepare the learner to 
                                                          
49 Ōide appears to have had a complicated relationship with the Manchukuo education leadership.  
Many in the leadership were his former colleagues from the SMR.  In 1937 the Ministry of Education 
asked Ōide to write the Japanese language texts for the middle schools and normal schools that were to 
be reorganized under the New Education System in 1938.  Many middle school textbooks in 1937-1940 
were farmed out to scholars living in the country, probably because the state textbook division was 
swamped by the job of creating whole new sets of textbooks for the new curriculum.  These privately 
authored texts were published as “state-approved” (kentei) rather than “state-edited” (kokutei) textbooks.  
By 1939 Ōide published at least seven texts for the first two grades of the boys and girls middle schools 
and the normal schools.  In November 1938 former SMR educator Terada Kijirō was named the new 
Textbook Division Chief, and by the end of 1939 he convinced the leadership to stop the 
“state-approved” system, and began a process of writing new texts in-house to replace the privately 
edited texts.  In 1943 the Ministry of Education published the first replacement text.  Terada’s actions 
probably had more to do with his desire to bring all aspects of education under state control rather than 
any personal animus toward Ōide and the other authors (Terada 1943: 65, Terada 1975: 85).  What may 
have been divisive, however, was Ōide’s private republication in “notes and translation” for all the 
textbooks he wrote for the government, as well as others.  These versions could be used in classrooms 
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pass a level of the Manchukuo state-run language proficiency text, which could lead to 
workplace bonuses.  
Like Yamaguchi, Ōide opposed an over-emphasis of pro-Japanese propaganda 
in language education, although for different reasons.  He rejected Yamaguchi’s claim 
that key Japanese principles could only be taught through the Japanese language, and 
appears to have had no interest in the concept of kotodama.  Rather, he suggested that 
such ideological teaching should occur in other parts of the curriculum, where it could 
be taught in the students’ native language.  In 1942 he wrote:  
There are some who think Japanese language instruction and Japanese 
spirit should be linked, that the spirit is transmitted through language 
instruction . . . Moreover, they say this link should be forged at the 
elementary language level.  Experience on the continent has shown that 
this to be a wasted effort, in fact it has poisoned Japanese language 
learning . . . We should teach about Japanese spirit and leading principles 
before we teach the Japanese language.  We should teach these things in 
their own language, so they can thoroughly understand it first (Ōide 
1942c, 51). 
  
Ōide did not deny the importance of teaching Japanese spirit, but he thought the 
principles could be taught better in Chinese than in Japanese.  His position struck at a 
fundamental principle of language optimism—that Japan’s unique culture could be 
taught only in Japanese, and as a result he was heavily criticized by Yamaguchi’s 
                                                                                                                                                                          
using Ōide’s accelerated method, which conflicted with the government’s support of the direct method.  
Ōide must have received permission to republish these texts, but I have seen no indication that the 
government supported their use.  Advertisements for the text did not appear in the central Manchukuo 
Education Society’s monthly journal Kenkoku Kyōiku (1940-1943), but did appear in the 1940 issues of 
the Fengtian Provincial Education Society’s journal Fengtian Jiaoyu.  
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disciples.  They derisively called his method a “translation method”, lumping it 
together with previously discredited non-verbal teaching methods.  One Yamaguchi 
supporter, Hino Seibi, censured Ōide for promoting practical concerns over the 
Japanese spirit and crudely appealing to the financial interests of the Chinese by 
referring to language proficiency test bonuses (Hino 1942, 72-73).  In a reply Ōide did 
not deny his method’s focus on practicality over spirit, but rejected the charge that it 
was a translation method, pointing out that he instructed classroom instruction to be 
done only in Japanese, and therefore his method had more in common with the direct 
method than translation methods.  Ōide also expressed concern that he was widely 
seen as a leader of a camp arrayed opposed to Yamaguchi, when he actually agreed that 
the direct method was ideal for elementary schools in which there were enough trained 
teachers.  He felt that his method, however, dealt with the reality of the situation in 
Manchukuo and North China that Hino and others seemed to ignore (Ōide 1942b, 
19-22). 
While I am aware of no comprehensive survey of teaching methods in 
Manchukuo, there is substantial anecdotal evidence showing that in the 1938-1945 
period Ōide’s method was widely used, as well as the cruder translation method.  
Naganuma Naoe, then a Japanese Ministry of Education textbook editor, recently 
claimed Ōide’s methods were used in many Manchukuo schools, while Yamaguchi’s 
were used in only “special cases, which caused Yamaguchi to sigh with indignity” 
(Kawamura 1994, 182).  The Kōa-in (Asia Development Board), a Japanese 
government sub-ministry involved in governing occupied China, sponsored a study of 
teaching methods used in Northern China in 1941, which had an education system 
similar to that of Manchukuo.  It reported that true direct method teaching was done 
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almost nowhere in the region because there were not enough trained teachers and 
instruction time was too brief.  Many ethnic Chinese in charge of Japanese language 
instruction used only the translation method.  The author of the study suggested 
promoting Ōide’s texts as appropriate transition material away from the translation 
method.  Japanese teachers who understood no Chinese could use it to teach 
effectively without trying to achieve total immersion, and Chinese teachers with limited 
Japanese skills could also use it with some effectiveness (Kōa-in 1941b, Tani 2000, 
26-30).    
 Although the Manchukuo government continued to support the use of the direct 
method, it appears to have eventually accepted the widespread use of Ōide’s methods in 
the schools.  They granted Ōide permission to publish versions of state-edited 
textbooks sometime around 1937, and advertisements for these textbooks began to 
appear in the provincial education journal Fengtian Jiaoyu in 1940.  In 1940 Hori 
Toshio, the Fengtian provincial education inspector, led a group of Fengtian educators 
in an study of Ōide’s texts as used in an adult night school, and concluded that it was a 
useful method for adults.   Hori continued to insist, however, that the direct method 
best for teaching elementary students (Hori 1942c, 38).50 
                                                          
50 While Ōide’s methods and texts were widely used in Manchukuo and occupied northern China, Hori 
and other leading Japanese educators writing in colonial education journals remained troubled with the 
continuing use of the translation method in Manchukuo schools.  Hori wrote: “Both before and after 
Manchukuo’s establishment [Japanese language teachers in Manchuria] generally avoided the translation 
method, using instead the direct method.  But some of the Manchurian [Chinese] teachers were still 
used translation methods, making it hard to tell whether they taught a Chinese or Japanese language class.  
When you ask why they use the translation method, they say that the students’ Japanese ability is so poor 
they can not understand any other way . . . We reject any instruction which is similar to how English has 
been taught in Japan.  That is why we encourage students to being their study by practicing 
conversation, not reading books” (Hori 1940b, 12-13, 16). 
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The division between the Yamaguchi and Ōide supporters is not easily divisible 
into terms of reformist and conservative ideologies.  Both opposed the nativist demand 
of emphasizing Japanese spirit in elementary school language texts, in fear that such 
teaching could damage students’ interest in learning the language.  Their difference 
sprung from their views of the role of the Japanese language.  While Ōide made his 
life work the teaching of Japanese to non-Japanese, he disagreed with Yamaguchi that 
there was anything inherently superior about the language, or that kotodama could 
change the hearts of non-Japanese.  For Ōide motivation had to come before learning, 
while for Yamaguchi motivation came after learning. 
  
Division #2: Language education content 
 The second division among Manchukuo education officials and teachers was 
over the content of Japanese language education.  Reformers and nativists disagreed 
over how to achieve the overall goal of creating a population friendly to Japan.  
Nativists thought schools should present the same Tennōsei ideology being taught in 
schools in Japan, including concepts of Japanese superiority and the divinity of the 
imperial house, in the expectation that these concepts would teach the students a respect 
for Japan.  Reformers, like Yamaguchi, wanted to teach the language in an 
environment as free from ideology as possible, and trust that the kotodama power of the 
language itself would win over the students.  Utilitarians like Ōide also tended to 
oppose the use of strongly ideological material in language education.  Until around 
1943 the Manchukuo education bureaucracy was dominated by reformers who managed 
to keep elementary textbooks remarkably free of strongly ideological material.  
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 In the 1938-1943 period, when the Manchukuo government used the Japanese 
language as a major tool in the effort to create a new Manchukuo consciousness, the 
language textbook editing department and teaching community were dominated by 
former SMR educators.  They included Fukui Yū, who was the editor in charge of the 
Japanese language textbooks from 1934 to 1940, and Terada Kijirō, who, as previously 
discussed, led the Manchukuo Textbook Department from 1938 to 1943.   Fukui, 
Terada, and the majority of Japanese in the Textbook Department were strongly 
influenced by liberal tradition in the SMR education system, originally fostered by 
Hobo Takashi.  Their background aligned them against the empire-wide swing in 
emphasis toward the glorification of the military, the divinity of the imperial house, and 
declarations of Japanese superiority.  They were also influenced by Yamaguchi’s 
position that kotodama is best transmitted through the form of the language, rather than 
the content.  They followed Yamaguchi’s admonitions to keep Japanese nationalistic 
material in elementary school textbooks to a minimum, expecting that the act of 
learning the language itself would be sufficient to inculcate the students in Japan’s 
spirit.   
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, Manchukuo education officials in 1939 and 
1942 publicly expressed concern over the Japanese Ministry of Education’s plan to edit 
a single language textbook series for all overseas territories, because they feared such 
texts would contain too much material about Japan, which would bore or offend 
non-Japanese.  In a 1942 roundtable of Manchukuo educators, Terada and two 
Japanese language professors from Kenkoku University (the state’s most prestigious 
university, founded in 1938 and located in the capital), Maruyama Rinpei and Uehara 
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Hisashi, spoke about their frustration with those who wanted to use Japanese language 
class time to teach Japanese nationalistic concepts: 
Terada: Some Japanese language teachers think that the purpose of 
their teaching is to communicate Japanese spirit.  They are only interested in 
teaching spirit, with the language . . . acting only as the organ of 
transmission . . . This does not result in improved language ability.   
Maruyama: I think ‘Japanese spirit’ can be misunderstood.  
Overbearing lectures on the subject do nothing but bore the students.  I think 
language teachers should [start with] subjects that seem useful to the students, 
like how to say ‘this is a pencil, this is a book.’ Eventually one can naturally 
start talking about Japanese culture.  I have found this to be the best way to 
teach them to appreciate Japanese things and become interested in the 
language.   
Uehara:  I have experienced that same thing.  Teaching Japanese by 
overbearingly forcing Japan’s culture on students is doomed to failure . . . 
Terada:  I am relieved to hear this from Kenkoku University 
professors . . . Many have argued that national studies [the morals curriculum] 
and our language courses must be taught together, . . . but we have replied 
that those who try to teach Japanese spirit and culture in language class from 
the start end up producing students who arrive at the higher peoples’ schools 
[middle schools] with terrible pronunciation.  Not only are their language 
skills poor, they have also not been taught about Japanese spirit well . . . So 
they end up not learning anything in their Japanese classes.  If we teach 
Japanese linguistically, then those advancing to the next level will both 
acquire good Japanese language skills and absorb Japanese spirit and culture 
without even being aware of it.  When [a student] uses Japanese he can not 
help but gain Japanese spirit. 
Maruyama:  That has been my experience as well.  That is what the 
Manchurians clearly have been saying.  When they come to Kenkoku 
University they say they are tired of all the emphasis on Japanese spirit.  So 
we do not repeat it, but rather try to find interesting, entertaining things to 
teach, until they gradually come to appreciate the language. 
Terada: One might ask how can saying [simple phrases like] ‘this is a 
face, this is an eye’ teach Japanese spirit?  Well, look at how we learned 
English.  Phases like ‘this is a dog, this is a cat’ [in English] did not teach 
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about the British Spirit.  But as we learned the language and read more texts 
until we came to understand British ideas of what makes a gentleman.  It 
simply takes time (Kenkoku Kyōiku, July 1942, 30-31). 
 
Iwazawa Iwao, a Nanman Middle School teacher, wrote in support of Terada’s 
position a few months later, saying:  
Japanese spirit naturally resides within the Japanese language.  You do 
not need to go around pointing it out, saying, ‘here it is, and here’.  
Japanese words contain kotodama; the words themselves are spirits.  
Therefore when students speak Japanese they will use the Japanese spirit 
which exists within it . . . Japanese is not the only language which acts this 
way.  It is true of Chinese or English as well.  If you speak the Chinese 
language frequently you will naturally come to comprehend the world as a 
Chinese, or if you use English, you will become like an Englishman 
(Iwazawa 1942, 23).   
 
Besides using the idea of kotodama in an attempt to keep out nationalistic material, both 
Terada and Iwazawa, by using the example of English, undercut the idea of the unique 
nature of Japanese then being propagated by Yamada Takao and other nativists. 
 It is quite remarkable that such public conversations and articles occurred in a 
military-controlled puppet state in May 1942, a time when Japanese militarist and 
Emperor-centered discourse was being ratcheted up to unprecedented levels throughout 
the empire.51  It is, therefore, a testament to the power the concept of kotodama that by 
                                                          
51 Although they were few in number, during the 1940s there were voices raised in the wartime occupied 
territories in support of keeping potentially divisive ideological materials out of the schools.  For 
example, in a March 24, 1942 Yomiuri Shinbun roundtable of officials in the Philippines, the Pilipino in 
charge of the territory’s Education Department, replied to a Japanese army officer who said schools 
needed to strengthen Japanese spirit that such education was appropriate only in Japan, and that the 
country’s of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere should have their own unique education 
content.  At the 1941 conference on Japanese language held by the Japanese Ministry of Education, 
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invoking it (whether they truly believed in it or not), education officials for a time could 
keep nationalist and militarist material at bay.  The leadership of former SMR 
employees was the key factor in this defiance. 52 
 Some nativist Japanese educators were disturbed by the efforts of the 
leadership to control the amount of Japanese-centered content in Japanese language 
textbooks.  For example in 1940 Asakawa Yoshihiko, a teacher at the Jilin Higher 
Normal School, bemoaned what he saw as Chinese continuing to learn Japanese only 
for utililitarian purposes, with no interest in Japanese culture or spirit.  Besides the 
Chinese themselves, he blamed the SMR education system and educators, who he said 
began the dominant trend of emphasizing utility over spirit.  As a corrective he called 
for an increase in Japanese literature instruction in Japanese language classes of all 
levels.  Only language classes which emphasized Japanese culture could change the 
people’s spirits, not linguistic-centered instruction (as Terada claimed) or 
Chinese-language ethics classes (as Ōide suggested) (Asakawa 1940, 22-24).  
Asakawa, therefore, agreed with the Yamaguchi/Terada line that the Japanese language 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Okubo Shōtarō, an education administrator in Central China said, “When teaching Japanese in East Asia, 
it shows more dignity not to emphasizing Japan and the Japanese spirit, and instead teach Japanese as an 
Asian language”.  Ishikuro Osamu, a Japanese language scholar at Hosei University in Tokyo, wrote in 
the journal Bungei in 1942 that the students in occupied China showed a dislike for those teachers who 
tried to instill “Japanese spirit” in language class (Yasuda 1997, 71). 
 
52 Ōide, who also was a former SMR educator, complained in 1941 that many language teachers then 
arriving in China and Manchukuo from Japan were warped by ultra-nationalism:  “They do not [see 
themselves] as just Japanese language teachers.  They boast of their great responsibility as 
representatives of the Japan people to lead the continental peoples.  They ignore the Japanese language 
classroom, and spend their time on political and official affairs.” (Ōide 1941: 24-25).   
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education which disseminated its kotodama spirit was the key to inculcating the students 
in Japanese spirit, but differed on the question of appropriate content. 
 
In the editing of Manchukuo textbooks, how much did the textbook officials’ put 
into effect Terada’s concern about keeping “Japanese spirit” material from dominating 
the classroom?  Currently about two-thirds of the Japanese language textbooks created 
or approved by the Manchukuo education bureaucracy are available for examination.  
Going through the available texts, I have calculated the percentage of chapters which 
contain Japan-related and imperial materials.  By Japan-related, I mean any mention 
of Japan, Japanese individuals, or Japanese customs.  By imperial, I mean material 
which tried to portray the Japanese military or Imperial household as powerful or 
awe-inspiring, or which taught about Japan’s founding myths.  These are what I 
believe Terada and others referred to as material which asserted “Japanese spirit”.  The 
second figure is a subset of the first.  For example, if I say that a text contains 20% 
Japan-related material and 10% imperial material, then the reader may deduce that the 
remaining 10% of Japanese-related material is of a less ideologically charged nature.  
These included such things as a depiction of Japanese children at play, a description of 
the train-system in Tokyo, or a story about a successful Japanese scientist.  While 
positive about Japan and the Japanese people, these chapters did not present them as 
objects worthy of awe, uniquely gifted or powerful, or connected to the divine. 
 There were three periods of textbook publication.  The first was in 1934-1935, 
before the establishment of the New Education System.  In these years Japanese was 
taught for two to three hours a week, beginning in the 3rd grade.  Two texts for lower 
elementary, two for higher elementary, and three for the lower middle schools were 
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created.  Details on all of these texts are available.  The second period was 1938-1941, 
after the establishment New Education System.  Japanese was now taught six to eight 
hours a week in lower and higher elementary schools, and eight hours a week in the now 
four-year middle schools and two-year normal schools.  Two textbook volumes were 
published for each lower elementary grade, for a total of eight.  Details on five of these 
eight are available.  It is not clear whether new textbooks were published for the higher 
elementary schools after 1938, some sources imply that the higher elementary schools 
continued to use the 1934-1935 texts (Minsei-bu 1941a, 113, Fukui 1939, 7).  Ōide 
Masayoshi edited six middle and normal school textbooks for the government in 
1938-1939, five of which are available.  In 1941 the Textbook Department published 
four middle school volumes, three of which are available.  In 1943 the Textbook 
Department was ordered to create an entirely new set of textbooks appropriate for the 
state’s changed ideology and war footing.  At least one elementary school textbook 
and one middle school textbook were completed before war conditions halted further 
publication.  Although the middle school textbook is available, the elementary school 
textbook is not. 
 Table 4.4 shows the percentages of Japan-related and imperial material in the 
1934-1935 and 1938-1941 elementary school Japanese language textbooks. 
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Table 4.4: Themes in Manchukuo elementary school Japanese language textbooks 
 
Date Title Japan-related Imperial 
1934 Lower Elementary #1 (3rd grade) 7% 0% 
1934 Lower Elementary #2 (4th grade) 14%  0% 
1935 Higher Elementary #1 (5th grade) 34% 23% 
1935 Higher Elementary #2 (6th grade) 32% 11% 
 1934-35 Average 20%  9%   
1938 Lower Elementary #1  (1st grade) 1% 0% 
1938 Lower Elementary #2  (1st grade)  7%  2% 
1938 Lower Elementary #3 (2nd grade) 10%  5% 
1939 Lower Elementary #4 (2nd grade) 10%  7% 
1941 Lower Elementary #7 (4th grade) 19% 15% 
 1938-1941 Average 13%  9% 
 
 I believe the second set of percentages is a more relevant indicator of the 
assimilative nature of the textbooks than the first.  It is to be expected that any 
Japanese language textbook would contain material that mentions Japan and 
Japan-related matters.  The Manchukuo elementary school textbooks are in fact 
remarkable for the lack of such references.  A majority of the people, landscapes, and 
situations depicted in the elementary textbooks are Chinese, not Japanese.  This 
probably reflects the influence of Yamaguchi and the new education movement 
educators, both of whom encouraged the use of everyday texts and materials with which 
students would be familiar.   Many of the chapters are directly copied from South 
Manchuria Education Society textbooks edited by Ōide from 1922 to 1931.  Ōide had 
made a point of placing the materials in those textbooks as much as possible in a local 
context.   One scholar has estimated that 24% of the 1934-35 elementary school texts 
came from the 1924 South Manchuria Education Society textbooks (Takenaka 2000b).   
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 Examining the figures, one can see that the amount of both Japan-related and 
imperial material rose along with the student’s age, as might be expected.  The 
1934-35 lower elementary texts contained a very small amount of Japan-related material 
and no imperial material.  The 1934-35 higher elementary school texts contained much 
more of both forms of content, a rather sudden spike.  Most of the imperial material in 
the Higher Elementary #1 text is made up of a series of rather benign chapters based on 
the Japanese foundation myths taken from the Kojiki.  The myths are presented without 
special reverence, and no attempt is made to link the ancient Japanese gods to the 
Manchukuo state, as occurred later in the 1941 and 1943 textbooks.  Both 
Japan-related and imperial material is very light in the 1938-39 texts for 1st and 2nd 
graders, but jumps up in the 1941 4th grade text, which contains 15% imperial material, 
including a story about Amaterasu from the Kojiki which mentions that the Manchukuo 
government made Amaterasu the state’s “founding god” the year before.   
 The four 1934-35 texts averaged 20% Japan-related material and 9% imperial 
material.  Since only five out of the eight 1938-1941 texts are available, a precise 
average can not be found, but a rough estimate, based on an extrapolation of the existing 
figures, finds 13% Japan-related material and 9% imperial material.53  Thus from the 
first series of textbooks to the second the amount of imperial material basically 
remained unchanged, and the amount of Japan-related material actually dropped 
significantly.   This drop occurred despite the outbreak of full-scale war between 
                                                          
53 Another problem in comparing the 1934-1935 and 1938-1941 texts is that the first set included two 
texts for higher elementary (5th and 6th grades), while the second set included only texts for lower 
elementary (grades 1-4).    
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Japan and China and the shift in Manchukuo state ideology in the years between the 
publication of the two series.  
 It is instructive to compare these figures to those of Japanese language 
textbooks produced for students in Japan and Korea.  The Japanese Ministry of 
Education began publishing its third textbook series in 1918 and its fourth series in 1933.  
The Korean colonial government began publishing its third textbook series (for Korean 
students) in 1930 and fourth in 1939 (Li 2000, 343-347).  In 1941 the Japanese and 
Korean governments both began publishing fifth and final series before the end of the 
war.  I do not, however, yet have information on the two 1941 series. 
Table 4.5: Elementary school Japanese language textbooks in Japan and Korea 
 
Series Japan-related Korea-related Imperial 
Japan 3rd series (1918) 80% 1% 18% 
Japan 4th series (1933) 73% 1% 26% 
Korea 3rd series (1930) 20% 60% 19% 
Korea 4th series (1939) 58% 24% 31% 
 
 Scholars have often pointed out that the Japan third series was edited during the 
height of the new education and internationalist movements, and as such contained an 
unprecedented amount of material with international settings.  The fourth series 
appeared at a time when a more conservative version of the new education movement 
was ascendant, and therefore contained much more statist and imperial material, but 
also many more stories about children.  The Korean third series is notable for the 
increase in the amount of material about Korea and decrease in material about Japan, 
including imperial material, compared to the previous Korea second series published in 
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1923.   This trend was completely reversed with the fourth series, when Japan-related 
material again became dominant and the amount of imperial material greatly expanded.   
 The amount of imperial material in Korean and Japanese texts rose in a parallel 
manner in the 1930s, with the amount slightly greater in the Korean texts in both 
periods.  The amount of imperial material in the Manchukuo texts, however, remained 
constant at 9%, at a much smaller level than in either Japan or Korea at any period.  
Also, while the amount of general material about Japan was the same in the Korea and 
Manchukuo texts of the early and mid 1930s, they diverged significantly in 1938-1939, 
with the amount rising dramatically in Korea while dropping almost as dramatically in 
Manchukuo. 
 Turning to the Manchukuo middle and normal school textbooks, the amount of 
Japan-related and imperial material tended to be greater than in the elementary school 
textbooks, particularly in the later years.   These texts were created for a much smaller 
population than the elementary school texts, as only 2 to 5% of elementary school 
graduates moved on to middle school throughout Manchukuo’s history.   
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Table 4.6: Manchukuo middle school Japanese language textbook themes 
 
Date Title Japan-related Imperial 
1934 Lower Middle #1  (7th grade) 13%   1% 
1935 Lower Middle #2  (8th grade) 32%   5% 
1935 Lower Middle #3  (9th grade) 36% 13% 
 1934-1935 average 27%   6% 
 
1938 Middle #1 (7th grade) 33%   5% 
1938 Middle #2 (7th grade) 23%   6% 
1939 Middle #3 (8th grade) 40% 18% 
 1938-39 average 31% 10% 
 
1941 Middle #5 (9th grade) 38% 23% 
1941 Middle #7 (10th grade) 50% 33% 
1941 Middle #8 (10th grade) 45% 33% 
 1941 average 44% 30% 
 
 1938-1941 average  41% 20% 
1943 Middle #1 (7th grade) 58% 48% 
 
The 1935 middle school texts had less Japan-related and imperial material than 
the exceptionally Japan-centric 1935 higher elementary school texts.  The average of 
the 1935 middle school texts were 27% Japan-related and 6% imperial material.   In 
1938-1939 Ōide, as a private citizen, edited the first four middle school textbooks for 
the government (three of which are available).  The texts contained 31% Japan-related 
material and 10% imperial material, both somewhat higher than the 1934-1935 texts.  
The 10% still was well below the amount found in the contemporary Korean and 
Japanese textbooks in the lower elementary school level (I have not seen figures for 
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contemporary middle school textbooks from Korea or Japan).  Also, Ōide’s imperialist 
materials seem quite restrained when compared to what followed. 
 In 1941 the Manchukuo government published the last four middle school 
textbook (three of which are available).  The number of Japan-related and imperial 
materials rose significantly from the level of those produced by Ōide, 44% 
Japan-related and 30% imperial.  Some of these texts were about life in the military 
and the Manchukuo army’s place as a partner in defending the Greater East Asian 
Co-Prosperity Sphere.  The immediate cause of this change may have been a 1940 
conscription law, which forced some middle school graduates to enter the military after 
graduation.  These texts can be seen as a preparation for that conscription.  Even 
more frequent than the militaristic texts, however, were those which described the 
Manchukuo population as an army of workers, cooperating in the Co-Prosperity Sphere 
through their labor.  I believe this emphasis demonstrates the primary role Japanese 
leaders saw the Manchukuo people playing in the Co-Prosperity Sphere at the time, 
workers rather than soldiers.   
In 1943, after Pacific War had begun, the Ministry of Education published the 
last known Manchukuo middle school textbook, which contained 48% imperial material.  
Besides chapters about Amaterasu and general cooperation with Japan, nearly a third of 
the textbook contained war-related material, which indicates how militaristic the middle 
schools had become.  For example one chapter lionized a self-sacrificing soldier 
serving in China, while another described the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Besides the 
chapters on the Japanese army, there were also several chapters depicting local 
Manchukuo soldiers involved in the war effort by protecting the railway lines from 
bandits and patrolling the northern boarder with the Soviet Union.  This may show a 
  193 
shift in the leadership’s conception of the Manchukuo population away from being 
chiefly economic labor toward becoming more active in the military side of Japan’s war 
effort.   The nature of the material also differed substantially from Ōide’s 1938-1939 
texts, which had some militaristic material, but little about actual fighting.  For 
example, a chapter in Ōide’s Middle School #1 textbook described General Nogi’s 
childhood, including his parents’ Spartan philosophies.  The 1943 Middle School #1 
text, on the other hand, contained a chapter describing General Nogi Maresuke leading 
the Japanese army to victory in the Russo-Japanese war.    
 The 1934-1935 and 1938-1939 secondary school texts, then, while containing 
considerably more Japan-related material than the elementary school texts, had only a 
slightly greater amount of imperial material.  In 1941 and especially in 1943 the 
demands of the war and a growing expectation to change the Manchukuo people into 
loyal subjects resulted in the amount of imperial material raising sharply and becoming 
exceedingly militaristic.   
 Assuming that Terada and his allies saw the materials which I define as 
“imperial” as the excessively ideological “Japanese spirit” materials which they feared 
would discourage students from studying the language, they were successful in keeping 
them from becoming major elements in the elementary school textbooks at least through 
1941.  The elementary school textbooks, particularly in the 1938-1941 era, emphasized 
the lives of Manchukuo students in Manchukuo, while mentioning Japan and the 
Japanese only occasionally, and using imperial materials very rarely.  Since no 1943 
elementary school texts have been found, it is not clear whether this trend continued 
during that more militaristic period.  In the secondary school texts, on the other hand, 
editors included much more material about Japan, although they kept the amount of 
  194 
imperial material down in 1935 and 1938-1939.   In 1941 and 1943, under the 
pressures of the war conditions, they made the middle school textbooks increasingly 
ideological, emphasizing the greatness of the Japanese imperial household and military 
and the people’s patriotic duty as industrial and military soldiers.  Perhaps it was these 
texts about which Terada, Murayama, and Uehara expressed frustration in their 1942 
conversation. 
 
Division #3: Japanese language reform 
 The third division among Manchukuo educators was over the question of 
Japanese language reform or preservation.  In particular, should Manchukuo schools 
teach the kana syllabary system then in use in Japan, or a newer, easier to learn system?  
This, like the other divisions, was part of a larger struggle found throughout the 
Japanese education world.  Within Manchuria the split mirrored that of teaching 
Japanese spirit.  The SMR-related educators who supported a language reform were 
basically the same people who supported the use of non-ideological materials.  
Nativists, who supported the preservation of linguistic tradition as well as the use of 
ideological materials, tended to be newer arrivals from Japan. 
 As has been mentioned, the Meiji-era linguist Ueda Kazutoshi was a pioneer in 
the Japanese language reform movement.  Members of the generation of language 
scholars after Ueda proposed a variety of written language reforms, in particular what 
was usually called the “historical kana” system, so-called because its characters did not 
consistently represent a single sound.  For example, the kana  could be pronounced 
[i] or [hi] and  could be pronounced [ha] or [wa] depending on the situation.   
Reformers felt that these inconsistencies made learning the language unnecessarily 
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difficult, and proposed a variety of “pronunciation kana” systems in which each kana 
represented a single sound.   
 Language nativists, or preservationists, on the other hand, argued that the 
historical kana system was linked to the state kokutai, and therefore declared any 
tampering a sacrilege.   Conservative scholar Yamada Takao was a leading voice in 
the preservationist camp, calling attempts at reform a “destruction of tradition.”  Sato 
Haruo, another nativist, said that language itself was a god with a spirit, and therefore 
any criticism of it was a blasphemous act.  “To lightly change eternal words for short 
term convenience is a short-sighted act.  Wounding the life of our national language 
will surely bring sorrow to following generations” (Mitani 1996, 112). 
 The Japanese Ministry of Education vacillated between these two camps.  It 
sponsored several kana reform studies, and in 1924 approved a pronunciation kana plan 
created by the ministry’s own Language Research Conference.  Strong opposition by 
Yamada and others, however, forced the Ministry to postpone implementing the plan 
throughout the pre-war and wartime eras.  Even Hirao Hachisaburō, a former director 
of the Kanamoji-kai, a leading reform group, was unable to produce any significant 
changes during his term as Minister of Education from 1936 to 1937 (Komagome 1997, 
322).  
 Although language reform was halted in Japan proper, supporters of reform 
among colonial education officials were free to experiment in the territories under their 
authority.  Many held that a logical pronunciation kana system was necessary in 
teaching non-Japanese.  The editors of Korea’s colonial-era elementary Japanese 
readers, beginning with the first series in 1912 and continuing through the fifth series in 
1941, used a pronunciation kana system in the first seven of eight Japanese elementary 
  196 
school language readers.  They introduced the historical kana in the final eighth 
volume, and then used historical kana in the middle school readers.  This pattern 
became the standard for elementary school Japanese textbooks in Manchuria, beginning 
with a 1916 SMR series.  The South Manchuria Education Society 1924 and 1931 
textbooks, Manchukuo government 1935 and 1938-41 elementary school textbooks, and 
Ōide’s 1937 private “accelerated textbooks” all used pronunciation kana (Takenaka 
2000b), while the middle school textbooks from these same institutions used historical 
kana.  The pronunciation system used in the Korea elementary textbooks used what 
Ōide called an “eclectic system”, keeping some inconsistent elements of the historical 
system, such as (normally pronounced [ha]) as the subject marker (pronounced [wa]).  
This system became the standard kana system in Japan after post-war orthographic 
reforms and remains so today.  The South Manchuria Education Society, Manchukuo 
government, and Ōide-edited texts, on the other hand, used a more radically consistent 
system, for example using  (pronounced [wa]) as the subject marker (Ōide 1941, 
24-26).54   
                                                          
 
54 Ōide called the system used in the Manchuria texts “pronunciation kana.”  He illustrated the 
differences between the three systems with examples of the sentence “Mr. Ō is probably not coming to 
school today” (	
).   
Historical kana: 	. 
“Eclectic” kana: 	. 
“Pronunciation” kana:  (Ōide 1941: 25). 
Komagome Takeshi has written that these debates over orthography and differences of usage in different 
parts of the empire betrayed the premise that there was a single standard Japanese language, and thus was 
an example of how imperialism illuminated the contradictions which existed within nationalist ideology 
(Komagome 1997: 322-323).    
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 Fukui and Terada, the two key leaders of Manchukuo textbook editing, publicly 
supported the use of pronunciation kana in the elementary school Japanese language 
readers (Fukui 1939, 4).55  Terada went as far as to call for an empire-wide conversion 
to pronunciation kana, even using the police to force public institutions like newspapers 
and publishing houses to make the switch.56 
                                                          
 
55 A 1972 history edited by former Manchukuo government officials incorrectly claimed that Terada, 
who became head of the textbook division in November 1938, introduced the pronunciation kana system.  
It said:  “In 1941 when the Japanese language readers were revised, the previous traditional kana were 
for the first time replaced with new pronunciation kana, and new words were given with accent marks to 
show how they are pronounced in the standard language.  This use of pronunciation kana was due to a 
suggestion from the advisor Yamamoto Yūzō” (Manshūkoku Shikai 1970: Kakuron 1108).  While both 
Yamamoto, who was a leading figure in Japan’s post-war language reform efforts, and Terada both 
supported teaching pronunciation kana, the system was already in place before Terada joined the 
ministry.  Pronunciation kana were used in the 1934-1935 and 1938 elementary school textbooks, all 
edited by Fukui. 
  
56 In a post-war memoir Terada wrote: “Secretly in my heart I wanted to blow a new wind into the 
Elementary and Middle School textbooks in Japan itself.  I tried to reform Japanese education from 
Manchuria . . . In Japanese national language texts . . . we used use pronunciation kana, and included 
accent marks for new words, demonstrating correct Tokyo standard pronunciation.  The kana usage was 
a forerunner of that used today in Japan, although the accents still are not used in Japan” (Ryōnankai 1972, 
240-241). 
Manchukuo textbook officials felt that there needed to be pronunciation guides to go along with the 
textbooks, probably not only because many of the teachers were Chinese, but also because a majority of 
the ethnic Japanese teachers in Manchukuo came from Kyūshū and western Honshū, and therefore spoke 
with non-standard dialects.  In 1938-1939 they made a series of 13 records of a Japanese speaker from 
Tokyo reading the text of the first four elementary school textbooks.  They abandoned this direction 
because of the expense of recording and manufacturing the records, however, and in 1940 created 
pronunciation guides utilizing a system of accent orthography, which it included in the elementary school 
teaching manuals (Fukui 1939: 6, Kenkoku Kyōiku July 1942: 26-27, Minsei-bu Henshin Kanshitsu 1940: 
17-21). 
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 In 1943 Terada wrote that reform policies were easier to enact in Manchukuo 
than Japan:  
Manchukuo is a new state, and so there is little pressure from tradition and 
convention to slow us down.  In this way it is superior to Japan.  For 
example, former Prime Minister Zheng extremely respected ancient books, 
so when he served concurrently as the Minister of Education, he arranged 
for the [Chinese language] textbooks to be based on the classics.  
However, the 1940 Textbook Advisory Committee Conference decided on 
a ratio of classical and colloquial Chinese texts, with colloquial texts 
taking up the great majority.  It was enacted, and remains the policy today.  
I do not think we would have been able to come to such a simple 
conclusion if this was Japan.  We have recently established polices on 
having joint Japanese and Manchurian [Chinese] language texts for middle 
schools, the reform of Japanese language notation, and the merging and 
splitting of curriculum, each of which would have taken at least five to ten 
years to achieve in Japan.  In Manchukuo we are able to move nimbly.  
If we fail we can try it again a different way (Terada 1943, 67). 
  
In the previously mentioned 1942 roundtable, Terada talked in greater detail about 
his vision of language reform, and the possibilities of leading that reform from the 
gaichi.  Among those present were the previously mentioned Kenkoku University 
language professors Maruyama Rimpei and Uehara Hisa, Chigusa Tatsuo, a Justice 
Ministry official trying to reform the language of the laws, and Matsukawa Heihachi, 
one of Terada’s subordinates in the Textbook Division.  Matsukawa was a former 
student of Terada’s at Kyōsen, the SMR teacher training school, and a fervent supporter 
of kana reform.   
Terada: I think we should move ahead more positively in some areas.  
Matsukawa, please tell us your opinion. 
Matsukawa: My ideas are very radical, and might seem mad . . . I 
think we should eliminate kanji, and only use pronunciation characters.  Just 
as [former Education Minister] Hirao has written, if we are able to create the 
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custom of writing just as we speak, our problems will be solved.  Then we 
will see rapid success . . .  
Terada: I would like colloquial writing to be like a voice recording.   
Uehara: Isn’t that impossible? 
Terada: I am not sure.  I want to throw away the present contrived 
writing style, and work at getting as close to recorded speaking as we can.  
We would write just as we speak, so that even a child can read and have no 
trouble understanding.   I think the time has come for written Japanese to go 
through a major reform.   
Chigusa: Today in Japan they are going to extremes to keep out 
foreign words—I want to avoid that.  Any attempt to ban words which have 
become a natural part of Japanese will end in failure.  The same thing is 
going on in Europe. England, France, and Germany are trying to keep out 
each others’ words, and punishing people for using them.  They are trying to 
reverse the course of language evolution.  I would also like to see language 
simplification, making the written language reflect the spoken language.  
Terada: Mr. Uehara has spoken about the need for a revolution in 
kana usage in Japan, but can it be done? 
Uehara: There is opposition. 
Terada: Some so-called scholars oppose it.  It is connected to the 
Kokutai problem. 
Uehara: The language reform in Japan has died away (smiles).  
[Uehara says this phrase in an archaic form, perhaps mocking language 
preservationists.] 
Terada: I think it is like the situation in Japan just before the 
Manchurian Incident.  There were two political camps, some who thought 
Japan could not progress unless the current state of affairs was destroyed, 
while others profited from the status quo, and did not mind if it continued.  
Today as well there are two such camps arguing about the national language 
problem.  There are those like us, who may be in the extreme, but who want 
more than anything else for the language to be organized so it can advance 
into the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the world.  Then there 
are those in the homeland who just work at their desks and can not imagine 
change.  Today, because we must move into the South Seas and India, the 
Japanese language must be organized.  We need to concentrate on this effort.   
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Uehara: [But what if the language] that goes overseas and the 
language which stays at home do not move together? 
Terada: There may be an interim period in which there will be a 
difficult bifurcation . . . There needs to be government enforcement.  Just 
like when the (Japanese) Ministry of Education issued orders to newspapers 
and magazines on what kanji could be used and how they should look in 
block printing . . . Another problem is that in the Manchukuo region we use 
pronunciation kana and restrict the number of kanji in the schools.  But 
every day the newspapers and magazines published in Manchukuo freely act 
in ways which oppose our efforts.  This contradiction disturbs us textbook 
editors.  If we want the Manchurians to quickly learn Japanese, 
pronunciation kana and restriction of kanji must not occur only in the 
textbooks but also in all newspapers and magazines.  If they do not 
participate, we are in trouble.  We need to work together in order to teach 
the Japanese language to foreigners and the people of Manchukuo.  
 
Later in the discussion Terada spoke about his vision of transforming the 
language throughout the empire:  
Terada:  If we make the decision to move toward pronunciation kana, 
in 30-50 years all written materials can be put into pronunciation kana.  We 
can’t destroy historical kana use in just 3-5 months. 
Maruyama:  What about Japanese culture? . . . You will have to 
rewrite all previous culture, like the Manyōshū, Kōjiki, Genji, and so on. 
Terada: Just like enacting the metric system, there will be a buffer 
period of some decades, then after 30 or 50 years there will have to be a law 
against the use of anything but pronunciation kana (Kenkoku Kyōiku, July 
1942, 21-29). 
Terada and Matsukawa were clearly the strongest supporters of reform in this 
group.  They put their ideas into action as leaders in Manchukuo government efforts to 
reform both Japanese and Chinese.  The state first became directly involved in 
language reform issues in January 1938, when the Civil Affairs Ministry created the 
Manchukuo Language Investigation Committee, a government organ dedicated to 
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researching and formulating language policy.  In October 1939 a group of educators 
and others involved in cultural institutions in Manchukuo established a 
non-governmental body which they named the Manchukuo Language Research 
Association.  Terada and other former SMR educators were among the leaders of the 
organization.   The association pledged to study issues on all the languages of 
Manchukuo and published a journal, Manshū Kokugo, of which at least ten issues 
appeared in 1940 and 1941.  The government merged the two groups together in 1941. 
57  These organizations actively researched and crafted policy statements on Japanese 
and Chinese pronunciation characters, Chinese language standardization, and language 
promotion activities. 
 The authors who appeared in the journal Manshū Kokugo were 
overwhelmingly pro-reform, frequently citing potential salutary effects of using 
pronunciation kana and limited numbers of kanji on the education of both Japanese and 
Chinese children (Akatsuka 1940, Hori 1941a).  The journal also ran some opposing 
views, however, as did other local education journals.  Jilin Higher Normal School 
teacher Asakawa Yoshihiko, who was quoted earlier in his support of the emphasis on 
Japanese spirit in language education, accused reformers of “acting sacrilegiously 
                                                          
57The Manchukuo Language Investigation Committee (	G5124) focused on 
Chinese language issues, and included three sub-committees, one dedicated to national language policy 
research, one on the establishment of a standard list of Chinese characters, and on research on a system of 
phonetic orthography.  Matsukawa was a central member of this organization.  In October 1941 the 
government merged the Manchurian Language Investigation Committee and the Manchukuo Language 
Research Association to form the National Language Investigation Committee (	G5124
), with the mandate to research the languages of Manchukuo for the purpose of advising the 
Civil Affairs Minister (Yasuda 1997: 96).   
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against the national language” by trying to change the traditional writing systems 
(Asakawa 1940, 24).  Onodera Miyasuke, a Manchukuo middle school vice-principal, 
wrote in Fengtian Jiaoyu about his disappointment with the Manchukuo language 
textbooks for their focus on pronunciation instead of kanji and historical kana:   
Up to now we have used phonological-style Japanese language textbooks.  
The phonological style is nothing more than a convenience, teaching 
syllabic mimicry, not the true essence of Japanese.  Without kanji, 
students can not understand the complex nature of Yamato words, which 
are the heart of the language’s mystery.  The phonological method also 
destroys true Japanese by not using the pure historical kana rules, which 
are set by the state.  Simplified language is an expression of a vulgar 
culture, while complex language expresses a state’s high culture.  
Manchukuo’s use of the “convenient” phonological method is very 
regrettable (Onodera 1938, 74).  
 
Despite these opposing voices, reformist educators dominated the Manchukuo 
central education bureaucracy for most of its existence, and were able to see many of 
their plans enacted.  They brought to the organization a zeal for change both for the 
sake of improved education in Manchukuo, and as a way to demonstrate the results of 
reform to their home country.  The short history of the state, as Terada noted, meant 
that there was little tradition or bureaucratic inertia to slow down their reform plans.   
These same men, however, could never have lost sight of who held final control over all 
major government decisions, the Japanese military.  After 1941, when the war became 
a pressing concern for the state’s ruling generals, only those reforms that contributed to 
the state’s immediate goals were allowed to remain.  They allowed written language 
reforms to progress, as the army itself was exploring reduction of kanji and kana 
simplification in the early 1940s to improve communication among soldiers (Tani 2000, 
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8-12).  Textbooks which did not emphasize the people’s duty to the Japanese emperor 
nearly as much as textbooks in Japan and Korea, however, were not acceptable at a time 
when local non-Japanese students were being drafted and trained to help replace the 
dwindling Japanese forces.  Therefore the government ordered the Ministry of 
Education to rewrite its entire series of elementary and middle school readers in 1943, 
an order which clearly annoyed Terada and may have lead to his resignation in March 
1944 (Terada 1943, 69-70).   
The military provided the reformers with a freedom of action which they did not 
have in Japan, but to do so they had to agree to participate in a system which forced a 
style of education on a population which clearly would have preferred something else.   
The following section will examine the overall failure to win the population over 
through the Japanese language.  
 
Results of Japanese language dissemination   
While the above debates about the nature of Japanese language education may 
tell us much about the colonizers’ view of their language and its place in Asia, they do 
not tell us the degree to which the language ultimately was taught in Manchukuo.   
This section will focus on three areas: the number of Japanese recruited to teach their 
language in Manchukuo, the degree to which members of the indigenous population 
were trained as language teachers, and anecdotal evidence about language ability and 
interest in Japanese among the general population.  This brief survey will show that 
Japanese language instruction in almost all elementary schools was quite limited, while 
the few elite students who attended middle schools received relatively substantial 
training.   
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In 1939 Fukui set forth a vision of Japanese language instruction occurring on 
two widely separated levels:   
In the future the people will be divided into two groups—first the common 
masses, who will be able to speak simple Japanese but not find it necessary 
to write complex texts.  Then there will be the leadership class, who will 
become skillful at the Japanese language, understand commonplace 
writing, and have the responsibility to introduce and guide the common 
masses in these things.  They will be able to both read and speak in both 
the modern formal and colloquial styles. Because they will be able to read 
and understand ancient texts, they will understand Japanese traditions and 
truly be able to enjoy Japanese culture (Fukui 1939, 4).   
 
The basis for this bifurcated view of the future was the limited amount of resources 
Japan could afford to use in Manchukuo language education. 
As schools slowly reopened after the Manchurian Incident, one of the 
government’s first priorities was to staff the regions’ few middle and higher schools 
with Japanese language teachers, as these schools were the training grounds for future 
leaders of society.  Throughout the Manchukuo period the number of middle school 
students was only 2% to 5% that of elementary school students (see Table 4.7).  From 
as early as 1935, the most prestigious provincial schools in the largest cities were well 
staffed with both ethnic Japanese and Chinese with substantial Japanese language 
experience.  In 1935 between 7% and 9% of the teachers in Fengtian Province’s 
twenty-one provincial middle schools, some of the best in the country, were Japanese, 
while an additional 5% to 8% of the teachers were Chinese who had studied in Japan or 
in Japanese-run schools (Fengtian-sheng 1935, 470, Liaoning-sheng 1990, 822-823).  
Since Japanese language instruction was only expected to take up three hours of school 
time a week, this number of Japanese-speaking teachers was more than adequate.   In 
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1937 the Japanese teachers made up 13% of Manchukuo’s middle school teachers, and 
the amount rose to over one-third of the total in 1939 and 1942.  The Japanese tended 
to be clustered in the provincial schools, there were fewer qualified language teachers in 
the less prestigious city and county schools, particularly those in more isolated areas of 
the country.  Wartime manpower shortages caused a drop in the number of Japanese 
teachers after 1942.  Still, these sizable numbers demonstrate that the government 
envisaged middle schools as a place in which a small elite population could experience 
a Japanese-centered education that went far beyond simple language training.    
Providing teachers for the much larger elementary school population, on the 
other hand, was far beyond the state’s means throughout its existence.  Figures for 
1937, 1939, and 1942 show that Japanese teachers probably never made up more than 
2% of the elementary school teaching population.   
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Table 4.7: Manchukuo elementary and middle school attendance and teachers 
 
Year Elementary 
school  
students 
Percentage  
of student- 
age popula- 
tion enrolled 
Japanese  
elementary 
teachers, %  
of total 
Middle school 
students 
Middle/ 
elementary
student 
ratio 
Japanese 
middle 
teachers, % 
of total 
1931* 747,176 19-20%  38,575   
1932 ?   21,896     
1933   502,223 13.5%  25,387   5%  
1934   830,960 21.0%  28,866     
1935   896,054 21.7%  26,324   3%  
1936 1,012,491  24.2%  29,375   
1937 1,179,910 30.2% 421   1.4% 33,640   3% 375  13%
1938 1,613,751 39.0%  38,703   
1939 1,792,560 44.0% 731   1.9% 35,944   2% 668  36%
1940 1,972,156 47.3%  42,745   
1941 2,099,342   51,267   2%  
1942 2,159,864  850   1.7% 57,341  990  35%
1943 2,241,322      
*-Before the Manchurian Incident. 
(Ōmori 1996, 62, Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1937b, Monbushō Toshokyoku 1939, 31, 
Minsei-bu 1942, 114, Wang 2000, 151.) 
 
In February 1936 the Manchukuo government established a five-year plan to 
increase the number of ethnic Japanese teachers.  Previously teachers were hired 
unsystematically from Japan and the Japanese settler communities in Manchuria and 
Korea, and were given little training.  Under the 1936 plan the Manchukuo 
government asked Japanese prefectural governors to recommend qualified secondary 
students.  These students were tested in selected cities in Japan beginning in 1937.  In 
the first round of tests fifty elementary school teachers were chosen out of 157 
applicants.  The selected teachers then spent six months training at the Jilin Higher 
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Normal School (Ōmori 1996, 63-65).  The process was repeated annually until 1941, 
when the Japanese government, concerned the number of teachers leaving Japan to 
teach in the extended empire was causing a drain on domestic education, set limits on 
the number allowed to leave the country each year (Komagome 1997, 329).  These 
limitations appear to have ended the 1937 recruitment system. 
In 1938, with the increased need for Japanese-speaking teachers under the New 
Education System, the government took a new track by establishing its own normal 
school for Japanese teachers.  They established the school in the capital Xinjing and 
named it the Central Teacher Training Center.  It was a two-year program for training 
Japanese middle-school graduates, rather than veteran teachers as in the 1937 
recruitment system.  In 1940 the school began accepting Japanese elementary school 
graduates for a five year training course.  The center trained at least five hundred 
Japanese boys from 1938 to 1945.    
 Although these methods provided sufficient teachers for the limited number of 
secondary schools in Manchukuo, they could not hope of placing many ethnic Japanese 
teachers in the elementary schools.  The alternative was training local non-Japanese to 
be Japanese language teachers.   The government reorganized its system of normal 
schools for non-Japanese in 1938, placing all under state control (rather than county or 
provincial control) and emphasizing instruction in the Japanese language, knowledge 
about Japan, and “state founding spirit.”  The quality of students in these schools is 
suspect, however, because of the low number of applicants.  Tsukinoki Mizuo has 
found that in 1939 the four normal schools in Fengtian Province (the economic and 
cultural heart of the region) had only 853 applicants for 701 positions, or an 82% 
acceptance rate.  The average acceptance rate for middle schools throughout the 
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country that same year, on the other hand, was 38% (Tsukinoki 1990, 15, Wang 2000, 
171).  A 1942 yearbook stated, “The number of applicants to the normal schools is 
decreasing, which is terribly troublesome, and makes the achievement of our goals very 
difficult” (Manshūkoku Tsūshin 1942, 229).   
Terada and Hori both pointed to low teacher pay as the major reason for the lack 
of Chinese applicants to normal schools.  In fact, Terada claimed that the national 
average pay for non-Japanese teachers, 42 yen a month, was lower than that of unskilled 
laborers (Terada 1941, 23, Hori 1941b, 58).58   
Ideological opposition to the school system was doubtless another factor in the 
low normal school enrolment rates.  Kimura Osamu, a Fengtian City elementary 
school teacher, described with credulity the attitudes of Chinese teachers and students: 
“Manchurian teachers have no desire to continue learning Japanese.  Maybe it is 
because many already know it to a degree, but you never hear a Manchurian teacher 
asking how to say a certain word.  Students are the same, except for those about to take 
a test; they have no desire to learn” (Kimura 1942, 36).  What Kimura labels obstinacy, 
                                                          
58 Statistics for 1935 show that in Fengtian Province Japanese elementary teacher salary averaged 143 
yen a month, while non-Japanese averaged 60 yen a month.  In Jilin province Japanese teachers received 
about the same, but non-Japanese averaged a much higher 92 yen a month.  Japanese lower middle 
teachers in Fengtian Province averaged 157 yen, while non-Japanese averaged 117 yen.   In 1939 the 
Civil Affairs Ministry claimed that the ideal pay scale for non-Japanese teachers was 36-49 yen for 
graduates of the normal school main course and 26-34 yen for graduates of the less prestigious special 
course.  Terada in 1940 stated that Japanese elementary school teachers in the capital Xinjing earned 133 
yen, non-Japanese in the capital averaged 66 yen, and non-Japanese throughout the country averaged 42 
yen.  A 1942 Education Department yearbook claimed the average pay for normal school graduates was 
44 yen (in 1933 the Manchukuo yen was pegged to the Japanese yen at a one-to-one basis) (Fengtian 
Jiaoyu 7.3, March 1939, Kenkoku Kyōiku 3.12, December 1941, Terada 1941: 23, Minsei-bu 1942: 65). 
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others might call passive resistance.  In this atmosphere, becoming a teacher in a 
Japanese-run school must not have appealed to many would-be normal school students. 
To help deal with the shortage of teachers, in January 1943 the Manchukuo 
government introduced an emergency measure shortening the number school-years 
required to become an elementary school teacher.  Under the 1938 system normal 
schools accepted students who had completed three years of middle school education, 
and trained them for two years.  In 1943 the normal schools were restructured as four 
year schools which accepted graduates of higher elementary schools.  Therefore 
normal school graduates finished with one less year of school experience.   As a result, 
youths as young as 15 could become elementary school teachers (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 
1941, 37).59 
 The lack of teachers from Japan, together with poor teacher training and 
widespread disinterest on the part of Chinese teachers and students, resulted in 
extremely low Japanese proficiency in elementary schools.  Yasui Katsumi, a member 
of the Manchukuo Language Research Association, said of urban elementary school 
children in 1942:  
I have yet to meet a Manchurian child who speaks Japanese well . . . Very 
few Manchurians who graduate from higher elementary school can pass 
the SMR Japanese language level three test, which requires only simple 
conversational ability.  On the street they use their own language, not 
                                                          
 
59A March 1941 initiative created a two-year preparatory course which admitted higher elementary school 
graduates.  Graduates of the preparatory course were expected to then go on to the two year normal 
school main course.  The option to enter the main course after three years of middle school remained 
until 1943, but the faster preparatory route was more widely used.  In 1943 the normal schools’ 
preparatory and main courses were merged into a single four-year course accepting higher elementary 
school graduates (Wenjiao-bu 1944: 529, 575-576).   
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Japanese.  Go to the athletic field, pick out any of the students, and try to 
talk to them in Japanese—they will not understand (Yasui 1942, 34-35). 
 
The level of education in the countryside was especially low.  Tōjō Tsuchirō, a 
Japanese teacher who transferred from a city elementary school to a rural middle school, 
wrote in 1940:  
Because there are many ethnic Japanese teachers in the towns along the 
railroads and in the big cities, the students there do much better.  In most 
other areas there are no ethnic Japanese teachers and Japanese language is 
used only in the language classrooms, therefore the students have low 
ability.  The students in the big cities are twice, even ten times more 
prepared than the students in the countryside . . . I can see their elementary 
schools were poor by listening to new middle school students reading from 
a text.  They are at the elementary school 3rd grade level (Tōjō 1940, 
33-34).  
 
An inspection of elementary schools in the rural Tonghua Province in 1940 
found that any teacher who passed level two of the government proficiency test, a level 
designed (ideally) for middle school graduates, left the schools to find a better paying 
job.  In fact very few schools had any teachers who had passed the level three test, 
designed for higher elementary school graduates.  The local school inspector requested 
that the government publish Chinese language versions of the Japanese reader teacher 
manuals, since the teachers could not understand the Japanese-language instructions 
(Honkai Dōjin 1940, 53).  As a result of such requests, beginning in 1942 Japanese 
language reader teacher manuals began including instructions in both Japanese and 
Chinese. 
Under these conditions, language education in the elementary schools was 
doomed to failure.  In November 1942 Ōide wrote the following about the situation:   
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The main problem is the lack of teachers.  Looking across the continent, I 
can not be optimistic.  In Manchukuo, ten years after its founding, and 
even with Japanese becoming a national language, elementary language 
education is in confusion and has achieved nothing.  I do not even want to 
mention north China, central China, and the Mongolian areas . . . In 
Manchukuo they are working to train a large number of Manchurians as 
Japanese language teachers, but they have not been able to get enough 
students enough to fill the normal schools, and those that do enter are not 
good quality (Ōide 1942d, 47). 
 
 Post-war interviews with former students confirm that few were interested in 
learning Japanese, although some, recognizing that it was the key to advancing in school 
and finding a good job, did make an effort.  Rumors of Japan’s eventual defeat, which 
would end the language’s usefulness, also acted to depress student interest (Komagome 
and Chō 1999, Qi 1997, Tanaka 2002, Takenaka 2003).  
  
Japanese language dissemination outside of the schools: Tests, officialdom, and   
Mango kana 
 We now turn to government-sponsored efforts at spreading Japanese outside of 
the schools, government-sponsored training classes, the establishment of the language 
proficiency exam system, and the creation of Mango kana, a Chinese language phonetic 
orthographic system based on Japanese kana. 
 The government encouraged Japanese language competency for non-Japanese 
officials from the beginning.  So-called “Self-rule training centers” were established in 
many of the major cities soon after the Manchurian Incident.  In 1932 the state General 
Affairs Board unified these centers into a single state-run school named Datong 
Academy, which trained both Japanese and non-Japanese middle school graduates to be 
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government officials.  The curriculum for non-Japanese students focused on the 
Japanese language and state ideology (Suzuki 1979, 23).  Also, as early as 1932 the 
Ministry of Education and the Fengtian Provincial government created part-time 
language training seminars for non-Japanese officials.  An Ministry of Education 
official claims that 770 officials signed up for its first course in 1932 (Wenjiang-bu 
1932a, 29).     
 In June 1936 the General Affairs Board created a system of language 
proficiency tests designed to encourage government employees to learn one of the main 
Manchukuo languages besides their own, and rewarded those who passed with monthly 
bonuses.  There were tests in Japanese, “Manchurian” (Chinese), and Mongolian, 
evaluating oral, listening, reading, and writing skills.  For each language there were 
four levels of tests: special, first, second, and third, with third being the lowest (Yasuda 
1997, 41).  In 1938 the government reorganized the system, placing the Civil Affairs 
Ministry in charge of administering the tests, adding Russian as one of the language 
options, and allowing the general public, including students, to participate, rather than 
limiting it to government officials. 
 An apparent de facto restriction of the test was that Chinese, Mongols, and 
Russians could only take the Japanese-language test, not any other non-native language.  
Japanese, on the other hand, were free to take any of the other language tests.  Koreans, 
considered Japanese subjects, could take the Chinese, Mongolian, or Russian tests, but 
not the Japanese test (Yasuda 1997, 41).   
 Ideally, the Japanese third level test represented mastery of the higher 
elementary school language curriculum, while the second level was equivalent to a 
middle school graduate’s ability.  As mentioned above, however, language education 
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in the schools often failed to reach this ideal (Manshū Kokugo 9, January 1941, 34, 
Matsuo 1944, 10).  
 The government encouraged its officials to take the tests through a system of 
monthly bonuses.  Those who passed level three, regardless of the language, received a 
bonus of six yen a month for one year.  Level two resulted in a monthly ten yen bonus 
for two years, level one was monthly fifteen yen bonus for two years, and the special 
level resulted in a monthly twenty yen bonus for five years (Morita 1942,81-82).60  For 
a teacher from Japan living in the capital Xinjing, whose salary averaged 133 in 1940, 
passing the third level test resulted in a bonus worth 5% of his or her monthly salary.  
For a non-Japanese teacher in the same city, receiving an average of 66 yen a month, the 
third level bonus was worth 9% of his or her salary.  In 1938, when the test was 
opened to the general population, the government encouraged companies to award 
similar bonuses to their employees.  The state central bank, for example, gave 
employees who passed the third level test a single 80 yen bonus, slightly higher than the 
government.  A former student has reported that students at the middle schools who 
passed a level of the test were given silver stripes to wear on their uniforms as a sign of 
their achievement (Qi 1997, 228). 
 The first test was held in only fifteen major cities, but by the early 1940s the 
test was offered at sites in most counties as well as at Manchukuo consulates in Tokyo, 
Beijing, and Nanjing.  From 1936 to 1943 over 170,000 non-Japanese took the 
Japanese language test, with over 17,000, or 10%, passing them.  42,000 Japanese and 
                                                          
 
60An individual could pass a level of the exam, and thus receive the bonus, only one time.  To receive 
another bonus after the payment period of the first bonus ended they would have to pass the next level of 
the exam (Manshū Kokugo 9, January 1941: 31). 
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Koreans took Chinese language tests, with 6000 passing it.61  Only 3600 took the 
Russian test, with 390 passing, and 376 took the Mongolian test, with 66 passing (Shi 
1993, 71, Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1937b). 
 As part of the added official emphasis on the Japanese language in 1938, new 
regulations made success on the language tests a requirement for certain kinds of 
bureaucratic promotions.  Japanese who had passed a government promotion test in 
Japan, which did not include a foreign language requirement, however, were exempted 
from taking Manchukuo promotion tests.  The result was a system which required 
non-Japanese to pass the language exams to gain promotion, but did not require 
language study of many of the Japanese.  In 1943 the government further strengthened 
the emphasis on Japanese language competence by making language test success within 
a set time a requirement for continued employment for all non-Japanese provincial and 
central officials under the age of 40 (Yasuda 1997, 44-45, Manshū Kokugo 9, 1941, 
36).62   
                                                          
 
61By analyzing the names of those who passed the tests in 1936-1940, Yasuda Toshiaki has found that 
although more than three times as many Japanese as Koreans took the Chinese language test, more 
Koreans passed the two highest levels than did Japanese.  This was probably due to the number of 
Koreans who had lived in China for a long period of time, and the strength of classical Chinese studies in 
Korean academies in the first half of the century (Yasuda 1993: 42-43). 
 
62The nature of this 1943 system is still unclear.  One source calls the test they were required to take 
“level four”, suggesting that it was a simpler test then the previously lowest level three (Matsuo 1944: 10).  
The non-Japanese had three years to pass the test, but there is no known time limit for Japanese.  Yasuda 
Toshiaki has estimated 100,000 officials passed this test in the closing years of the state (Yasuda 1997: 
58).  
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 The Manchukuo government, therefore, tried to encourage its non-Japanese 
officials to set the example for their countrymen by learning the Japanese language.  
Originally this encouragement was demonstrated by the bonus system, but gradually the 
stick, in the form of minimum requirements for employment. was applied along with the 
carrot.  Unlike the colonial governments in Taiwan and Korea, however, the 
Manchukuo government also encouraged Japanese officials to learn one of the 
languages of the local population.  Similarly, Chinese was taught in most elementary 
and middle schools for Japanese students, although for fewer hours than non-Japanese 
studied Japanese.  Also, since good grades in the Chinese language courses were not 
required to advance to the next level of education, most Japanese students did not take 
the courses seriously (Takenaka 2003, 139).  Japanese students and officials, therefore, 
were encouraged to study Chinese only with the carrot; there was no stick.   
 Manchukuo officials, as I have mentioned, usually called the Chinese language 
“Manchurian” (J. Mango, C. Manyu) as part of their efforts to encourage the Han 
Chinese to develop a new “Manchurian” consciousness and stop thinking of themselves 
as Chinese.63  One of the ways Japanese officials tried to separate the Chinese from 
their national heritage was their effort to create a new Chinese phonetic orthographic 
                                                          
63 Pro-Manchukuo language scholars debated the establishment of a pronunciation standard for the 
language, especially after the government instituted the language proficiency exams.   Several pointed 
out the dialect spoken in the Manchukuo capital Xinjing and Jilin City was similar to standard Beijing 
dialect, while the language spoken in Fengtian Province and the rest of the south was more similar to the 
Shandong dialect, since many immigrants from Shandong settled in the south.  A secondary source 
claims the dialect spoken in the “Sungari river area,” which includes Xinjing, Jilin, and Harbin, was 
declared the national standard in 1944.  However, the government appears to have never published a 
national dictionary or standard pronunciation guide (Manshū Kokugo 1, 52-53, Yasuda 1997: 46-47).  
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system based on Japanese kana, usually called the “Mango kana” plan.   The plan was 
primarily the creation of Matsukawa Heihachi, who was, as noted above, a Japanese 
official passionate about written language reform.  He saw the plan as a way to 
improve literacy, spread Japanese language and culture throughout the country, and 
keep out unwanted ideological messages.  Some Chinese scholars have claimed that 
the system was an attempt to weaken the population’s Chinese character literacy, and 
therefore further separate the population from the rest of China.  Although it is not 
clear that Matsukawa or others specifically intended the system as a wedge between 
Manchukuo and China, they certainly did intend for it to draw people closer into the 
Japanese cultural orbit.  Unlike the debates over language reform and teaching 
Japanese spirit, this was a case in which the goal of education reformers and supporters 
of cultural assimilation worked together hand and hand.  
 For years there had been a variety of proposals for the creation of a Chinese 
language phonetic character system.  Some of these used Latin characters, principally 
the Wade (or Wade-Giles) system.  In 1918 group of scholars sponsored by the 
Chinese government created a system of phonetic characters now known as the National 
Phonetic System (which remains in use in Taiwan).64  In 1937 the Manchukuo 
government formed a phonetic characters research subcommittee under the previously 
mentioned Manchurian Language Investigation Committee.  Although early on a 
majority of the committee members favored using a system based on either the National 
Phonetic System or a Latin system, Matsukawa called for a new plan based on Japanese 
                                                          
64 The National Phonetic System was used in some 1933 textbooks published by Fengtian Province. 
  217 
kana.  Education Department Director Minagawa endorsed Matsukawa’s proposal, and 
placed Matsukawa in charge of the effort to create the system.65   
 The resulting plan, as described in a 1941 document, used only katakana, with 
no other special marks (although one document states that marks representing the four 
tones could also be used).  Each syllable was to be expressed with four kana characters 
or less.  Without going through the details of this complicated system, here are two 
examples: Fengtian (
):   !"#, Manchukuo (): $#  
%&' (.    
 At time of its public announcement in 1943, the government claimed the goal 
of the system was to assist in spreading literacy.  They justified the decision to use 
kana rather then other accepted systems by pointing to the Japanese language’s position 
as a national language and kana’s historical connection with China.66   
                                                          
 
65In April 1937 Minagawa spoke of his opposition to systems that used the Latin alphabet, and in favor of 
limiting the number of standard Chinese characters (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1939: 41-42).  
 
66 The official announcement read: “The complexity of Manchurian [Chinese] characters has made 
teaching and learning in our elementary schools for Manchurians difficult.  Research on pronunciation 
characters has led the way in solving these problems.   Anciently there were many ways to represent the 
sounds of Chinese characters, and in modern times there have been the Chinese Republic’s pronunciation 
marks, roman letters known as Wade-Giles, and Japanese kana.  Research on Japanese kana has borne 
the most fruit.  This is because: 1. Japanese is a Manchukuo national language, and is taught in all the 
schools.  Students have become familiar with the Japanese kana symbols, so they will be easy to 
remember.  2. Kana originated from Chinese characters, so they have a deep connection with those 
characters.  Moreover, they can be freely written either horizontally or vertically.  3. Kana have been 
used since ancient times in East Asia.  The characters are intended to be used as pronunciation symbols 
to assist in teaching and studying in our elementary schools for Manchurians.  They are certainly not 
meant to eradicate Chinese characters.  Rather, the main goal is to facilitate the memorization of 
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 Although the plan’s official description denied any intention of trying to 
eliminate Chinese characters, its chief architect clearly did see such this as a long-term 
goal.   Matsukawa, as has been mentioned, was a member of the first graduating class 
at the SMR teacher-training school Kyōsen, a hotbed of education reform thought.  His 
former classmates described him as a lifelong language reformer, determined to 
eliminate the use of Chinese characters throughout East Asia, as he felt that they kept 
Japanese as well as Chinese culturally behind Westerners.  Matsukawa’s ideas were 
rooted in Ueda Kazutoshi’s writings, and were not uncommon among contemporary 
Japanese language scholars.67   
With the establishment of Manchukuo, Matsukawa saw an opportunity to put his 
ideas into effect.  By 1933 he joined the Concordia Association, the Manchukuo 
government’s main mass mobilization and social education organization, and also 
worked for several years in the state education bureaucracy.  While working for these 
organizations he became began developing his ideas for a Chinese-language kana 
system (Ryōnankai 1972, 234).  In a 1941 newspaper article he wrote, “The system 
will save the majority of the Manchurian population from the consuming effort of 
memorizing so many characters.  In the end there is no other way to plan for long term 
intellectual liberation of the people” (Yasuda 1997, 48). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
characters.  At the same time, the illiterate masses and younger students at the elementary schools, 
through using kana alone, will be able to express their thoughts.  In other words it is a step in learning 
Chinese characters, opening a new road for a portion of humanity, and will contribute to the cultural 
advancement of all Manchukuo’s people” (Shi 1993: 76-77).    
 
67For example Tokyo Imperial University professor Hoshina Kōichi, a leader in the Japanese 
orthinagraphic reform movement, proposed in 1932 that Japan’s kanji (Chinese characters) be replaced by 
kana (Hoshina 1932:3).    
  219 
 Matsukawa also defended his plan by claiming it could help spread Japanese 
culture to the Chinese people.  At a 1938 conference of the Kanamoji-kai, a group 
dedicated to the elimination of kanji in Japan, Matsukawa said, “The most effective way 
of improving Manchukuo education efficiency and importing Japanese culture is to 
teach Japanese kana.”  At that same conference the head of the reform group noted the 
pride different Asian ethnic groups had in their written languages, and the difficulty 
involved in divesting them of those systems.  He stated that Japanese kana would be 
the best way to help them forget their own systems, and gradually introduce them to the 
Japanese language (Kurokawa 1938).  Plans for creating kana systems for Mongolian, 
Malay, and Thai also appeared the Kanamoji-kai’s journal Kana no Hikari during the 
1938-1945 period.  Matsukawa and his reformist allies, therefore, saw the Manchukuo 
project as part of a greater effort to help create a united East Asian cultural zone through 
the phonetic kana characters.  The marginalization of the various native written 
languages, and presumably the native cultures, appears to have been at most of little 
concern, and possibly even an unspoken goal of these efforts.68    
                                                          
 
68 Many Chinese scholars, including Shi Gang, a scholar based in Japan, have claimed that the real 
intention of the plan was the eventual merger of the two languages into a new pidgin language, which 
they called “Kyōwa-go (cooperation language)” (Shi 1993: 78).  The Japanese scholar Yasuda Tosihaki, 
on the other hand, maintains there is no evidence to back up this claim, and said the term “Kyōwa-go,” 
often used by Chinese scholars, had not yet been found in Manchukuo-era documents (Yasuda 1997: 
52-53).  I agree that it is very doubtful that the Mango Kana planners intended to create a single pidgin 
spoken language.  However I have found the term “Kyōwa-go” used by Japanese educators in 
Manchukuo.  In almost every case it was used pejoratively to describe the habit of some Japanese and 
Chinese to mix words from the two languages into one sentence.  I did find one Japanese author, a 
middle school teacher, who used the term positively about the developing pidgenization, supporting of 
the idea of an eventual merging of the languages (Kawaguchi 1941).  He was clearly in the minority 
among the Japanese on this issue, however. 
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 Just as Matsukawa saw the system as actively working to spread the Japanese 
language and culture, he also recognized the defensive role the elimination of Chinese 
characters could play in keeping unwanted ideological messages from reaching the 
people.  In another 1941 newspaper article Matsukawa described how the Soviet 
government, after the Russian Revolution, planned to create Latin alphabet systems for 
the languages of minority ethnic groups within the state and in nearby puppet 
governments.  He described how by Latinizing the language of the Mongolian 
People’s Republic they “imported Red culture by opening up [the society] to the 
importation of many Russian words.”   He thus linked Latinizing programs with 
communization—if the Soviets could successfully import their ideology to Mongolia 
through Latin characters, widespread use of Latin characters in Manchukuo could have 
the same result.  “We need to unify the characters of all the ethnicities in East Asia 
through kana, completely scattering [the opposition],” he said (Yasuda 1997, 48, see 
also Matsukawa 1942).  The Soviet example acted as both a warning of the role 
Western alphabets could play in the spreading dangerous Western ideas, and an example 
of the power of a unified empire-wide writing system.   
Another situation of which Matsukawa may have been aware was French 
Indochina, where the French colonial authorities strongly encouraged the use of the 
Romanized Quoc Ngu transcription system for Vietnamese.  By teaching this script, 
and discouraging the use of Chinese characters, the French hoped to cut the Vietnamese 
off from the education traditions of the private academies, which traditionally had 
served as centers of popular mobilization against the state when it became too 
oppressive (Kelly 1991). 
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 The Concordia Association and the state education bureaucracy ran a series of 
experimental Mango kana lessons in schools and adult education facilities around the 
country from 1941 to 1943.  In February 1944 the system was officially announced as 
the state’s sole Chinese language pronunciation system.  It is not clear how widely the 
system was taught and applied, but it appears that it had not gotten far by the time the 
state ceased to exist in 1945.69  So far no Manchukuo government documents or school 
materials using the system have been discovered.70 
 In the public sphere, as well as in the schools, the Manchukuo government 
never made a major effort to force the majority ethnic groups to abandon their native 
languages.  Not only that, it encouraged a moderate degree of Chinese language study 
among the Japanese settler population, and developed a plan to boost rudimentary 
Chinese language literacy.  From at least 1937 on, however, it made perfectly clear 
which language was favored—Japanese.  Japanese officials and educators of almost all 
stripes, reformists and nativists, agreed on this point, and worked to encourage increased 
Japanese language use throughout the country.   
  
Conclusion 
 This chapter discusses the debates among Japanese colonial official and 
educators about the proper content of colonial schools.  Clearly there was a diversity of 
opinion among these men, a diversity tolerated by the colonial governments.  In 
Manchukuo, the relatively liberal education leadership was able to keep extreme 
                                                          
 
70 In 1945 two linguists,  (I am not sure if this person is Japanese or Chinese) and Kuraishi 
Mushirō, wrote articles analyzing and ultimately opposing the Mango kana system on practical grounds 
(Yasuda 1997: 51). 
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Japanese nationalistic material to a minimum, and also found the room to try out a 
variety of reforms.  By 1943, however, this freedom began to disappear, and 
Manchukuo education increasingly resembled Tennōsei education throughout the 
empire. 
 Throughout the Manchukuo period, however, regardless of shifts in 
government policy, the educators failed to stir much interest in Japanese among the 
people.  Nor were they able to inspire many locals to become active allies in the 
Japanese cause.  In 1942 Ōide Masayoshi, speaking to a group of Japanese language 
teachers, expressed his doubts that the people of Manchukuo would ever desire to learn 
the Japanese language, and thereby become partners in Japan’s efforts in building the 
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.  
We have been teaching Japanese in Manchukuo for ten years, and we have 
had the advantage of the experiences of the SMR schools which existed for 
decades before.  We should have seen success by now.  Today’s results 
are not good, and there is no indication that it will ever get better, no 
matter how long we try.  I would be glad if I was wrong, but we are not 
that lucky.  Can any of you teachers who have experienced the situation 
tell me I am wrong? (Ōide 1942a, 51). 
 
 Post-war interviews with former Manchukuo students have confirmed Ōide’s 
pessimism.  The state succeeded to a only a very limited degree in its “negative” goal, 
of preventing Chinese children from gaining a sense of themselves as Chinese, through 
a combination of censorship, repression, and rewards.   They failed, however, in the 
more “optimistic” goals of the 1938 system, which included fostering among the 
Chinese an enthusiasm for learning the Japanese language, leading to their “true” 
understanding of Japan and the righteousness of its cause, and finally their assumption 
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of Japan’s state goals as their own.  The inequality of the state’s social situation and 
the very oppression that kept Chinese nationalist messages out taught them that the 
Japanese were not their friends.  The switch toward emphasizing the Japanese 
language and State Shintō ceremonies only deepened popular cynicism toward the 
Manchukuo state.  Idealistic optimism in the power of the Japanese language was 
another case of Japanese overconfidence in Japanese national spirit, which contributed 
to the Japanese government’s disastrous imperial over-extension and inability cut their 
losses throughout the 1937-1945 period. 
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Chapter 5 
Textbooks and the struggle over Manchurian identity 
 The Manchukuo government worked to create a Manchurian consciousness in 
the minds of its students in two places, the school curriculum and school ceremonies.  
The bulk of this chapter is dedicated to an examination of the school curriculum for 
Chinese students through an analysis of the content of Manchukuo’s elementary and 
middle school Chinese language studies, Japanese language studies, morals, and history 
textbooks.  Nowhere does the Manchukuo government give a clearer picture of what it 
hoped the rising generation would think and believe than in these textbooks.  The main 
themes taught in the textbooks changed several times over Manchukuo’s history 
because of changes in the state ideology and changes in the education bureaucracy’s 
personnel.  The first image of a model Manchukuo citizen portrayed a young person 
steeped in Confucian morals, aware of the region’s dual Chinese and independent 
heritage, and friendly to Japan.  Over time the central themes changed to loyalty to the 
Manchukuo Emperor and the state, and recognizing the greatness of Japan and the 
Japanese, while the emphasis on Confucianism, Chinese culture, and the region’s 
independent history faded.  
The original ideals never completely disappeared, however, and textbooks as 
late as 1943 continued to portray Manchukuo as a unique state with a culture at least to 
some degree independent from Japan.  Other textbooks, on the other hand, closely 
resembled those published in Korea during the height of cultural assimilation.  
Differences in emphasis between Manchukuo textbooks of the same era indicate 
differences within the government over the messages they wanted to present.   
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Methods and objects of study 
 The purpose of this study is to discover what ideological messages the 
Manchukuo government intended to pass on to the country’s elementary and middle 
school children.  Public schools are a prime location for a government to influence 
society and culture by creating a shared experience for a generation of children.  By 
looking at the textbooks, we can see the nature of the “citizen consciousness” they tried 
to teach—what they wanted the children to understand about the country and their role 
as citizens (or, after 1934, subjects).  Also, what messages about the country’s culture 
did they disseminate?  What was the source of the materials used in the schools; did 
they hope to see Manchukuo society develop based on Chinese precedents, Japanese 
precedents, or something unique to the region?   
 To explore these questions, I have focused my analysis on how much each 
textbook refers to the state (both Manchukuo and Japan), and what messages are 
presented in these references.  I look at how many references are made to China and 
Chinese individuals, Japan and Japanese individuals, and people and places unique to 
the Manchuria region, to determine the degree to which students were encouraged to 
identify with these cultures. 
 I also break the textbooks into groups based on categories created by scholars 
in their analyses of contemporary textbooks in Japan and Korea, to facilitate 
comparisons with those works.  For example, following the lead of Lee Jung-su’s 
study of Japan and Korea textbooks, I categorize each chapter in the Japanese language 
studies and Chinese language studies textbooks into one of three categories: practical, 
national, and literary (Lee 2000).  I further divide these categories into twelve 
sub-categories.  The “practical” category is subdivided into chapters on lifestyle 
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(including family, home, play, and traditional events), vocation, society and school, and 
science and nature.  The “national” category is divided into chapters on the state, 
military, history, and geography.  The “literary” category is divided into chapters 
which contain fictional stories and fables, historical stories (which do not have a strong 
tie to the state), poetry, and miscellaneous literary subjects (including dramas, grammar 
lessons, and letter writing practice).   
I am particularly interested in the “national” chapters.  I have created my own 
sub-division of the “national” category, which I call “hard state”.  Hard state chapters 
are those which present strongly ideological messages about the creation, legitimacy, 
and requirements of both the Manchukuo and Japan states.  These include chapters 
about the Emperors, including their mythological ancestors, descriptions of military life 
or war, depictions of state symbols such as the flag, and discussion of the people’s 
obligations to the state, such as payment of taxes.  The “hard state” category is similar 
to the “imperial” category used in Chapter 4, except that it includes state-centered 
material about Manchukuo as well as Japan.  Chapters that are “national” but not “hard 
state” include chapters on the country’s geography and historical chapters which are not 
linked to the state’s foundation or Imperial house. 
In my analysis of the morals textbooks, I use a system of categories which 
Karasawa Tomitarō developed for his 1956 study of textbooks in Japan.  He divides 
the chapters thematically into those that teach about individual morals, family morals, 
society morals, state morals, and international morals (Karasawa 1956). 
 There were four clearly defined periods of Manchukuo textbook publication, 
and one of those eras can be broken down further into two sub-periods.  The first, or 
transition period, went from the founding of the state in March 1932 to September 1934.  
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During this time the government instructed schools to use textbooks published by the 
SMR, Fengtian Provincial government, traditional Chinese classics, or Chinese 
Republican textbooks with offending portions removed.  It is very difficult to know 
what textbooks were used during this period, so I have not tried to analyze those I have 
found.71  The second period begins in September 1934, when the first Ministry of 
Education textbooks were published, until the end of 1937.  I divide the 1934-1937 
textbooks into two groups: 1) those published in 1934, before Pu Yi’s Spring 1935 state 
visit to Japan and the subsequent change in state ideology toward a greater emphasis on 
unity with Japan, and 2) those published afterward in late 1935 (as well as a few 
published in 1937).  Copies of almost all of the 1934-1937 textbooks are available for 
analysis.  The third, or Shingakusei (new education system) period, began in January 
1938 and ended in 1942.  Because of radical changes in the school system and 
                                                          
71 Besides textbooks published by the SMR, Fengtian Provincial government, and traditional Chinese 
classics, schools also used Chinese Republican textbooks with anti-Japanese and pro-Guomindang 
sections removed.  One Chinese normal school teacher reports that he had to ink out the sections of the 
textbooks that used the words “imperialism” or “national shame” to refer to Japanese actions on the 
continent (Qi 1997, 100).  The textbook editing department for the SMR and Kwantung Territory 
schools kept careful records of what texts published in China contained anti-Japanese and other 
objectionable material, so the Manchukuo Ministry of Education probably used reports from that 
department as a guide during the state’s first years (Takenaka 2000a, 141-142).  In 1935 the ministry 
published its own report documenting which texts from China were approved, as well as documenting 
which pages of non-approved texts were objectionable, presumably so teachers could ink those sections 
out (Wenjiao-bu 1935d). 
The SMR Chinese language textbooks were originally published for the SMR schools in 1931 and 1932.  
I have not yet examined them.  The Fengtian Provincial Education Department edited at least nine of its 
own Chinese language texts in 1932.  I examined one Fengtian Provincial textbook written for higher 
elementary schools, and was surprised to find no mention of Japan at all, even in a chapter about the 
Manchurian Incident and the founding of the country.   
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curriculum in 1938, the government had to create a completely new set of textbooks for 
the elementary and middle schools.  Some of the textbooks published in the first part 
of this period were revised in 1941-1942.  Terada was the supervisor of textbook 
editing for most of this period.  The amount of state-centered and pro-Japanese 
material in many of these textbooks increased significantly over the 1934-1937 
textbooks, although a few subjects remained largely propaganda-free, even after the 
commencement of the Pacific War.  Unfortunately, less then half the textbooks 
published during this period are known to have survived. The final period began in 1943, 
when the government ordered a complete revision of all textbooks to more closely 
reflect the state’s wartime goals.  Because of wartime conditions, including a paper 
shortage, very few textbooks were actually published during this period, and I have 
found only two to analyze. 
 The first textbooks to be analyzed are those published in 1934 and 1935, 
starting with those created for Chinese language studies (guowen). 
 
Chinese language studies in Republican China and Japan’s colonies 
 Manchukuo Chinese language education was a confluence of two traditions: 
the region’s previous Republican-era language education, and Japan’s native language 
education policies in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria.   
China’s education system went through a series of major changes in the period 
from 1912 to 1931.  Emerging from an age dominated by private schools focused on 
traditional literary studies, the central and provincial governments began to introduce 
math, science, vocational studies, and foreign languages into the elementary and middle 
school curriculums.  Chinese literary studies continued to act as the central course of 
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study, however, taking up over half of the total recommended school hours during first 
10 years of the Republic.  In 1922, during the May 4th movement, China’s Ministry of 
Education instructed schools to de-emphasize Confucian materials, especially in the 
early grades, and instead use materials which reflected the modern “Republican spirit” 
and which were written in colloquial Chinese (baihua).  The Ministry of Education did 
not publish its own textbooks during this period, although it did approve privately 
published textbooks.  In the northeast Zhang Xueliang allied himself with the 
Guomindang in 1928, and schools in Northeast China began using texts which reflected 
the Guomindang ideology, including criticism of Japanese and Western imperialism. 
 In Taiwan the Japanese encouraged the study of traditional Confucian texts in 
the first decades of colonial rule, but in 1922 considerably scaled back Chinese 
language study to two hours a week, and schools began banning students speaking 
Chinese at any other time in the schools.  The Japanese did not encourage the study of 
modern baihua texts in the Taiwan schools.  In 1937 the study of Chinese language 
texts was completely eliminated from Taiwan schools.  In Korea the study of Chinese 
and Korean language texts was combined into a single subject, with Chinese taking up 
the majority of the time.  This non-Japanese language study took up 23% of the total 
school hours in elementary school, a higher total than in Taiwan.  Like Taiwan, 
however, in 1938 the Korean colonial government instituted a major cut in 
non-Japanese language instruction, limiting Korean language courses to the 1st grade. 
 In SMR railway zone and Kwantung Territory schools before the Manchurian 
Incident, Japanese administrators bowed to the local political reality and gave a much 
larger percentage of school-hours to native language education.  This was particularly 
true in the SMR-run schools, where all classes, except for Japanese language studies, 
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were taught in the students’ native language.  Putting aside the question of schools for 
Koreans, the regulations for Chinese-language SMR schools declared that Chinese 
language studies would amount to 36% of the total school time in 1914, 35-42% in 
1923, and 42% in 1931 (Takenaka 2000a, 143-147).  They also followed the Chinese 
Ministry of Education’s 1922 switch in policy toward a greater use of baihua texts 
featuring modern individuals and themes.  The SMR schools used texts published in 
Shanghai until 1931, when the increasing amount of anti-Japanese material in the texts 
created the need to publish their own unique Chinese language studies texts.   
  
Manchukuo textbooks in 1934-1937 
 There are widely varying reports on how many hours a week students were to 
spend in Chinese language studies in elementary and middle schools during the 
1932-1937 period.  Plans drawn up in 1931 by the SMR Economic Research Group 
and in 1932 by the Fengtian and Jilin provincial education departments called for an 
amount nearly identical to that taught in Chinese Republican and SMR schools.  
Ministry of Education descriptions of the 1934 and 1935 Chinese language studies 
textbooks, however, recommended a large cut in Chinese language study hours, nearly 
half of the 1931-1932 plans, with the additional hours taken up in part by increased 
science and Japanese language instruction hours.  A 1937 Education Department 
document indicates that the officials had adjusted the Chinese language recommended 
hours upwards to a position half-way between the 1931-1932 plans and the 1934-1935 
recommendations.  
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Table 5.1: Recommended number of weekly hours of Chinese language class 
 
 Grades 
1-2 
Grades 
3-4 
Grades 
5-6 
Grades 
7-9 
1931-1932 plans (SMR, Fengtian, Jilin) 
Percentage of total hours 
10  
42% 
10-12 
36-48% 
8-9  
24-31% 
NA 
1934-1935 textbook prospectus 
Percentage of total hours 
6  
27% 
6  
24% 
4 (6)  
13 (19)% 
6  
19% 
1937 regulations 
Percentage of total hours 
8 
36% 
7 
29% 
7 (9)  
22 (28)% 
6 
19% 
The 1934-1935 and 1937 curriculum descriptions included an additional two hours a week of readings in 
the Chinese classics in Higher Elementary grades 5-6.  The hours in parentheses indicate the inclusion of 
these hours (Wenjiao-bu 1932a, 47, 74, Minami Manshū Tetsudō 1935, 86-89, Wenjiao-bu 1935a, 76, 
Wenjiao-bu 1936b, 11, Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1937c, 35-37).  
 
 The Manchukuo Ministry of Education produced eighteen Chinese language 
studies texts for lower elementary, higher elementary, and lower middle schools in two 
stages, the first four lower elementary and all lower middle school texts in September 
1934, and the last four lower elementary and all higher elementary texts in December 
1935.  The 1934 and 1935 Chinese language studies textbooks are significantly 
different in tone and character.  The 1934 textbooks rarely mentioned the state, either 
Japan or Manchukuo.  When they did, it was in the context of the Confucian ideal of 
wangdao (the kingly way).  The 1935 textbooks contained much more ideological 
material and often made positive references to Japanese people and institutions.  These 
differences in all likelihood stem from changes both in the official state ideology and in 
the Ministry of Education leadership in the intervening years.   
In the spring of 1935 Pu Yi, the Manchukuo Emperor, made his first state visit 
to Japan, and upon his return issued the Huiluan Rescript, written by his Japanese 
advisors.  In it, Pu Yi expressed devotion and loyalty to the Japanese Emperor, and 
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announced that the government and people of Manchukuo should strive in all things to 
be united “in one heart and one spirit” with Japan, as he was with the Japanese Emperor.  
The rescript was intended to play the same role in Manchukuo that the Rescript on 
Education played in Japan, recited in schools daily as well as at other public events.  It 
signaled a major change in the tenor of the ideological messages produced by the state 
toward a greater emphasis on pro-Japanese material.  
 Parallel to these ideological changes was a change in the Japanese personnel at 
the Ministry of Education.  I believe Kamimura Tetsuya and Zheng Xiaoxu were the 
moving forces behind the 1934 textbooks.  Kamimura led the ministry’s School 
Affairs section from its creation until March 1935.  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
Kamimura had stated in a 1932 pamphlet distributed to Chinese teachers that he was 
opposed to emphasizing ideological and “narrowly nationalistic” messages in education, 
as he felt occurred in both Republican China and Japan, and said education should 
instead teach children how to think for themselves (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 238, 240).   
The two officials in charge of textbook editing under Kamimura were Iwama 
Tokuya and Nagahama Yoshitsuna.  Iwama was the dean of Japanese-run education 
for Chinese in Manchuria; he had been the principal of the Nankin Academy in the 
Kwantung Territory since 1905.  Iwama was known as a maverick in the Manchuria 
education world; he often clashed with the Japanese territorial leadership, but was very 
popular with the local Chinese population.  He refused to teach Japanese language 
courses for as many hours as called for in the territorial regulations, and instead 
constructed a curriculum mixing traditional Confucian moral education and modern 
vocational training, all taught in Chinese (Tsukinoki 1982, 82-87).  Kamimura also 
brought in Nagahama, a fellow Kagoshima native, who had been a girls’ middle school 
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teacher in Japan.  Not much is known about him, but since Kamimura sponsored him, 
it can be presumed that he shared his superior’s New Education movement views.  
Kamimura, Iwama, and Nagahama were just of the few ministry officials with local and 
New Education movement ties in the years from 1932 to 1934.   
Zheng, a conservative Confucian scholar skeptical of modernizing reforms, 
including the Chinese baihua colloquial language movement, patriotic nationalism, and 
urbanism, was one of the creators of the wangdao ideology of the early Manchukuo 
period.  He appears to have played an influential role in the ministry; he visited the 
ministry offices once a week, and installed several of his Chinese disciples in ministry 
positions.  Two Japanese officials in the ministry in the 1932-1934 period, who were 
former SMR educators, spoke very highly of Zheng and his disciples, so there appears 
to have been a good relationship between those two camps (Ryōnankai 1972, 197, 
Tsukinoki 1993, 176-177).  
 In late 1934 and early 1935 many of the former-SMR and New Education 
movement education officials left the central education bureaucracy, in part because of 
a rivalry with officials who came from the Japanese Ministry of Education (Monbusho).  
In early 1935 the powerful General Affairs Board, in a bid to gain control over the 
Ministry, dismissed the leadership of both the “local (SMR)” and “Monbusho” factions.  
By summer Kamimura, Iwama, and Nagahama had all left the ministry.  Prime 
Minister Zheng was also forced into retirement in May 1935, and his Chinese disciples 
appear to have left the ministry around that same time.  The incoming education 
leadership was made mostly of non-educators with strong ties to the General Affairs 
Board and little experience in the region.  Inagaki Shigeichi became head of the 
textbook department in August 1935, and remained there until June 1937.  I have not 
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been able to find any information about his background, except that he had no previous 
experience in Manchukuo.  As for the remaining Chinese officials, there is no 
indication that any wielded the kind of influence in the ministry that Zheng had after his 
retirement. 
 
The 1934 textbooks were a collaboration between Kamimura’s group and 
Zheng’s Chinese officials.  Within Chinese language studies they seem to have divided 
the job of textbook editing, with the Japanese officials in charge of the elementary 
school textbooks and the Chinese officials in charge of the middle school textbooks.  
The four lower elementary school Chinese language studies textbooks published in 
1934 were very similar to textbooks edited previously by the SMR, and nothing like 
elementary school readers then being produced in China, as I will discuss below.  The 
six lower middle school Chinese language studies textbooks published that same year, 
however, were very traditional in character.  Each was made up entirely of classical 
language stories and essays written in pre-modern times, from the ancient Zhou period 
up to the reign of Qing Tongshi (1862-1874).  None of the chapters were written by 
Japanese, there was no mention of Japan, and there was no attempt to select stories set 
in the Manchuria region.  An ethnic Han student who attended middle school in 
Liaoyang City beginning in 1937 reports that the middle school Chinese language 
studies textbooks were: 
very complex and systematic. They gave the students a good 
understanding of classic Chinese literature, but did not teach anything 
about modern literature. They included nothing from the cultural 
reforms of the May 4th movement; Lu Xun and Hu Shih were forbidden 
(Qi 1997, 126). 
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The 1935 textbooks, published after the purge of the SMR/New Education 
movement Japanese and the Zheng-affiliated Chinese, were significantly different from 
the 1934 textbooks.  The Ministry of Education’s goals for the textbooks, as stated in a 
ministry-published prospectus, show how in the 1935 texts they moved away from the 
accent on the founding principles of wangdao and ethnic harmony, focused on the state 
rather than the citizen, and emphasized Japan to a much greater degree.  The 1934 
prospectus said the texts would teach students how “to be citizens of the new state . . . 
including the pure principles of the state’s founding and of wangdao”.  The 1935 
prospectus did not mention wangdao, but instead spoke of teaching students to 
understand the state’s “national polity” (C. guoti, J. kokutai), a term closely tied to 
contemporary Japanese political ideology.  The 1934 prospectus emphasized the 
importance of using materials full of local flavor, which would appeal to the students.  
It also spoke of the importance of teaching ethnic harmony.  The 1935 prospectus did 
not mention using local materials or teaching ethnic harmony, but did insist that 
Chinese language studies, along with the morals curriculum, were the subjects most 
appropriate for teaching “loyalty to the monarch and national patriotism”.  Finally, 
while the 1934 prospectus said nothing about Japan, the 1935 prospectus stated the texts 
must “deepen the students’ understanding of Japan, teach about Japan and Manchukuo’s 
unbreakable relationship, and the Huiluan Rescript”.  The students, it continued, “must 
understand the spirit, customs, and ways of the Japanese people” (Wenjiao-bu 1935a, 76, 
Wenjiao-bu 1936b, 11).   
 Table 5.2 breaks down the chapters of the 1934 and 1935 Chinese language 
studies textbooks in terms of themes, settings, and individuals.  First the content of the 
1934 textbooks will be examined. 
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Table 5.2.  Themes, settings, and individuals in the 1934-1935 Chinese language studies textbooks 
  
Theme 1st-2nd 
grades 
(#1-4)  
Sept. 1934 
3rd-4th  
grades 
(#5-8) 
Dec. 1935 
5th-6th 
grades 
(#1-4) 
Dec. 1935 
7th-9th 
grades 
(#1-6)  
Sept. 1934 
Practical 54.7% 24.7% 33.2% 0.0% 
Lifestyle 16.7%  7.8% 14.9%  
Vocational  4.0%  5.4% 8.0%  
Society 15.3%  9.2% 14.5%  
Nature 18.7%  7.7%  3.8%  
National  8.0% 45.0% 35.1% 0.0% 
Hard State  2.0% 13.4% 14.9%  
State  1.3% 10.2% 12.6%  
Military  0.7%  3.2%  2.3%  
History 2.7% 9.9% 12.2%  
Geography  3.3% 21.7%  8.0%  
Literary 37.3% 30.4% 31.7% 100.0% 
Setting     
Japan related  0.7% 22.3% 20.6%   0.0% 
Manchukuo related  7.3% 38.7% 13.7%   0.0% 
Manchukuo state  0.7%  6.9%  2.3%  
Manchukuo geography  3.3% 27.0%  8.4%  
Other Manchukuo  3.3%  4.8%  3.1%  
China  3.3%  8.2% 23.7% 100.0% 
West  0.0%  3.9%  0.0%   0.0% 
Individuals 
Unique individuals (frequency) 
    
“Manchurians” 1  (1)   5   (9)  6   (7) 0 
Japanese 0  (0)  17  (18) 18  (21) 0 
Chinese 6  (6)  19  (22) 21  (25) Many 
Westerners 0  (0)   2   (2)  0   (0) 0 
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1934 elementary school Chinese language studies textbooks 
 The editors of the first and second grade Chinese language studies texts, 
probably influenced by the SMR and New Education movement, tried to appeal to 
children by using humorous materials and familiar settings, including scenes of Chinese 
domestic life, school, and nature, as well as children’s stories and fables.  They tried to 
teach Chinese pronunciation through rhythmic and poetic passages, repeating a line 
several times with slight variations.  They used only colloquial Chinese, and illustrated 
nearly every page of the texts.  They used as their models the Chinese language texts 
created by the SMR for its own Chinese language schools in 1931-1932.  The 
contemporary settings, humor, and rhythmic patterns of the SMR texts were a 
significant break from contemporary Chinese textbooks (Takenaka 2000a, 143-147).  
Image of Manchukuo and Japan: 8.0% of the chapters contain national material, 
and only 2.0% of the chapters contain “hard state” material.  Only one of the national 
chapters refers to Japan, describing the role Japanese troops played in the Manchurian 
Incident.  The rest refer to Manchukuo, including a scene of villagers cheering a 
military squad passing through the town, a brief description of the founding of the 
country, a chapter on the national anthem, and a chapter on the Manchukuo flag.  Pu 
Yi is mentioned only once, while the Japanese Emperor is not mentioned at all.    
 Image of China: The textbooks briefly touch on traditional Chinese culture.  
There is one chapter which shows students bowing reverently in a shrine to Confucius, 
although nothing about his teachings are mentioned, while another gives a short 
synopsis of the life of Mencius.  Four other Chinese historical figures, all scholars and 
poets, are also mentioned, usually as part of a story or fable.  Most of these individuals 
were identified by the dynastic period in which they lived, not as “Chinese”.  In fact, 
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the texts used no versions of the words “China” or “Chinese”.  This is an early 
indication of a concept implicitly taught by textbook editors throughout the history of 
Manchukuo education, that while the Manchuria region had its own independent history 
separate from China, it also claimed all pre-Republican Chinese history and culture as 
part of its own cultural heritage.  This concept can also be seen in the lower middle 
school Chinese language studies textbooks published at the same time, which were 
made up entirely of Chinese pre-modern materials.  
 One other interesting aspect of the 1934 elementary school texts is the 
prominence given to girls.  The school scenes are almost always shown as 
coeducational, including a picture of the students playing basketball, and girls in general 
appear in as many illustrations as do boys.  One chapter portrays a girl asking her older 
brother for help reading a book.  When the brother asks why, she says that while in the 
past few girls learned to read, in present times all girls should become educated.  
Ministry officials clearly intended to encourage increased acceptance of girls receiving 
an elementary education.  The number of girls in elementary schools did increase 
during the Manchukuo period, although not dramatically, from 18% of the total in 1933 
to 24% in 1942 (Minsei-bu 1938, 10, Wenjiao-bu 1944, 10). 
 
1935 elementary school Chinese language studies textbooks 
 The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th grade Chinese language studies textbooks, edited in 
1935 after the purge of SMR and Zheng-associated officials, contain significantly 
different content from the 1934 textbooks.  They are much more state-centered, 
including a large increase in material about Manchukuo and Japan. National and hard 
state material rose from 8% and 2% in the 1934 1st and 2nd texts (and none at all in the 
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7th-9th grade texts) to 45% and 13% in the 1935 3rd and 4th grade texts and 35% and 15% 
in the 1935 5th and 6th grade texts.  Material about Manchukuo and Japan rose 
dramatically, while the number of child-centered chapters (those about the family, 
school, and nature) decreased, as did the number of chapters with poetry and children’s 
stories, as might be expected in higher-level texts.   
 Image of Manchukuo: The 1935 textbooks constitute a concerted effort by the 
Ministry of Education at encouraging elementary school students to gain a 
consciousness of the Manchukuo state by presenting a variety of state symbols and 
lauding past notables from the region.  Material about Manchukuo rose from 8% in the 
1934 lower elementary textbooks to 39% in the 1935 lower elementary and 14% in the 
1935 higher elementary textbooks. 
 Pu Yi, the Manchukuo Emperor, is mentioned six times in the 1935 Chinese 
language texts. He is the central focus of a chapter in a 6th grade textbook, which 
portrayed him in Confucian terms as an ideal wangdao ruler, an image typical of the 
first years of the state, but rarely seen after 1935.  It depicts Pu Yi as answering the 
pleas of the people to become the head of state, and succeeding by following the maxim 
“follow the mandate of heaven and bring peace to the people”, a commonly used phrase 
in the early years of the state.  It presents him as charitable man, distributing food to 
Manchukuo peasants in need, and also sending relief to Japan after a fire in Hakodate in 
1934.  It also presents him as educated and informed, reading a variety of newspapers 
and other periodicals to keep up with world events.  The chapter does not, however, 
mention the Emperor’s ties to Japan, or present his legitimacy as deriving from the 
Japanese Emperor, as government publications after 1937 invariably did. 
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 Other state symbols employed by the 1935 Chinese language studies textbooks 
include the Manchukuo national flag, the national anthem, and the Imperial Palace.  
The texts frequently mention the importance of March 1st, a national holiday marking 
the founding of the state in 1932.  Examples of how the people should celebrate the 
day are provided, and the celebrations are linked to commemorations of Japanese and 
“Manchurian” soldiers who died in the defense of the country.  
 Besides references to the short history of the Manchukuo state, the 1935 
textbooks include a considerable number of references to the pre-modern history of 
Manchuria apparently in an attempt to forge a consciousness of a continuous 
independent history of the region.  The Chinese language studies texts acted as 
auxiliary material in this effort to the higher elementary Manchukuo history textbook, 
published in 1934, which I will discuss later in the chapter.  9% of the 1935 lower 
elementary texts and 5% of the higher elementary texts are specifically about the 
region’s pre-modern history, and many of the geography chapters also comment on the 
pre-modern history of cities, geographic sites, or castles in the region.  The pre-modern 
history chapters usually discussed the history of dynasties and khanates led by non-Han 
peoples who were independent of the southern ethnic Han dynasties, some of which 
won control over parts or all of what today is known as China.  These included the 
Parhae (or Bohai) (705-926), Liao (907-1119), Yuan (1279-1368), and especially the 
Qing (1644-1911) dynasties. 
 Over half the chapters on the region’s pre-modern history were about the Qing, 
presumably because Pu Yi was the last Qing emperor, and therefore positive portrayals 
of the dynasty helped to legitimize his reign and strengthen the argument for Manchuria 
as a historically separate region.  The materials include two chapters on the legendary 
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origins of the Manchu people and the Qing ruling house.  Both refer to Mt. Zhangbai 
(Long White Mountain), the tallest mountain in the region, which Qing rulers revered as 
the cradle of the Manchu people.  One chapter lauds the character and military abilities 
of Qing Shunzhi, the first Qing emperor, and four chapters mention Qing Kangxi, the 
second Qing emperor.  One of the Kangxi chapters describes him in terms of a 
powerful military leader who was also concerned with the welfare of his people. 
Another relates a poem he wrote while on a tour of Manchuria, describing several of its 
sites, including Mt. Zhangbai.   
 Besides Mt. Zhangbai, the textbook editors portray another Qing historical site 
as a sacred space, the tombs of the Qing emperors near Fengtian city.  Three chapters 
describe the tombs, one of which tells a story set during the days of the Boxer Rebellion, 
in which Russian troops stationed in Fengtian were dissuaded from destroying the 
tombs by an elderly Manchu man who pledged to defend the site with his life.  Twice 
chapters about the tombs are immediately followed by chapters on the Meiji Shrine, 
which may have been an attempt by the editors to draw a parallel between the 
Manchurian and Japanese imperial sacred spaces.  Other Qing-themed chapters include 
one on the Willow Palisades and one on the palaces in Rehe.   
 Other chapters on the region’s history include one on the Parhae kingdom, 
which is treated as a cultural antecedent to Manchukuo because of its active diplomatic 
and trade relations with the Japanese court at Nara.  Another describes the military 
victories of Genghis Khan, ending with the claim “he is one of the great heroes among 
the ancestors of our country,” thus showing the editors’ intent to include Mongol as well 
as Manchu history in the state’s heritage. Other include a story about a Liao empress, a 
description of an ancient statue of Buddha, and two stories about ethnic Han individuals 
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who went to live in the Manchuria region, one in order to escape conflict in the south, 
and the other because of economic opportunity.  These final two stories may have been 
included to show that the region welcomed ethnic Han looking for peace and prosperity. 
 Another aspect of the textbook editors’ creation of a consciousness of 
Manchukuo was the large number of chapters on Manchukuo geography.  Manchukuo 
geography was the theme of 27% of the 1935 lower elementary chapters, up from 3% in 
the 1934 lower elementary texts.  Only 8% of the 1935 higher elementary texts were 
about Manchukuo geography, but this drop can be explained by the fact that there was a 
separate geography curriculum and textbook in the higher elementary schools.  The 
geography materials included chapters on most of the country’s major cities, railroads, 
rivers, and mountains.  They also include chapters on a variety of natural resources, 
and descriptions of the country’s largest coal mine and iron works.  Two of the 
chapters describe the daily lives of contemporary Mongol herdsman. 
 Image of Japan: The amount of material which mentions Japan or Japanese 
people increased sharply from 1% in the 1934 lower elementary textbooks to an average 
of 21% in the 1935 lower and higher elementary textbooks.  Of the 1935 chapters 
which mention Japan, about one fifth contain only passing references.  Another fifth 
describe Japan’s geography.  Most of the remainder are stories about individual 
Japanese, both pre-modern and modern.  A total of 35 Japanese appear in the 1935 
texts, far more than the 11 “Manchurians”, although equal to the number of Chinese.  
Twelve of the Japanese individuals, or a third of the total, were Confucian scholars from 
the Tokugawa period, perhaps presented to show Japan shared a cultural heritage with 
Manchukuo.  Among the remaining Japanese were imperial officials, samurai, and 
modern warriors. 
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 Two of the most strongly emphasized messages about Japan in the textbooks 
are the Japanese people’s loyalty to their emperors and their martial ethic.  Japanese 
emperors themselves are the center of only a few chapters, but many other chapters 
describe the actions of loyal subordinates who served their imperial lords with devotion.  
These include two chapters on the Heian-era official Sugawara Michizane, which 
emphasize his continuing devotion to his emperor even while he was in exile and 
several stories about samurai warriors loyal to the emperors during the Kemmu 
Restoration and Bakumatsu periods.  There are also five chapters about Japan’s 
modern military strength and the devotion of its soldiers, mostly set in the 
Russo-Japanese War.  These include stories about victorious naval officers 
Commander Hirose and Admiral Togo, and the self-sacrificing army officers Lieutenant 
Colonel Tachibana and Captain Sakuma, all of whom regularly appeared in textbooks in 
Japan from 1910 to 1945.  The respect and affection the Japanese felt for their military 
heroes is described in two chapter, one of which compares soldiers to cherry blossoms, 
and another about the Yasukuni Shrine.  Clearly the editors wrote the chapters 
intending to impress the students with the greatness of the Japanese character and to 
encourage them to follow that example by becoming devoted to their own emperor and 
willing to sacrifice their own lives in his defense if necessary.    
 Shintoism and the Japanese myths are not emphasized in the textbooks, 
although there is one chapter on the Ise Shrine, which briefly mentions the sun goddess 
Amaterasu, and chapters about the Meiji and Yasukuni Shrines.  These chapters focus 
on the architecture and beauty of the shrines, rather than describing their ceremonial 
aspects.  There are two chapters about Mt. Fuji, one of which came almost directly 
after a chapter about the Mt. Zhangbai.  This may have been an attempt to link the 
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sacred mountains of the two countries, similar to the connection made between the Qing 
tombs and the Meiji Shrine. 
 Another aspect of the image of Japan in these textbooks are the chapters which 
described in positive terms Japanese exploring or living in the Asian mainland.  One 
chapter tells about Mamiya Rinzo, a samurai sent by the Tokugawa shogunate to 
explore the islands known today as Hokkaido and Sakhalin.  The chapters relates how 
in the course of his travels he landed at the mouth of the Amur River on the Asian 
mainland and explored an area near what eventually became the border between Russia 
and Manchukuo, enjoying friendly relations with the native peoples he encountered.  
Another chapter tells the (probably apocryphal) story of Yamada Nagamasu, a merchant 
in the early Edo period who traveled to Siam.  The chapter relates how he became the 
head of the Japanese merchant community in the Siam capital, and eventually became a 
military advisor to the king during a time of civil war.   
 As for the modern era, a chapter tells the story of a SMR station master who 
gave his life rescuing an elderly Chinese woman and child who had strayed onto the 
railroad tracks.  Another tells the story of Hirose Takeo, one of the heroes of the 
Russo-Japanese War, describing how he prepared for his victories through careful study 
of the Russian language and Manchurian terrain while living in the region before the 
war.  These chapters praise Japanese in Asia for their pro-active spirit, and may have 
been intended to show a long history of positive Japanese involvement in the continent, 
thus justifying current Japanese actions. 
 Image of China: Chinese individuals appear as often as Japanese in the 1935 
Chinese language studies textbooks.  A total of 34 Chinese individuals appear 43 times 
in the 1935 textbooks, not counting the Qing emperors and other northern peoples who 
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the textbooks treat as “Manchurian”.  This is about the same as the number of Japanese 
in the textbooks.  Unlike the chapters on Japan and the Japanese, however, these 
chapters are almost all about pre-modern China.  With these chapters the editors strive 
to claim Chine’s cultural heritage for Manchukuo, while for the most part ignoring the 
modern Chinese state. 
 The people who appear most frequently are ancient sages—seven individuals 
who appear ten times—with Confucius and Mencius mentioned the most often.  
Military heroes from the Three Kingdoms and Song periods also are frequently referred 
to, and there are three chapters telling the story of the fictional female warrior Mulan.  
Poets and authors are featured seven times, usually as a way of introducing a quoted 
piece of their literature.  The only chapter that features a modern person is a Horatio 
Alger-type story about Xia Wenjing, a diligent orphan who eventually graduates from 
medical school and becomes a successful doctor.  The chapter does not say whether 
Xia is from intramural China or Manchuria.   
The higher elementary textbooks also include several chapters on Chinese 
geography, particularly mentioning sacred mountains.  The chapters on China are 
limited to natural landmarks, and there is no discussion of the cities of China, as 
opposed to the many chapters on the cities of Manchukuo.  Finally, a number of 
chapters condemn what the editors saw as harmful social practices in China, such as 
foot-binding and opium smoking.      
 To summarize, the 1935 elementary school Chinese language studies textbooks 
featured a sharp increase in the number of chapters about the governments, geographies, 
and histories of Japan and Manchukuo.  Many of the chapters taught reverence to the 
countries’ imperial rulers, and lauded the exploits of past military men, particularly 
  246 
those from Japan.  They taught the principle of Manchuria as an independent region 
from ancient times, which had a long history of contact with Japan.  Although Japan 
was not presented as having dominance over Manchukuo, many examples of Japanese 
conduct and attitudes were held up as models for the Manchukuo students.  The editors 
also introduced aspects of Chinese history as part of their cultural heritage, although 
almost nothing was taught about the modern Chinese state.  One should keep in mind, 
however, that the Chinese language studies courses were taught almost entirely by 
Chinese teachers.  There were few teachers from Japan in Manchukuo elementary 
schools, and those that were there for the most part taught the Japanese language classes 
and spoke little Chinese.  Presumably most of the Chinese teachers had little previous 
knowledge of Japanese culture and history, and many may have harbored anti-Japanese 
sentiments.  It is doubtful, therefore, that many of them taught the chapters on Japan 
with much conviction.  
 
Manchukuo morals textbooks  
 The morals curriculum was taught for one hour a week throughout elementary 
and middle schools in the period from 1934 to 1937, with one textbook used for each 
grade.  As was the case with the Chinese language studies textbooks, half were 
published in 1934, and half in 1935.  In September 1934 the Ministry of Education 
published the lower elementary 1st and 2nd grade and lower middle 7th, 8th, and 9th grade 
texts.  In December 1935 the ministry published the lower elementary 3rd and 4th and 
higher elementary 5th and 6th grade texts.   
 The textbook editing was presumably influenced by the attitudes Japanese 
educators in Manchuria had toward the character of Chinese students.  A study by 
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Takenaka Ken’ichi has uncovered some of the common perceptions Japanese teachers 
had of their students.  For example, in 1934 Furubayashi Takeo, a teacher at a Fengtian 
SMR school, stated that Chinese were calculating, apt to follow blindly, egoistic, 
smooth-tongued, fond of quarreling, had a weak sense of the state, and respected the 
literary and civilian world while despising the military.  In 1937 Tsuda Gentoku, a 
principal at a Kwantung Territory normal school, wrote that the four greatest weakness 
in the Chinese character were disobedience, a lack of moral innocence, poor hygiene, 
and a fondness for gambling.  Others said the Chinese were apt to make up lies, and 
rarely took baths (Takenaka 2000).   
 Furubayashi tried to quantify the basis for his concerns by studying the 
students’ lifestyles.  He found that his students took baths on an average of once every 
three to six days, about the same as Japanese children living in the same region.  He 
also found, however, that nearly 20% of the children had an opium addict in their family, 
most frequently one of the parents.  Polygamy was practiced in the homes of 8% of the 
children.  Many of these concerns found their way into the textbooks (Takenaka 2000). 
 The Ministry of Education presented different goals for the 1934 and 1935 
morals textbooks, as they did with the Chinese language studies textbooks.  The 
textbook prospectus for the 1934 lower elementary texts declared the purpose of the 
texts to be “to teach a spirit of morality fitting for subjects of the imperial state of 
Manchukuo”.  This included teaching students to acquire “knowledge of morality, 
moral feelings, and a moral will” (Wenjiao-bu 1935a, 73).  The textbook prospectus 
for the 1935 lower and higher elementary texts, on the other hand, added to these goals 
an intention to “train children to have a consciousness of themselves as Manchukuo 
imperial subjects.  That means giving them a consciousness of the correctness of our 
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empire, training them in loyalty and patriotism, and teaching about the close 
relationship between Japan and Manchukuo” (Wenjiao-bu 1936b, 1).  As the 
prospectus indicates, the 1935 textbooks often held up Japan and the Japanese as 
positive examples, and were much more state-centered than the 1934 texts.   
 Table 5.3 breaks down the themes of the 1934 and 1935 morals textbooks into 
personal, family, society, state, and international.  “Hard state”, a subset of the state 
category, includes those chapters which praise the imperial or military institutions of 
Japan or Manchukuo.  The percentage of chapters which refer to Manchukuo, Japan, 
China, and the West are also calculated, as are the number and frequency of references 
to individuals from the different regions.  
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Table 5.3: Themes, settings, and individuals in the 1934 and 1935 morals textbooks 
 
    Lower Elementary            Higher Elementary    Lower Middle 
Themes     
   
Personal 
Family  
Society   
State          
International    
 
Hard State        
Manchukuo     
Japan     
  In Manchukuo    
 Other Modern        
  Pre-modern    
China           
West      
Manchukuo Emperor  
Japanese Emperors   
 
Individuals (frequency) 
“Manchurian”     
Japanese         
Chinese          
Western          
Other            
#1-2    
1934.9 
46.8  
14.3  
38.1  
0.8  
0.0  
 
0.8  
3.2  
0.0   
0.0      
0.0 
0.0  
1.6      
0.0    
0.0    
0.0    
 
 
0 (0)    
0 (0)    
1 (1)   
0 (0)    
0 (0)    
#3-4 
1935.12 
35.7 
10.7 
23.2 
28.6 
 1.8 
 
25.0 
23.2 
30.4 
12.0 
 6.0 
12.0 
19.6 
 3.6 
14.3 
 0.0 
 
 
2  (9) 
9  (9) 
11 (14) 
 1  (1) 
 0  (0) 
#5-6 
1935.12 
32.1 
16.1 
25.0 
23.2 
3.6 
 
25.0 
34.3 
12.5 
 5.4 
 3.6 
3.6 
29.2  
0.0 
12.5 
3.6 
 
 
1  (7) 
6  (7) 
13 (19) 
 0  (0) 
 0  (0) 
#7-9 
1934.9 
41.7 
11.7 
31.6 
13.3 
1.7 
 
16.7 
11.7 
3.3 
1.6 
0.0 
 1.6 
70.0 
15.0 
1.7 
0.0 
 
 
1  (1) 
1  (1) 
37 (88) 
 9 (10) 
 2  (3) 
 
 
1934 morals textbooks 
 The 1934 lower elementary school texts say nothing about Japan; in fact they 
mention no state by name.  The only two references to Manchukuo are a national flag 
seen flying above the school in one picture, and a map of the country seen on a 
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schoolroom wall in another picture.  The textbooks are very child-centered, teaching 
about personal morals such as diligence, hygiene, and neatness, family morals such as 
obedience to parents and the role of each member within the family, and social morals 
such as proper classroom etiquette, deference to elderly people, and honesty.  Only one 
historical figure is referred to, a story about Confucius being polite as a child. 
 The lower middle morals texts are of course quite different in character, since 
they were written for much older students.  Like the 1934 lower elementary morals 
texts, but unlike the 1935 elementary morals texts, the lower middle texts include 
comparatively little material about Japan.  They are similar to the 1934 lower middle 
school Chinese language studies textbooks in that they are written in a kind of classical 
Chinese, and a considerable amount of the material is made up of quotes and stories 
from pre-modern Chinese literature, including the ancient classics.  Unlike the 1934 
lower middle school Chinese language studies texts, however, the editors of these 
textbooks discuss modern state and society issues.  The textbooks portray a fascinating 
although contradictory vision of an independent society which would mix some liberal 
Western concepts with traditional Chinese values, a vision espoused by at least some 
officials in the 1934 Manchukuo government.  The texts probably were the product of 
a joint effort by the Japanese former SMR and New Education movement educators 
under Kamimura and the Chinese disciples of Zheng.    
 The word “Manchukuo” is actually never used in the texts, although Pu Yi as 
emperor is mentioned once.  Significantly different from the 1935 morals and Chinese 
studies texts, there is no attempt to build a consciousness of the state or increase 
patriotism by using state symbols.  Except for the single mention of the Emperor, state 
symbols such as the flag, the imperial palace at Xinjing, Mt. Zhangbai, and past 
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Manchu and Mongol rulers do not appear.  The role of the state is discussed in 17% of 
the chapters, but all use logic and appeals to the wisdom of ancient Chinese writers to 
make their points, not grand symbols or semi-divine leaders.  A chapter on patriotism, 
for example, posits that love of country builds from the farmers’ love of the land, which 
naturally develops into love of village, then region, and finally country.  Therefore if 
one loves family and neighbors, that person is on the way to becoming a true patriot.  
Nationalism based on fear of foreigners, it claims, however, is not true patriotism, and 
can harm the state.   
 Another chapter, on ethic harmony, presents a detailed theory on the origin of 
national or ethic groups (minzu), saying they can be based on mutual lineage, shared 
geography, or a common culture.  While the author of the chapter claims the formation 
of national groups is natural, he also paints a vivid picture of the dangers posed by 
nationalism in an era with rapid transportation and fierce weapons of destruction.  
Manchukuo’s policy of ethnic harmony, in which all groups are treated equally, is 
presented as an antidote to this danger.  These two chapters on patriotism and national 
groups are remarkable for the editors’ refusal to link national unity to a mythic past or 
emotional state symbols.  Prime Minister Zheng, who openly spoke of his distrust of 
modern nationalism, may have been involved in the creation of these chapters. 
 Two chapters in the second volume particularly stand out as unique in the 
history of Manchukuo.  The first outlines different rights and obligations which exist 
between the individual and the state, and mentions limits on the state’s power.  After 
recognizing that the idea of “rights” is based on Western, not Eastern, tradition, it states: 
Public rights are set by the law.  These include the right to appoint 
officials, vote and be voted on in elections, receive judgment, petition, 
and public appeal.  When these laws are set, the people’s rights are 
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protected.  Then there are rights pertaining to liberty.  One can not be 
arrested, tried, or punished without regard to the law.  This is liberty of 
one’s person.  One has the freedom to pick one’s own domicile, or 
move whenever one pleases.  A government official can not illegally 
enter a home and search it.  This is liberty of residence.  Debate, 
authorship, and publishing are part of freedom of thought.  One may 
believe in a religion, work at an occupation, join an organization, or 
assemble.  For the state to push forward the public good, it must follow 
the laws (Wenjiao-bu 1934d, 2:120-121). 
A few paragraphs later, it continues: 
The people have the responsibility to vote.  A constitutional state has a 
parliament, chosen by elections.  The people must not neglect their 
right to vote.  There is no legal punishment for not voting, but those 
who do not are not fulfilling their responsibility.  The people need to 
vote intelligently, not based solely on their financial conditions, the 
words of authorities, or personal feelings.  The moral way is to choose 
trustworthy people through elections, who will participate in the 
country’s business and politics (Wenjiao-bu 1934d, 2:122). 
 These are amazing principles to teach in a country which would never in its 
history allow free elections, or ever produce a constitution or any other laws guaranteeing 
individual liberties, such as freedom of speech or assembly.  It apparently represents the 
hopes of the more liberal members of the Ministry of Education, hopes that were 
permanently dashed by 1935.  The chapter, however, ends with the following caveat: 
One must also respect the state’s authority.  In order for the state to use 
its authority, sometimes it cannot help but restrict personal liberties.  
For example, in order to build a public work, it may compel 
participation, or requisition a part of a person’s goods.  However, these 
limitations are tied to individual rights.  Therefore trustworthy people 
will follow instructions and act morally.  Our native oriental moral 
outlook recognizes the spirit of responsibility, but does not have a 
tradition of a spirit of rights.  There is the saying, “You must not forget 
your debt to others”.  This is the spirit of responsibility . . . which 
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denies the spirit of rights.  Our country’s ethic holds that all have the 
duty to dedicate themselves to the country (Wenjiao-bu 1934d, 2:124). 
 
One might be able to read the first part of the chapter as simply an explanation of 
the way Westerners conceive of rights, which were not applicable in the wangdao state of 
Manchukuo.  In no other place in the textbooks, however, do the editors go into such 
detail about conditions in the West.  It is clear that the author intended the readers to 
understand the rights delineated as the natural outcome of a social contract with the state.  
Another chapter in the series repeated many of these ideas, although it also included the 
caveat of final state control: 
The people have the right to speak, write, form organizations, and 
assemble.  However, these acts need to follow the principle of 
preserving public stability.  Printed materials and publications which 
damage public morality, or which damage culture and civilization, or 
gatherings in which excessively stimulating lectures are given, are 
prohibited.  If these kind of evil actions are not closely regulated, the 
entire society could be damaged (Wenjiao-bu 1934d, 3:69). 
 Certainly these chapters are not glowing demonstrations of the government’s 
devotion to a liberal society.  They are, however, the only post-1932 Manchukuo 
documents known to even mention the possibility of rights such as the right to vote, 
freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly, or which speak of limitations on the 
state’s power.  All other known Manchukuo textbooks and documents say nothing of 
individual rights, only duties.  Rather than granting rights, the state presents itself as 
providing domestic peace and stability so the people could prosper, or as a benevolent 
entity providing public education and disaster relief.  In other words a paternalistic 
state with absolute authority, in which independent voices are not welcomed.  It is 
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somewhat of a mystery how these sections which discussed limits on state power and 
individual liberties made it into government-published textbooks, even in 1934. 
Over a quarter of the chapters in the lower middle morals textbooks concern 
social issues, such as public manners, charity, and correct behavior in one’s occupation.  
It is notable that two of the chapters teach the proper conduct of employers (or 
“capitalists”) as well as employees.  One chapter states, “Capitalists must help the 
people.  Their wealth comes from heaven and earth, so they need to assist the regular 
people”.  The other chapter asserts that capitalists must provide good wages, avoid 
extreme labor conditions, help employees when they are sick, and educate employees 
and their children. 
 Chapters on the family for the most part emphasize the correct roles of each 
member.  To a certain degree the textbook editors write supporting traditional roles, 
but they also call for girls to receive education equal to boys, and support the trend 
toward greater mixing of the sexes in public places, such as the workplace.  In another 
chapter they call for an end to the practice of child marriages, but oppose the newly 
spreading idea of young people picking their own spouse.  The majority of the other 
chapters concern topics of personal morality such as honesty, diligence, and 
self-discipline.  One encourages young people to avoid opium, tobacco, alcohol, 
gambling, and going to pleasure quarters.   
 These textbooks use a large number of quotes and stories from pre-modern 
Chinese literature in the course of explaining the different moral issues.  A total of 54 
different works are quoted 103 separate times, or nearly two quotes a chapter.  Among 
the most frequently quoted are Confucius (19 times), Mencius (13), the Doctrine of the 
Mean (5), and the Greater Learning (3).  None of the quoted authors were from the 
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Manchuria region, and none wrote during the Republican era.  Nine different 
Westerners are mentioned or quoted, including Socrates, Kant, and Benjamin Franklin.  
Only once is anything Japanese mentioned, a section in which the Russo-Japanese War 
hero General Nogi Maresuke is presented as an example of bravery.   
  
1935 morals textbooks 
 The 1935 elementary morals texts (lower elementary 3rd and 4th grades and 
higher elementary 5th and 6th grades), published after the Huiluan Rescript and the 
reorganization of the Ministry of Education, were significantly different from the 1934 
texts in character.  An average of 25% of the chapters centered on the state, up from 
1% in the 1934 lower elementary textbooks and 17% in the 1934 lower middle 
textbooks.  References to symbols of the Manchukuo state, particularly the Emperor, 
increased significantly, as did the number of chapters which referred to Japan.  There 
were particularly many references to Japan in the lower elementary school textbooks, 
30% of the chapters.  Although there were less quotes and stories from Chinese 
literature than in the 1934 lower middle school texts, there were still as many of these 
kinds of references as references to Japan. 
 The Manchukuo Emperor’s place as the central character in the 1935 morals 
textbooks is the most immediately recognizable difference from the 1934 texts.  He 
appears in an average of 13% of the chapters of the four 1935 volumes.  The Emperor 
is featured in the first one or two chapters of each text.  The first chapter of the 3rd 
grade textbook, for example, opens with a full page picture of the Emperor in military 
uniform.  The chapter then states: 
Our Great Manchukuo Empire is ruled by the Emperor.  The 
Emperor is lord of the whole country; he is honored like the heavens 
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and revered as divine.  The subjects throughout the land venerate 
him.  Students coming to school see his picture in the textbook, and 
bow to the sacred image in deepest reverence.  (Wenjiao-bu 1935e, 
3:2) 
The next three textbooks follow a pattern of having first chapters which 
describe a key moment in Pu Yi’s time as head of state, and quote from declarations 
given in his name. The first chapter of the 4th grade textbook explains how Pu Yi was 
originally named the president of the country in 1932, and quotes from the Declaration 
Upon Taking Office.  The first chapter of the 5th grade textbook describes his 
enthronement ceremony in 1934, and quotes the Enthronement Rescript.  The first 
chapter of the 6th grade textbook discusses his state visit to Japan in 1935, and quotes 
the Huiluan Rescript.  Besides these extensive quotations, the full texts of the 
Enthronement Rescript and Huiluan Rescript appear in each of the 1935 textbooks 
before the table of contents.  
 Besides these very formal chapters centered on imperial rescripts, other 
chapters in the textbooks explain how the Emperor supports education, is careful to 
keep taxes low, has authority over the military and the power to make treaties, acts as a 
father to the people, and is united in all things with the Japanese Emperor. 
 Other chapters concerning the Manchukuo state include several about the 
various national days of celebration, including two newly created events, the 
anniversary of the state’s founding on May 1st and the Manchukuo Emperor’s birthday 
on January 13th, as well as traditional Chinese events such as New Years, Confucius’ 
birthday, the Spring and Fall festivals, and days in celebration of the Chinese 
pre-modern heroes Guan Yu and Yue Fei.  The textbook repeatedly instructs the 
students to fly the national flag at the gates of their homes on each of these days.  
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Other chapters describe the roles of the different organs of government, ethnic harmony, 
the principle of wangdao rule, and the importance of obeying the laws and paying taxes.  
The state-centered chapters for the most part focus on the individual’s duty to the state; 
there is no discussion of rights guaranteed by the state, as was found in the 1934 lower 
middle morals textbooks. Above all else, the theme of absolute loyalty to the 
Manchukuo Emperor runs constantly throughout the textbooks.  
 There are few references to the pre-modern history of the Manchukuo region in 
the morals texts, unlike the Chinese language studies texts.  Only two chapters in the 
3rd grade textbook mention the region’s history.   
 Over 21% of the chapters in the 1935 morals textbook refer to Japan or the 
Japanese, a significant increase over the 1934 texts.  In almost half of these chapters 
there is discussion of Japan’s assistance in the founding and management of 
Manchukuo.  One of these chapters labels the Japanese as the ethnic group “with the 
greatest abilities”.   
 The Japanese Emperors are mentioned rarely in the 1934 textbooks, but they 
appear in three chapters in 1935 higher elementary morals textbooks.  In almost every 
case they are presented in terms of their link with the Manchukuo Emperor.  The first 
describes the Manchukuo Emperor’s state visit to Japan in 1935, where he was received 
by the Japanese Shōwa Emperor.  Another chapter goes into further detail about the 
visit, saying that the Manchukuo Emperor felt unity with the Japanese Emperor, and 
was deeply impressed by the loyalty shown by the people to the imperial household.  
The following chapter shows the Manchukuo Emperor discovering morality education 
as the key to the Japanese people’s unity and devotion to their Emperor, and that 
Japan’s education was based on the principles outlined in the Meiji Emperor’s Rescript 
  258 
on Education.  The chapter then quotes the entire rescript, and then encourages 
students to “thoroughly study the Japanese education system, and make it part of your 
nature”. 
 Several other chapters hold up pre-modern Japanese heroes and current 
Japanese customs for the Manchukuo students to emulate.  Among the stories are a 
description of Japanese troops whose patriotism overcame any fear of death, a portrait 
of contemporary Japan in which no one throws trash into the roads and the children do 
not break plants in the parks, and stories about generous, cooperative, hard working, 
self-reliant, and filial individuals.   
While there are many references to Japan and the Japanese in the 1935 morals 
textbooks, there are even more quotes and stories from Chinese literature, although 
there is less of this kind of material than in the 1934 lower middle school texts.  
Almost 25% of the chapters include quotes or stories from Chinese literature.  Like the 
rest of the 1934 and 1935 texts, there are no references to modern China.  Like the 
other texts, Confucius and Mencius are the most often mentioned, followed by military 
heroes like Guan Yu and Yue Fei and literary figures like Sima Gong. 
 Although there are fewer chapters about personal and social moral issues in the 
1935 morals textbooks than in the 1934 morals textbooks, these chapters still make up a 
majority of the total.  They include chapters which warn against the dangerous of 
opium, tobacco, and alcohol, urge students to avoid superstition, and admonish students 
to improve public hygiene, including correct trash disposal and prohibitions against 
spitting or urinating in the streets. 
 While the amount of material aimed at inculcating loyalty to the state and 
Emperor and positive regard for Japan in the 1935 morals textbooks rose sharply above 
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the level of the 1934 texts, in all likelihood the strength of the messages presented were 
diminished by three factors: the greater amount of time spent on traditional Chinese 
ethics, the background of the teachers, and the colonial nature of society.   
 First, the curriculum for higher elementary and both levels of middle schools in 
the 1934-1937 period included two hours a week for study of the Chinese classics, twice 
the amount of time spent in the morals courses. A series of textbooks on classics for use 
in these courses was published in 1934 and 1935 (Wang 2000, 156, 166, Minsei-bu 
1937b, 100).  These textbooks focused only on the classics, and did not mention 
modern China, Manchukuo, or Japan.  Clearly traditional Chinese ethics remained a 
central part of the curriculum during this period, given even more time than material 
about the Manchukuo state and Japan. 
 Second, as with the Chinese language studies courses, I assume that the morals 
classes were taught almost entirely by non-Japanese instructors.  Although the central 
and provincial governments held many retraining courses for teachers throughout 
Manchukuo’s existence, it is not hard to imagine that many of the Chinese teachers 
disliked teaching about the greatness of Japan or devotion to the new emperor, while 
others simply did not know much about these subjects.  While they probably had little 
objection to the materials about general personal and family morals, contemporary 
observations and post-war interviews show that teachers during this period often 
showed little interest in the more ideological material, and some middle school teachers 
stealthily provided anti-Japanese materials to students they deemed trustworthy (Isoda 
1994, Qi 1997, Yamamoto 1940). 
Third, the colonial nature of Manchukuo society worked against the efforts of 
the textbook editors to present Japanese as positive role models and Manchukuo as an 
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ideal state.  A Japanese teacher in Fengtian City expressed his frustration with the state 
of affairs in a 1936 article in Mantetsu Kyōiku Tayori, a SMR education journal.  He 
said that teachers received reports that Japanese on the streets frequently cursed at 
Chinese:  
calling them ‘chinks (chankoro)’, ‘idiots’, and ‘smelly’, and yelling at 
them to get out of their way. Many see all Chinese as thieves, or treat 
them as coolies and beggars.  The students often told us Japanese 
would hit them for no reason, and Japanese children would throw stones 
at them, hurting them and making them cry.  In cases like that we had 
to go to great lengths to soothe them.  We were stuck in a bind, because 
we did not want to dwell on the misdeeds of Japanese, but we could not 
say that these good children were wrong (Takenaka 2000, 135).  
The teacher reported that these conditions made it very hard to teach principles 
like “do not fight”, “do not tease weak things”, “do not use crude language”, and “the 
greatness of Japan”. 
 To summarize, morals textbooks published in 1934 for the most part focused 
on private and social morality, rather than teaching loyalty to the state or the Emperor.  
They made almost no reference to Japan, and very few to Manchukuo itself.  The 
lower middle school texts, probably written jointly by lieutenants of Zheng and 
Kamimura, did discuss questions of general civics, but they were remarkable for 
describing a positive image of Western-style democracy and individual rights.  For the 
most part they drew on the words of pre-modern Chinese writers to support the concepts 
taught.  The 1935 elementary morals textbooks, published after the Huiluan Rescript 
and the change of leadership in the Ministry of Education, contained much more 
material about the Manchukuo state, in particular urging students to become loyal to the 
Manchukuo Emperor.  The 1935 texts continued the tradition of using pre-modern 
Chinese texts to legitimize many of its messages, but made no references to modern 
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China.  The texts also included a considerable amount of material about Japan, 
including the Japanese Emperor.  While the amount of material about Japan and the 
Japanese was increasing, it still could not be called cultural assimilation at this point, 
because the frequency of pro-Japan lessons was still dwarfed by the amount of material 
which used pre-modern Chinese sources, the lack of teachers from Japan, and the 
distrust of the messages among Chinese students as well as teachers.  
 
History textbooks 
The Manchukuo government, in its attempt to disseminate a narrative of a 
Manchukuo state naturally independent of China and indebted to Japan, found the 
history curriculum to be a key route of instruction in the 1934-1937 period.  Concern 
over unintended consequences of teaching the region’s history, however, led to the 
suspension of the curriculum during the 1938-1942 period. 
 From 1934 to 1937 the Ministry of Education recommended two hours of 
history instruction a week in higher elementary and lower middle schools, the same 
amount as taught in Republican China.  In elementary schools Manchukuo history was 
taught in 5th grade and Japanese and Chinese history were taught in 6th grade.  In the 
middle schools Manchukuo history was taught in 7th grade, Japanese history in 8th grade, 
and Western history in 9th grade.  The Ministry of Education published a Manchukuo 
history textbook, called National History Textbook, for the 5th grade course in 1934, and 
a Japanese History Textbook and an East Asian History Textbook (for Chinese history) 
for the 6th grade courses in 1935 or 1936, all of which were available for this study.  
Textbooks for the lower middle school history courses were also completed in 1935 and 
1936, but I have not yet seen any of them. 
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The 1934 Manchukuo history textbook 
 While presumably most of the 1934 textbooks were published by a 
combination of Japanese New Education educators and disciples of Zheng Xiaoxu, the 
1934 Manchukuo history textbook appears to have been written by a different group.  
Although there is no document which clearly points out the authors, Terada has 
indicated that the chief author of the textbook was Inaba Kimiyama (also known as 
Inaba Iwakichi).  Inaba was one of four members of a “State Founding History Editing 
Department,” and independent bureau within the Ministry of Education during this 
period (Wenjiao-bu 1936c, 8, Terada 1975, 85).  He was an associate of two of the 
creators of the ideology of a historically independent Manchukuo, Ishihara Kanji, whom 
he became close with while teaching at Japan’s Army War College, and Yano Jin’ichi, a 
colleague at the Oriental Studies department at Kyōto University.  The significantly 
different tone of the Manchukuo history textbook from the other language and morals 
textbooks published in 1934 also indicates it was edited by an author or group of 
authors separate from the ministry textbook division.  For example, Japan, the 
Manchukuo Emperor, and the state in general were much more central aspects of the 
Manchukuo history textbook then they were in the other 1934 textbooks.  
 This textbook appears to have been particularly important to the government.   
Besides the creation of an apparently separate editing group for this single textbook, the 
Ministry of Education also produced a teacher’s manual for the course in 1935.  This 
was the only teacher’s manual created for a lower elementary course as late as the end 
of 1936.  The manual instructs teachers on the purpose and main points of each chapter, 
gives additional historical information, supplies sample questions, and coaches the 
teachers on the delivery of the material.  In key chapters the instructions resemble 
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stage directions.  For example, the chapter on the country’s founding directs teachers 
to “Solemnly explain the necessity of state founding in terms of Manchuria’s ethnicity 
and history. . . [W]ith great emotion explain that since the Republic, the warlords put 
Manchuria in a distressing plight . . . [W]ith eagerness explain how the Sept. 18th 
Incident was the first sign of the state founding movement” (Wenjiao-bu 1935c, 95-96). 
I discussed the content of the textbook in some detail in Chapter 3.  The 
authors’ central goals clearly were to strengthen the students consciousness of 
Manchukuo as an independent state by emphasizing the region’s historical separation 
from China, and make the region’s relationship with Japan seem natural by describing 
beneficial contacts with Japan which had occurred over the centuries.72  The 
textbook’s introduction began with this statement: 
                                                          
72 These goals can be seen in the textbook prospectus: “Purpose of the textbook: 1. Teach about the rise 
and fall of the various ethnicities and kingdoms in the Manchurian region, about how Manchuria has a 
long independent history, and how it is not part of Chinese territory, so the students can see how the 
founding of Manchukuo was both necessary and a continuation of what came before.  2. Tell the 
historical truth about the successive generations, destroying the established notions about race.  Explain 
that the events which occurred in Manchuria over the years have historical value, regardless of what 
ethnicity was involved.   Teach that by recording all of these events together we are acting in 
accordance with the true spirit of our new state’s Minzoku Kyowa.  3. Above all clarify in detail the 
ancient close relationship between Japan and Manchuria, and have them see that the present spirit of 
co-existence and co-prosperity is not at all an accident (Wenjiao-bu 1935a, 82). 
The 1934 lower elementary Manchukuo history textbook was not the first textbook edited by 
Japanese to emphasize the region’s historic independence and debt to Japan.  In 1932 the South 
Manchuria Textbook Group edited a volume for Chinese 5th grade students in SMR schools entitled 
Manchukuo History Textbook, replacing a 1930 textbook by the same department which taught the 
history of China and Manchuria together in the same text.  It covered the history of the region from the 
kingdoms of the ancient period up to the Manchurian Incident.  It was 46 pages long, half the length of 
the 1934 National History textbook (Takenaka 2000, 169). 
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On the Relationship between China and Manchuria:  Many states have 
been established in Manchuria over the ages, like the Parhae, Liao, Jin, 
and Qing.  These were all independent states, and contended with China 
proper (zhongguo benbu) as equals.  These strong ethnic groups were 
able to ward off the Chinese ethnicity (zhongguo minzu).  Because of 
their outstanding culture they could make exchanges with the Chinese.  
Therefore our Manchuria truly is a complete state, with traditional ethnic 
groups, and a firm culture (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 1). 
The first two thirds of the text portrays Manchuria’s history from ancient times 
up to the Manchurian Incident, always emphasizing the region’s independence.  The 
Han are presented as just one of many ethnic groups in the region.  The final third of 
the book discusses the creation and first two and a half years of the state’s development.  
Connections with Japan are emphasized wherever possible.  For example the textbook 
considers the Parhae Kingdom (705-926), which had diplomatic and trade relations with 
the Yamato court at Nara, over the course of three chapters, while study of the Liao 
Dynasty (907-1119), which had no contacts with Japan, takes up half as much space.   
The textbook editors depict the relationship between Parhae and Japan as a 
mutually beneficial exchange between equals.  It was no coincidence, however, that 
the editors portray Parhae as the less technologically advanced state, and therefore a 
model for the current status of Manchukuo as equal in name but inferior in nature to 
Japan.  For example this comparison of the nature of goods produced in each society:  
The Parhae merchants often sold pelts and hides, ginseng, and other 
natural resources.  In exchange they bought Japanese silk fabrics, lacquer 
wares, and other manufactured products (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 16).   
The teacher’s manual points out the parallel to the current relationship, 
instructing teachers to “compare and talk in detail about the similarities between the 
trade of Parhae’s raw materials and Japan’s manufactured materials with today’s trade 
between Manchukuo and Japan” (Wenjiao-bu 1935c, 219).    
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Japanese actions in the region from the Sino-Japanese War to the Manchurian 
Incident consistently are portrayed as attempts to protect the people from Russian 
occupation and warlord deprivations.  The textbook ends with a description of Pu Yi’s 
ascension as Emperor, and a plea to students to become aware of the nature of the state 
and their status as nationals, based on four main points: historical independence, 
wangdao rule, reliance on Japan, and ethnic harmony.  The teacher’s manual directs 
instructors to end the course by having the students “pledge to strive in constructing a 
national people and advance the glory of the state” (Wenjiao-bu 1935c, 117). 
 
Japan and East Asia history textbooks 
 The Manchukuo Ministry of Education’s 1935 6th grade Japanese history 
textbook is a condensed and translated version of the Japanese Ministry of Education’s 
two-volume elementary school national history textbook, published in 1934.  The 
Manchukuo version contains less than a quarter of the material found in the version 
used in Japan.  Two features of the textbook stand out--its focus on the Japanese 
imperial line and its emphasis on Japan’s history of activities abroad.   
The textbook prospectus of the Manchukuo version stated the chief purpose of 
the text as “To clearly teach Japan’s historical development, centering on the Imperial 
House’s unbroken line” (Wenjiao-bu 1936b, 23).  Considerable space is given to the 
mythical foundations of the ruling house and events during the Asuka and Nara periods, 
when the Imperial house was central to national events, while periods in which the 
Imperial house was weak, such as the Kamakura and Ashikaga shogunates, are hardly 
mentioned.    
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 The editors of the 1935 textbook included nearly every story from the 1934 
Japan textbooks which mentioned Japanese actions outside of the home islands, 
sometimes in even greater detail than in the original.  Naturally they always tried to 
put Japanese actions in the best possible light, particularly when a member of the 
Imperial family was involved.  Japan’s relations with the Korean kingdoms are always 
portrayed as that between a superior and an inferior, although relations with China are 
for the most part depicted in more equal terms.  For example they included the 
legendary story of Empress Jingu’s subjugation of the Korean kingdom of Silla, 
emphasizing the King of Silla’s awe at Japan’s military strength and his payment of 
tribute to the Japanese court, a story found in all of the Japanese government’s pre-war 
history textbooks.  They downplayed, however, the role of Korean scholars and artists 
who had come to the Japanese court to teach literacy and continental culture.73  The 
editors also included the initiatives during Empress Suiko’s reign to open contact with 
Sui Dynasty China, and Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea. 
The editors also incorporated a few stories not mentioned in the 1934 Japanese 
Ministry of Education textbook, particularly a description of the contacts between the 
Nara court and Parhae.  The editors, however, portrayed Parhae as opening the 
                                                          
73 Satō Hideo, in a study of the depiction of the Korean scholars and artists in Japanese textbooks, found 
that first Japanese Ministry of Education history textbooks in 1903 mentioned two of the leading Korean 
scholars by name, and described them as active individuals who by their own volition decided to help 
Japan.  The 1910, 1920, and 1934 textbooks emphasized Jingu’s role in bringing the scholars to Japan 
after her military success, making the Japanese the initiators of the events.  The history textbooks 
published in 1943 said only that many people came to Japan from the peninsula because Japan was a 
great country, completely turning around the portrayal of the Koreans as teachers, instead implying that 
Koreans came to Japan to study (Satō 1996, 181).  The 1935 Manchukuo text falls in between the 1934 
and 1943 Japan texts in terms of this portrayal.  
 
  267 
relationship by asking to be recognized as a vassal state to Japan, a significant 
difference from the 1934 Manchukuo history textbook, which depicted Japan and 
Parhae as diplomatic, if not technological, equals.  This difference may have been due 
to the Japan history textbook’s publication a year later in 1935, after Pu Yi’s state visit 
to Japan, which itself resembled the missions of vassal states to the suzerain powers in 
pre-modern times.  It also may have been due to the difference in source material.  
Inaba and the other 1934 Manchukuo history textbook editors were historians of China 
and Korea, familiar with Chinese-authored histories in which the Japan-Parhae 
relationship was described as one of equals, while the 1935 Japan history textbook 
probably was compiled by non-historian textbook editors who probably used only 
Japanese sources, which portrayed the relationship as a tributary one. 
 The textbook concluded with this statement of support for Japanese suzerainty:  
Of course today Japan is culturally and politically among the leading 
countries of the world.  The Japanese people are becoming more aware 
of their obligations.  If we Oriental countries take Japan as our leader, 
we will start on a pathway leading toward world peace (Wenjiao-bu 
1934d, 66-67).   
 While the Japanese history curriculum delivered messages of the divinity of the 
Japanese Imperial house, the legitimacy of Japanese action on the Asian continent, and 
the need for Japanese suzerainty, it was taught for a limited number of hours in the 
school: only half a year in higher elementary school and one year in lower middle 
school.  Thus the history of Japan was taught systematically for only two hours a week 
in one and a half years over the course of five years of lower elementary and higher 
middle school in the 1934-1937 period.  Also, as with the morals curriculum, because 
the textbooks were written in Chinese and because of the lack of teachers from Japan, 
one could assume that non-Japanese teachers taught the course in most schools, which 
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may have blunted the degree to which a message of a divine and ascendant Japan was 
taught. 
 Besides Manchukuo and Japanese history, one half of a year in 6th grade was 
devoted to teaching Chinese history.  In 1935 or 1936 the Ministry of Education 
published a textbook titled East Asian History, which was primarily about intramural 
Chinese history.  When speaking in a general sense, rather than referring to certain 
dynasties, the country is referred to as Zhina (J. Shina) rather than Zhongguo (J. 
Chūgoku).  The former term, a transliteration of the English term China, was 
commonly used in Japan at the time, while the latter, which meant “middle country,” 
was preferred by contemporary Chinese.  This was a change from the 1934 
Manchukuo History textbook, in which the country is called Zhongguo.  
 The East Asian History textbook includes a section which praises the system of 
ethics created by the ancient Chinese sages, but otherwise describes the country in a 
dispassionate tone.  This tone changes in final chapter on the Republican Era, in which 
the Guomindang government is criticized strongly for anti-foreign and undemocratic 
policies.  The textbook concludes with this criticism of contemporary Chinese society:  
Some irrational people are in a hurry to change social norms.  They want 
to foolishly throw away Confucianism, overturning integrity and honor, 
and overthrowing the sages.  This is the fashion in modern China, and it 
will bring the country to ruin.  This is as different as heaven and earth 
from the situation in our country, where under wangdao we have 
preserved Confucianism, and revere and worship the sages (Wenjiao-bu 
1935f, 58). 
 The Chinese history course thus repeated the message delivered in the Chinese 
language studies and morals textbooks of this era, that China’s pre-modern history was 
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part of Manchukuo’s cultural heritage and worthy of emulation, but the modern Chinese 
government was inferior to Manchukuo and a danger to social stability.  
 
 The 1934 Manchukuo national history textbook more than any other laid out to 
the students a clear argument for the existence of the Manchukuo state, the 1935 Japan 
history textbook contained a concentrated effort to explain the divinity and 
righteousness of the Japanese Imperial house and the legitimacy of the role of Japan as 
leader of East Asia.  Some Japanese officials, however, felt the history curriculum in 
elementary schools did more damage than good to their cause in Manchukuo.  Their 
concerns may have been the reason the Manchukuo government dissolved the history 
curriculum, along with the language studies and morals subjects, into a single “national 
studies” curriculum under the new education system of 1938.  Their concerns, and the 
changes which occurred as a result, will be discussed later in this chapter.   
 
Japanese language textbooks 
 As with the morals and Chinese language studies textbooks, the Ministry of 
Education published Japanese language textbooks in two stages, in 1934 and in 1935, 
with significant differences between the two stages.  Textbooks for the 3rd, 4th lower 
elementary grades and 7th lower middle grade were published in 1934, and textbooks for 
the 5th and 6th higher elementary grades and 8th and 9th lower middle grades in 1935.  
The 3rd grade textbook, the introductory textbook, is not included in this analysis 
because it was not divided into chapters.   
Table 5.4 breaks down the themes of the chapters of the six textbooks under 
examination into three groups: practical, national, and literary.  The category “hard 
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state” is a subset of the “national” category, referring to chapters which praise the 
Imperial house or military of Japan or Manchukuo.  The percentage of chapters which 
refer to specific national symbols, and which refer to Japan, Manchukuo, China, and the 
West are also calculated.   
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Table 5.4: Themes, settings, and individuals in the 1934-1935 Japanese language textbooks 
 
 Lower Elementary 
#2   4th grade 
1934.9  
Higher Elementary
#1-2  5-6th grades
1935.12  
Lower Middle  
#1  7th grade 
1934.9   
Lower Middle 
#2-3  8-9th grades 
1935.12 
Practical  77.0 33.6 47.5 34.6 
National 17.6 37.3 15.0 28.2 
Literary  5.4 29.1 37.5 37.2 
     
Hard State  5.4 22.3 2.5 15.4 
Manchukuo Emperor  2.7  4.1  0.0  9.0 
Japan Emperor  0.0  6.8  0.0  5.1 
Manchukuo Flag  2.7  2.5  2.5  5.1 
Japan Flag  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.8 
     
Japan related 13.5 33.3 12.5 28.2 
  Lifestyle 10.8  4.0  7.5  1.3 
  Literary  0.0  5.3  0.0  6.4 
  Geography  2.7  2.7  0.0  1.3 
  Pre-modern history  0.0  5.3  2.5  6.4 
  Modern  0.0  9.3  2.5 11.5 
  Imperial myth  0.0  6.7  0.0  1.3 
Manchukuo related 16.2  9.3 22.5 19.2 
  Modern  8.1  6.7 10.0 12.8 
  Geography  8.1  2.7 12.5  6.4 
China related  0.0  4.1  2.5  3.8 
West related  0.0  2.9  0.0 15.4 
     
Individuals     
  “Manchurian” 1/1 1/3 0/0 2/8 
  Japanese 0/0 16/22 1/1 13/15 
  Chinese 0/0 1/1 1/1 1/2 
  Westerners 0/0 1/1 0/0 9/9 
 
  272 
 The Japanese language textbooks published in 1934 contain an amazingly 
small amount of material about Japan.  Only 14% of the 4th grade textbook chapters 
and 13% of the 7th grade chapters refer to Japan.  While they contain more Japan 
references than the morals and Chinese language studies textbooks of the same eras, as 
might be expected, many of the chapters refer to everyday life events of non-Japanese 
students, or simply are moral exhortations.  Of the chapters that refer to Japan, the 
majority are about the lifestyles and traditions of Japanese, such as doll displays on 
Girls’ Day and carp streamers on Boys Day.  In fact the 1934 Japanese language 
textbooks contained very few “hard state” chapters.  The Manchukuo Emperor is 
mentioned only once in the 1934 textbooks and Japanese Emperors are not mentioned at 
all.   
 As discussed in Chapter 4, the lack of Japan and hard state references in the 
1934 Japanese language textbooks may have been due to the presence of SMR New 
Education movement educators among the editors. They tended to be disciples of the 
Yamaguchi Kiichirō, and therefore opposed the inclusion of overly ideological material 
in language textbooks in fear that it could alienate language learners.  Yamaguchi 
supported the use of materials familiar to the students and universal in nature 
(Komagome 1997, 335-336).  Following Yamaguchi’s reasoning, rather than including 
materials about the state, the 1934 Japanese language textbooks contain a considerable 
number of references to Manchukuo’s culture and geography, many more than are 
found in the morals and Chinese language studies textbooks published that same year. 
 The 1935 Japanese language textbooks contain many more chapters referring to 
Japan and to “hard state” subjects than the 1934 texts, while using less references to 
Manchukuo.  Comparing the 1935 5th and 6th grade text to the 1934 4th grade text, the 
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1935 texts have an average of 33% of the chapters referring to Japan, up from 14%, and 
22% of the 1935 chapters include “hard state” materials, up from 5%.  Current and 
past Japanese Emperors, as well as the Manchukuo Emperor, appear frequently in the 
1935 textbooks.  There was a similar shift in content from the 1934 7th grade lower 
middle textbook to the 1935 8th and 9th grade textbooks.  References to Japan turn from 
relatively benign descriptions of Japanese lifestyle in the 1934 textbooks to discussions 
of the greatness of modern Japanese society, portrayals of the Japanese military, and 
retelling the Japanese creation and state founding myths in the 1935 volumes.  Clearly 
the 1935 editors, while continuing to support the use of the direct method in the 
classroom, had begun to retreat from Yamaguchi’s related concept of a non-ideological 
teaching environment.74  
 
 To summarize the analysis of the textbooks published in 1934 and 1935, 
changes in the Manchukuo state ideology and personnel of the Ministry of Education 
precipitated a major change in the content of the government’s textbooks.  1934 
textbooks, edited by Japanese who had long experience in the area and were 
sympathetic to the New Education movement, together with disciples of Prime Minister 
Zheng, were for the most part child- and citizen-centered.  The elementary school 
Chinese language studies, morals, and Japanese language textbooks were largely free of 
strong ideological messages, instead using materials familiar to the students, like scenes 
of Chinese children going to school, associating with their family, or enjoying nature.  
                                                          
74 The leading editor of both the 1934 and 1935 Japanese language textbooks probably was Fukui Yū, a 
veteran educator who had taught in SMR schools for Chinese from 1918 to 1932, and was a supporter of 
Yamaguchi’s direct method (Fukui 1939).   
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When Manchukuo and Japan were mentioned it was usually in terms of culture and 
geography.  The higher elementary Manchukuo national history textbook and lower 
middle morals textbooks contained the strongest ideological messages of the 1934 texts.  
Both used appeals to logic and history to make their points.  The Manchukuo national 
history text, apparently edited by a separate group, presented a focused defense of the 
propositions that the Manchuria region was historically independent, that Manchukuo 
was a legitimate state created by the will of the people, and that Japan both in the past 
and in the present was a good friend to the region.  The editors of the lower middle 
morals textbooks tried to teach a new moral order, mixing what they saw as the best of 
the old with the new, without resorting to nationalistic or mythical rationalizations for 
their authority.  The people are presented as the ultimate legitimizing force of the state, 
which exists for their benefit. 
 The 1935 textbooks, on the other hand, rely heavily on national and mythical 
symbols to buttress a changed national ideology in which the state’s legitimacy drew no 
longer on the supposed voice of the people, but instead on the unifying figure of the 
Manchukuo Emperor.  The Manchukuo Emperor’s own legitimacy is portrayed as 
primarily coming from his relationship with the divine Japanese Imperial house, 
although also on his connection with the region’s past rulers.  The Chinese language 
studies, Japanese language studies, and morals texts include many more references to 
the Manchukuo state and to Japan, including repeated references to sacred Qing spots in 
the Chinese language texts and the mythical beginning of the Japanese Imperial house 
in the Japanese language texts.  Stories about Japanese who acted out of loyalty to past 
Emperors, who displayed military prowess, and who acted heroically on the Asian 
continent were common in the 1935 textbooks, in an attempt to teach students to be 
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loyal to their own Emperor and to stand in awe and deference to Japanese military 
power.   
 Teachers for most of these classes, however, were Chinese, many of whom 
were educated in the midst of the New Culture Movement of the 1920s, and therefore 
had accepted many of that movement’s nationalist and anti-Japanese messages.  The 
Japanese could dominate the region militarily, but found is more difficult to staff the 
schools with teachers who would present the state’s messages with true enthusiasm 
(Isoda 1994 and Qi 1997).  
 
The 1934-1935 textbooks compared to textbooks in Korea 
 A brief comparison of the content of the 1934-1935 Manchukuo textbooks to 
those used in Korea at the same time is now in order.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
Japanese language instruction in Korea during this period was much more intense than 
Japanese language instruction in Manchukuo.  The language was taught from the first 
grade in Korea, and many of the other subjects were also taught in Japanese, including 
the morals curriculum.  There was a Korean language course, but it was taught for only 
three to six hours a week in elementary school.  Besides those for the Korean language 
course itself, all of the textbooks were written in Japanese.  
 From 1930 to 1935 the Korean colonial government published what is usually 
known as the Third Korean Textbook Series.  One similarity between the 1934-1935 
Manchukuo textbooks and the 1930-1935 Third Korean Textbook series is the 
considerable number of non-Japanese historical figures who appeared in the morals and 
indigenous language studies textbooks.  The large number of Korean individuals who 
appear in the Korean language studies texts of the period was a continuation of a trend 
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begun in the previous Second Series, published from 1923 to 1924, as a part of the 
colonial government’s efforts to win local support after the 1919 March 1st uprisings.  
A difference, however, is that the Korean characters in the Korea texts were almost 
always passive figures, usually ancient scholars or poets.  Few powerful political 
figures from the past appeared, and there are no cases of a Korean military figure in the 
textbooks.  In her study of the textbooks, Yi Suk-cha has posited that this choice of 
characters was part of an effort by Japanese colonial authorities to portray Korea as a 
weak nation naturally dependent on outside forces, thereby helping to legitimize 
Japanese rule (Yi 1985).  The 1934 and 1935 Manchukuo textbooks, on the other hand, 
contained several stories about powerful political or military Chinese and “Manchurian” 
historical figures, like Genghis Khan and the early Qing emperors.   
 Another difference is the positive image of Manchuria presented in the 
Manchukuo textbooks, compared to the frequently negative image of Korea found in the 
Korea textbooks.  Many chapters in the Korean language textbooks focused on 
subjects such as past military defeats and how Korea had failed to modernize before 
Japan began to help.  The texts also criticized some Korean customs, such as dressing 
in white.  The Manchukuo textbooks, on the other hand, for the most part spoke 
positively about the region’s history and customs.  Negative parts of the region’s 
recent history, such as warlord rule, were labeled as “Chinese” problems.  Some 
practices, such as opium smoking and gambling, were criticized, but these were 
criticisms with which the many in the population could agree, and were presented in a 
context of praise for the region’s cultural heritage.       
 Both the Korea and Manchukuo textbooks contained material on ancient 
connections between Japan and the occupied country, which was intended to help 
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legitimize Japanese control.  The Korea textbooks, however, contained far more of this 
kind of material than the Manchukuo textbooks, perhaps because there was a much 
stronger historical connection between the neighboring countries of Japan and Korea 
than existed between Japan and Manchuria.  Finally, there was a much lower degree of 
militaristic and Shinto materials in the Manchukuo 1934-1935 textbooks compared to 
the Korea textbooks. 
 Therefore while the textbooks in the two occupied areas shared common traits, 
they varied greatly in terms of degree.  Both depicted the respective regions as closely 
connected with Japan, but the Korea texts presented the relationship as completely 
dependent and one-sided, while the Manchukuo texts presented a friendly relationship 
of equals or near-equals.  The Korea texts were for the most part negative about 
Korean society, thereby rationalizing the need for cultural assimilation, while the 
Manchukuo texts were for the most part positive about Manchurian society, allowing it 
to develop as something different from Japan. 
 
The Shingakusei 
In 1937 the Manchukuo government announced a sweeping set of changes in 
the Manchukuo education system, known as the Shingakusei (new education system).  
As mentioned previously lower and higher middle schools, both of which were 
three-year courses, were combined into single four-year middle schools, each of which 
was assigned a vocational specialty.  None of the middle schools were allowed to 
specialize in humanities and science, the favored middle school major in early 20th 
century Chinese schools.  The Japanese language was raised to the status of a national 
language, and the number of hours spent in Japanese language instruction in elementary 
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and middle schools increased sharply.  The number of hours spent in vocational 
training in higher elementary and middle schools also increased.  In elementary 
schools all of the “literary” subjects—Chinese language studies, Japanese language, 
morals, history, and geography—as well as science, were combined into a single 
“national people’s studies” (C. guomin-ke, J. kokumin-ka) curriculum.  The 
government published two sets of textbooks, one in Japanese, the other in Chinese, each 
with different content, for use in the course.  Official guidelines for the number of 
hours students spent in school increased at most levels, but the ratio of time spent on the 
“literary” subjects remained about the same as before (although more of that time was 
now taken up by Japanese language study). 
 
The history curriculum after 1938 
 The Manchukuo government published no separate science, morals, geography, 
or history texts for the elementary schools in the period from 1938 to 1942; rather the 
Chinese and Japanese language national people’s studies readers were expected to cover 
those subjects.  These readers contained little historical material and nothing about 
Manchuria’s pre-1932 history.  History was taught for two hours a week in the first 
two years of middle school, and new middle school Japan and Manchukuo history texts 
were published in 1938.  I have not been able to find copies of either of these texts.  
History in the higher elementary schools, a key part of the dissemination of the 
government’s message of Manchukuo independence in the 1934-1937 period, was 
eliminated from the curriculum. 
 The government offered no explanation for the deletion the history courses, but 
apparently some Japanese education officials feared discussion of pre-modern Chinese 
  279 
history did more harm than good to the cause of instilling a national consciousness of an 
independent Manchukuo.  For example, Kita Ryūjirō, the editor of a 1935 
SMR-published “Manchurian history” textbook in 1935, wrote, “Manchuria’s history 
must be taught independently, not as a part of China’s history”.  Rather than teaching 
about ancient dynasties, he said, schools needed to emphasize the actions of modern 
Japanese in the region, including soldiers and settlers (Kita 1967, 68, Isoda 1999, 273).  
After the war the Terada wrote: 
[I thought] Manchukuo History should only be the history of 
Manchukuo since its founding, that it should not include ancient history, 
like the periods of ethnic conflict and the Qing dynasty . . . This [kind of 
history] caused university students and others to ask why, if there was 
ethnic harmony, the Han people divided in two at the Great Wall? . . . I 
did not think it was of any value to teach insignificant things from before 
the establishment of Manchukuo like the history of ethnic conflicts 
(Terada 1975, 85, Ryōnankai 1972, 294).   
These comments demonstrate that some felt teaching about the region’s 
pre-modern history had inadvertently resulted in raising more questions about the 
legitimacy of the new state in the minds of the students than it answered.  Rather than 
force teachers to try to explain the need to separate the overwhelming Han majority of 
the country from their fellow Han in the south, or explain the present link with Japan in 
the face of a much stronger historical link with China proper, the authorities apparently 
decided the subject should be avoided altogether.75 
                                                          
75 It would be interesting to see what was taught in the 1938 middle school Manchukuo history textbook, 
which I have not found.  My conjecture is that it contained much less material about the pre-modern 
history of the region than did the 1934 higher elementary text.   
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This increasingly negative view of Manchukuo’s past can also be discerned in 
1941, when the Education Bureau created a unified “Geography and History” textbook 
for normal schools, and promised to publish a similar one for middle schools later in the 
year.76  Although there are no known extant copies, an Education Bureau description 
of the text shows that it was almost completely negative about the region’s past, and 
instead taught mostly about the short history since 1931.  It stated: 
We are trying to create a positive history which will inspire the people.  
Our [pre-Manchukuo history] has seen many ups and downs; there really 
nothing in the history which needs to be emphasized.  Now, however, 
as we stand on a new starting point, trying to push forward the ideal of 
the state’s founding . . . we should be able to create a great history.  By 
faithfully looking at our history, even if there is almost nothing that 
needs to be expanded upon, we can reflect on what has been lacking, and 
pick important materials which will make students conscious of what 
needs to be fixed . . . Certainly the events of the past cannot be changed.  
However, there are different ways of looking at and emphasizing the 
past, which can give it meaning (Minsei-bu 1941b, 68).   
Other factors which probably played into the decision to limit the use of 
historical materials in the schools were the increasing emphasis on basing the 
Manchukuo state’s legitimacy on its support from the Japanese Emperor, rather than 
claims of the region’s historical independence or the Emperor’s credentials as a 
                                                          
76The unification of history and geography into a single subject (sometimes called “social studies”) was a 
frequent topic of debate in Japanese education circles in the late 1930s and 1940s.  While the Japanese 
Ministry of Education did not act on this idea until after the war, the colonial education bureaucracies 
actively experimented with different history/geography combinations.  The Korean government was first, 
publishing “Kokushi Chiri” textbook for elementary school 4th graders in 1938.   Manchukuo followed 
with “Chireki” textbook for normal schools in 1941, and the Kwantung Territory published “Mikuni no 
Sugata” in 1943-1944.  Isoda Kazuo has written extensively on the development of the Korean and 
Kwantung Territory texts (Isoda 1999, 208, 315). 
 
  281 
wangdao ruler, and the conviction among many Japanese that Japanese language 
training was the surest way to win support from the people.77 
 The shift toward ignoring or giving negative messages about the region’s 
history paralleled an even stronger shift occurring in Korea at the same time.  In 1921, 
as part of a response to the disturbances of the March 1st movement, the colonial 
government for the first time included a few chapters about Korea in Japanese history 
textbooks.  The material was generally negative about Korea, however, emphasizing 
periods when Korea was ruled by outsiders, particularly Japan.  The amount of 
material about Korea increased while that about Japan decreased in the 1932 revision of 
the textbooks, and while they continued to emphasize historical contacts between Korea 
and Japan, the message of Japanese dominance was softened, and some positive aspects 
of Korean culture, such as the creation of the Hangul alphabet, were included (Isoda 
1999, 195-201, Yi 1985, 403-403).  These textbooks were created around the same 
time as the 1934 Manchukuo national history and 1934-1935 Chinese language studies 
texts, which also emphasized positive aspects of the country’s past.  Therefore the 
early 1930s can be said to be the time in Japanese colonial history when governments 
                                                          
77 There were similar fears about Japanese history instruction.  Yamamoto Haruo, an outside observer 
of Manchukuo education, told in a 1940 report of the embarrassment one teacher felt after allowing 
students to closely examine certain aspects of Japanese history too closely.  The teacher said, “In a 
Japanese history text there was a story of an Emperor who exiled a former Emperor to a distant island for 
the sake of his subjects.  After reading it, the Manchurian students said, ‘The Japanese are not very 
loyal,’ and made light of Japanese spirit.  There have been many cases where they have not shown 
proper respect to the Japanese Emperor and his subjects.  The textbooks contain many dangerous things, 
so teachers should go over the historical facts lightly, focusing on the good results loyal subjects achieve 
in difficult times”.  Yamamoto then called for a reevaluation of the presentation of Japan in the teaching 
materials, particularly ancient texts (Yamamoto 1940, 35). 
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utilized positive messages of indigenous culture and history to win support from the 
local people. 
 Policy shifted dramatically in 1937 when colonial government began instituting 
the fiercely cultural assimilationist kōmin-ka movement.  The Korean government 
discontinued the textbooks which incorporated Korean history, and instead began using 
history textbooks identical to those used in Japan (Isoda 1999, 208-210).  While the 
purportedly independent Manchukuo government did not go as far as the Korean 
colonial authorities in their assimilation policies, they did follow their lead in 
abandoning the use of positive portrayals of the occupied region’s past as a way of 
gaining the people’s support. 
  
Elementary National people’s studies readers 
 The textbooks published by the Manchukuo government’s Textbook Editing 
Department from 1938 to 1942 are a diverse lot, with some full of ideological materials, 
stressing the importance of loyalty to the Emperor and the state, and endorsing the 
position of Japan as a worthy and even divine hegemon, while others contained little of 
such material.  It was a period when the Manchukuo government, involved in the war 
with China and facing the potential of war with the Soviet Union or the Atlantic powers, 
began ratcheting up imperial propaganda.  The Japanese who ran the state sent Pu Yi 
on a second visit to Japan in 1940, and upon his return in July issued the Guoben 
Dianding Zhaoshu, which declared Amaterasu Ōkami to be the country’s “foremost 
god”, and essentially established State Shintō as a part of the official ideology.   
This period also, however, saw a resurgence of New Education movement 
educators within the Manchukuo education bureaucracy, led by Terada.  Many of these 
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officials have claimed while they supported the concept of a Manchukuo state, they 
were uncomfortable with what they saw as an irrational attempt to force the local 
population to accept a foreign ideology, especially after the Guoben Dianding Zhaoshu 
rescript was promulgated (Komagome 1996, 439, Ishimori 1970, 82-83, Tamura 1941, 
36-37, Terada 1941, 223).  Because of their discomfort with the developments of 1940, 
they kept State Shintō and its related principles out of most of the textbooks until 1943.  
They also carved out a few places in the curriculum which contained very few 
ideological messages.  Even in 1942, when pressure from the government to increase 
ideological messages in support for the war must have grown very strong, Terada and 
his allies managed to actually push back the ideological tide in a few spots in the 
curriculum. 
 Late in 1937 the Textbook Editing Department began creating lower 
elementary school readers for the new national people’s studies curriculum, two 
Japanese and two Chinese language texts for each grade.  Of these, the Chinese 
language texts contain strong ideological messages from the first page of the first 
volume, while the Japanese language texts contain less ideological material in the initial 
volumes.  This may have reflected the influence of Yamaguchi Kiichirō, who 
disapproved of the use of such materials early in a student’s study of the Japanese 
language.  In 1941 Terada instituted a revision of the Chinese language readers, in 
which he significantly reduced the amount of ideological materials in at least the 1st 
grade, making them more like the Japanese language texts.  It is not clear why Terada 
did this; perhaps he was uncomfortable with strong ideological instruction in any course 
for the youngest children in elementary school.    
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 Looking at the lower elementary Japanese language textbooks, only about 3% 
of the 1st grade Japanese language readers refer to the state.  These include a page 
showing the Imperial palace in Xinjing, references to the national anthem and flag, a 
scene of soldiers marching through town, a portrayal of a class visit to a memorial for 
the state’s war dead, and a description of a school ceremony in honor of the Meiji 
Emperor.  The overwhelming majority of the materials portray everyday student 
experiences at home, in nature, and at school.  The content was very similar to the 
introductory Japanese language readers published by the Manchukuo government in 
1934.   
The editors filled the 1938 1st and 2nd grade Chinese language national people’s 
studies textbooks, on the other hand, with ideological materials.78  Of the two 
textbooks found from that period, 24% of the chapters contain references to the 
Manchukuo Emperor or state (see Table 5.5).  The very first words in the first volume 
are “His Majesty the [Manchukuo] Emperor.”  The accompanying picture shows a 
large group of students bowing toward a portrait of the Emperor, hanging on the wall 
above a dais, half shrouded by a curtain (see Figure 5.1).  The next page shows 
students cheering in celebration on the Emperor’s birthday, and a picture of the gates of 
the palace.  Another depicts a class of students in front of the palace’s gates, where the 
teacher lectures to them on the Emperor’s benevolence and the need for everyone to 
                                                          
78 I have found two Chinese language national people’s language studies textbooks,  
!" #1 (January 1938), the first volume for the elementary schools, and #$%& 
!"#3 (January 1938), part of a series designed for use in the recently nationalized sishu, or academy 
schools.  The two textbooks are very similar; they clearly were created by the same editors. 
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show their loyalty to him.  The illustration accompanying the text shows the students 
bowing in unison toward the gates.   
 
(Figure 5.1) The first two pages of the Manchukuo Lower Elementary National Studies Chinese language 
textbook volume #1.  Students bow toward a portrait of the Manchukuo Emperor. 
 
 
 Japan is referred to in 22% of the chapters of these early grade Chinese 
language studies textbooks, usually in connection to the Japanese Emperor or the 
military.  Often the chapters encourage students to look to the Japanese as leaders.  
For example, a chapter on the foundation of the country in the 2nd grade textbook 
concludes, “We need to take the Japanese people’s moral ideal as our own.  We need 
to take the Japanese people as our leaders, and move forward” (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi. 
1938b, 12).  Another chapter features a poem which praised the unity of Japan and 
Manchukuo, along with drawings of Mt. Fuji and the Mt. Zhangbai side-by-side.  The 
editors here borrowed a trope often found in Japan’s colonial textbooks of placing 
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symbols of Japan and the colony side-by-side to demonstrate their unity.  For example 
Mt. Fuji and Mt. Kumgang, a mountain in Korea considered sacred, were commonly 
juxtaposed in the textbooks (see Figure 5.2) (Yi 1985, 346-347). 
 
(Figure 5.2) From the Manchukuo Lower Elementary National Studies Chinese language textbook 
volume #1, 1938.  It features a poem proclaiming the eternal unity of Japan and Manchukuo, illustrated 
by drawings of Mt. Zhangbai and Mt. Fuji. 
 These texts were published before Terada’s appointment to head the Textbook 
Editing Division in November 1938.  Terada ordered a revision of the elementary 
school Chinese language studies textbooks, which were published in 1941 and 1942.  I 
have found only one of these texts, a 1st grade reader.  It shows a remarkable change in 
content; Terada almost completely replaced the heavily ideological messages of the 
1938 Chinese readers with poetry, children’s fables, and nature scenes.  The textbook 
contains only a single reference to the state or Japan.  In it, a father and son shopping 
in town before the New Years holiday decide to buy Japanese and Manchukuo flags to 
fly in front of their homes.  Looking the 1938 and 1942 texts side by side, the absence 
of the Manchukuo Emperor, who appears prominently in both 1938 Chinese language 
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textbooks, as well as the lack of almost any other reference to the state or to Japan, is a 
remarkable alteration.  Together with the Japanese language studies textbooks, they 
appear to indicate an intention on the part of the textbook editors to establish lower 
elementary school as a space largely free of ideological messages. 
 If the changes in the lower elementary Chinese language studies textbooks in 
1941 and 1942 represented an effort by textbook editors to turn back strongly 
ideological messages, they did not attempt a similar rollback in the higher elementary 
national people’s studies Chinese language textbooks.  I have found two of these texts, 
one published in 1938, and the other in 1941.  The 1941 volume contains even more 
state-centered and militaristic material than the 1938 volume.79  The two 
post-Shingakusei volumes averaged together represent a significant change from the 
1935 higher elementary Chinese language textbooks.  29% of the post-Shingakusei 
chapters contain “hard state” material, up from 15% in the 1935 textbooks.  35% of the 
chapters are about Japan, up from 21% in 1935, and 60% mention the Manchukuo state, 
compared to 14% in 1935.   Several chapters in the 1935 textbooks discuss with 
approbation Manchuria’s pre-modern history, while the post-Shingakusei textbooks 
dismiss pre-1931 history as “a bad dream” (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1939b, 48).  
Japanese emperors did not appear in the 1935 higher elementary Chinese language 
studies textbooks at all, and the Manchukuo Emperor appears in only 2% of the chapters.  
In the post-Shingakusei textbooks, on the other hand, 11% mention Japanese emperors, 
and 10% mention the Manchukuo Emperor.   
                                                          
79 No Japanese language higher elementary national people’s studies textbooks are known to exist.  
There is some evidence to suggest that no new texts were made before 1942, and that schools continued 
to use the 1935 Japanese language texts at this level until that time (Isoda 1998, 70, Terada 1943, 66). 
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Another major difference was the amount of material taken from pre-modern 
Chinese sources.  Almost 24% of the 1935 higher elementary Chinese language studies 
chapters include quotes or stories from pre-modern Chinese literature.  Only 8% of the 
chapters in the post-Shingakusei higher elementary textbooks mention China, and 
almost all of those chapters discuss China’s modern problems and the opportunities for 
the new pro-Japanese government in Nanjing.  Only one chapter includes material 
from pre-modern China, a collection of brief selections from the ancient classics The 
Greater Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1930b, 
160-163).  Finally, the 1941 higher elementary volume was particularly militaristic, 
including several references to the religious honors given to those killed in war at the 
Yasukuni Shrine in Japan and at Manchukuo’s war memorials, and also positive 
descriptions of Japan’s new Axis allies. 
 
Table 5.5: Themes in the 1938-1942 national people’s studies Chinese language textbooks   
Lower Elementary 1st-2nd grades    Higher Elementary 6th grade 
       #1 and #3       #2      #3         #4     6th grade average 
1938.1       1942.7          1938.9     1941.1      
Practical 68.6 55.6  33.2 24.6 28.9 
National 27.9  2.2  66.8 73.7 70.3 
Literary  3.5 42.2   0.0  1.7  0.9 
Hard State 24.4  2.2  27.2 38.6 32.9 
Japan related 18.0  2.2  37.6 32.1 34.9 
Hard State + Japan 29.1  2.2  43.1 48.4 45.8 
Military  2.7  0.0   2.0 11.7   6.9 
Manchukuo related 35.3  6.7  60.0 60.2 60.1 
China related  0.5  0.0   5.4 10.6 8.0 
Western related  0.5  0.0   9.9 10.6 10.3 
Manchukuo Emperor 13.6  0.0   8.9 10.5  9.7 
Japan Emperor  6.4  0.0  10.9 12.2 11.5 
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Middle school Chinese language studies textbooks 
 After the highly state-centered, pro-Japanese, and militaristic content of the 
1938 and 1941 higher elementary Chinese language national people’s studies textbooks, 
the completely different nature of four middle school Chinese language studies 
textbooks published in the 1940s is quite surprising.  These textbooks are made up 
overwhelmingly of literary materials by pre-modern and modern Chinese authors; they 
contain little material about the state or Japan.  Here was another place where textbook 
editors were able to create a zone largely free of the otherwise relentless drumming of 
Japanese imperial ideology in the last years of Manchukuo’s existence.  They were 
very different from the middle school Japanese language studies textbooks published 
around the same time. 
 A total of eight middle school Chinese language studies (Manyu Duben) 
textbooks, four for boys’ middle schools and four for girls’ middle schools, were 
published from 1938 to 1940, and at least some of them were revised from 1942 to 1943.  
Four of the eight are known to exist: the 1943 revised version of volume 3 for the boys’ 
schools (hereafter Boys #3), the 1940 original of volume 4 for the boys’ schools 
(hereafter Boys #4), the 1942 revised version of volume 1 for the girls’ schools 
(hereafter Girls #1), and the 1942 revised version of volume 2 for the girls’ schools 
(hereafter Girls #2) (see Table 5.6). 
 The majority of chapters in these textbooks were excerpts from literary essays 
by pre-modern and modern Chinese, mostly about personal ethics, nature, and art.  
Several of the chapters in the girls’ middle school textbooks were also about the family.  
Only 6% of the boys’ chapters and 12% of the girls’ chapters contain hard state material, 
and Japan or Japanese are mentioned in only 10% of the boys’ chapters and 11% in the 
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girls’ chapters.  These were much lower than the higher elementary Chinese language 
textbooks published in 1938 and 1941, in which 33% of the chapters contained hard 
state material and 35% mentioned Japan.  The makeup of the textbooks resembles the 
1934 lower middle morals textbooks in its ratio of hard state and Japan-centered 
chapters.  A major difference, however, is that these texts contained many essays and 
other literary works written by noted modern Chinese authors, while the chapters in the 
1934 lower middle morals textbooks were anonymously written, and used quotes and 
stories only from pre-modern Chinese authors. 
 The nature of the few state- and Japan-related chapters also differed from other 
middle school textbooks from this period.  The middle school Japanese language 
studies textbooks published in the 1940s, as will be discussed later in this chapter, 
focused on the effort to create a strong, united East Asia under Japan’s direction, and 
the role of Manchukuo and its people in this undertaking.  Only one chapter in the 
boys’ middle school Chinese language textbooks mentioned the attempt to create a 
united East Asia, and in fact only three chapters, all in the 1943 Boys #3 textbook, even 
bring up the Manchukuo state.  The one chapter which talks about the effort to create a 
united East Asia is about Manshoujie, the celebration of the Manchukuo Emperor’s 
birthday.  The chapter compares the event with the similar Tenchō-setsu celebration in 
Japan, and discuses how both words are based on phrases found in the Chinese classics.  
It explains the proper ways to celebrate the day, lauds the Manchukuo Emperor for his 
frugality and devotion to the people, and emphasizes his close contact with the Japanese 
Emperor.  Its focus on the Emperors fits in with much of the other material found in 
1940s textbooks, although its detailed discussion of the pre-modern precedents for 
Manshoujie is unique for the era.   
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 Besides this chapter, only two others mention Manchukuo, one which 
encourages recycling waste and another which praises the recently deceased former 
Prime Minister Zheng.  A few chapters refer to the pre-modern history of the 
Manchuria region, another similarity to the 1934 and 1935 textbooks.  Two described 
Manchu literary collections, and one described a Qing palace near Fengtian city.  Of 
the nine chapters that mention Japan, only three can be termed “hard state”.  One is a 
laudatory chapter about Motoda Eifu, a Confucian scholar and advisor to the Meiji 
Emperor, one describes Japan’s naval victory at the Straights of Tsushima in the 
Russo-Japanese War, and one tells the story of Yamada Nagamasa, the Edo-period 
merchant said to have become one of the King of Siam’s chief advisors.  The other 
chapters about Japan are about Japanese culture, including an essay comparing Chinese 
and Japanese theater by Akutagawa Ryūnosuke, and a modern play by Kikuchi Kan.   
 The majority of the chapters in the two volumes for boys’ middle schools were 
written by Chinese authors, 39 by modern Chinese and 52 by pre-modern Chinese.  Of 
the modern authors, the two most frequently included were Cai Yuanpei, a reformer and 
Minister of Education in the early years of Republican China, and Zeng Guofan, one the 
leaders of the self-strengthening movement in the mid-19th century and a dedicated 
Confucianist.  Both are represented by five essays.  Most of Cai’s essays discuss the 
development of civilization, while most of Zeng’s are letters to his younger brothers and 
children encouraging them in their studies of the classics.  The One Hundred Days 
reformer Liang Qichao also was represented with four essays.  Most of the other 
modern authors were novelists and essayists.  Although some of the modern essays 
include criticism of modern China’s government and culture, the majority are positive 
about the country.  Of the chapters from pre-modern sources, the majority are essays 
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by literary figures from the Tang, Song, and Qing periods, such as Han Yu and Su Shi, 
although there are also a few excerpts from the ancient classics.  
 The two girls’ middle school Chinese language studies textbooks, both 
published in 1942, contain 12 % hard state material, twice as much as appear in the 
boys’ texts.  The hard state material in the girls’ textbooks are much more militaristic 
as well.  Still, 12% hard state content is still a much lower than that found in many 
other Manchukuo textbooks published in the 1940s.  Three of the hard state chapters 
are about proud family members seeing off or thinking about brothers or sons in the 
military.  Others discuss sacrifices required by those on the home front during the war.  
The few chapters about Japan, however, are all about its culture and geography.  The 
Manchukuo and Japanese Emperors hardly appear at all.  Almost 10% of the chapters 
mentioned the West or Westerners, and all of these references are positive, despite the 
fact that Japan was at war with the United States and Britain.  Like the boys’ middle 
school textbooks, the editors chose selections from works by Chinese authors for most 
of the chapters, but unlike the boys’ textbooks the majority of the selections are by 
modern Chinese authors, with only a few by pre-modern Chinese.  Modern female 
novelists authored many of the selections.  The most frequent choice was Bing Xin 
(1900-1999), a popular female novelist and professor at Yanjing University in Beijing, 
who appears seven times in the textbooks.  The editors also selected two works by the 
famous modern author Lu Xun. Lu’s inclusion is interesting because some have claimed 
that his works were banned in Manchukuo during the 1930s (Qi 1997, 127). 
 The boys’ and girls’ middle school Chinese language studies texts of the 1940s, 
therefore, are for the most part collections of pre-modern and modern literary works, 
mostly by Chinese authors, and include relatively few propaganda messages about 
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Manchukuo, Japan, or the war.  Most present a positive picture of China.  They show 
that elements within the education bureaucracy still thought Manchukuo national 
identity and culture should be linked to Chinese culture, and therefore be distinctly 
different from Japanese identity and Japanese culture.  I have not encountered any 
other middle school textbooks published in Japanese colonies or occupied areas from 
this era which contain so few materials about the war effort, the state, and Japan.  One 
should keep in mind, however, that Manchukuo middle schools from 1938 to 1945 
taught Chinese language studies only three hours a week.  Middle school students 
spent more of their time in Japanese language studies class (six hours a week), and in a 
combined morals, history, and geography course (an average of four hours a week).  
The textbooks for these courses contained much more ideological material than the 
Chinese language studies textbooks. 
 
Table 5.6: Themes in the 1940-1943 middle school Chinese language studies textbooks 
 
Girls’ #1-2    Boys #3-4 
7-8th grades.  9-10th grades 
1942.10, 1942.7               1943.10, 1940.10 
Practical 29.8% 22.7% 
National 21.8% 19.2% 
Literary 48.4% 58.2% 
Hard State 11.5%  6.1% 
Japan related 11.3%  9.6% 
Hard + Japan 19.5% 10.5% 
West related 13.5%  (all positive)  9.6%  (all positive) 
Manchukuo related   8.7%  6.3% 
China related 68.6% 81.8% 
Manchukuo Emperor  0.0%  1.3% 
Japan Emperor  1.3%  1.8% 
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Middle school Japanese language and morals texts   
 In contrast to the middle school Chinese language studies texts, Japanese 
language and morals texts published in the Shingakusei era, particularly in the 1940s, 
were filled with state-centered and pro-Japanese materials. The Education Bureau 
published eight Japanese language studies textbooks for the four grades of middle 
school.  The bureau farmed out the editing of the first four textbooks, published from 
1938 to 1939, to Ōide Masayoshi, a private citizen discussed in Chapter 4.  The 
Textbook Editing Department of the bureau edited the last four, all of which were 
published in 1941.  Six of these texts have been found, three of Ōide’s and three of the 
1941 volumes.   
 Of the chapters edited by Ōide, 17% are hard state and 31% are Japan-related, 
which are about the same ratios as the 1935 lower middle Japanese language textbooks.  
Ōide included discussion of the Manchukuo and Japanese Emperors in his textbooks, 
(they appeared in 7% and 4% of the chapters respectively), as well as a few positive 
portrayals of Japanese military figures and descriptions of cooperation between 
Manchurians and Japanese during the Manchurian Incident.  In the majority of 
chapters about Japan and Manchukuo, however, he focused on literary, cultural, and 
geographic issues rather than the state or military.  Many of the chapters try to appeal 
to students on a personal level.  Some are written from the point of view of a Chinese 
middle school student living in a school dorm, discussing his daily lifestyle.  Others 
tell stories of friendly (if paternalistic) personal relationships between Japanese and 
Manchurians.  One that stands out in particular is the story of a sick Manchurian army 
officer.  At the hospital two Japanese gallantly offer their blood for a transfusion.  
Although the officer finally succumbs to his illness, he first thanks the Japanese doctors, 
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and says, “Japanese blood now flows through my own body.  Even if I die, I have 
nothing to regret” (Ōide 1939b, 135-139).  Ōide’s textbooks, therefore, avoid trying to 
overawe the students with lofty words about the Emperor and state, and instead try to 
win them through appeals to an emotional bond between the two countries.     
 While Terada instituted a decrease in ideological messages in lower elementary 
school Chinese language textbooks in 1941 and 1942, just the opposite occurred in 
middle school Japanese language textbooks.  The 1941 middle school Japanese 
language textbooks edited within the Education Bureau include almost twice as much 
hard state and Japan-related material as the Ōide textbooks.  There is nearly the same 
amount of material about Japanese history, geography, and culture, but there is much 
more about the Japanese state and its political and military ties with Manchukuo.  The 
1941 textbooks, unlike those written by Ōide, include almost no references to school 
lifestyle, instead many of the chapters discuss Manchukuo’s army and factories, 
probably because the government intended many of the students to become soldiers and 
industrial employees (see Table 5.7). 
 Among the militarist and state-centered chapters in the 1941 middle school 
Japanese language studies textbooks is one purported to be a letter to a young 
Manchurian army recruit from his older brother, encouraging him put all his trust in 
Japan, a country with a “peerless army” and a divine Emperor.  “Our ancestors are 
looking on from afar at our present day efforts,” he reminds his brother (Minsei-bu 
Kyōiku-shi 1941a, 57-64).  In another students from Japan, Manchukuo, and China are 
portrayed as writing words of encouragement to each other about their common work in 
the creation of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 
1942b, 89-99).  The last chapter of the 8th and final Japanese language studies textbook 
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describes the 1940 Guoben Dianding Zhaoshu rescript, in which Amaterasu the 
country’s “foremost god,” and the subsequent construction of shrines to Amaterasu at 
the capital and near each school.  “The establishment of our country”, it states, “and all 
its developments since then derive from the divine virtues of Japan’s Great Ancestor 
Amaterasu Ōkami, and the protection of the living god the Japanese Emperor” (144).  
The Manchukuo Emperor is presented as the link between these Japanese principles and 
his state, “The Manchukuo Emperor reveres the Japanese Emperor as a father-king, and 
his ancestor, Amaterasu, as the founding divinity of our country . . . [T]he Way of the 
gods is the principle ideology of our country, deriving from the Manchukuo Emperor’s 
firm conviction and understanding” (145).  This final chapter probably was the kind of 
material about which Terada and his allies expressed their wariness, in fear that such 
blatant submission to extreme Japanese imperial concepts would destroy the illusion of 
Manchukuo independence (Ishimori 1970, 82-83, Tamura 1941, 36-37, Terada 1941, 
223).  It is the only chapter from the Japanese and Chinese language studies textbooks 
from the pre-1943 period to mention the Guoben Dianding Zhaoshu rescript, and its 
placement at the end of the final textbook in the series may have been their way of 
bowing to pressure from the central government to include the material, while tucking it 
away in an obscure location.80 
                                                          
80 Volume #8, which included the chapter on Amaterasu as the state’s “leading god”, probably was not 
used in many middle schools, because the middle school Japanese language studies textbooks were 
written at impractical high language levels.  Hori Toshio, a Fengtain Provincial education inspector and 
Japanese language teacher at Nanman College, wrote several articles published in the 1940s in which he 
complained that the Japanese texts were too difficult for students.  In one he describes teaching a 9th 
grade class at one of the stronger middle schools in Fengtian City a lesson from a 9th grade textbook, 
which ended in failure because of the students’ inability to comprehend the Japanese (Hori 1942b).  He 
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Table 5.7: Themes in the 1938-1943 middle school Japanese language textbooks 
 
             #1-3     #5, 7-8    #1   
             (Ōide)    (state)    (state) 
1938-1939      1941      1943.5 
Practical 33.6 26.5 15.4 
National 43.6 55.8 80.4 
Literary 22.8 17.5  4.2 
Hard State 16.6 37.8 69.2 
Japan related 31.0 44.1 66.7 
  State  4.4 12.1  
  In Manchukuo 5.3 11.2  
  History 4.4  1.6  
  Culture 15.0 12.4  
  Geography 1.8  6.7  
Manchukuo related 38.1 50.3  
  State 13.3 29.7  
  Other modern  6.2  9.4  
  Geography 17.7  8.3  
  History  0.9  2.9  
China  4.4  6.5  6.1 
West  5.5 17.8 18.2 
Manchukuo Emperor  6.9  9.5  3.0 
Japan Emperor  3.6  9.9  6.1 
 
 
 While there was a wide variation in the ratio of ideological and non-ideological 
material in the Japanese and Chinese language studies textbooks published in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
also said that Nanman College, which accepted graduates from the middle schools, started its first-year 
students from the second volume (7th grade) of the middle school textbooks (Hori 1940b).   
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post-Shingakusei period, the morals textbooks published for middle schools during this 
period appear to have been extremely ideological in nature.  Terada intimated his 
displeasure with these textbooks after the war, so this may have been an area where he 
had little control (Terada 1975, 85).     
No morals textbooks were published for the elementary schools in the 
1938-1942 period because the morals curriculum was folded into the omnibus national 
people’s studies course.  There was a separate morals course in middle schools, 
although the course name changed in 1938 from “ethics” ()*) to “national people’s 
morals” (+).  Both Japanese and Chinese language morals textbooks for the 
boys’ and girls’ middle schools were published during the 1938-1942 period, only one 
has been found, a Chinese language text for the first grade of girls’ middle school (7th 
grade overall), published in October 1942 (see Table 5.8).  This textbook is even more 
state-centered than the 1941 middle school Japanese language studies textbooks (72%), 
referred more often to Japan (67%), and contains several references to Amaterasu and 
State Shintō.   
 Only the first chapter of this textbook discusses the role of women.  It 
encourages girls to prepare to be mothers who will strengthen the country by preserving 
the home, and instructs them to educate and morally train their children, comfort their 
husbands, and preserve the family’s traditions, health, and finances. 
 The Manchukuo Emperor appears in nearly half of the textbook’s chapters, and 
almost every time his link with the Japanese Emperor is mentioned.  Rather than a 
Chinese Emperor in the traditional mold, the textbook portrays the Manchukuo Emperor 
as a conduit of power from a divine source of virtue, the Japanese Emperor. A major 
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difference from other textbooks of this period is the frequent description of State Shintō 
rituals associated with the Japanese Emperor, and the place of Amaterasu as the 
“leading god” of both Japan and Manchukuo.  Among these are two chapters which 
emphasize the importance the declarations of Amaterasu’s oracle at the Ise Shrine.  
These chapters connect both emperors’ “morality” with the oracles, and thereby the 
divine.  So while State Shintō was not mentioned in the middle school Chinese 
language studies textbooks, and referred to only once in the last chapter of the Japanese 
language studies textbooks, it appears to have been a major theme in the morals 
textbooks.  
 
Table 5.8: Themes in the 1942 girls’ middle school morals textbook 
 
      7th grade 
                  1942.10 
Hard State 71.5 
Japan related 66.5 
Manchukuo related 52.2 
China related 24.6 
West-positive 16.5 
West-negative 10.6 
Manchukuo Emperor 48.0 
Japan Emperor 48.0 
State Shinto 17.8 
 
The 1943 system 
 In 1943 the Manchukuo government instituted a series of changes in the 
education system.  The Ministry of Education, reduced to the level of a bureau in 1937, 
was recreated.  In elementary school the omnibus national people’s studies curriculum 
was split into three subjects: science, national language (Japanese and Chinese), and 
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“state founding spirit” (morals).  In higher elementary and middle schools the morals, 
history, and geography curriculum were merged into “state founding spirit”.  As war 
conditions worsened, an increasing amount of school time was spent in labor service 
and military drills, particularly in the middle schools and colleges.  Some former 
students report that it got to the point in agricultural middle schools that classroom 
instruction occurred only on rainy days.   
The government directed the Textbook Editing Division to begin a complete 
revision of the textbooks to reflect wartime conditions.  Because of a paper shortage, 
however, few new textbooks were published (Terada 1943, 97).  Two have been 
found: a teacher’s manual for elementary school 1st grade state founding spirit (morals) 
course, and a middle school 7th grade Japanese language studies textbook.81   
 The elementary school morals teacher’s manual, published in February 1943, is 
a clear indication that any attempts by Terada and his allies to limit the amount of 
ideological material in the first years of elementary school had now ended.  65% of the 
chapters contain hard state material, much of it about the war.  The first chapter 
teaches students how to bow to the Imperial portraits.  The second introduces the idea 
of worshiping Amaterasu.  Another gave instructions about what days to fly the 
national flag in front of ones house.82  Many of the chapters refer to honoring the 
military, including visits to memorials for the war dead.   The 8th of each month is set 
                                                          
81 I have also recently found a 1944 elementary school 2nd grade Chinese language studies textbook, 
although I have not yet analyzed its content. 
 
82 A 1943 survey by a Chinese elementary school teacher in rural Tonghua Province found that out of 
280 families whose children attended the school, only 23 owned a Manchukuo flag, and only five of those 
owned a Japanese flag as well (Zhao 1943, 101). 
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aside for special lessons about the war, as also occurred in schools in Japan.   One 
section instructs teachers to ameliorate student concerns about the rationing system and 
their general poverty by telling them that conditions are even worse in the enemy 
countries.  It then provides the teachers with detailed stories of those conditions.  
About England, for example, they claim all supplies of heating coal had been exhausted, 
and police were powerless to stop looters.  In the United States saboteurs were 
destroying industrial production, and race riots were breaking out in all cities.  In 
Nationalist China the people were wasting away in caves.  The text then instructs 
teachers to “not be abstract” in their descriptions of their enemies’ sufferings 
(Wenjiao-bu 1943, 136-138).  Another story provided to teachers is a history of the 
East Asian conflict told as a children’s play, with each major country anthmorphosized 
as characters.  The Western countries are portrayed as dissembling robbers, China as a 
foolish drug addict, Japan as a fearless defender of Asia, and Manchukuo as “the cute, 
precious child of Japan.”83   
                                                          
83 “Asia is sleeping.  Without a word, someone has snuck into Manchuria.  One, two, three of them.  
No, they are not visitors.  They are burglars—white men, with pointy noses.  One of them 
immediately waves a gun, and frightens the people, saying, ‘Hand over Manchuria!’  China is surprised, 
and starts shaking violently.  Japan immediately gets up, and knocks the burglar down.  This burglar’s 
name is Russia.   
“Russia is bitter about Japan beating it, but can’t do anything about it.  The other two burglars see 
this, and hide their guns behind them.  They say in sweet voices, ‘Everyone, let’s be friends’.  Then 
they turn to each other and mockingly stick their tongues out.  These two robbers have stolen goods 
from throughout the world, and have come to steal Asia’s things.  However, seeing how Japan defeated 
Russia, they have suddenly become scared.  ‘Everyone, let’s be friends’, they say, trying to trick Asia. 
“Because Japan fully understands the robbers’ evil hearts, it repeatedly warns China, ‘These men are 
dangerous robbers.  Don’t be tricked by them’.  China, however, does not listen.  ‘They are wearing 
beautiful clothes, and have brought many presents, they must be good visitors’, China thinks.  ‘Welcome, 
visitors, please come in, let’s be friends’, it says. 
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“What are the visitor’s gifts?  A terrible drug, opium.  When the Chinese people smoke this drug, 
they become very sick.  Their bodies and spirits rot away, and they cannot work or study.  Then, with 
eyes glittering, the robbers pull out their guns.  They are the Britain and the United States.  They say to 
sick China, ‘Give us your goods, your land, your money’, and take it all away.  Japan is concerned, and 
says over and over, ‘Wake up. Don’t let them cheat you’.  But China turns on Japan instead.  Japan 
feels sorry for China, whose heart has been depraved by the robbers’ drugs.  In order to revive China’s 
bad heart, it gives it a hard slap.  China begins to sob, and says to the robbers, ‘Japan hit me! Help me!’ 
Then the robbers, bringing many of their underlings, begin threatening Japan.  But Japan faces them 
undaunted.   
“Strong Japan, just Japan, raises its fists, and glares at them, saying, ‘Come on robbers, I am ready 
for you’.  Then, someone tears themselves from the robber’s grasp, and flies to the side of Japan.  It is 
our Manchukuo.  Manchukuo, the cute, precious child of Japan.  Seeing this, the robbers get red-faced 
with anger.  They try to crush the newly born country.  But it is safe, because Japan, the greatest 
country in the world, is here.  Japan has helped our country, and gradually we are becoming great. 
“Around this time, Russia begins to bully our country.  As soon as it does, Japan immediately 
defeats it.  1200 of its airplanes are shot down, and Russia says, ‘I am tired of fighting with Manchukuo’, 
and runs away.  Then Britain and the United States join hands, and trick China again.  They say to it, 
‘We’re here for you, slap Japan back’. So China turns on Japan.  Japan angrily says to it, ‘You pitiful 
thing, you’ve been tricked by those two again.  Aren’t you scared of them robbing you?’  But China 
does not listen. 
“Britain, the United States, and Russia lend airplanes, artillery, and big guns to China, and it goes to 
war with Japan.  But how can it think it is a match for the Japanese army?  The Chinese army is routed 
by the Japanese army, and it flees to the deep hills of Chongqing.  In its hiding place, the Chinese army 
haughtily says, ‘Here we are safe.  The Japanese army won’t come here’.  But the Japanese army’s 
airplanes suddenly fly to Chongqing and rains bombs on it.  Fires burn everything.  The Chinese 
soldiers flee into holes like moles. 
“Japan is certainly not trying to bully China.  It is fighting China in order to save it from the hands 
of the robbers.  It is fighting in order to help China and build a great Asia.  In the midst of this, in 
China friends of Japan and Manchukuo are made.  New China sees how old China was tricked by the 
robbers, and gets angry.  Japan, Manchukuo, and the new China unite their power and hearts, and turn 
on the enemy.  The enemies sees this, and bring even more of their underlings to besiege Japan. 
Japan has been patient for a long time, but now it is really mad, and it suddenly attacks, cutting off the 
enemies’ hands and feet.  At this time a country named Thailand joins our group.  Our numbers are 
growing: Japan, Manchukuo, new China, and Thailand.  The enemies are surprised by Japan’s sudden 
act.  ‘Oh, Japan has ships that move as quickly as airplanes.’  ‘Worse, they have something called 
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 69% of the middle school 7th grade Japanese language studies textbook, 
published in May 1943, is made up of hard state material, which is twice as much as the 
already state-centered 1941 textbooks.  Besides chapters about Amaterasu and general 
cooperation with Japan, nearly a third of the textbook contains war-related material.  
For example one chapter lionizes a self-sacrificing soldier serving in China, while 
another describes the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Besides the chapters on the Japanese 
army, there are also several chapters depicting local Manchukuo soldiers involved in the 
war effort by protecting the railway lines from bandits and patrolling the northern 
border with the Soviet Union.  This may show a shift in the leadership’s conception of 
the Manchukuo population from being chiefly a source of economic labor toward 
becoming more active in the military side of Japan’s war effort.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
human torpedoes.  They ride the bombs, and blow us up.’  ‘They do such dangerous things?  Don’t 
they care about their lives?’  ‘No, the Japanese are so scary because they gladly give up their lives for 
their country’. 
“The blue-eyed robbers go pale.  Their legs shake violently.  Manchukuo has now come to its full 
strength, and begins helping Japan.  Because strong Manchukuo is striving so hard, Russia is scared, and 
does not come to our enemies’ aid.  And Manchukuo is not just staring down Russia.  In thanks it sends 
aid to Japan, including food, coal, and metal. Manchukuo is working to do all it can to help Japan 
establish a truly great Asia.  Sending every bit of kaoliang and soybeans to Japan is more important than 
anything.  It wishes it could give even more coal to Japan. 
“Please to not forget this most important spirit.  If you do forget it, you would be ungrateful to Japan 
for its many favors.  It was terrible in the past when robbers came and bullied everyone, wasn’t it?  
Please understand that now Manchukuo has united with Japan to fight Asia’s enemies (Wenjiao-bu 1943, 
139-149). 
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The 1938-1943 textbooks compared to textbooks in Korea 
 The Korean colonial government published the Fourth Korean Textbook Series 
in 1939-1941, in order to reflect the changes in the education system instituted by the 
start of the kōmin-ka movement in late 1937.  While the Korean language studies and 
Japanese language studies from the previous Second and Third Textbook Series include 
many references to Korean history and geography, the government erased nearly all 
such references in the Fourth Series.  Not a single historical Korean appears in any of 
the Fourth Series textbooks.  There are some depictions of nameless contemporary 
Koreans, almost all of which are portrayed as following Japanese customs such as 
wearing Japanese clothes, bowing toward the direction of the Imperial palace, and 
flying Japanese flags.  Korean language studies was reduced to the status of an 
optional subject in 1938, and Korean language textbooks were made only for the 1st 
grade.  The number of chapters about the military and Japanese myths nearly tripled in 
the elementary Japanese language and morals textbooks, while the number of chapters 
about State Shintō doubled in those same texts (Yi 1985, 461-495).  A final Fifth 
Series, produced in 1942-1944, continued in this direction, becoming nearly identical 
with the textbooks used in Japan.  Clearly, 1937-1939 was a fundamental turning point 
in Korean colonial education. 
 Manchukuo education went through its own turning point during these same 
years.  As in Korea, Japanese language instruction increased, native language 
instruction decreased (although not nearly as drastically), and the amount of material 
about the occupied region’s history decreased.  One difference was that one 
Manchurian, the Manchukuo Emperor, appeared frequently in the Manchukuo 
textbooks, while there was no comparable figure for the Korea textbooks.  Besides the 
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Manchukuo Emperor, very few Manchurian historical figures appear in the Manchukuo 
elementary school texts in the post-Shingakusei period.  The middle school Chinese 
language studies texts were the one exception to this trend, they included many positive 
stories about contemporary figures from Manchuria and the rest of China.  The number 
of military-related chapters increased in Manchukuo textbooks, although somewhat 
behind the Korean curve, spiking up in the 1942 middle morals textbook and the 1943 
textbooks.  The number of references to State Shintō also was high only in the 1942 
middle morals textbook and the 1943 textbooks, three to four years after a similar rise in 
the Korean textbooks.  No analytical study of the Korean middle school textbooks has 
yet been done, but it is doubtful there were any Korean equivalents to the Manchukuo 
middle school Chinese language studies textbooks, which mention Japan only briefly 
and continue to assert the importance of Chinese culture and the region’s independent 
history as a part of Manchukuo identity.  The Manchukuo textbooks, therefore, 
followed many of the trends of the Korean textbooks in the 1938-1942 period, but for 
the most part did not go as far (or as rapidly) toward an emphasis on the Japanese 
language over the native language, the removal of materials which admitted the 
existence of a local identity within the Japanese empire, and a preponderance of 
materials about the military, Japan’s myths, and State Shintō. 
 
School Ceremonies 
The nature of Manchukuo school ceremonies mirrored the changes which 
occurred in the textbooks in response to changes in state ideology.  They went from 
ceremonies which depicted the society as independent and Confucian-centered, to ones 
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which were increasingly Japan-centered, implying the superiority of Japan’s language 
and polity, and demanding the students support Japan’s war.   
In the 1932-1937 period most school ceremonies appear to have been 
traditional Chinese ceremonies.  As mentioned previously, one of the Education 
Ministry’s first acts was to establish the Festival of Confucius as a central part of the 
annual school calendar.  There were some innovations, including State Founding Day 
and the Emperor’s Birthday, and there are two passages in the 1935 textbooks which 
encouraged students to fly the state flag outside their homes on those days.  Japanese 
icons, however, for the most part did not appear in school ceremonies in this period, 
according to the testimonies of former students.84 
After 1938, however, the government discontinued most of the traditional 
Chinese ceremonies, and began to focus on those which glorified the Manchukuo and 
Japanese emperors.  A September 10, 1940 law established seven “celebration days” 
and four “commemoration days” for schools throughout the country.  The celebration 
days were: New Years, the Manchukuo Emperor’s birthday, Japan’s Founding Day 
(Kigensetsu), Manchukuo’s Founding Day, the Japanese Emperor’s birthday, the 
anniversary of Pu Yi’s first visit to Japan, and a day in honor of Amaterasu.  The four 
commemoration days included two separate days in honor of soldiers who died in the 
establishment of Manchukuo, and two traditional events celebrating the planting and 
harvesting seasons (Su 2000, 2).  Three of the eleven, therefore, were traditional 
Chinese events, while four focused on the Japanese imperial house.  Also, all schools 
                                                          
84 One exception is the testimony of Meng Shaomin, who was an elemtary student in Liaodong Province 
when Manchukuo was cretaed.  He claimed Mancukuo schools flew both the flags of both Japan and 
Manchukuo as early as 1932 (Qi 1997, 125). 
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were required to hold daily morning devotionals in which rescripts supposedly written 
by the Manchukuo Emperor were read, and the students paid obeisance in the direction 
of the palaces of both emperors.  Older students were expected to memorize the 
rescripts in Japanese as well as Chinese.  Special buildings dedicated to housing a 
portrait of the Manchukuo Emperor were constructed at most schools, and the students 
were expected to treat the portrait with the utmost respect, mimicking an established 
practice in schools in Japan (Nomura 1995, Qi 1997, 204). 
 The number of longer special commemorations increased over the years, and 
became increasingly Japan-centered.  Because the Huiluan Rescript was promulgated 
on May 2, 1935 special ceremonies were held on 2nd of each month.  After the Pacific 
War began on December 8, 1941, special ceremonies were held on the 8th of each month 
to honor the war dead and strengthen martial spirit. 
 On December 8, 1942, on the first anniversary of the commencement of the 
Pacific War, the Manchukuo government promulgated an oath designed to be recited in 
schools and workplaces.  Named “Precepts of the People” (J. Kokumin-kun), it began 
with a pledge to recognize the Shinto “way of the gods” as the foundation of the country, 
reflecting the change in state ideology after Pu Yi’s second visit to Japan in 1940.  It 
also contained pledges of loyalty to the Manchukuo emperor, diligence in labor, 
personal honor, and unity in accomplishing the goals of the state and the Greater East 
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.  Testimonies from former students indicate the recitation 
of this oath became a central part of school ceremonies.  Elementary students were 
expected to recite it in Chinese, while middle school students recited it in Japanese.  It 
was also recited at morning devotionals by soldiers and industrial workers (Nomura 
1995).  In testimonies gathered after the war, many former students single out these 
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ceremonies as the most objectionable part of Manchukuo education (Isoda 1994, Qi 
1997). 
 
Conclusion 
 There are few available post-war descriptions of the internal workings of 
Manchukuo’s education bureaucracy, so figuring out who supported what positions is a 
bit like fumbling about in the dark.  Clearly, however, some elements within the 
bureaucracy, like Kamimura and Terada, wanted to create a consciousness of 
Manchurians as an independent people, with their own unique culture and history.  
They, like a handful of other Japanese officials, believed in the vision of Manchukuo 
becoming a partner with Japan by its own free will.  Even if they realized that was not 
the true state of affairs, they probably hoped that by teaching these principles in schools, 
the ideas could become self-fulfilling.  Several Manchukuo textbooks bear their 
imprints, such as the 1934 middle school morals textbooks and the 1941 middle school 
Chinese language studies textbooks.  For the most part, however, the Manchukuo 
textbooks became increasingly centered on teaching loyalty to the state and deference to 
Japan.  In 1934 Manchukuo society was presented as an ideal mixture of Chinese 
literary culture, a heritage of rugged military and pastoral traditions from the Manchus 
and Mongols, and modernity provided by a friendly Japan.  After 1938 the historically 
independent and Chinese aspects of the culture were deemphasized in all but a few 
hours of middle school instruction, and the image of Manchukuo dependent on and 
obedient to Japan was accentuated.  After 1943, Manchukuo government policy had all 
but in name gone the way of Korea and Taiwan toward kōmin-ka, making the people 
into Japanese imperial subjects.  The images of Manchukuo presented in the textbooks 
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at the end was as Japan’s “cute, precious child”, and the people were depicted as 
railway guards, a lowly position in the ranks of Japan’s disintegrating military.  
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Epilogue 
Manchukuo as a window on the soul of Japanese colonialism 
 Why study Manchukuo’s education?  One might say that it can help us 
understand present-day Northeast China more fully, but this is a problematic position.   
Recent scholarship has discovered significant physical, economic, and social legacies of 
Japanese colonialism in Korea and Taiwan.  For example Carter Eckert has found 
substantial economic and social structures in Korea which date from the years of the 
Japanese occupation (Eckert 1996), and Leo Ching has shown the colonial legacy 
informs the discourse of separation from China which persists in Taiwan (Ching 2001).  
In Northeast China, however, the residual marks of the Japanese imperial experience are 
more difficult to find.  In August 1945 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and 
swept through Manchuria, destroying the Kwantung Army in less than a week and 
looting much of the most valuable industrial equipment.  The region was subsequently 
reincorporated into the Chinese state.  Although Manchukuo policies left their marks 
in terms of city planning and to some degree industrial development, it is difficult to 
find substantial signs of the Manchukuo legacy in the post-war social structures in 
Northeast China.  Moreover, the Communist Chinese government’s unyielding 
opposition to the development of sub-national regional identities has destroyed any 
conception of a regional “Northeastern” identity which may have otherwise persisted. 
As far as education, the number of students attending schools increased 
significantly during the Manchukuo period (see Table 4.8), and real strides were made 
in the areas of general literacy and middle school vocational education, although similar 
advances might well have taken place without Japanese involvement.  Also the 
physical results of education policies, the school buildings themselves, remained.  It is 
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difficult to ascertain how much Manchukuo education “convinced” the students of its 
various messages, and to what degree those convictions persisted after the war.  All 
indications suggest that the general public’s distrust and fear of the Japanese, fostered 
by Japan’s military actions from 1931 through 1934, never dissipated during the 
Manchukuo era.  Chinese children and parents, however, faced with the choice of 
accepting or rejecting a modern education laced with the ideology of the invader, 
overwhelming chose to accept.    
Rather than looking at Manchukuo education as a building block for the future 
of Northeast China, however, I hold that it is a window for understanding the 
complicated nature of Japanese colonial thought and procedures.  Manchukuo’s 
institutional separation from the Japanese government gave a variety of actors the 
breathing room to treat the country as a testing ground for their ideas, many of them 
working at cross-purposes.  Manchukuo education illustrates the contested and ad-hoc 
nature of Japanese colonialism.  
The curriculum created for Manchukuo schools and the application of the 
curriculum show what the leading Japanese officials in the country wanted the young 
people to think and how they wanted them to act.  In 1934, the state leadership allowed 
the Ministry of Education, led by Zheng and Kamimura, a degree of independence in 
the formation of policies.  They tried to teach children to see themselves as part of an 
important new project, an unprecedented attempt to create a new kind of society which 
mixed the best parts of East Asia’s historical legacy with a new vision of the future.  
They used familiar Chinese concepts, particularly the Confucian idea of an ideal 
government responsive to the needs of the people, as well as asserting a unique regional 
history marked by the martial spirit of the Manchus and Mongols.  Added to these 
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legacies, the officials encouraged the students to accept their version of “ethnic 
harmony,” and thereby acquiesce to the current state of Japanese political and economic 
dominance.  They did not, however, frequently refer directly to Japan in the textbooks, 
nor did they emphasize Japanese language study.  They did not expect the students to 
model themselves on the Japanese.  Manchukuo officials encouraged students to 
understand and respect Japan as a great nation, but also to proudly assert a legacy 
presented to them as their own.  They tried to teach the students to see their state as a 
truly independent entity which entered into a partnership with Japan of its own volition.  
In 1935 the central state authorities took greater control of Manchukuo 
education, and began to change the state ideology to one more closely linked to Japan.  
The state began encouraging the students to look to Japan as the superior in its 
relationship to Manchukuo, and moved toward the use of national and mythical symbols 
intended to create a sense of awe among the students.  They continued, however, to use 
appeals to the region’s Chinese cultural and independent legacies. 
In 1938 the trend toward teaching students to identify with Japan and speak 
Japanese gained momentum, as did the use of national symbols, particularly the 
Emperors.  A new emphasis on the Japanese language was part of an assertion among 
some Japanese that the process of learning the language could change the very nature of 
the students, allowing them to feel the “Japanese spirit” and thereby become friendlier 
to Japan.  The messages of Manchukuo’s long independent history and proud Chinese 
cultural heritage all but disappeared, except in the middle school Chinese language 
textbooks.  Textbooks shifted from a focus on encouraging greater agricultural 
productivity to one which emphasized the industrial economy, probably a reflection of 
the perceived needs of the first five-year plan.  Despite these shifts, however, liberal 
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officials in the education bureaucracy, such as Terada, worked to limit the amount of the 
most chauvinistic material, such as sections which praised the Japanese military or 
taught that the Japanese imperial house was descended from the gods.  
In 1943, however, the pressures of the war enabled the government to defeat 
the efforts of Terada and his colleagues, and the schools began teaching much more 
about the military, encouraging the students to honor soldiers and become brave fighters 
themselves.  This reflected the implementation of Manchukuo’s army conscription 
system in 1942, enacted because of the shift of many Japanese troops from the 
Manchukuo/Soviet border to battle zones in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.  The 1943 
textbooks also included much more material about Shinto myths, as part of the 
government’s efforts beginning in 1940 to make State Shinto and Amaterasu central to 
the state’s ideology.  This represented a further step in the attempt to have the students 
feel the “Japanese spirit”.   
While the Manchukuo government always intended to use education to further 
Japan’s goals, the methods they used changed considerably over time.  The switch 
from rational argument to a reliance on the “spirit” of the Japanese language and finally 
State Shinto to win over the population reflected the general trend in the Japanese 
empire away from the ideas of gradualists like Gotō Shimpei, who insisted colonial 
policies must be based on some kind of “reason” or “science”, to those of nativists, who 
relied on the perceived power of the Japanese spirit to convert the population.       
 In Manchukuo Japanese officials experimented with what was to them a new 
form of colonial control, the puppet state.  They took the lessons learned there in the 
establishment of subsequent puppet states in Inner Mongolia and China.  For example 
Ōide Masayoshi and Iizuka Michio, two leading textbook editors, went on to edit 
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textbooks for puppet governments in occupied China in 1936 and 1937 (Komagome 
1996).  Nishimoto Tetsumitsu, a former student of Terada’s at Kyōsen and a 
Manchukuo textbook editor under Terada, was sent to one of the Inner Mongolian 
puppet states in 1939 to lead their textbook department (Terada 1975).  Officials and 
teachers with experience in Manchukuo took education positions in locations 
throughout occupied China during the war years.     
Finally, in the context of the wider world, Manchukuo education provides an 
example of government ideology and policy in a multi-ethnic society in which a 
minority group controls the levers of power, and can act as a contrast in studies of 
places such as the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union and the black South 
African homelands of the 1970s and 1980s.  For example, both the Soviet Union and 
Japan expected the people of their client states to accept a certain civic ideology and 
identity while retaining their ethnic identity.  In the 1920s the Soviet central 
government expected the minority nationalities to accept communism and a “Soviet” 
civic identity, but they also encouraged the minorities to keep their own languages and 
culture, and run their own local governments (Martin 2001).  In two major ways, 
however, the Manchukuo government’s policies were more intrusive.  First, in the 
Soviet case, it was an intellectual construct the people were expected to accept 
(Marxism), while in Manchukuo after 1938 it was an emotional one, the “Japanese 
spirit”.  Second, Marxism could be taught in any language, but Japanese spirit, the 
Manchukuo officials held, could be taught only in Japanese.   
While both governments intended to change the people through education, the 
Soviets of the 1920s aimed more for the intellect, the head, while the Manchukuo 
officials of the period from 1938 to 1945 aimed more toward emotion, or the heart.  
  315 
This overconfidence in the power of the Japanese spirit, perhaps more than anything 
else, accounted for Japan’s military overextension and eventual defeat.  
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Glossary 
 
Pinyin  Wade-Giles/Other Japanese Character 
Dalian     Dairen   
Changchun Ch’angch’un     
Fengtain  Mukden     	
 
Guandong Kwantung        
Heilongjiang Heilungkiang     
Jilin  Kirin      
Liaodong Liaotung     
Manzhouguo Manchukuo     
Xinjing  Hsiking   Shinkyō   
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Manchuria education timeline 
 
1905 
September Japan and Russia sign the Portsmouth Treaty, ending the 
Russo-Japanese War, and cedes a lease to the Liaodong 
Peninsula to Japan. Japan renames the ceded region the 
Kwantung Leased Territory. 
 
1906 
June Japan creates the semi-public South Manchurian Railway 
Company (SMR).  The Kwantung territorial government 
and the SMR began opening schools. 
 
1912 
January   The Chinese Republic is established. 
 
1925 The SMR establishes the Manchurian Education Specialty 
School (Kyōsen), under the direction of Hobo Takashi.  
 
1928 
December Zhang Xueliang declares an alliance with the Guomindang 
government. 
 
1931 
September Plotters from the Kwantung Army stage an explosion which 
they use as an excuse to begin occupying all of Manchuria. 
 
1932 
March The state of Manchukuo is established, with Pu Yi as 
President, and Zheng Xiaoxu as Prime Minister.  Kamimura 
Tetsuya, a former SMR official, is named as the head of the 
Education Bureau, a division of the Civil Affairs Ministry. 
 
July The Ministry of Education is created, with Zheng Xiaoxu as 
Minister, and Kamimura Tetsuya as School Affairs and 
General Affairs Director. 
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September Nishiyama Masai, a former Japan Ministry of Education 
official, becomes General Affairs Director, while Kamimura 
remains as School Affairs Director.  A period of struggle 
between the “Monbusho faction” and “local faction” begins. 
 
1933 
May Japan and China sign the Tanggu Truce, by which the 
Chinese Nationalist government implicitly recognized 
Japanese control over Manchuria. 
 
1934 
March Pu Yi becomes the Manchukuo Emperor. 
 
September  The Ministry of Education publishes its first textbook series. 
      
1935 
March Nishiyama Masai and Kamimura Tetsuya are removed from 
their leadership positions in the Ministry of Education, 
replaced by Kume Nario and Kamio Kazuharu. 
 
April Pu Yi visits Japan and meets the Japanese Emperor.  Upon 
his return he promulgates the Huiluan Rescript, in which he 
declared his loyalty to Japan. 
 
May Japanese officials force Zheng Xiaoxu from office.  Zhang 
Jinghui becomes the second prime minister. 
 
December The Ministry of Education publishes its second textbook 
series. 
 
 
 
1936 
July The Ministry of Education produces its first plan for a new 
education system. 
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August Minagawa Toyoji is named General Affairs Director and 
Tsutomi Tsukuda is named School Affairs Director of the 
Ministry of Education.  The creation of a new education 
system becomes the main focus of their tenure. 
 
1937 
May The Manchukuo government promulgates the Shingakusei 
(New Education System). 
 
June The government dissolves the Ministry of Education, and the 
education bureaucracy are shifted into the newly created 
Education Bureau within the Civil Affairs Ministry.  
Minagawa Toyoji is named first director of the bureau. 
 
July Marco Polo Bridge Incident. 
 
December Nanjing falls to Japanese military. 
 
1938 
January The Shingakusei (New Education System) is enacted.  
Japanese, Chinese, and Mongolian are declared the national 
languages.  The Education Bureau begins publishing an 
entirely new set of textbooks, meant to replace the 1934-1935 
textbooks. 
 
August Tamura Toshio replaces Minagawa as director of the 
Education Bureau.  
 
November Terada Kijirō is named director of the Education Bureau 
Textbook Editing Department. 
 
 
 
  320 
1940 
May Pu Yi travels to Japan for the second time.  After his return, 
the government promulgates the Guoben Dianding Zhaoshu, 
which declares Amaterasu as the country’s “foremost god”.  
The government builds Shintō shrines at the imperial palace 
and at many schools. 
 
1941 
March Kida Kiyoshi is named director of the Education Bureau. 
 
December Japan goes to war with the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
1943 
January The Education Bureau enacts a revision of the elementary 
and middle school curriculums, and begins publishing a new 
set of textbooks to fit the current state ideology and wartime 
conditions. 
 
March The Ministry of Education is reestablished.  Tanaka Koshio 
is appointed vice-minister 
 
1944 
April Terada Kijirō resigns his position as director of the Textbook 
Editing Department. 
 
October A state deliberative council recommends new wartime 
education principles. 
 
1945 
August The Soviet Union declares war on Japan, swiftly defeats the 
Kwantung Army, and occupies all of Manchuria.  
Manchukuo is dissolved. 
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